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ABSTRACT 
The r o l e o f the Treasury i n the f o r m a t i o n of B r i t i s h economic p o l i c y 
i n the per i o d 1918 t o 1925 i s one of considerable i n t e r e s t ; , both because the 
economic problems which confronted the B r i t i s h Government a t t h i s time were 
many, complex and o f t e n w i t h o u t close h i s t o r i c a l p a r a l l e l , and because there 
was a considerable c o n t r a s t i n both the q u a l i t y and the d u r a t i o n of experience 
between the Treasury o f f i c i a l s and the Chancellors of the Exchequer. 
This study begins by studying the s t r u c t u r e and nature of the Treasury, 
and goes on t o examine f i v e major- areas of p o l i c y i n which the" Treasury was 
c l o s e l y concerned. The t o p i c s s t u d i e d i n c l u d e the C u n l i f f e Committee, whose 
r e p o r t s formed the foundation f o r B r i t i s h post-war f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y ; the 
problems i n v o l v e d i n a r e t u r n t o a peace-time economy, i n c l u d i n g the 'economy 
campaign' of .mid-1919, i n which Treasury advisers played a leading r o l e ; the 
development of i n t e r - A l l i e d debt p o l i c y which l e d up t o the p u b l i c a t i o n of the 
B a l f o u r Note i n 1922, i n which a Treasury o f f i c i a l played a prominent p a r t j 
and the r e s t r u c t u r i n g of the N a t i o n a l Debt during t h i s p e r i o d c a r r i e d out by 
the Treasury. F i n a l l y , the Treasury's r o l e i n the r e t u r n t o gold i s examined. 
I t i s evident throughout t h a t the Treasury's primary concern i n the 
d i s c u s s i o n of any p o l i c y was i t s desire t o r e t u r n t o the Gold Standard w i t h 
a l l p o s sible speed. Further, Treasury o f f i c i a l s always advised f o l l o w i n g 
h i s t o r i c a l precedent wherever p o s s i b l e . But i t i s apparent t h a t there was 
strong support among informed contemporaries f o r the Treasury views, nor i s 
there evidence to. suggest t h a t the Chancellors would have looked f a v o u r a b l y 
on unorthodox advice had i t been o f f e r e d . 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The period between the two World Wars was regarded by those who l i v e d through 
i t as one of the most disturbed i n the peace-time history of the modern world„ The 
problems of adjustment to the changed conditions of the twentieth century were 
considerable,, The prosecution of h o s t i l i t i e s imposed great reorganisation i n 
i n d u s t r i a l and economic l i f e , and involved the decimation of a whole generation 
i n a war of attrition,, The s i t u a t i o n was aggravated and i n t e n s i f i e d both by these 
distortions, and by the i n a b i l i t y of both national and international i n s t i t u t i o n s 
and statesmen to deal adequately with the situation,, These problems were p a r t i c -
u l a r l y apparent i n B r i t a i n , which was i n an e s p e c i a l l y d i f f i c u l t position. While 
the manifest economic di s a s t e r s of the period, i n terms of trade depression and 
unemployment, came mainly a f t e r 1 9 2 9 , the roots of the problem are, as f a r as 
B r i t a i n i s concerned, to be found i n the years before, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the 
period from the end of the war i n 1918, u n t i l the return to the Gold Standard i n 
1 9 2 5 . This study sets out to examine the problems of the making of economic policy 
i n B r i t a i n i n t h i s period, from the viewpoint of the Government Department most 
deeply involved, the Treasury. The object i s to attempt to shed l i g h t on the ways 
i n which decisions on matters of economic policy were made, and to i s o l a t e the part 
played by Treasury o f f i c i a l s i n t h i s process. 
For some time before the war, B r i t a i n had gradually been losing the commercial 
and f i n a n c i a l supremacy i n world markets which she had held during the greater part 
of the nineteenth century 0 Two important features of her trading position were to 
have serious consequences after the war. F i r s t l y , the direction of her trade: i n 
1 9 1 3 , 60$ of B r i t a i n ' s exports went to countries other than Canada, the United 
1 2 States and Europe, while only 39$ of her imports came from those countries. In 
addition, of B r i t a i n ' s European customers, Germany was before the war much the most 
importanto In 1 9 1 3 , the value of B r i t i s h exports to Germany was exceeded only by 
1 o I . Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation i n the European Economy (Geneva:. United 
Nations. Economic Commission for Europe, 1954-) , Table 5 1 , p . 1 7 6 . 
2o I b i d o , Table 5 1 , P o 1 7 7 . 
2 „ 
exports to the United States and to India, Thus B r i t a i n ' s foreign trade position 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable to two of the most important features of the world 
economy between the wars, the slump i n the prices of primary products and the extreme 
dislocation of the German economy. 
Secondly, there was an excessive reliance on a few staple commodities i n 
Br i t a i n ' s export trade. The chief of these were t e x t i l e s , coal and shipbuilding, 
a l l of which were commodities i n which trade was declining even prior to the F i r s t 
2 
World War, This factor was reinforced by several factors after the war. Notable 
among these were the development of domestic production of these goods i n countries 
which had been denied them during the war, and the fa c t that production of these 
commodities, p a r t i c u l a r l y coal and ships,-had had to be expanded v i r t u a l l y without 
regard to cost or productivity to meet the demands of war, which were i n any case 
considerably i n excess of peacetime needs, la r g e l y because of the amount of actual 
destruction of resources i n wartime. 
The long-term economic problems were exacerbated by the circumstances of the 
post-war period. The ending of the war i n 1918 was followed by a post-war boom5 
during which large numbers of demobilised ex-servicemen returning to t h i s country 
were absorbed into employment without much d i f f i c u l t y . However, the boom was 
large l y a speculative and restocking phenomenon, based on the expected shortages 
i n commodities and raw materials, and the sharp r i s e i n prices i n the two years 
af t e r the war were followed by catastrophic f a l l s i n succeeding years. The recession 
which followed the post-war boom saw the emergence of the phenomenon of long-term 
unemployment on a scale unknown before the war. The whole country did not suffer 
equally: i t has been estimated that the most depressed areas, containing only j u s t 
over a quarter of the t o t a l work force of the United Kingdom, included nearly half 
3 
the unemployed labour. Modern studies suggest that t h i s problem was larg e l y due 
1, A.W. Kirkaldy (ed.), B r i t i s h Finance 1914-21 (London: Pitman, 1921), 
pp. 370-373. 
2 0 W.A. Lewis, Economic Survey 1919-1939 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1949), pp. 78-9. 
3, R.I.A,A„, Unemployment: an International Problem (Oxford: O.U.P., 1935), 
p. 60, 
3. 
t o the nature of economic growth i n t h i s country between the wars, which i n v o l v e d 
s u b s t a n t i a l increases i n output per man„ This appears t o have been p a r t l y due to 
the nature of the i n d u s t r i e s which were-growing f a s t e s t ; i n t h a t they were h e a v i l y 
c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e , and also seem t o have made b e t t e r use of the c a p i t a l they had 
by improved methods of o r g a n i s a t i o n , .-and-.partly because even those i n d u s t r i e s 
which were stagnant i n terms of t o t a l output saw a growth i n p r o d u c t i v i t y and a 
r e d u c t i o n i n the labour force„ 
B r i t a i n ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the commercial f i e l d were t o a l a r g e extent 
p a r a l l e l e d by, and to_ some degree responsible, for., d i f f i c u l t i e s i n - t h e - f i n a n c i a l -
f i e l d , , Before the war, the C i t y o f London had been the p r i n c i p a l f i n a n c i a l centre 
of the wor l d . While B r i t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l importance i n the post-war world was s t i l l 
considerable, her p o s i t i o n of primacy was being eroded by the United States. 
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s change l i e s p a r t l y w i t h the trade changes, and p a r t l y w i t h 
the war. During the war B r i t a i n had l i q u i d a t e d a considerable p a r t of the f o r e i g n 
assets which she had b u i l t up du r i n g the previous century,, She had also l e n t 
considerable sums t o a l l her A l l i e s except the United States, which had i n t u r n 
l e n t B r i t a i n sums t o t a l l i n g about t w o - t h i r d s of B r i t a i n ' s loans t o other A l l i e s , , 
At the end of the f i n a n c i a l year 1 9 1 9 - 2 0 , the -grand t o t a l of B r i t i s h loans outstand-
i n g was £ 1 , 8 5 2 m i l l i o n , of which £ 1 2 0 m i l l i o n had been l e n t t o Empire c o u n t r i e s , 
and the remainder t o other A l l i e s , of whom France and Russia took more than £ 5 0 0 
2 
m i l l i o n each. B r i t i s h borrowing overseas during the war was considerably l e s s 
than her l e n d i n g ; B r i t i s h debts outstanding at the same date t o t a l l e d £ 1 , 2 7 9 m i l l i o n , 
of which £ 1 , 0 3 6 m i l l i o n was owed t o the United States. Thus the B r i t i s h 
Government's loans t o France and Russia alone were i n excess of the B r i t i s h debt t o 
the United States. Much of the f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t y of the i n t e r - w a r years r e s u l t e d 
from the unw i l l i n g n e s s of the United States t o recognise any connection between 
1 . S. P o l l a r d , The Development of the B r i t i s h Economy 1 9 U - 1 9 5 0 (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1 9 6 2 ) , pp. 1 8 5 - 1 8 8 . 
2 . E.V. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1 9 1 A - 1 9 2 5 (London: 
Macmillan and Co„, 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 3 1 7 „ 
3 o I b i d . , pp. 3 2 0 - 1 . 
r e p a r a t i o n payments due t o her A l l i e s , and t h e i r debts t o her; and between A l l i e d 
debt t o B r i t a i n and B r i t i s h debt t o the United States. 
Further d i s l o c a t i o n r e s u l t e d froxn the i n a b i l i t y and un w i l l i n g n e s s of the 
United States t o take over B r i t a i n ' s r o l e as the f i n a n c i a l centre of the world 
and the c h i e f c r e d i t o r n a t i o n , together w i t h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s which t h i s 
1 
e n t a i l e d . The much smaller p a r t played i n the American economy by overseas trade 
made her l e s s s e n s i t i v e t o changes i n world t r a d i n g c o n d i t i o n s , and i t was also 
l e s s important t o her than i t had been t o B r i t a i n t o maintain easy and f l e x i b l e 
world t r a d i n g conditions„ The Federal Reserve Board was considerably weaker i n 
i t s c o n t r o l over the American banking system than was the Bank of England i n t h i s 
country,, I n a d d i t i o n , the absence of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r m e d i a r i e s i n the c a l l 
market on Wall Street d i d not give the banks i n America the same degree of 
i n s u l a t i o n from the e f f e c t s of sp e c u l a t i o n on the stock markets as B r i t i s h banks 
2 
enjoyed. On the Continent, banking s t a b i l i t y was not enhanced by the widespread 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n of banks i n commercial ventures. The v i r t u a l absence of a c a l l 
market i n France l e d many banks, during the 'twenties, t o keep c a l l money i n 
London and r e p a t r i a t e i t as needed, which increased the 'hot money' s t r a i n s on 
the London market, since withdrawals by French banks f o r p u r e l y i n t e r n a l reasons 
were l i a b l e t o be construed as c o n s t i t u t i n g a run on the pound and t o be f o l l o w e d 
by f u r t h e r , s p e c u l a t i v e , outflows.'^ 
I n many ways, the Governments of the war and post-war periods i n B r i t a i n d i d 
nothing t o a l l e v i a t e and much t o exacerbate these problems. The cost of the war 
was l a r g e l y financed by borrowing, at i n f l a t e d r a t e s of i n t e r e s t . L i t t l e e f f o r t i 
was made t o assess r e a l i s t i c a l l y the y i e l d s which might be obtained from t a x a t i o n 
under war-time c o n d i t i o n s 0 The extent t o which expenditure was covered by revenue 
1 . S 0 P o l l a r d , The Development of the B r i t i s h Economy 1914-1950. p. 1 8 6 . 
2 „ W.A. Brown, Jnr„, The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Gold Standard R e - i n t e r p r e t e d ( 2 v o l s ; 
New York: 'N.B.E.R., 194-0) , pp. 2 1 - 3 . 
3 . United Nations, I n t e r n a t i o n a l C a p i t a l Movements i n the Inter-War Period 
(New York: United Nations, 1 9 4 9 ) , pp. 2 1 - 2 3 . 
y « 
changed from f u l l cover . (indeed o f t e n w i t h a small surplus) before the war, t o 
21 o6f0 cover i n 1916-17, the worst year of the war, and 3A°5% cover I n 1918-19. 
Over the f o u r years from A p r i l , 1914- t o A p r i l , 1918, i t was estimated t h a t 
2 
revenue amounted t o 26 e3% of expenditure on average. A f t e r the war, however, 
the Government set i t s face f i r m l y against f u r t h e r borrowing, and i n every year 
from 1921 t o the end of our per i o d achieved a surplus of revenue over expenditure,^ 
During the e a r l y p a r t of the 'twenties, d e f l a t i o n was d e l i b e r a t e l y pursued i n order 
t o b r i n g down B r i t i s h p r i c e s and t o strengthen the exchange r a t e , preparatory t o 
r e s t o r i n g the Gold Standard at the pre-war parity„ The c h i e f r e s u l t was t h a t 
w h i l e a number of other c o u n t r i e s , n o t a b l y the United States, experienced a m i l d 
recovery i n t h i s p e r i o d , B r i t i s h i n d u s t r y remained severely depressed, and unemploy-
ment was never below 10% of the p o p u l a t i o n - the " i n t r a c t a b l e m i l l i o n " . ^ I n d u s t r y 
s u f f e r e d p a r t i c u l a r l y from the n e c e s s i t y of m a i n t a i n i n g high i n t e r e s t r a t e s t o 
counteract the p u l l of the New York market on money, as d i d government finance 
from the consequent high l e v e l of debt s e r v i c e , which c o n s t i t u t e d n e a r l y h a l f of 
5 
government expenditure d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . ; 
The impact of the economic and f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y of the government of the day 
was enhanced by an increased involvement i n the economy. I t has been estimated 
t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n of the N a t i o n a l Income expended by the Government rose from 
approximately one t w e l f t h i n 1914 t o about one h a l f i n 19180 0 Even a f t e r the 
Economy Campaign of 1919, and the Geddes Axe of 19' 2, Government expenditure 
r e l a t i v e t o the N a t i o n a l Income was s t i l l about double the pre-war f i g u r e . 
1 . A.W. . K i r k a l d y ( e d . ) , B r i t i s h Finance 1914-21 (London: Pitman, 1921), p. 215. 
2„- Budget speech 1918; quoted i n E 0L. Hargreaves, The N a t i o n a l Debt (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1930), p. 24.6, 
3. See below, S t a t i s t i c a l Appendix, Table 1 , 
4* A„C, Pigou, Aspects of B r i t i s h Economic H i s t o r y 1918-1925 (London: Macmillan 
and Co 0, 1948), pp. 42-55, 2 2 1 , 
5, U„ Hicks, The Finance of B r i t i s h Government 1920-1936 (London: O.U.P., 1938), 
p. 380, Table 1 „ 
6 , E.V. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1914-1925. p. 105, 
6, 
Thus i n the period immediately following the F i r s t World War, the Government 
was faced with economic problems of a seriousness and a magnitude with which i t had 
hot had to deal before the war, both i n the national and the international sphere: 
and i t was more deeply concerned i n those problems than governments had customarily 
been i n economic problems before 1914-. Further, i t had. to deal with many new 
s o c i a l problems, some of them consequent upon the economic d i f f i c u l t i e s already 
outlined. 
These economic and s o c i a l changes were accompanied by major changes i n the 
p o l i t i c a l sphere. During the years from 1918 -25, there were four General Elections 
and fi v e Administrations, a Coalition, three Conservative, and one Labour, held 
office under four Prime Ministers. Within these Administrations, a number of major 
Cabinet reorganisations took place, so that i n our period no fewer than seven men 
held the o f f i c e of Chancellor of the Exchequer, i n charge of the Ministry most 
concerned with these widespread economic changes. Thus the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
permanent o f f i c i a l s of the Treasury and t h e i r relationships with t h e i r chief 
ministers assume considerable importance i n t h i s period, f i r s t because of the 
magnitude and novelty of the economic problems with which they had to deal, and 
because the Chancellor whom they advised was frequently a man inexperienced i n the 
direction of economic policy, so that the c i v i l servants provided a continuity of 
experience which would otherwise have been absent. 
The Treasury which had to deal with these complex and far-reaching changes 
i n the economy was i t s e l f going through a period of change. In the years before 
the F i r s t World War, following the effective introduction of open competition for 
posts i n the F i r s t Division of the C i v i l Service, what i s now the Administrative 
Class, many of the best graduates of the U n i v e r s i t i e s of Oxford and Cambridge had 
been recruited to that Division. As the most prestigious of the Departments of 
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State, the Treasury was able t o take the best of these h i g h l y able men.. Since by-
modern standards i t was then a very small.Department, numbering around f o r t y i n 
the F i r s t D i v i s i o n , the Treasury had by 191A acquired the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a 
c l o s e l y - k n i t e l i t e , a d vising M i n i s t e r s on policy-making w i t h an a u t h o r i t y which 
was not e a s i l y ignored. This was the more so since at t h a t time there was no 
u n i f i e d C i v i l Service promotion system-, and the senior Treasury o f f i c i a l s were 
f o r the most p a r t men who had spent t h e i r whole working l i v e s i n t h a t Department. 
Despite the i n f l u x of new s t a f f d u ring the war (the numbers i n the Higher 
D i v i s i o n more than doubled by 1919) the s i t u a t i o n was not g r e a t l y a l t e r e d . 
P a r t l y t h i s was because the newcomers were of s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same class and 
educational background as the 'regular' Treasury men; p a r t l y i t was because many 
of the newcomers were temporary C i v i l Servants, w i t h jobs t o r e t u r n t o a t the end 
of the war; f i n a l l y , the f a c t t h a t many of them were employed i n two new, and 
temporary, d i v i s i o n s of the Treasury, one of which was headed by J.M. Keynes, 
himself a temporary o f f i c i a l - , must have tended t o i s o l a t e many of these men from 
t h e i r permanent colleagues,, But there seems t o have been some breaking down of 
t r a d i t i o n a l reserve, and i n p a r t i c u l a r there was an increased r e c o g n i t i o n of the 
value of the work of the c l e r k s i n the.Second D i v i s i o n , and of the i n v i d i o u s 
nature of many of the d i s t i n c t i o n s between the two D i v i s i o n s . 
More considerable changes came a f t e r the war, when i n accordance w i t h the 
1 
recommendations of the Haldane Committee, the importance of a u n i f i e d Service 
w i t h a p r o p e r l y s t a f f e d Establishments D i v i s i o n a t the Treasury was recognised. 
As a r e s u l t , the numbers of Treasury s t a f f d e c l i n e d very l i t t l e a f t e r the war, 
although of course considerable changes i n personnel took place as the temporary 
o f f i c i a l s l e f t t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r normal occupations. Thus those i n what became 
i n September 1919 the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Class, the o l d F i r s t or Higher D i v i s i o n , s t i l l 
numbered about e i g h t y i n the Treasury of the l a t e 'twenties and e a r l y ' t h i r t i e s , 
1• Cd. 9230, M i n i s t r y of Reconstruction, Report of the Machinery of Government 
Committee, 1918. 
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Under the r e o r g a n i s a t i o n scheme of 1 9 1 9 , the s i x d i v i s i o n s of the pre-war 
Treasury were increased t o nine and l a t e r t o eleven, w i t h a s p e c i a l ' F i n a n c i a l 
Enquiries' d i v i s i o n . These were d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e sections, each under a 
C o n t r o l l e r w i t h the rank of Permanent Secretary-, and w i t h a Permanent Secretary, 
l a t e r designated 'Head of the C i v i l Service', over the whole. The s e c t i o n 
p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h economic .policy was Finance, which i n c o r p o r a t e d the 
pre-war Home and Foreign Finance d i v i s i o n s , and F i n a n c i a l E n q u i r i e s . The f a c t 
t h a t many of the war-time e n t r a n t s t o the Treasury had been temporary appointments 
meant t h a t the new personnel needed t o s t a f f the expansion of the Establishments 
work had- l a r g e l y t o come, not from e x i s t i n g Treasury s t a f f t r a n s f e r r e d from war 
work, but from other Departments. This was i n accordance w i t h the views of S i r 
Warren Fisher, appointed Permanent Secretary the month a f t e r the r e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of September 1 9 1 9 . But these, changes a f f e c t e d the Finance s e c t i o n t o a much 
1 
smaller extent than the other sections. 
s -:t 
So the p i c t u r e t h a t emerges at the end of the war i s of a Treasury undergoing 
major changes and expansion; but despite t h i s the d i v i s i o n s of the Treasury most 
deeply concerned i n policy-making and advice t o M i n i s t e r s s t i l l c o n s t i t u t e d the 
small, c l o s e l y k n i t , ..highly educated, and able e l i t e t h a t they had been before the 
war. The aim of t h i s study i s to.examine, the s t r u c t u r e of the Treasury i n the 
years immediately a f t e r the war i n some d e t a i l , paying c l o s e s t a t t e n t i o n t o the 
d i v i s i o n s most c l o s e l y concerned w i t h policy-making, i n order t o i d e n t i f y the r o l e 
of the Treasury i n the f o r m a t i o n of economic p o l i c y i n B r i t a i n i n the e a r l y years 
of the i n t e r - w a r p e r i o d . 
1, See below, Ch. I I passim. 
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The f i r s t stage i n t h i s process . w i l l , -take the form of an examination of the . 
s t r u c t u r e and development of the Departmental Treasury, during our p e r i o d , and of the 
p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n v o l v e d , both-at the o f f i c i a l . a n d the M i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l . I t w i l l 
become evident t h a t the economic a c t i v i t i e s of. the Treasury i n t h i s p e r i o d can be 
d i v i d e d i n t o three.main c a t e g o r i e s . One area covers the management of government 
s e c u r i t i e s and the National. Debt. Another concerns budgetary p o l i c y , and Treasury 
c o n t r o l over p u b l i c ' e x p e n d i t u r e . A t h i r d concerns i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s , and i n p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y on German r e p a r a t i o n s , and on i n t e r - A l l i e d 
debts. Each area tends t o overlap the others: some issues have i m p l i c a t i o n s 
f o r more than one area. I n . p a r t i c u l a r the ..question of the Gold- Standard, which 
was of paramount importance i n economic p o l i c y i n our p e r i o d , has an impact i n 
a l l throe .areas,-and i s i n a sense i n a,category of i t s own. But the c l a s s i f -
i c a t i o n i s a v a l i d -and-a valuable one f o r the purpose of t h i s work. 
The three categories o u t l i n e d comprise the three main kinds of economic 
a c t i v i t y w i t h which the Treasury was concerned. These a c t i v i t i e s can also be viewed 
i n terms of the k i n d of approach which the Treasury took t o p a r t i c u l a r problems. 
Again, there are three main d i v i s i o n s t o be considered. F i r s t l y , some kinds of 
a c t i v i t y , although having .an economic impact and being the concern of members of 
the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Glass, were not s t r i c t l y concerned w i t h the making of p o l i c y . 
Much of the a c t i v i t y of the Establishments and Supply D i v i s i o n s was of t h i s k i n d , 
since they acted at one remove, as i t were, through and w i t h other government 
departments. Secondly, there were areas i n which Treasury o f f i c i a l s acted i n an 
i n i t i a t o r y r o l e , but i n which the Issues were of so complex a nature t e c h n i c a l l y 
t h a t , although sometimes q u i t e important matters of p o l i c y were at stake, consult-
a t i o n w i t h M i n i s t e r s was kept t o a minimum, and o f f i c i a l advice u s u a l l y accepted 
by M i n i s t e r s w i t h l i t t l e demur. T h i r d l y , there were areas of l e s s t e c h n i c a l 
d i f f i c u l t y , but w i t h perhaps stronger p o l i t i c a l overtones, which concerned 
M i n i s t e r s c l o s e l y , and where the M i n i s t e r took h i s own d e c i s i o n , o c c a s i o n a l l y 
1 0 . 
against o f f i c i a l advice... Again, the three categories overlap, nor are they 
e n t i r e l y exhaustive 5 but they .provide some i n s i g h t i n t o the way Treasury a c t i v i t y 
evolved. 
The second ..stage i n t h i s study of Treasury policy-making takes the form of" an 
examination i n d e t a i l o f - f o u r problems i n which the Treasury was deeply concerned. 
Each of these studies i l l u s t r a t e s a d i f f e r e n t aspect of the Treasury's work, and 
a problem from each of the three areas o u t l i n e d has been.included,, Each study 
also shows a f r e s h aspect of the Treasury approach t o p o l i c y problems. As we 
have seen, f i n a n c i a l and.-economic p o l i c y was the province of the Finance s e c t i o n 
o f _ t h e Treasury, under.a C o n t r o l l e r , who was responsible d i r e c t l y t o the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, but whose Departmental superior was the Permanent Secretary. 
Treasury business was so organised t h a t the need f o r a p o l i c y d e c i s i o n might 
o r i g i n a t e as a r e a c t i o n t o events from o u t s i d e , which r e q u i r e d a d e c i s i o n ; t h i s 
category i n c l u d e s matters r a i s e d i n i t i a l l y a t M i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l , f o r instance i n 
Cabinet, and passed on f o r the a t t e n t i o n of the Chancellor and h i s o f f i c i a l s . Or 
on occasion an o r i g i n a l p o l i c y proposal might come from w i t h i n the Treasury. Some 
problems r e q u i r e d the co-operation of other Departments, such as the Board of Trade, 
or the I n l a n d Revenue, or w i t h outside but c l o s e l y r e l a t e d bodies l i k e the Committee 
of Clearing Bankers, or, most p a r t i c u l a r l y , the Bank of England. A l l these p o i n t s 
c o n t r i b u t e d t o the choice of the f o u r t o p i c s which are examined i n d e t a i l : as d i d 
a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of chronology, since many of the most pressing problems which 
confronted the Treasury during our perio d continued t o be important throughout 
the i n t e r - w a r p e r i o d , and could not be meaningfully t r e a t e d w i t h i n the chosen 
time-span 0 
The f i r s t problem examined concerns the discussions and decisions of the 
Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchange a f t e r the War, appointed i n 1918 w i t h 
Lord C u n l i f f e , l a t e Governor of the Bank of England, and i t s chairman. I t was t h i s 
Committee which recommended w i t h o u t r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t B r i t a i n should r e s t o r e the 
Gold Standard, w i t h the pound a t the o l d p a r i t y , as soon as possible a f t e r the end 
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of the war: and by accepting the Reports of the G u n l i f f e Committee i n December 
1919, the Government committed i t s e l f t o the r e t u r n t o the Gold Standard. The 
Treasury member of the G u n l i f f e Committee f o r most of i t s l i f e was S i r John 
Bradbury, then J o i n t - Permanent Secretary t o the Treasury ( t h i s was p r i o r t o the 
post-war r e o r g a n i s a t i o n ) , Bradbury had spent n e a r l y a l l of h i s working l i f e i n 
the Treasury, broken only by a sho r t p e r i o d of secondment t o the N a t i o n a l Insurance 
Commission; he had been thoroughly steeped i n t r a d i t i o n a l Treasury views, and w h i l e 
a b r i l l i a n t and much admired man., he was impeccably orthodox i n h i s opinions. 
He and C u n l i f f e were p r i m a r i l y responsible f o r the conclusions of the Committee, 
and the Minutes of the Committee's proceedings present a f a s c i n a t i n g and in f o r m -
a t i v e p i c t u r e of the views of a very senior Treasury o f f i c i a l , and t h e i r impact 
on the produc t i o n of a document of outstanding importance i n post-war B r i t i s h 
f i n a n c i a l and economic p o l i c y . This study i s also i l l u s t r a t i v e of the r e l a t i o n -
ship between the Treasury and the Bank of England; i t shows, t o o , the development 
of Treasury r e a c t i o n s i n a s i t u a t i o n i n which the i n i t i a l impetus, t h a t i s f o r the 
s e t t i n g up of the Committee, .came from outside the Treasury. P a r t l y because of 
t h i s l a s t f a c t , and p a r t l y because of the t e c h n i c a l nature of the problem, t h i s 
i s also an example of the t a k i n g of a d e c i s i o n i n which the advice of o f f i c i a l s was 
apparently accepted by the responsible M i n i s t e r w i t h o u t f o r m a l d i s c u s s i o n or debate, 
despite the f a c t t h a t the s e t t i n g up of the Committee had been a M i n i s t e r i a l i n i t -
i a t i v e . The Treasury and the Bank o f England t h e r e f o r e were e f f e c t i v e l y allowed 
t o commit B r i t a i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a l monetary p o l i c y 
w i t h o u t f o r m a l M i n i s t e r i a l d i s c u s s i o n at Cabinet l e v e l . 
The second s p e c i a l area of study concerns the r e l a x a t i o n of economic c o n t r o l s 
a f t e r the war. I n the sense t h a t i t covers the r e t u r n from wartime t o peacetime 
c o n d i t i o n s i n the economy, the problem i s a t y p i c a l of Treasury work; but i t covers 
the re-establishment of Treasury C o n t r o l a f t e r the wartime expedients of Votes of 
1. For a d e f i n i t i o n of the term 'orthodox 1 as used i n t h i s work, see below, 
12. 
C r e d i t , and I t also i l l u s t r a t e s some aspects of the nature of Treasury r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h other Departments.. The p r i n c i p a l Treasury, f i g u r e i n t h i s study i s the 
Permanent Secretary, S i r .Warren Fisher. Fisher took very l i t t l e p a r t or even 
i n t e r e s t i n the day-to-day work of the Finance D i v i s i o n s ; but o c c a s i o n a l l y he 
would make a sudden, s w i f t and devastating f o r a y i n t o t h i s complex world, f o l l o w e d 
by a speedy withdrawal i n t o the ,Establishments work w i t h which he was p r i m a r i l y 
concerned d u r i n g h i s tenure of o f f i c e . On t h i s occasion the i n s t i g a t o r was 
Lloyd George, then Prime M i n i s t e r i n the C o a l i t i o n Government, who became during 
the summer of 1919 i n c r e a s i n g l y anxious about s t a t e spending, and p u b l i c , Press 
and Parliamentary a l l e g a t i o n s . ..of^government extravagance. Lloyd George wrote t o 
Fisher, u r g i n g him t o make a thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n : Fisher, anxious t o complete 
the re-establishment of Treasury C o n t r o l , and w i t h the chance of being i n s t r u m e n t a l 
i n a b o l i s h i n g a l t o g e t h e r the Departments of war-time c r e a t i o n , which were financed 
l a r g e l y through u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d Votes of C r e d i t , seized the o p p o r t u n i t y w i t h 
a l a c r i t y . I t provides an example of a problem which was r a i s e d d i r e c t l y by the 
Prime M i n i s t e r , and i n which the Treasury o f f i c i a l e f f e c t i v e l y by-passed h i s 
Chancellor t o advise the Prime M i n i s t e r d i r e c t . 
The t h i r d study i s concerned w i t h one aspect of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n , the n e g o t i a t i o n s over the B r i t i s h war debt t o the United States, 
culminating i n the p u b l i c a t i o n of the Balfo u r Note i n August, 1922, and the funding 
of the American debt by Baldwin i n 1923. I n much of t h i s study the p r i n c i p a l 
Treasury man i s S i r B a s i l B l a c k e t t , C o n t r o l l e r of Finance from 1918 t o 1922, 
B l a c k e t t , although a l i f e - t i m e Treasury o f f i c i a l , had a b r i l l i a n t and o r i g i n a l 
mind, and was a f r i e n d and l a t e r d i s c i p l e of Keynes,, The study i s p r i m a r i l y 
concerned w i t h a proposal made by B l a c k e t t f o r the s o l u t i o n of the i n t e r - A l l i e d 
debt problem, a p l a n which because of i t s g e n e r o s i t y became known as the 'Beau. 
Geste 1, and which represented a l a r g e l y o r i g i n a l attempt at a r e a l and l a s t i n g 
s o l u t i o n of t h i s i n t r a c t a b l e problem. Despite the e n t h u s i a s t i c support of S i r 
Austen Chamberlain and Lord Curzon, the Plan was defeated by the combined e f f o r t s 
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of Winston C h u r c h i l l and Lloyd George, and the p o l i c y set out i n the B a l f o u r Note 
adopted i n s t e a d . But while B l a c k e t t ' s p o l i c y was never approved by the Cabinet, i t 
i s very r e v e a l i n g of the. o r i g i n a l i t y and-imagination of which a t any r a t e one 
Treasury o f f i c i a l was capable when confronted w i t h a new problem, w i t h o u t 
c o n s t r i c t i n g h i s t o r i c a l precedent: and i t represents a_genuine p o l i c y i n i t i a t i v e 
by an o f f i c i a l , as d i s t i n c t from a necessary r e a c t i o n along stereotyped l i n e s t o 
a problem pressing f o r s o l u t i o n . I t - i s also an example of .a problem which was 
otherwise approached i n what tends t o be thought of as the 'normal' way f o r p o l i c y 
decisions t o be made,- t h a t i s the o f f i c i a l advised h i s M i n i s t e r how t o d e a l w i t h 
the problem, the-Chancellor took t h i s advice and h i s own views t o the Cabinet f o r 
d e c i s i o n and d i s c u s s i o n , and passed the decision-back t o h i s o f f i c i a l f o r approp-
r i a t e a c t i o n t o be taken. 
The f o u r t h study concerns the Treasury's p o l i c y w i t h regard t o the f u n d i n g 
and redemption of government debt, and i n p a r t i c u l a r the f l o a t i n g debt, i n the 
per i o d up t o 1925. I n these years the s u b s t a n t i a l Ways and Means Advances obtained 
from the Bank of England during the war were r e p a i d , and a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of the 
l a r g e volume of Treasury B i l l s outstanding at the end of the war was funded or 
redeemed, but a t considerable cost i n terms of the d e f l a t i o n a r y impact on the 
economy, a problem 1 of which the o f f i c i a l s concerned seem t o have been i n s u f f i c -
i e n t l y aware. The o f f i c i a l s concerned at the senior l e v e l were S i r B a s i l B l a c k e t t 
and h i s deputy, S i r Otto Niemeyer, who succeeded B l a c k e t t as C o n t r o l l e r i n 1922. 
This study examines a p a r t of the t h i r d f a c e t of Treasury a c t i v i t y , the management 
of the N a t i o n a l Debt; i t .also shows how the o f f i c i a l s behavedin a s i t u a t i o n i n 
which the problems were of so t e c h n i c a l a nature t h a t on the whole the Chancellor 
allowed them complete freedom of a c t i o n . The main exception t o t h i s 
occurred a t the beginning of the p e r i o d examined, when the o f f i c i a l s were urging 
a r i s e I n the Treasury B i l l rate.; since these B i l l s were then a v a i l a b l e on t a p , 
t h i s would have an impact analagous t o a r i s e i n Bank Rate before the war. Since 
Bank Rate was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Bank of England, not of the Treasury, 
.'Ho 
such a d e c i s i o n had no p a r a l l e l . i n Treasury experience, and a g r e a t d e a l o f w r i t t e 
evidence was presented t o the Chancellor t o help Jiim decide. These papers were 
c o l l e c t e d together by Keynes while a t the Treasury d u r i n g the Second World War, 
and provide an unusually complete record of Treasury advice on a p a r t i c u l a r 
problem. 
These f o u r studies t o g e t h e r present a number of d i f f e r e n t aspects of the 
TreasuryIs r o l e i n the f o r m a t i o n of economic p o l i c y on a v a r i e t y of d i f f e r e n t 
issues. The f i n a l study .attempts t o . look at the Treasury'.s policy-making r o l e as 
a whole, by examining, as .a. ease-study, the r e t u r n t o the Gold Standard i n 1925. 
This episode i s of prime.importance "for a number of reasons; f u r t h e r , i t d i s p l a y s 
t o an unusual extent the. way i n which Treasury .men tended t o t h i n k on c e n t r a l 
issues. I t s f i r s t claim" t o importance i s tho extent t o which i t dominated p o l i c y 
decisions on other t o p i c s : the l i k e l y e f f e c t of a p a r t i c u l a r decision-on the 
p o l i c y of r e s t o r i n g the Gold Standard as soon as possible was always a major 
f ^ t q r in.deci^]^_its.--^c.eptance _ or/rejection. _ From, the p o i n t of view of a 
"study of the Treasury, the Gold Standard i s important i n I t s e l f . But there are 
other f a c t o r s : one is/.that the decision, was debated f o r so long°that a consid-
erable body of Treasury o p i n i o n is..available .on the s u b j e c t , from more j u n i o r 
o f f i c i a l s as w e l l as those close' t o the Chancellor. "Another i s t h a t , owing t o 
Winston C h u r c h i l l ' s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept advice w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n i n g , there i s 
a much l a r g e r body of .information about the way i n which the d e c i s i o n was reached 
than i s usual i n Treasury archives. Further, t h i s episode i s one of the few 
occasions during the e a r l y 'twenties when there was a p o s s i b i l i t y of. a serious 
d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n between the Chancellor and h i s o f f i c i a l s . F i n a l l y , the 
Treasury approach t o t h i s question brings together several strands of thought 
and a t t i t u d e s which are common t o many t o p i c s , and represent i n some sense the 
Treasury orthodoxy of the day; t h i s i s the more so since a l l the senior o f f i c i a l s 
i n the Finance s e c t i o n were i n v o l v e d i n g i v i n g advice on the problem, i n close 
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Bank of England. 
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The process by which B r i t a i n r e t u r n e d t o the Gold Standard, from the d e l i b -
e r a t i o n s of the CiJ.nli.ffe Committee i n 1918 t o the announcement of the removal 
of the gold expoi^..prohibitiqn.in. : the lBudget -of '1^25, thus represents a unique 
demonstration .of Treasury .pollcy^jna^i^-;ac.tivity-.in our p e r i o d . I t s importance 
as a d e c i s i o n , the .•amount of evidence..available,, and Winston C h u r c h i l l ' s 'exercise', 
a l l c o n t r i b u t e t o making.the .decision a t y p i c a l i n i t s e l f ; but there i s every 
reason t o believe t h a t the.way I n which the d e c i s i o n was made I s l a r g e l y 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the processes i n v o l v e d i n other, l e s s well-documented 
decisions. Because t h i s i s so, the r e t u r n .to the. Gold Standard I s examined i n 
some d e t a i l , not in :.an tattempt t o d u p l i c a t e the work of others, but as a case-
study of Treasury decision-making, set i n the context of ..an an a l y s i s of the r o l e 
' ' " * • • -1 of the. Treasury in., the f o r m a t i o n ;of.ecqnomic p o l i c y i n - g e n e r a l . 
The._aim .of ..the. j.tiidy_.^....a-.^h'qle - i s , _therefore, to _ .examine the process by 
which the Treasury'••advised,-Mriist.er;s on economic p o l i c y , ../and the impact of t h a t 
advice on decision-making. :The f i r s t step i n t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t o o u t l i n e the 
.organisation • and s t a f f i n g of the Treasury d u r i n g the p e r i o d a f t e r 1918, i n order 
t'o e s t a b l i s h a general f o u n d a t i o n on which to base the more s p e c i f i c studies of 
Treasury advice and a c t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r .areas. I t i s t o t h i s examination of the 
s t r u c t u r e of the Treasury i n our period t h a t we must now t u r n . 
1. The most important study i n t h i s sphere i s D.J. "Moggridge, 
The Return t o Gold. 1925 (Cambridge; C.U.P., 1969)'. On the whole, , the present 
author concurs i n Moggridge',s conclusions: a f u r t h e r d iscussion w i l l be 
found i n Chapter V I I below. 
16. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE ORGANISATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE TREASURY 
S i r Thomas Heath, j o i n t Permanent Secretary t o the Treasury d u r i n g the F i r s t 
World War, has described the Treasury as: 
"...the Department which, subject t o the c o n t r o l of the executive and 
t o the a u t h o r i t y of Parliament, i s responsible f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of 
the p u b l i c finances of the country ... i t i s the one permanent i n s t i t u t i o n 
which stands between the country and n a t i o n a l bankruptcy."'' 
The Treasury o f f i c i a l s . d u r i n g our p e r i o d , t h e r e f o r e , saw t h e i r r o l e p r i m a r i l y as 
guardians of the n a t i o n a l f i n a n c e s , ,and .as members o f a n - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and 
executive Department. The l a c k of any perception of the impact which t h a t 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n might have on the economy, the absence of any idea of the m&cro-
economic i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e i r a c t i o n s , i s one f e a t u r e of the Treasury i n our 
per i o d which s t r i k e s the observer most s t r o n g l y . Another important feature" i s the 
f a c t t h a t the department was a small and f r i e n d l y one; i n 1914- the t o t a l Treasury 
establishment i n the Higher D i v i s i o n numbered only about f o r t y men. These men 
shared a commonality of background, education and i d e a l s t h a t tended t o produce 
homogeneity and conformity i n advice and p r a c t i c e . There were, of course, 
i n t e r n e c i n e squabbles, but the .general impression i s one of harmony and close 
co-operation. During the 1914-18 war, the Treasury was g r e a t l y expanded, but 
much of the o l d atmosphere remained, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Finance sections of the 
Treasury, which were the most c l o s e l y concerned w i t h p o l i c y making and w i t h the 
g i v i n g of advice t o M i n i s t e r s . The purpose of t h i s chapter i s t o examine these 
f a c t o r s and t o t r y t o i d e n t i f y the way i n which they and the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of 
those concerned a f f e c t e d the r o l e and running of the Treasury. 
Treasury S t r u c t u r e 
Following the i n t r o d u c t i o n of open competition f o r p o s i t i o n s i n the Home 
C i v i l Service, which g r a d u a l l y became e f f e c t i v e d u r i n g the l a s t q u a r t e r of the 
2 
ninetee n t h century, the Higher D i v i s i o n , as i t was then known, became a focus 
f o r the ambition of many of the most b r i l l i a n t of the young men who graduated from 
1. S i r Thomas Heath, The Treasury (London: G. Putnam's Sons, 1927), p. 1. 
2. G.K, Fry, Statesmen i n Disguise (London: Macmillan and Co., 1969), pp. 34--5. 
18. 
Oxford and Cambridge each year. I t i s hard t o r e a l i s e how l i m i t e d were the opport-
u n i t i e s f o r such men i n the p e r i o d before and a f t e r the F i r s t War. For those 
w i t h o u t a v o c a t i o n f o r the Church, or f a m i l y connections i n the Armed f o r c e s , 
or a p r i v a t e income to maintain them through the f i r s t meagre years of law p r a c t i c e , 
an academic career was the only a l t e r n a t i v e t o p u b l i c s e r v i c e , and t h a t only f o r 
the most g i f t e d . I n d u s t r y had not yet begun t o r e c r u i t graduates e i t h e r i n research 
or f o r management; many of the f i e l d s i n which graduates are now employed, such 
as the s o c i a l s e rvices, b a r e l y e x i s t e d ; the s a l a r y and status of the teacher-
compared p o o r l y w i t h the C i v i l Service. Thus by the e a r l y 'twenties of t h i s 
century, the Service had come t o be s t a f f e d i n the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Class (the o l d < 
Higher D i v i s i o n ) by men who had obtained e x c e l l e n t degrees at Oxford or Cambridge, 
most o f t e n i n c l a s s i c a l s u bjects, having come f o r the most p a r t from grammar 
schools of the k i n d which would now mainly be 'Direct Grant 1 schools. Often 
they came from q u i t e poor homes, and had only been able t o continue t h e i r 
1 
education by means of Open Scholarships. Some idea of the l e v e l of competition } 
can be gained from the f a c t t h a t i n 1927, the worst year between the wars, there 
2 
were t e n vacancies, and f i v e hundred candidates. The Treasury, as the most 
p r e s t i g i o u s Department, was able to take the best of the candidates. This was 
n o t , however, always a success, and i n 1927 the Permanent Secretary changed t h i s . 
p o l i c y f o r one of r e c r u i t i n g men w i t h some years experience i n other Departments.' 5 
Before the F i r s t World War, the Treasury was composed of s i x d i v i s i o n s , of 
which two were responsible mainly f o r f i n a n c e , three f o r Supply arid establishments 
work, and one d e a l t w i t h the work of the Parliamentary C l e r k . ^ During the war two 
f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n s were added, the famous 'A' d i v i s i o n which John Maynard Keynes 
headed, and which d e a l t w i t h f o r e i g n exchange and s e c u r i t y questions, and lB J 
d i v i s i o n , d ealing w i t h new Departments, such as the M i n i s t r i e s of Shipping and of 
1o See f o r example P.J. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement (London: Jonathan Cape, 
194-8), pp. 16-22. 
2. Fry, Statesmen i n Disguise, p„ 82. 
3. P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o the author; H. Roseveare, The Treasury (London: 
A l l e n Lane The Penguin Press, 1969), p. 2^7 „ 
h. Heath, The Treasury, pp. 97-100. 
A t a b l e of the s t r u c t u r e of the Treasury establishment i n the p e r i o d 
before the F i r s t World War w i l l be found on p. 23 as Table. 1. 
19. 
Munitions. These two d i v i s i o n s were absorbed i n t o the main s t r u c t u r e i n February 
1919j by the a d d i t i o n of two P r i n c i p a l s t o the permanent s t a f f , ' 
At the head of t h i s o r g a n i s a t i o n there was, before 191-4* a s i n g l e Permanent 
Secretary, I t was even then becoming c l e a r , however, t h a t the job was too much 
f o r one man, and when S i r Robert Chalmers resigned the post i n 1913 i t was s p l i t 
i n t o two, the f i r s t occupants being S i r John Bradbury and S i r Thomas Heath, 
A f t e r war broke out, Chalmers r e t u r n e d , and there were three j o i n t Permanent 
2 
Secretaries f o r the remainder of the war. 
This was only a s a t i s f a c t o r y s i t u a t i o n where the three men were able t o work 
i n p e r f e c t harmony, and Bradbury saw t h a t such an arrangement would not always be 
p r a c t i c a b l e . F u r t h e r , two committees which reported during 1919, the Haldane 
Committee on the Machinery of Government, and a Departmental Committee of I n q u i r y 
chaired by Bradbury, recommended major changes i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h a t p a r t 
of the Treasury which d e a l t w i t h s t a f f i n g , r e c r u i t m e n t and a l l i e d problems i n 
3 
other Departments, I n September 1919, t h e r e f o r e , the o r i g i n a l s i x d i v i s i o n s 
were expanded i n t o eleven, grouped i n t o three sections, each c a l l e d Departments, 
t o deal r e s p e c t i v e l y w i t h questions of Supply, Finance and Establishments, Each 
Department had a C o n t r o l l e r at i t s head, who was responsible d i r e c t l y t o the 
Chancellor, This r i g i d arrangement g r a d u a l l y d i s s o l v e d -and became more f l e x i b l e 
from the l a t e 'twenties onwards. The whole Department was headed by a Permanent 
Secretary who was g i v e n the t i t l e of 'Head of the C h v i l Service', received a 
s l i g h t l y higher s a l a r y than the other Permanent Secretaries, and exercised a 
watching b r i e f over the work of the C o r . t r c i l e r s , whose p o s i t i o n s ranked equal i n 
s a l a r y and s t a t u s w i t h t h a t of the Permanent Secretary i n other Departments.^ 
A diagram of the o r g a n i s a t i o n w i l l be found i n Figure 1„ 
1. P.R.O., T.165/46. 
2. Heath, The Treasury, p. 104? Roseveare, The Treasury, pp„ 231-2. 
3. Roseveare, o p . c i t . , pp. 244-5. 
4. Heath, o p . c i t . . pp. 104-5O A chart showing the f l o w of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
the chain of command w i t h i n the Treasury w i l l be found on p, 21 as Figure 1„ 
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The t o t a l size of the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Class i n the Treasury at t h i s time was 
r a t h e r more than double the pre-war f i g u r e , t h a t i s about 90, d i s t r i b u t e d unequally 
1 
among the three Departments. The Supply and Establishments D i v i s i o n s tended t o 
administer at one remove, as i t were; t h e i r work was p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h 
d e a l i n g w i t h and through other Government Departments. Thus, although they might 
have a negative e f f e c t on p o l i c y through t h e i r encouragement or discouragement of 
the i n i t i a t i v e s of other Departments, they had v i r t u a l l y no executive or i n i t i a t i n g 
r o l e independent of those Departments. Only the Finance Department was an 
executive Department i n i t s own r i g h t , and as such was both most c l o s e l y concerned 
w i t h policy-making, and also had most contact w i t h the Chancellor, who tended t o 
leave I n t e r n a l C i v i l Service problems to the Permanent Secretary. I n December 1920 
the Finance Department had s i x t e e n A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Class o f f i c i a l s i n W h i t e h a l l . 
Of these seven, one P r i n c i p a l Assistant Secretary, f o u r P r i n c i p a l s , and two 
Assistant P r i n c i p a l s , were i n 1D, which d e a l t w i t h Home Finance; f i v e , one A s s i s t a n t 
Secretary, two P r i n c i p a l s and two A s s i s t a n t P r i n c i p a l s , were i n 2D; and two, an 
A s s i s t a n t Secretary and an Assistant P r i n c i p a l , were i n the F i n a n c i a l I n q u i r i e s 
D i v i s i o n . 1D and 2D had pre-war counterparts, though they were smaller$ F i n a n c i a l 
Enquiries was a new d i v i s i o n , i n s t i t u t e d i n 1915? and somewhat detached from the : 
2 
other two, being p r i m a r i l y a research d i v i s i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , ZD had several members 
serving overseas i n the more Important Embassies, such as W-.shington, Paris and ; 
B e r l i n , and i n various other spheres. The Finance. Department was, as we have seen;, 
3 
headed by a C o n t r o l l e r , who had a P r i v a t e Secretary of Assistant. P r i n c i p a l rank. 
Above t h i s Treasury s t r u c t u r e vsr- J,& p o l i t i c a l masters, the F i n a n c i a l . 
Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchqeuer. The F i n a n c i a l Secretary had one 
1o A t a b l e of the s t r u c t u r e Of the Treasury establishment i n the post-war' 
per i o d w i l l be found on p. 23 as Table 2. 
2. Unpublished Treasury documents. 
3* I b i d . ; Roseveare, The Treasury, p. 271. 
22. 
The I r e a s u r y i n 1908 
D i v i s i o n F u n c t i o n and D e p a r t m e n t s Served 
F i r s t * F i n a n c e , B a n k i n g , C u r r e n c y e t c 
Second* I n d i a O f f i c e , S e r v i c e D e p t s . 
T h i r d * E d u c a t i o n , Board o f T r a d e , A g r i c u 1 t u r e , 
S c o t t i s h & I r i s h D e p t s , 
F o u r t h P o s t O f f i c e , L o c a l Government B o a r d , 
O f f i c e o f Works, I s l e o f Man e t c ; 
Royal Duch i es 
F i f t h S u p e r a n n u a t i o n , Customs;' I n l a n d Revenue, 
Pens i o n s 
S i x t h * Home, F o r e i g n and C o l o n i a l O f f i c e s , 
Law C o u r t s e t c 
T a b l e 1 
S t a f f 
AS PC 1C 2C 
1 -
- 1 
1 -
- 1 
- 1 
- 1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
N o t e s 
* AS a l 
+ AS a l 
AS-Assi 
C l e r k , 
so s u p e r v i s e d UD. 
so s u p e r v i s e d 5D 0 
s t a n t S e c r e t a r y , P C = P r i n c i p a l 
2C=Second C l a s s C l e r k , 
# S u p e r v i s e d by Permanent S e c r e t a r y . 
C l e r k , l C = F ? r s t C l a s s 
The T r e a s u r y i n 1920. 
D i v i s i o n F u n c t i o n and D e p a r t m e n t s Served 
Board o f T r a d e , 
F i r s t * Home F i n a n c e 
Second* O v e r s e a s F i n a n c e 
FE* F i n a n c i a l E n q u i r i e s 
T h i r d * A g r i c u l t u r e & F i s h e r i e s , 
A r t s & S c i e n c e 
F i f t h * S e r v i c e s D e p a r t m e n t s 
S i x t h * F o r e i g n O f f i c e , Royal D u c h i e s , 
Law C o u r t s , Post O f f i c e 
S e v e n t h * E d u c a t i o n , H e a l t h , L a b o u r , P e n s i o n s 
E i g h t h * S u p e r a n n u a t i o n 
N i n t h * G e n e r a l S e r v i c e & E s t a b 1 i s h m e n t s 
T e n t h * S e r v i c e s D e p a r t m e n t s ' P e r s o n n e l 
E l e v e n t h * O t h e r E s t a b l i s h m e n t s 
T w e l f t h * O t h e r E s t a b l i s h m e n t s 
T a b l e 2 
Noties 
* F i n a n c e D i v i s i o n s d i r e c t e d by C o n t r o l l e r o f Finance,, 
# Supply D i v i s i o n s d i r e c t e d by C o n t r o l l e r o f Sup p l y S e r v i c e s . 
+ E s t a b l i s h m e n t s D i v i s i o n s d i r e c t e d by C o n t r o l l e r o f 
E s t a b 1 i s h m e n t s . 
PAS = P r ? n c i p a 1 A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y , A S = A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y , 
P = P r i n c i p a l , A P = A s s i s t a n t P r i n c i p a l , , 
Not i n c l u d e d i n t h e t a b l e a r e T r e a s u r y s t a f f s e r v i n g as P r i v a t e 
S e c r e t a r i e s , i n O f f i c e s a b r o a d , on secondment t o o t h e r 
D e p a r t m e n t s , e t c 
AS P AP - k 2 
1 2 2 
1 - 1 1 2 1 
1 2 1 
1 3 2 
2 1 
1 2 2 - 2 2 
1 2 1 
1 2 1 
1 2 1 
23. 
P r i v a t e Secretary, the Chancellor two-, one senior t o the other, drawn i n i t i a l l y 
from the lowest grade, t h a t of A s s i s t a n t Principal,, These posts, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
those attached, t o the Chancellory were t r a d i t i o n a l l y regarded as ones i n x^hich 
very b r i g h t young men had a chance t o l e a r n q u i c k l y and t o shine. During our 
pe r i o d , the occupants of these posts tended t o be a l i t t l e more senior, and t o 
r e t a i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s a good deal l o n g e r 9 than had been the case before the war;' 
t h i s tended t o add t o the p r e s t i g e and i n f l u e n c e of these posts.-
Organisation of work 
The l a r g e s t category of work i n the Treasury consisted of problems posed 
from the outside, mostly a r r i v i n g i n the morning post. From t h i s arose the custom, 
open t o much m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , of senior c i v i l servants not a r r i v i n g f o r work 
u n t i l about t e n o'clock, t o give the c l e r i c a l s t a f f time t o open and s o r t the 
morning delivery,. I t was the task of the R e g i s t r y t o form f i l e s , or a t t a c h a 
l e t t e r t o an e x i s t i n g f i l e , and pass the f i l e t o the appropriate j u n i o r , u s u a l l y 
an A s s i s t a n t P r i n c i p a l , , This o f f i c e r , being a member of a t r a i n i n g grade, had no 
power t o commit the Treasury, but i n many cases he would d r a f t an appropriate 
response f o r h i s P r i n c i p a l ' s approval,, I f the matter were more complex, the j u n i o r 
would take the matter as f a r as he could, i n c l u d i n g accumulating precedents and 
other r e l a t e d documents„ A r e a l l y d i f f i c u l t problem would be taken up w i t h the 
P r i n c i p a l ' s s u p e r i o r , and so on. Where a matter was of s u f f i c i e n t importance as t o 
r e q u i r e M i n i s t e r i a l d e c i s i o n , a senior o f f i c i a l would be concerned w i t h b r i e f i n g the 
M i n i s t e r , o b t a i n i n g a d e c i s i o n , and carryix-g i t out. An i n t e r e s t i n g account of an 
1 
occasion on which t h i s proved very d i f f i c u l t w i l l be given l a t e r i n t h i s chapter,, 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , a request f o r i n f o r m a t i o n and advice might o r i g i n a t e at a high 
2 
p o i n t i n the chain, r a t h e r than the advice being o f f e r e d from below. 
1. See below, p. 68. 
2. Heath, The Treasury, pp. H5-7; p r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o the author. 
24. 
I n the Finance Department, much of the work o r i g i n a t e d w i t h i n the Department, 
and not i n response t o a stimulus from outside. Each o f f i c e r had areas of duty, 
and w i t h i n t h i s area I t was h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o foresee problems and r a i s e them. 
However, i t has been..suggested t o me t h a t c e r t a i n very s e n s i t i v e areas of p o l i c y 
were excepted from the normal methods of procedure. The Treasury was apparently 
' s e c u r i t y conscious' 1 long before many other..government Departments, and matters 
of h igh p o l i c y were confined t o three or f o u r of the most senior o f f i c i a l s i n 
Finance, the C o n t r o l l e r , h i s Deputy, and sometimes the...Assistant Secretaries who 
headed 1D and 2D (the second and t h i r d posts were synonymous du r i n g our period), 
This i s c e r t a i n l y borne out by the documentary evidence, where i n matters of 
f i n a n c i a l p o l i c y the. great b u l k of the w r i t t e n m a t e r i a l i s from these o f f i c i a l s , 
and indeed p r i m a r i l y from the C o n t r o l l e r and h i s Deputy. What seems t o have 
happened f r e q u e n t l y i s t h a t the senior o f f i c i a l s kept the main matters i n t h e i r 
own hands, but brought i n more j u n i o r colleagues on s p e c i f i c p o i n t s . For instance, 
i n the Gold Standard f i l e s a l l the w r i t t e n Treasury memoranda submitted t o the 
Ghancellor, apart from Hawtrey's work, i s by the C o n t r o l l e r ; but two more j u n i o r 
o f f i c i a l s were asked t o w r i t e a note on a p a r t i c u l a r aspect, the proposed c r e d i t 
'cushion', f o r Niemeyer, and he seems t o have used t h i s m a t e r i a l i n presenting a 
2 
paper of h i s own on the s u b j e c t . I t i s , however, impossible t o be completely 
dogmatic about t h i s question of j u n i o r s ' work, because there i s evidence t h a t when 
the f i l e s are 's t r i p p e d * of excess m a t e r i a l before being sent t o the Public Record 
O f f i c e f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n , .many -handwritten d r a f t s on which the f i n a l typed versions 
of l e t t e r s or memoranda are based are destroyed, i f the f i n a l v e r s i o n i s on the 
3 
f i l e . I t i s o f t e n hard, t h e r e f o r e , t o be sure whether the person who signed the 
f i n a l v e r s i o n of a l e t t e r or memorandum had d r a f t e d i t himself or n o t . But the 
evidence of such f a c t o r s as s t y l e , mode of address, and so on, together w i t h the 
1o I n f o r m a t i o n given t o the author i n conversation w i t h S i r Henry Wilson Smith. 
2„ P.R.O., T.I72/1A99B, note by Niemeyer on the proposed 'cushion', undated. 
3. P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o the author. 
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observations of contemporaries, tends t o support the idea t h a t much of the work 
even of d r a f t i n g memoranda, -was done by the most senior men, where the matter was 
one of high p o l i c y . 
The work of the.. F i n a n c i a l E n q u i r i e s D i v i s i o n seems t o have occupied r a t h e r 
a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n i n t h i s system,, The D i v i s i o n was created by S i r John Bradbury 
i n 1915 S as a S t a t i s t i c a l Section, and i t s f i r s t D i r e c t o r was H a r t l e y Withers, 
brought i n s p e c i a l l y f o r the purpose. . .After the .war, i n 1919, Withers l e f t the 
Treasury, and the character of the.Section .changed somewhat; i t apparently became 
p r i m a r i l y a v e h i c l e f o r Ralph, l a t e r S i r Ralph Hawtrey. The i m p l i c a t i o n i s c l e a r l y 
t h a t the Treasury structure" could not e a s i l y absorb an.able economist i n a normal 
way, and so the problem was solved b y . g i v i n g him.a unique p o s i t i o n . During the 
period t h a t Bradbury and B l a c k e t t were i n charge of Finance, Hawtrey's advice 
seems t o have been asked on many occasions, and volunteered on many more; my 
impression, which has been confirmed by others, i s t h a t i n Niemeyer's time the 
p r o p o r t i o n of volunteered i n f o r m a t i o n grew sharply r e l a t i v e t o requested papers. 
Perhaps t h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g , i n view of the observed and observable r i g i d i t y 
of Niemeyer, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n regard t o problems of d e f l a t i o n and i n t e r e s t r a t e s , 
and Hawtrey's o p p o s i t i o n t o h i g h r a t e s i n a pe r i o d of depression. 
Matters of Treasury concern which were of s u f f i c i e n t importance e v e n t u a l l y 
came t o one of the Treasury m i n i s t e r s , the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the 
F i n a n c i a l Secretary. The r o l e of the F i n a n c i a l Secretary seems t o have changed 
somewhat du r i n g the F i r s t War. One Treasury o f f i c i a l has w r i t t e n , 
" I n the p i p i n g times of peace a l l important questions came t o the 
F i n a n c i a l Secretary and through him t o the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer; i n war-time he was l a r g e l y s h o r t - c i r c u i t e d and l e f t 
t o do the housework."2 
1. See, f o r example, P.R.Q., T.176/5, memo, by Hawtrey, 5 Mar., 1923. 
2 Q S i r Andrew MacFadyean, Recollected i n T r a n q u i l l i t y (London: P a l l M a l l 
Press, 1964-), p. 5A» 
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A f t e r the war, t h i s tendency p e r s i s t e d , and dur i n g our perio d the F i n a n c i a l 
Secretary's r o l e seems t o have been an i n f e r i o r and somewhat i n s i d i o u s one, 
e s p e c i a l l y when he and the Chancellor were not on good terms personally,, He was 
responsible f o r the 'hack work' concerned w i t h the Budget, a f t e r the main l i n e s 
of p o l i c y had been l a i d down by the Chancellor i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the senior 
o f f i c i a l s and w i t h other members of the Government; t h i s mostly consisted of 
for m a l approval of Departmental estimates„ He was also responsible f o r s e t t l i n g 
disagreements over Establishments questions when these could not be solved a t 
the o f f i c i a l l e v e l 0 
The Chancellor thus r e t a i n e d i n h i s hands power t o take decisions i n a l l 
important matters of p o l i c y ; the e x t e n t t o which he exercised h i s a u t h o r i t y , 
whether he was a strong or a weak Chancellor, had a profound impact on h i s o f f i c i a l s , 
and on the work and atmosphere i n the upper echelons of the Treasury„ He was 
ass i s t e d by two P r i v a t e Secretaries,, During the i n t e r - w a r period a remarkable 
c o n t i n u i t y of holders of these o f f i c e s was maintained; one man held the o f f i c e 
from 1920 t o 1930, and was succeeded by h i s deputy, who i n t u r n was f o l l o w e d by 
2 
h i s deputy, who was senior p r i v a t e s e c r e t a r y from 1933 t o 1938 0 This c o n t i n u i t y 
enhanced the p o s i t i o n which these men h e l d , which would i n any case have been one 
of considerable i n f l u e n c e 0 They tended t o be the channel through which other 
Departments, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Departments, such as the Board of I n l a n d Revenue 
or of Customs and Excise, who had a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with, the Treasury, 
communicated d i r e c t l y w i t h the Chancellor, Quite o f t e n t h i s l e d t o the P r i v a t e 
Secretary being a b u f f e r between the CS-.-.n-.^llor and h i s l e s s welcome v i s i t o r s . 
When Parliament was s i t t i n g , the P r i v a t e O f f i c e s t a f f would work w i t h the 
Chancellor- i n the Treasury i n the morning, and then go w i t h him to the House of 
Commons i n the afternoon, t a k i n g w i t h them i n despatch boxes any papers which were 
1o Heath, The Treasury, pp. 80-96; p r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o the author. 
2. Unpublished Treasury documents. 
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l i k e l y t o be needed. As a r e s u l t , there were frequent occasions when the P r i v a t e 
Secretary was the only Treasury o f f i c i a l i n the House, and was f r e q u e n t l y asked f o r 
advice by the Chancellor. This tended t o increase the i n f l u e n c e of these o f f i c i a l s , 
and they f r e q u e n t l y came t o be on such good terms w i t h t h e i r master t h a t they were 
o f t e n asked t o w r i t e manuscript notes on the submissions of senior o f f i c i a l s , 
1 
p a r t i c u l a r l y where the problem had p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . 
Record-keeping 
The way i n whiph the records of t h i s small but complex o r g a n i s a t i o n were kept 
went through a dras'tic overhaul i n June 1920, soon after, the . s t r u c t u r a l changes-. 
Before t h i s r e o r g a n i s a t i o n , Treasury Board papers, which c o n s t i t u t e d the vast bulk 
of Treasury m a t e r i a l , formed an enormous s i n g l e class of papers. W i t h i n t h i s 
category, a numbered f i l e was created each year f o r each l e t t e r , group of l e t t e r s 
or memoranda on a p a r t i c u l a r s ubject; the number of a f i l e had no l o g i c a l s i g n i f -
icance f o r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n purposes. These two p r a c t i c e s , of having a l l subjects 
i n the same f i l i n g c l a s s , and having a new f i l e f o r each year, l e d t o considerable 
2 
confusion and, apparently, l o s s . I n a d d i t i o n t o the Treasury Board papers, two 
other important categories of records e x i s t e d : the papers of the Chancellor's 
O f f i c e , and the Budget papers. The f i r s t class contains much of the s i g n i f i c a n t 
m a t e r i a l f o r studies of p o l i c y , i n p a r t i c u l a r the memoranda by Treasury advisers 
on many important t o p i c s . The second contains a l l the r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l on the 
p r e p a r a t i o n of the Budget, deputations from i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r e s t s , d r a f t s of the 
Budget Speech, notes on Parliamentary amendments and the passage of the Finance 
B i l l , and so on. Both these classes operated on a s i m i l a r p r i n c i p l e t o the Treasury 
3 
Board papers, t h a t i s a f i l e was normally created f o r each subject f o r each year. 
1. P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o the author. 
2. Heath, The Treasury, pp. 14-3—A. 
3. I b i d . , pp. 14&-7. 28. 
The classes of Budget papers and Chancellor's O f f i c e papers r e t a i n e d t h e i r 
form and character (throughout our p e r i o d , but major changes were made i n the way 
i n which the formerj Treasury Board papers were organised. Any f i l e which was i n 
use at or created a f t e r June J920 was c l a s s i f i e d under one of f i v e headings: 
three of these corresponded t o the areas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the C o n t r o l l e r s , 
t h a t i s Supply, Establishments and Finance; a f o u r t h covered matters i n which 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was shared among two or three Departments, and a f i f t h d e a l t 
separately w i t h superannuation problems and pension r i g h t s w i t h i n the C i v i l 
Service as a whole. The p r a c t i c e of having each f i l e cover no more than a year 
was discarded, and t h i s combined w i t h a s l i g h t l y more l o g i c a l numbering system 
made i t somewhat easier t o keep r e l a t e d m a t e r i a l t o g e t h e r . The i n i t i a l f i l e 
numbers were a l l o t t e d i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l order, but i f the m a t e r i a l i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
f i l e became too bulky, a second f i l e would be created w i t h the same f i l e number 
and an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t i t was a c o n t i n u a t i o n . Thus i n the Finance s e c t i o n , f i l e 
number 7528 denotes the m a t e r i a l c o l l e c t e d during the l i f e t i m e of the Chamberlain/ 
Bradbury Committee i n 1924-5; w i t h i n t h i s .group, three . . f i l e s , numbered 75.28/01 / 1 , 
7528/01/2 and 7528/01/3 deal w i t h the discussions and d r a f t r e p o r t s of the 
Committee, three f u r t h e r f i l e s , 7528/02/1, 7528/02/2 and 7528/02/3 deal w i t h the 
minutes of evidence, and another f i l e , 7528/03, contains Press comments on the 
Committee's Report. This form of o r g a n i s a t i o n helps t o keep papers on a p a r t i c u l a r 
subject together, but i t can make subjects which have not been w e l l described 
2 
d i f f i c u l t t o t r a c e , since no system of cross-referencing was used. 
This, then, was the way i n which Treasury records were kept. However, the 
records which are a v a i l a b l e t o the h i s t o r i a n are by no means a complete s e t . The 
reasons f o r t h i s are manifold, and the s e l e c t i o n of m a t e r i a l f o r p r e s e r v a t i o n has 
taken place on at l e a s t three l e v e l s . F i r s t l y , not a l l the m a t e r i a l on a p a r t i c u l a r 
1. P.R.O. Catalogues and the documents r e f e r r e d t o . 
2. P.R.Q., TJ85/2. 
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subject was r e t a i n e d i n the f i l e a t the time. To begin w i t h , i t has been 
suggested t h a t the i n f o r m a l h a b i t s of the pre-war C i v i l Service l a r g e l y p e r s i s t e d 
u n t i l the Second World War, and t h a t as a r e s u l t l e s s w r i t t e n m a t e r i a l was 
created. Secondly, and l i n k e d t o t h i s , committee sessions i n camera tended not 
t o be recorded; t h i s i s borne out at any r a t e by the minutes of the C u n l i f f e 
Committee, which merely c o n t a i n a note of the date of meetings a t which the 
1 
r e p o r t s were discussed. Furthermore, there i s some evidence t h a t S i r Warren 
Fisher, Permanent Secretary from October 1919, was p e r s o n a l l y i n c l i n e d t o dispose 
of superfluous material,, Where a p o l i c y matter concerned both the Treasury and the 
Prime M i n i s t e r ' s O f f i c e , Fisher was^apparently i n c l i n e d t o leave record-keeping 
2 
t o the l a t t e r , and destroyed h i s own copies of documents. 
The completeness of the records i s f u r t h e r a f f e c t e d by the f a c t t h a t i n the 
i n t e r - w a r years, as i n . t h e years before the war, r u l e s about what p u b l i c papers 
an o f f i c i a l might take w i t h him when he l e f t o f f i c e were l e s s w e l l - d e f i n e d and 
s t r i n g e n t than i n modern times. As a r e s u l t , much m a t e r i a l which would today be 
kept i n p u b l i c f i l e s was then r e t a i n e d by the o f f i c i a l s themselves. The f a t e of 
these papers has v a r i e d . S i r Warren Fisher i s be l i e v e d t o have destroyed a l l his 
3 
o f f i c i a l papers on l e a v i n g o f f i c e . S i r B a s i l B l a c k e t t ' s papers are s t i l l i n 
p r i v a t e hands, and are not a v a i l a b l e f o r i n s p e c t i o n . The papers of S i r John 
Bradbury and S i r Otto Niemeyer have been deposited i n the Public Record O f f i c e , 
as have those of S i r Frederick Leith-Ross, a j u n i o r o f f i c i a l i n our pe r i o d ; i n 
some instances these papers c o n t a i n m a t e r i a l which i s apparently not t o be found 
elsewhere. 
The o f f i c i a l s were not the only sinners i n t h i s respect; p o l i t i c i a n s , t o o , 
had considerable hoards of p r i v a t e papers, many of them removed when the men l e f t 
o f f i c e . However, of the Chancellors of our perio d only Snowden i s believed t o 
have done t h i s t o any ext e n t . Bonar Law's papers c o n t a i n very l i t t l e o f use about 
1. P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o the author. 
2. I b i d . 
3. I b i d . 30 „ 
the l a s t p a r t of h i s time a t the Treasury; Austen Chamberlain's have v i r t u a l l y 
nothing, and neither.-Jaave Baldwin's; C h u r c h i l l ' s papers are not y e t a v a i l a b l e 
f o r i n s p e c t i o n . Snowden had a r e p u t a t i o n f o r t a k i n g l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s of documents 
w i t h him and dest r o y i n g many t h a t were unfavourable. 
F i n a l l y , f i l e s and records which survive i n i t i a l l y go through a weeding 
process before being, t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Public Record O f f i c e . I n d i v i d u a l f i l e s 
are s t r i p p e d of d u p l i c a t e m a t e r i a l : where a handwritten d r a f t put forward by a 
j u n i o r i s modified and approved by Ms senior and passed f o r t y p i n g , and the 
handwritten d r a f t and the carbon copy of the f i n a l v e r s i o n both remain on the 
f i l e , i t i s the handwritten v e r s i o n which i s s t r i p p e d . - Personal-items, such'as 
i n v i t a t i o n s and personal l e t t e r s , • a r e also s t r i p p e d . I n some circumstances, press 
c u t t i n g s and excerpts from Hansard are also removed. F i n a l l y , c e r t a i n categories 
of f i l e are destroyed a l t o g e t h e r . These in c l u d e f i l e s prepared f o r r e p l i e s t o 
Parliamentary questions, which are u s u a l l y prepared from the subject f i l e s ; any 
unique m a t e r i a l from a question f i l e i s . n o r m a l l y removed t o the subj e c t f i l e before 
2 
the question f i l e i s destroyed. 
Relations w i t h other Departments 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p s which the Treasury had w i t h other Government Departments 
can be considered i n three main categories. F i r s t l y , the Supply d i v i s i o n s were 
i n constant touch w i t h the Departments about t h e i r estimates and expenditure, and 
these contacts were mainly f o r m a l ones at the o f f i c i a l l e v e l , c o n s i s t i n g of e i t h e r 
an exchange of l e t t e r s , or o c c a s i o n a l l y f o r m a l i n t e r v i e w s . Secondly, there were 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the Departments very close t o , and i n a sense dependent upon, 
the Treasury, notably the Boards of Customs and Excise and I n l a n d Revenue. These 
Departments worked d i r e c t l y w i t h the Chancellor as f a r as p o s s i b l e , through the 
1. I n f o r m a t i o n t o the author from the Treasury. 
2. I b i d . 
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P r i v a t e O f f i c e . T h i r d l y , there were contacts about matters of mutual i n t e r e s t 
w i t h Departments of equal s t a t u s , such as the Foreign O f f i c e ; these were p r i m a r i l y 
the province of the Finance d i v i s i o n s . 
As f a r as the f o r m a t i o n of p o l i c y was concerned, the contacts i n the t h i r d 
category were of g r e a t e s t importance. The f i r s t k i n d of communication tended t o 
be a t a very low l e v e l ; since the Treasury f o r t h i s kind of business was not an 
executive Department, questions of p o l i c y tended t o be s e t t l e d i n the Department 
concerned, and where arguments arose w i t h the Treasury, serious disagreement tended 
t o be s e t t l e d a t M i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l , i n Cabinet i f necessary. This tended t o be 
the area i n which the Treasury|.s 'saving candle-ends' approach t o economy was most 
evident, and i t i s perhaps not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t r e l a t i o n s between the Treasury 
and the new Departments created during the war were o f t e n less than amicable, i n 
view of the f a c t t h a t these Departments tended t o be 'big spenders'. The M i n i s t r y 
of Reconstruction, i n p a r t i c u l a r , had a number of brushes w i t h the Treasury at 
several l e v e l s . Addison had protracted, discussions w i t h the Treasury about recon-
s t r u c t i o n expenditure i n e a r l y 1918, and he crossed swords w i t h S i r John Bradbury, 
who was most u n w i l l i n g t o give any concessions on expenditure w i t h o u t having 
d e t a i l s of how i t was t o be spent. There were f u r t h e r clashes when, i n t h e spring 
of 1919, Addison moved t o the- Local Government Board t o supervise the s e t t i n g up of 
the M i n i s t r y of Health. Addison became exasperated w i t h what he regarded as the 
penny-pinching a t t i t u d e of the j u n i o r Treasury o f f i c i a l s , and alleged t h a t h i s 
2 
Director-General of Housing resigned h i s post l a r g e l y on t h i s i s s u e . 
The 'new' Departments were s i n g l e d out f o r s p e c i a l treatment i n t h e 'Economy' 
campaign of summer 1919. This episode was one i n which S i r Warren Fisher, at the 
request of the Prime M i n i s t e r , took a p r i n c i p a l r o l e . Lloyd George's sec r e t a r y 
wrote t o Fisher asking him t o make a s p e c i a l enquiry i n t o possible economies. 
1. P.R.Q., T.170/125. 
2. Lloyd George Papers, F/1./5/9. Addison t o Lloyd George, 27 Feb., 1919. 
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Fisher sent a c i r c u l a r l e t t e r on the subject t o a l l Departments, and r e p l i e d t o 
the Prime M i n i s t e r t e l l i n g , him of the a c t i o n he had taken, and suggesting some 
areas i n which economies would be p o s s i b l e . His c h i e f suggestion was t h a t a l l 
Departments which were war-time creations should be "disbanded immediately and 
1 
not continued" and i t seems not implausible t h a t the vehemence of Fisher's 
a n t i p a t h y was r e l a t e d t o the d i f f i c u l t y . w h i c h the Treasury had i n b r i n g i n g 
expenditure i n these Departments under c o n t r o l . 
Relations between the Treasury and the ' c l i e n t ' Departments, the Boards of 
Customs and Excise and I n l a n d Revenue, are much l e s s w e l l documented above the 
p u r e l y f o r m a l l e v e l . This i s . p r i m a r i l y because these Departments were r a t h e r 
s e n s i t i v e about t h e i r t e c h n i c a l e q u a l i t y w i t h the Treasury, and t h e i r contacts 
tended t o be w i t h the Chancellor., through the P r i v a t e O f f i c e , r a t h e r than w i t h the 
main-line a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . 
The t h i r d k i n d of contact, the most important f o r our study, was t h a t between 
the Treasury, u s u a l l y the Finance Department, and other Departments of equal status 
about matters of common i n t e r e s t . These r e l a t i o n s h i p s were of course at v a r y i n g 
l e v e l s , and took d i f f e r e n t forms. Relations w i t h the Foreign O f f i c e , f o r instance;, 
tended t o be of two kinds; one i n v o l v e d the Foreign O f f i c e simply as a k i n d of 
Post O f f i c e f o r communications to the Treasury from o f f i c i a l sources abroad; the 
other i n v o l v e d d i s c u s s i o n about p o l i c y problems i n which both were concerned. 
Relations w i t h the Foreign O f f i c e a t t h i s time seem to have been extremely 
c o r d i a l . During the long p e r i o d of n e g o t i a t i o n over i n t e r - A l l i e d debt, and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y over the funding and payment of the American l o a n , a great deal of 
correspondence passed between the two o f f i c e s . I t was the p r a c t i c e of the Treasury 
t o communicate w i t h the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Washington through the Foreign O f f i c e , 
and f o r t h a t O f f i c e to ask f o r Treasury advice when queries were received from t h e 
Ambassador on f i n a n c i a l problems. An example of t h i s i s an episode i n the autumn 
1. E.R.Q., T. 171/155. Fisher t o Lloyd George, 3 Sep., 1919, ^oU^in.nj ,„ frU O 
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of 1922, when the Americans were urging B r i t a i n t o take steps t o fund the war 
debts she owed t o America. The U.S. Embassy i n London had w r i t t e n t o the Foreign 
O f f i c e t o communicate the t e x t of the Funding Act which Congress had j u s t passed; 
S i r Auckland Geddes, the Ambassador i n Washington, had telegraphed requesting a 
statement of the p o l i c y of the Government on f u n d i n g . S i r Eyre Crowe, Permanent 
Secretary at the Foreign O f f i c e , wrote t o B l a c k e t t asking him " t o d r a f t a telegram 
(or l e t t e r or despatch or whatever i t i s ) " i n r e p l y t o Geddes. B l a c k e t t answered 
t h a t he thought the most appropriate way t o communicate Government p o l i c y i n t h i s 
matter would be i n the form of -a r e p l y t o the U.S. Embassy, r a t h e r than through 
Geddes. He included a d r a f t r e p l y . The Foreign, O f f i c e t o o k - h i s advice, and the 
l e t t e r was d u l y sent. 
This example i s t y p i c a l p f the k i n d of communication which took place between 
the two Departments* >As f a r as p o l i c y matters were concerned, i t was almost 
e n t i r e l y on a very senior level;, as i n t h i s example; v i r t u a l l y a l l the w r i t t e n 
m a t e r i a l sent from the Foreign O f f i c e t o the Finance Department of the Treasury 
was addressed e i t h e r t o B l a c k e t t or Niemeyer, or very o c c a s i o n a l l y t o Fisher, by 
name. On the whole, the r e l a t i o n s h i p seems t o have been a very harmonious one; 
i t i s noteworthy t h a t the Foreign Secretary was Chamberlain's strongest a l l y i n the 
Cabinet i n h i s championship of B l a c k e t t ' s 'Beau Geste' p l a n t o solve the i n t e r -
3 
A l l i e d debt problem. 
The Cabinet O f f i c e does not f i t e a s i l y i n t o any pf the three categories 
o u t l i n e d , but probably i t i s most appropriate t o place i t w i t h other Departments 
of equal s t a t u s , l i k e the Foreign O f f i c e . I n , f a c t , f o r m a l communication between 
the o f f i c i a l s of the two o f f i c e s was r e l a t i v e l y r a r e ; the Treasury had, as one of 
the 1919 in n o v a t i o n s , an o f f i c i a l permanently seconded to the Cabinet O f f i c e , and 
i t was h i s duty t o look a f t e r Treasury i n t e r e s t s t h e r e . The f i r s t occupant of the 
post, Leith-Ross, has commented: 
1 . P.R.O., T.I60/557 /6. Crowe t o B l a c k e t t , 17 June, 1922. 
2. I b i d . . B l a c k e t t t o Crowe, 19 June, 1922. 
3. See below, p„. 234-. 
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"One o f the d u t i e s of the new post was t o keep a s p e c i a l watch on a l l 
proposals f o r new expenditure and t o make sure t h a t the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer had had s u f f i c i e n t time t o pronounce on t h e i r f i n a n c i a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s before they were submitted t o the Cabinet f o r d e c i s i o n . 
Treasury Procedure; an example 
At t h i s p o i n t i t would perhaps be appropriate t o include a d e t a i l e d example 
of Treasury procedure; the example i s a t y p i c a l i n the sense t h a t the ' h i s t o r y 
of the case' i s preserved i n d e t a i l , t h a t i t concerns o n l y the senior o f f i c i a l s 
(although t h a t i s only a t y p i c a l of Treasury work as a whole, and i s probably 
t y p i c a l of matters of p o l i c y ) and t h a t i t i n v o l v e s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
Cabinet O f f i c e and the Treasury; but as f a r as i t i s possible t o judge the general 
form of the Treasury treatment i s t y p i c a l . 
The episode occurred i n J u l y 1921, when alarm was once again being expressed 
over the high l e v e l s of Government expenditure, j u s t before the Geddes Committee 
was appointed. An o r g a n i s a t i o n c a l l e d the Independent Parliamentary Group, whose 
chairman was Horatio Bottomley, wrote t o the Prime M i n i s t e r w i t h some suggestions 
2 
about the economic s i t u a t i o n . Lloyd George's secretary, A.J. Syl v e s t e r , was 
i n s t r u c t e d t o acknowledge the l e t t e r and t o pass i t t o the Treasury f o r t h e i r 
3 
observations. The l e t t e r was given t o Niemeyer, the Deputy C o n t r o l l e r of Finance, 
by Grigg, the Chancellor's P r i v a t e Secretary; Niemeyer noted t h a t he was w r i t i n g 
a memorandum, and then passed the l e t t e r t o S i r Robert S c o t t , Deputy C o n t r o l l e r 
i n the Establishments Department of the Treasury, f o r h i s comments. Scott 
returned the l e t t e r and h i s remarks t o .Blackett, the C o n t r o l l e r of Finance. 
Niemeyer also submitted h i s comments t o B l a c k e t t , and asked f o r B l a c k e t t ' s own 
views. B l a c k e t t combined h i s own views and Niemeyer's i n t o a s i n g l e Finance 
Department memorandum, and submitted i t andj the Establishments document t o Fisher, 
the Permanent Secretary, suggesting t h a t Upcott, the P r i n c i p a l A s s i s t a n t Secretary 
1. S i r Frederick Leith-Ross, Money Talks (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1968), p.53; 
Leith-Ross was t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Cabinet S e c r e t a r i a t i n January 1920, but 
only remained a few months. 
2. P.R.Q., T. 172-/1391. Major Lowther t o Prime M i n i s t e r , 9 J u l y , 1921. 
3« I b i d . . Sylvester t o Chancellor of Exchequer, 15 J u l y , 1921. 
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i n the Supply Department, should be asked t o combine the views of a l l three 
sections i n t o a d r a f t r e p l y t o the Independent Parliamentary Group. Rowe-Dutton, 
Fisher's P r i v a t e Secretary and an A s s i s t a n t P r i n c i p a l at the time, noted t h a t 
Fisher would be glad i f Upcott would do t h i s . Upcott's d r a f t was returned t o 
Fisher, and was amended i n Rowe-Dutton's hand: the i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t the 
changes were Fi s h e r ' s , but of course t h i s cannot be d e f i n i t e l y asserted. The 
d r a f t was then sent back t o the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s o f f i c e , f o r t y p i n g and f o r 
1 
signature by Lloyd George. 
This example i s a t y p i c a l i n the sense t h a t the stages through which the 
l e t t e r and i t s r e p l y went are b e t t e r documented than i s common: the f i l e i s a 
f a s c i n a t i n g hotchpotch of notes w r i t t e n on the back of other men's memoranda, 
s c r i b b l e d notes, and so on. But other more fragmentary evidence suggests t h a t i t 
i s t y p i c a l i n i t s d i s p l a y of the way i n which problems presented t o 
the Treasury from outside were handled. 
Treasury r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Bank of England 
Up t o t h i s p o i n t , except when g i v i n g d e t a i l e d examples, i t has proved 
possible t o discuss Treasury s t r u c t u r e and procedure i n a form a l sense w i t h o u t 
being p a r t i c u l a r about the conduct of i n d i v i d u a l s , which might have d e t r a c t e d 
from the g e n e r a l i t y of the -analysis. But where the Bank i s concerned, the 
s i t u a t i o n i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t , f o r during our p e r i o d , t o a very great e x t e n t , 
Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank from 1920 t o 194-6, was the Bank. Ms a 
r e s u l t , r e l a t i o n s between the Treasury and the Bank of England d u r i n g the i n t e r -
war period depended on the personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the Chancellor and the 
ch i e f o f f i c i a l s , and the Governor. Generally, the tone of the correspondence 
passing between Norman and the Treasury was c o r d i a l . The main p o i n t of c o n f l i c t 
1 . P.R.O., T.172/1391, the d r a f t r e p l y was typed and despatched on 
25th J u l y , 1921. 
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came over i n t e r e s t r a t e s . During the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d , w h i l e Treasury B i l l s 
were s t i l l a v a i l a b l e on ta p , Treasury B i l l r a t e s were the e f f e c t i v e a r b i t e r of 
market r a t e s , and Bank Rate was rendered i n e f f e c t i v e by the a b i l i t y of the j o i n t -
stock banks t o l e t Treasury B i l l s run o f f w i t h o u t renewal, r a t h e r than having t o 
go t o the Bank f o r accommodation, when they became short of l i q u i d funds. Thus 
there are several instances d u r i n g l a t e 1919 and e a r l y 1920 of Norman urg i n g the 
Chancellor t o r a i s e i n t e r e s t r a t e s , o f t e n unsuccessfully, and a t l e a s t on one 
1 
occasion t h i s l a c k of success was due t o Lloyd George's i n t e r v e n t i o n . This 
d i f f i c u l t y reached i t s height i n the spring of 1920, when the matter became the 
2 - -subject f o r f o r m a l debate, and i n t e r e s t r a t e s were r a i s e d t o penal heights i n 
A p r i l 1920 i n an attempt t o curb the post-war boom. 
A f t e r the Treasury B i l l tap issue ceased, the pre-war p r a c t i c e of l e a v i n g 
the matter of the Bank Rate e n t i r e l y t o the Bank of England was resumed, and 
during the remainder of the i n t e r - w a r p e r i o d it.was a constant a s s e r t i o n of 
C o n t r o l l e r s of Finance t h a t Bank Rate changes were the sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the 
Bank, and t h a t there was no p r a c t i c e of j'pj,o n s ul'tation between the two o f f i c e s . 
Indeed, there i s a document i n the f i l e s which .gives the views of several Permanent 
Secretaries on the su b j e c t , a l l agreeing t h a t the p r a c t i c e of c o n s u l t a t i o n which 
grew up duri n g wartime was q u i t e outside normal peacetime p r a c t i c e , and t h a t a f t e r 
the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d the pre-war p r a c t i c e was resumed. For instance, 
Bradbury i s quoted as saying: 
"There has never so f a r as I know been any suggestion t h a t the Treasury 
has any o f f i c i a l concern w i t h the Bank Rate..."3 
and Niemeyer, w r i t i n g i n 1929, i s quoted as saying: 
"There never has been, e i t h e r i n my time or p r e v i o u s l y , any ' c o n s u l t a t i o n 1 
between the Bank of England and the Treasury i n any shape or form w i t h 
regard t o changes i n Bank Rate."4 
1. S i r Henry Clay, Lord Norman (London: Macmillan & Co., 1957), p. 124.. 
2. P.R.O., T.172/1384. Dear Money papers of Feb., 1920. 
3. P.R.Q., T. 176/13 p t . 1. 
4. I b i d . 
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As f a r as one can t e l l , C h u r c h i l l was the only Chancellor i n our p e r i o d t o question 
t h i s arrangement; t h i s f i r s t arose very e a r l y i n h i s p e r i o d of o f f i c e , when 
Norman r a i s e d the Bank Rate t o prepare f o r the r e t u r n t o the Gold Standard. I t 
was not , as we have seen, the p r a c t i c e of the Governor t o consult the Treasury 
before making such a change, but he d i d u s u a l l y warn the Chancellor a l i t t l e i n 
advance, on the day of the change. On t h i s occasion, C h u r c h i l l was away, and 
Leith-Ross, who was d e p u t i s i n g f o r Niemeyer while the l a t t e r was i n Geneva, 
promised t o give C h u r c h i l l the Governor's message as soon as he re t u r n e d . 
C h u r c h i l l was most aggrieved t h a t he had not been consulted, and Leith-Ross 
wrote t o Niemeyer t e l l i n g him of the i n c i d e n t and .asking f o r h i s comments. 
Niemeyer r e p l i e d : 
"Winston w i l l never r e a l i s e t h a t he i s not Governor of the Bank...As 
regards Parliament, i f i t a r i s e s , Winston i s a b s o l u t e l y e n t i t l e d t o 
say t h a t i t has never been the p r a c t i c e f o r the Bank of England, an 
independent bank f i x i n g i t s own discount r a t e , t o consult the Treasury, 
t h a t i t d i d not do so on t h i s occasion, and t h a t t h ere i s no reason why 
i t should have."1 
During the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d , Norman also took a leading p a r t i n the 
move t o begin funding the Na t i o n a l Debt.and repaying, the f l o a t i n g debt, urged on 
by the d i f f i c u l t y which the l a r g e volumes of the l a t t e r had l e d t o i n attempts 
to c o n t r o l the money market. I n A p r i l 1920 he submitted a scheme t o B l a c k e t t f o r 
a force d loan from income t a x payers, f o r the purposes of repaying debt, which 
would, one supposes, have brought him the astonished support of the C a p i t a l Levy 
2 
proponents i n the Labour Party, The scheme was r e j e c t e d as being p o l i t i c a l l y 
impossible. 
Norman's a t t i t u d e to the funding of debt, and also h i s determination t o 
s t a b i l i s e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n as a necessary p r e p a r a t i o n f o r 
r e t u r n i n g t o the Gold Standard, made him a f e r v e n t supporter of the p o l i c y of 
sending a funding mission t o the United States, t o make arrangements f o r f u n d i n g 
1. S i r Frederick Leith-Ross, Money Talks, p. 95. 
2. S i r Henry Clay, Lord Norman, pp. 117-8. 
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the o b l i g a t i o n s i n c u r r e d by B r i t a i n d u r i n g the war. I n t h i s connection,, there i s 
an i n t e r e s t i n g example of the. high-minded tone which. Norman sometimes adopted 
i n some correspondence i n June 1922, about i n t e r e s t payments due on the American 
loans. Part of Norman's l e t t e r t o B l a c k e t t on t h e subject reads: 
"The Court of D i r e c t o r s have received..an i n t i m a t i o n of your i n t e n t i o n , 
at an e a r l y date, t o withdraw g o l d from the Bank i n order t o pay 
i n t e r e s t on the demand o b l i g a t i o n s due by t h i s country t o the United 
States Government. .^They f u r t h e r understand t h a t o . ^ a request f f o r 
f unding^ has been put forward by the Foreign Debt Commission of the 
United States» They t r u s t t h a t His MajestyIs Government w i l l comply 
w i t h t h i s request."' 
However, o n l y a small p a r t of the discussions between the Treasury and the 
Bank took place on paper. Because .Norman.personified the Bank, and because he 
tended t o do t h i n g s on a personal basis-and..as s e c r e t i v e l y as p o s s i b l e , most of 
the contact between the two i n s t i t u t i o n s took place on .a personal level, , I t was 
Norman's custom t o c a l l at the Treasury, e i t h e r alone or w i t h the Deputy Governor v 
every weekday except F r i d a y , a t about 5.30 i n the evening, on h i s way home. He 
would go f i r s t t o see the Chancellor's P r i v a t e Secretary, who would t e l l him i f 
the Chancellor were f r e e t o see him; then he wouldgo-..and chat t o the C o n t r o l l e r 
of Finance and other senior o f f i c i a l s ; f i n a l l y he would go t o the Chancellor's 
o f f i c e i f necessary and i f the Chancellor were .available - t h i s tended t o be once 
or twice a week. I t f e l l t o the Chancellor's P r i v a t e Secretary t o warn a l l 
concerned t h a t the Governor was on h i s .way. S i r Henry Wilson Smith, who was a 
P r i v a t e Secretary f o r some years i n the ' t h i r t i e s , remembers being able t o give 
a good e a r l y warning t o h i s colleagues o f the Governor's mood, because he could 
always deduce i t from the manner i n which Norman addressed him. Normally the 
Governor would c a l l him "Wilson Smith"; i f he were i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y benign mood 
he would address the P r i v a t e Secretary as "Wilson"; but S i r Henry knew t h a t i f 
2 
Norman addressed him as "Smith", then " a l l h e l l would be l e t loose!" 
1 . P.R.Q.y T.I60/557/6, Norman t o B l a c k e t t , 22 June 1922; a copy was sent t o 
the Chancellor. 
2. I n f o r m a t i o n given t o the author i n conversation by S i r Henry Wilson Smith. 
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This close and frequent contact i m p l i e s a. good deal of co-operation between 
the two i n s t i t u t i o n s . But the very closeness and personal nature of the contact 
has r e s u l t e d i n a l a c k of documentation of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , which makes more 
d e t a i l e d examination very d i f f i c u l t . 
Treasury Personnel 
The formal s t r u c t u r e and o r g a n i s a t i o n of the Treasury i s , of course, o n l y a 
p a r t of the subject matter of t h i s ..chapter. Equally important i s the way i n which 
the o r g a n i s a t i o n was operated by the men who s t a f f e d i t , and we s h a l l new t u r n t o 
a b r i e f study of t h i s aspect of the problem. .As.we. have already seen^ a t the end 
of the war there were three j o i n t Permanent Secretaries t o the Treasury, S i r John 
Bradbury, S i r Robert Chalmers and S i r Thomas Heath. Chalmers r e t i r e d a t the end 
of the war, and Heath l e f t f o r a post outside the service soon afterwards: S i r 
John Bradbury, who had been i n charge of the f i n a n c i a l side of the Treasury during 
the war, was t h e r e f o r e the obvious choice f o r the post of Permanent Secretary under 
the 1919 r e o r g a n i s a t i o n scheme. However, i t was decided t h a t he should go t o the 
Reparations Commission as the permanent B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , and S i r Warren 
Fisher, p r e v i o u s l y Chairman o f the Board of I n l a n d Revenue, took the post i n s t e a d . 
I t was, as has been noted, intended t h a t the Permanent Secretary should 
exercise c o - o r d i n a t i n g powers, l e a v i n g the c h i e f burden of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
various Departments i n the hands of the C o n t r o l l e r s . This i n t e n t i o n was r e i n f o r c e d 
as f a r as the Finance Department was concerned by Fisher's personal i n c l i n a t i o n s . 
He remained Permanent Secretary u n t i l 1939, and was noted f o r h i s o v e r r i d i n g 
i n t e r e s t i n the questions of Service o r g a n i s a t i o n a n d . s t a f f i n g ; the a u t h o r i t a t i v e 
b i o g r a p h i c a l a r t i c l e on Fisher contains not a s i n g l e reference t o the s i n g u l a r l y 
i n t r a c t a b l e economic problems experienced by t h i s country during h i s time a t the 
1 
Treasury. During the p e r i o d from 1919 t o 1925, the only p o i n t at which he 
1. S i r Horace Hamilton, " S i r Warren Fisher and the Public Service", Public 
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n XXLX (1951), notes 12 and 13 on page 10. 
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f i g u r e s w i t h any prominence i n a major matter of economic p o l i c y i s i n l a t e 1919, 
immediately a f t e r he j o i n e d the Treasury, when he i s revealed as a staunch 
upholder of the ideas of f i n a n c i a l orthodoxy common i n the Treasury and among 
1 
economists at the time. 
When Fisher became Permanent Secretary, B a s i l ( l a t e r S i r B a s i l ) B l a c k e t t 
was appointed C o n t r o l l e r of Finance. He occupied t h i s post f o r three years, 
and was succeeded by Otto, l a t e r S i r Otto, Niemeyer, who remained i n the Treasury 
u n t i l 1927. Thus during the p e r i o d 1918 t o 1925 there were three men success-
i v e l y i n charge of Finance, S i r John Bradbury u n t i l October 1919, S i r B a s i l 
B l a c k e t t u n t i l the l a t e summer of 19.22, and S i r Otto Niemeyer u n t i l 1927. I n 
a d d i t i o n , S i r Warren Fisher held an o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o - o r d i n a t i o n . 
During the same p e r i o d , there were no fewer than seven Chancellors of the 
Exchequer. Of these, only one, S i r Austen Chamberlain, held o f f i c e f o r more 
than eighteen months, although Bonar Law had been i n o f f i c e f o r some time by the 
end of the war, and Snowden and C h u r c h i l l held o f f i c e f o r longer periods a f t e r 
1925. Thus du r i n g the years from 1918 t o 1925 there was a s i n g l e Permanent 
Secretary at the Treasury, and three d i f f e r e n t f i n a n c i a l advisers, a i l of whom 
were career c i v i l servants who had been i n the Treasury most of t h e i r working 
l i v e s . The Chancellors of the p e r i o d , i n c o n t r a s t , held o f f i c e f o r an. average 
of one year each, and were i n the main w i t h o u t experience of tb'-; Treasury. 
Bonar Law (December 1916 - January 1919), Home (-Vpril 1921 - October 1922), 
N e v i l l e Chamberlain (August 1923 - January 1924), Snowden (January 192-4 -
October 1924) and C h u r c h i l l (November 1924 onwards) had never served i n the 
Treasury before; Baldwin (October 1922 - August 1923) had p r e v i o u s l y been 
F i n a n c i a l Secretary t o the Treasury from 1916 t o 1920, and S i r Austen Chamberlain 
(January 1919 -• A p r i l 1921) had p r e v i o u s l y been Chancellor from 1903 t o 1906. 
Moreover, while Bonar Law, C h u r c h i l l and S i r Austen Chamberlain were already 
1. P.R.O.., T. 171/155. Fisher t o Lloyd George, 3 Sep., 1919. 
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senior M i n i s t e r s when they went t o the Treasury, f o r N e v i l l e Chamberlain and 
Snowden i t was t h e i r f i r s t experience of an o f f i c e of Cabinet rank, and Home 
1 
and Baldwin had not p r e v i o u s l y been prominent M i n i s t e r s . Thus the pe r i o d 
1918-1925 was one i n which the Chancellors were o f t e n inexperienced, and always 
short-term appointments; while the o f f i c i a l s were career c i v i l servants w i t h both 
wide experience and s e c u r i t y of tenure, and provided the c o n t i n u i t y absent a t 
M i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l . We s h a l l now examine i n a l i t t l e more d e t a i l the personal-
i t i e s of the men concerned w i t h i n the Treasury i n t h e f o r m a t i o n of economic p o l i c y 
d uring our p e r i o d . 
The c i - v i l servant i n charge" of the Finance side of the Treasury u n t i l 
autumn, 1919, then, was S i r John Bradbury 6 He entered the Treasury s t r a i g h t 
from Cambridge, and f o l l o w e d the t r a d i t i o n a l Treasury career of a b r i g h t young 
man by becoming p r i v a t e secretary t o Asquith when he was made Chancellor i n 1905. 
By 1908, when he was 36, he. had become head of one of the s i x pre-war d i v i s i o n s 
of the Treasury. He helped Lloyd George t o frame h i s Budget of 1909, and i n 
1911 became one of the f i r s t Insurance Commissioners, while r e t a i n i n g h i s post 
at the Treasury. I n 1913, he became j o i n t Permanent Secretary, u n t i l 1919, 
when he went t o the Reparations Commission. He remained I n t h a t post u n t i l 
1926, when he r e t i r e d . His c h i e f c l a i m t o p u b l i c fame came from h i s designs f o r 
small currency notes a t the outbreak of the war; these notes, known as 'Bradburys' 
2 
made Sir John's name a household word. 
1. A.J.P. Taylor, English H i s t o r y 19U-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 
pp. 64-0-5. The term 'orthodox' i s used f r e q u e n t l y i n t h i s work t o describe 
the opinions held by the m a j o r i t y of men i n high p o s i t i o n s i n t h e C i t y and i n 
p u b l i c l i f e during the pe r i o d f o l l o w i n g the F i r s t World War. The ideas and 
views of S i r John Bradbury were so t y p i c a l of those of other men i n these 
spheres t h a t h i s opinions have been taken as embodying the orthodoxy of the 
p e r i o d , and thus f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of the term 'orthodox' f o r the purpose of 
t h i s work the d e s c r i p t i o n of S i r John Bradbury's views on pp.88-90 should 
be consulted. 
2. D i c t i o n a r y of N a t i o n a l Biography (London: O.U.P., 1959), Supplementary 
volume f o r 194-1-50, pp. 98-9. 
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The picture of Sir John Bradbury which emerges from the Treasury f i l e s and 
from the evidence submitted by him to various Committees i s of a man whose 
opinions are t y p i c a l of many men at the Treasury and i n the City during our period, 
so that i n some sense he embodies the f i n a n c i a l orthodoxy of the day„ Bradbury 
believed f i r s t and foremost that the Gold Standard was the most important element 
i n Britain's success both i n in t e r n a t i o n a l finance and i n business during the 
pre-war period. He believed also that the way i n which the money market and the 
other i n s t i t u t i o n s of the City of London had been run before the war was the best 
way i n which they could be run and that these i n s t i t u t i o n s and mechanisms, 
including an effective Bank Rate.and a powerful .and independent Bank of England, 
were essential to the prosperity of business i n t h i s country and abroad, and 
thus to the economic l i f e of the nation. I m p l i c i t i n these judgements was a 
lais s e z - f a i r e view of the economic functions of the State, and he therefore f e l t 
that i t would be an inestimable benefit to the economic prosperity of the nation 
i f the Government were to withdraw as quickly.as possible from those spheres of 
economic a c t i v i t y which i t had been obliged by the exigencies of war to enter, 
and not to take a more active part i n the operations of the money market than was 
made necessary by the need to manage e f f i c i e n t l y the great load of government 
1 
debt. He was an implacable enemy of inf l a t i o n . , and tended to adhere to the 
classical economic views about the necessity f o r reductions in. wages i n times 
of depression, i n order to bring costs and prices down, and thus stimulate 
demand.^ 
Sir John seems to have combined a r i g i d personal honesty with considerable 
doubts about the a b i l i t y of p o l i t i c i a n s to pursue a long-term goal, and maintain 
1 „ - P o R . O o , T.160/197/7528/01/2, Second Draft Report of the Committee on the 
Currency and Bank of England Note Issues (the Bradbury Committee) and Sir 
John Bradbury's proposed amendments, Sep., 19 2,4. 
2„ P . R . O . , T.I85/1 < minutes of evidence of the Committee on Currency and • 
Foreign Exchange after the War (the Cunliffe Committee), 3rd meeting, 
Feb. 1918, and 9th meeting, March 1919. 
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t h e i r i n t e g r i t y i n t h i s connection i n the face of p o l i t i c a l temptations. Keynes 
has related a revealing incident, from the period j u s t before the Americans entered 
the war i n 1917, when B r i t i s h c r e d i t i n New York had reached i t s nadir: 
"Chalmers and Bradbury never f u l l y confessed to Ministers the f u l l 
extent of our extremity when i t was actually upon us, though they 
had. of course warned them, f u l l y but unavailingly, months beforehand 
of what was coming. This was because they feared that i f they 
emphasised the r e a l position, the policy of the peg might be abandoned, 
which they thought would be disastrous. They had been brought up i n 
the doctrine that i n a run one must pay out one's gold reserve to the 
l a s t bean...I r e c a l l an h i s t o r i c occasion a day or two af t e r the 
formation of the second c o a l i t i o n government at the end of 1916. 
The position was very bad. We i n the Treasury were a l l convinced 
that the only hope was to pay out and t r u s t that the drain would 
suddenly dry up as i t had on previous occasions. But we had no . 
confidence i n the~understanding of Ministers. Chalmers went...to 
report to the newly-formed War Cabinet, 'Well, Chalmers, what i s 
the news?' said the goat fLloyd George}. 'Splendid', Chalmers replied 
i n his high quavering voice, 'two days ago we had to pay out 020 m i l l i o n ; 
the next day i t was $10 m i l l i o n ; and yesterday i t was only $5 m i l l i o n . ' 
He did not add that a continuance of t h i s rate f o r a week would clean 
us out completely, and that we considered an average of $2 m i l l i o n 
very heavy. I waited nervously i n his room, u n t i l the old fox came 
back triumphant."1 
According to the o f f i c i a l minutes of that Cabinet meeting, 
"Sir Robert Chalmers,.. fwas^ able to congratulate the War Cabinet on 
the f a c t that the amount required d a i l y had dropped i n the l a s t two 
days from 17 m i l l i o n dollars - f i r s t to 8 m i l l i o n and then to U m i l l i o n 
d o l l a r s . 
Another incident i n which Bradbury's d i s t r u s t of m i n i s t e r i a l i n t e g r i t y is 
evident occurred over the return to the Gold Standard. I n his account of the 
famous dinner party at which Churchill i n v i t e d Bradbury and Niemeyer to argue 
the matter out with Keynes and McKenna, Grigg reports: 
"Bradbury made a great point of the f a c t that the Gold Standard was 
knave-proof. I t could not be rigged f o r p o l i t i c a l or even more 
unworthy reasons. I t would prevent our l i v i n g i n a fool's paradise 
of false prosperity... 
1 . J.M. Keynes, A c t i v i t i e s 1914--1919: The Treasury and Versailles (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1971), Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes XVI, 
ed„ E. Johnson, p„ -211. 
2. P.R.Q.., Cab. 23/1, 9 Dec*, 1916, quoted i n Keynes, op.cit., p. 212. 
3. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p. 183. 
a. 
On a more personal l e v e l , Bradbury, despite his rather narrow and r i g i d 
outlook, seems to have been admired .and respected by his contemporaries. One 
colleague describes him as -a t y p i c a l , product of Manchester Grammar School, a 
shrewd Lancastrian, proud of his origins and retaining his Lancashire accent, 
1 
popular^ i n the City and with many connections there. 
Another colleague, Sir Andrew MacFadyean, who was Secretary to the B r i t i s h 
Delegation to the Reparations Commission while Bradbury was B r i t i s h Representative 
on the Commission, has l e f t a f u l l e r p o r t r a i t of the man, which adds valuable 
colour to the two-dimensional picture which emerges from the f i l e s s 
"Within his own province he had, as Keynes had, a mind l i k e a razor blade, 
but r e l a t i v e l y his province was a narrow one. I think he loved r h e t o r i c , 
I doubt i f he cared much about l i t e r a t u r e i n genera]., and I am sure he 
knew nothing about a r t . He was .one of the world's worst bridge players, 
and an even worse driver^! He was an introvert, and therefore self-centred. 
He was quite passionately f a i r , and nobody and nothing would have induced 
him to s a c r i f i c e a point of p r i n c i p l e . He was, as he abundantly proved 
i n the Reparations Commission, a born debater.* Two remarks.which he made 
w i l l suffice as examples. When the..Germans were adjudged to'be i n default 
over timber deliveries, which Med to the occupation of the Ruhr, he 
denounced the decision with the scathing observation that history recorded 
no similar use of timber since Troy f e l l to the stratagem of the wooden 
horse. On another occasion, when .the Commission seemed slow to give the 
Germans what the Treaty, aceorded them '.a j u s t opportunity of being heard', 
he reminded h i s colleagues that t h i s was d i f f e r e n t from 'an opportunity 
of j u s t being h e a r d ' H e was an inveterate cigarette smokeroo„0n 
retirement from o f f i c i a l duties he was elected a director of The Imperial 
Tobacco Co,,, presumably, as Keynes said, as t h e i r largest customer, 
I do not think he l i k e d foreigners; they were a l l .'foreign bodies 3 
to him, though I hasten to add that he.never allowed that to deflect bis 
judgement,.,,He was capable of f l y i n g i n t o a rage« .and once stalked out 
of a meeting of the Reparations^ Commission,,,,He quite r i g h t l y regarded 
his function as largely j u d i c i a l and was unwilling to accept orders from 
the Treasury or even the Chancellor of the Exchequer. One resu l t was 
that a l e t t e r of resignation was permanently domiciled i n his breast 
pocket; the grenade never quite went o f f ] The conclusion of the whole 
matter i s that he was a very human person, a delight to work with or f o r 
Sir John l e f t the Treasury i n October 1919, but throughout his term as B r i t i s h 
representative on the Reparations Commission he was i n f a i r l y close touch with his 
erstwhile colleagues at the Treasury, When P h i l i p Snowden, who was then Chan, eel l o r , 
1o Private information to the author, 
2, MacFadyean, Recollected i n T r a n q u i l l i t y , pp. 74-5. 
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set up a Committee i n the summer of 1 9 2 4 to examine the Gunliffe Report i n the 
l i g h t of ensuing experience, Bradbury became a member, and when Sir Austen 
Chamberlain became a member of the new Conservative Government i n December 1 9 2 4 , 
Bradbury took over from him as Chairman. I t seems that the extent to which the 
Report of t h i s Committee echoed the o r i g i n a l recommendations of the Cunliffe 
Committee was i n part duo to the influence of Bradbury himself.' There seems 
l i t t l e doubt that he was among the leaders of the body of men i n the f i n a n c i a l 
and business world who f e l t , as did Montagu Norman, that t h e i r best hope was i n 
"saving B r i t a i n by t r y i n g f i r s t to save the world. 1 , 2 - -
When Bradbury l e f t the Treasury he was succeeded by a man of rather d i f f e r e n t 
stamp, Basil Blackett. His early history .was similar to Bradbury's, as to dozens 
of other able c i v i l servants of his time and later„ He too entered the Treasury 
straight from.Cambridge,, where he had, taken..a .First i n Classics.. He had 
o r i g i n a l l y intended to enter the Indian C i v i l Service,, but on coming top i n the 
C i v i l Service examinations i n 1 9 0 4 , he opted f o r the Treasury instead. He retained 
his i n t e r e s t i n India, and was Secretary to the Royal Commission on Indian Currency 
i n 1 9 1 3 - 1 9 1 4 " He went to the United States during the war, and was f i n a l l y B r i t i s h 
3 
Treasury representative i n Washington from 1 9 1 7 to 1 9 1 9 - His experiences i n 
America, combined with a love of Germany which began while on holiday from 
Marlborough i n his teens, and ended with his death there i n a car accident i n 
1 9 3 6 , may have contributed to the formation of his ideas about reparation and 
the i n t e r - A l l i e d debt, which came to the fore i n 1 9 2 0 . ^ 
During his time at the Treasury Blackett was on the whole an orthodox 
adviser to his Chancellors, but he tended to err on the side of caution i n such 
matters as d e f l a t i o n i n a way which neither his predecessor nor his successor did. 
1 . D. Moggridge, The Return to Gold (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 3 3 - 4 . 
2 . A. Boyle, Montagu Norman (London: Cassell and Co., 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 1 4 3 . 
3 . Dictionary of National Biography, 1 9 3 1 - 4 0 , pp. 8 3 - 8 4 = 
4 . See below, pp. i ' t - 2 2 2 . 
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I n his evidence to the Select Committee on War Wealth i n 1 9 2 0 , he made i t apparent 
that while he believed that the National Debt should be reduced as quickly as 
i 
possible, due consideration should be paid to the dangers of def l a t i n g too f a s t . 
I n most ways, however, his views were along the same lines as those of his 
colleagues; the difference was one of emphasis rather than of content. Blackett 
certainly did not have any proto-Koynsian ideas on balancing budgets at t h i s time. 
Typical of his opinions I n t h i s .matter i s a memorandum wr i t t e n i n 1 9 2 2 i n 
reply to a suggestion by the Minister of Health, .Sir, .Alfred Mond, that the 
Chancellor should present ,a d e f i c i t Budget i n order to be able to reduce taxation, 
and thus stimulate investment. The Idea of reducing taxation to increase 
consumption per se had not as yet apparently occurred to anyone, so Blackett's 
reply must be seen simply-as a re b u t t a l of Mond's .suggestion, not of budgeting 
f o r a d e f i c i t i n general, although the tone of.Blaekett's reply indicates that 
2 
he deplored the idea i n principle as w e l l . Blackett deplored Mond's idea on the 
grounds that experience had shown, and a l l men of sense ..agreed, that t h i s was the 
way to f i n a n c i a l r u i n . B r i t a i n , i n company with the United States and Japan, had 
steadily reduced i t s government debt i n the period immediately before the war; no 
other country had done so. I t was no coincidence i n his view that these three 
countries were the only ones to emerge from- the war with t h e i r f i n a n c i a l structure 
unscathed. I n addition, at every int e r n a t i o n a l gathering since the war, B r i t a i n 
had advocated strongly the necessity of every country's balancing i t s budget as 
soon as possible; i t would be a tremendous shock to world confidence f o r B r i t a i n 
to f a i l to balance her own budget. The same applied at the private business l e v e l 
the e f f e c t on confidence i n the City would be disastrous. Furthermore, i t was not 
a shortage of c a p i t a l f o r investment purposes that was i n fact the trouble at that 
time; Blackett stressed that the problem was one of a lack of security f o r good 
1 . House of Commons Papers, 1920. (London; H.M.S.O. , 1 9 2 0 ) , No. 1 0 2 , p.9 8 , Q.I 54-6. 
2 . P7RVQo, T, 171/202, memo, by Blackett, 24. Mar., 1 9 2 2 . 
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investments, because of the disorganisation of industry i n Europe and the lack 
of demand by people on the Continent f o r our goods. 
Thus on matters of i n t e r n a l finance Blackett tended to.advise i n orthodox 
veirip I n in t e r n a t i o n a l matters, his opinions were less conventional,' i n one 
particular area, that of our-attitude to the.American, debt-and to the debts owed 
us by the other A l l i e s , his ideas were unconventional to a surprising degree, 
2 
They were also p o l i t i c a l l y unpopular,-and f a i l e d to gain acceptance. But 
Blackett's ideas i n t h i s sphere show him to,be a man of imagination, and a man 
w i l l i n g to adapt his ideas to change§ in. circumstancef his-solution t o - t h e debt 
problem had,an a i r of 'cutting the Gordian knot' about i t , , not perhaps the sort 
of idea which one would expect as a product of a 'Treasury mind 1. 
Blackett made as favourable an impression on.most of his contemporaries 
as on the reader of his w r i t t e n work. Sir Ralph Hawtrey found him more receptive 
of Hawtrey's ideas about the domestic economy than some of his colleagues„ 
Blackett was one of the three men whom - Sir-Ralph most admired among his colleagues 
at the Treasury, the others being Bradbury and Frederick ( l a t e r Sir Frederick) 
3 
P h i l l i p s . One colleague of Blaekett's judged him to be both b r i l l i a n t and 
f l e x i b l e , ^ and another described him :as 
; " « o oexceedingly handsome, welcome everywhere, a flowing (broadminded) 
handwriting. quick i n decision, he seemed to me to make an excellent 
head,, .."5 
Late i n 1919j a n experiment was made i n promoting two members of the Executive 
Class to the Administrative Class, one at Assistant Principal l e v e l and the other 
to Principal. I n the opinion of a contemporary, Blackett was responsible f o r t h i s 
innovation, believing that there was no-one else i n the Treasury at the time 
"with both the desire and the power". 
1„ P.R.O., T.171/202, memo, by Blackett, 21, Mar.., 1922. 
2. See below, Ch. V, passim. 
3. Information given to the author i n conversation by Sir Ralph Hawtrey. 
4» Private information to the author. 
5. I b i d . 
6. I b i d . 
AS, 
Thus Blaokett seems to have been a man of great b r i l l i a n c e and o r i g i n a l i t y , 
both successful w i t h i n the establishment and yet with s u f f i c i e n t independence to 
pursue and hold his own views, even when they were unorthodox. I n 1 9 2 2 , Blackett 
l e f t the Treasury to go to India, where he served f o r s i x years on the Viceroy's 
Council as Finance Member, While there, he implemented a series of major reforms, 
which included setting the country's railways on a sound f i n a n c i a l f o o t i n g , 
concentrating debt charges i n t o a statutory.sinking fund, and bringing the 
provincial f i n a n c i a l members together f o r annual conferences. He became Leader 
of the Assembly, and restored the rupee to a fi x e d value. He returned to England 
i n 1928, where he was found..a position i n charge of a major in t e r n a t i o n a l company, 
and was sponsored by Montagu Norman .as a Director of the Bank of England. He had 
of course by t h i s time l e f t the Treasury, and when the great f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s of 
19.31 came, he was free to express .and develop his own ideas, independent of the 
r e s t r i c t i o n s of o f f i c i a l duties. -A l i f e l o n g f r i e n d of Keynes, he now became a 
champion of the Keynsian cause, of d e f i c i t budgeting during depressions, and of 
1 
planned money, a subject on which he published a book. Planned Money. 
When Blackett l e f t f o r India i n 1922, he was succeeded by his Deputy 
Controller r Otto ( l a t e r Sir Otto) Niemeyer.. Niemeyer had also been a career 
c i v i l servant a l l his l i f e 5 and had entered the Treasury i n 1906. He was always 
keenly interested i n int e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s ; he was a member of the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations from 1922 to 1937, and af t e r he l e f t the 
Treasury i n 1 9 2 7 to go into commerce, he undertook a number of missions to the 
2 
Dominions and to China on f i n a n c i a l matters. The tone of his memoranda i s 
uncompromisingly orthodox, and he regarded i n f l a t i o n and large volumes of 
government debt as Inherent e v i l s i n much the same way as Sir John Bradbury d i d , 
without Blackett !s awareness of the dangers of precipitate action i n the economic 
1, Sir Basil Blackett, PlannedJ4o_ney (London: Constable and Co,., 1932). 
2. Who's Who, 1970 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1970), pp. 2294.-5. 
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sphere„ He tended to f e e l the forces urging governments i n the d i r e c t i o n of 
too great expenditure and too l i t t l e control over that expenditure to be so great 
that a Treasury man must do a l l he can to bring influence to bear on the other 
side. 
One of the most contentious economic problems of the inter-war years was 
that of the r e l i e f of unemployment. In.the autumn of 1921, Niemeyer wrote a 
memorandum on present.and future f i n a n c i a l policy which contains a whole-hearted 
advocacy of the t r a d i t i o n a l - a t t i t u d e to the problem. The budget must be balanced, 
i n order that no i n f l a t i o n s h a l l occur; t h i s is_desirable f o r - i t s own sake, but" 
also because I f i n f l a t i o n occurs, prices i n B r i t a i n w i l l r i s e r e l a t i v e to those 
i n other countries, and B r i t i s h exports w i l l be placed i n a bad competitive 
position vis-a-vis other exporting countries. 
. I f . B r i t i s h trade i s to compete i n the markets of the world the 
prices of B r i t i s h goods must come down. This.in eff e c t means that 
the wages of B r i t i s h labour must come down.....Experience has shown 
that the earnings of B r i t i s h Industry are not s u f f i c i e n t to pay the 
present scale of wages a l l round. Consequently . i f present Wages are 
to be maintained a certain f r a c t i o n of the population must go without 
wages. The p r a c t i c a l manifestation of which ([sic] i s unemployment."'' 
He went on to point out that there was a tendency i n America at that time towards 
i n f l a t i o n , and that i f t h i s continued - i t would help lessen the amount by which 
d e f l a t i o n would have to occur i n t h i s country f o r the two currencies to be brought 
back to t h e i r pre-war r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Niemeyer then turned to the problem of financing the r e l i e f of unemployment, 
while the t r a n s i t i o n to lower wages and f u l l e r employment which he hoped to see 
occurred. He did not regard i t as a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y that the Government 
could raise more revenue by taxation or by.long-term loans; therefore any help 
that could be given would have to be found by recourse to Ways and Means advances, 
with the accompanying dangers of i n f l a t i o n . Some help would have to be given to 
1. P.R.O., T.172/1208, memo, by Niemeyer, para, i v ; undated, but i n t e r n a l 
evidence suggests that I t was w r i t t e n i n October, 1921. 
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the unemployed; but any help would be l i k e l y to encourage I n f l a t i o n because of 
the means by which the Government would have to r a i se. the money, and so the 
assistance should be as small as possible. 
" I t i s obvious that certain minimum assistance must be .given to the 
unemployed to prevent starvation; but f o r the ultimate solution of 
the unemployment problem i t i s essential that t h i s assistance should 
be kept to a minimum....Ambitious schemes of expenditure of credits 
caii only i n t e n s i f y the e v i l s of unemployment by maintaining wages 
and prices and making i t s ultimate remedy more d i f f i c u l t . 
Indeed the best assistance which the State can give to unem-
ployment (apart from the minimum to prevent starvation) i s (1) to 
reduce i t s expenditure and (2) to repay.its debts."'' 
Furtherfore, a t was, according, to Niemeyer, much better from the economic point 
of view f o r r e l i e f of unemployment to be given by the Poor Law Guardians than 
by the State. 
" I t i s sometimes urged that r e l i e f of unemployment t h i s winter w i l l 
cost £100 m i l l i o n and that the State, might j u s t as well make that 
£100 m i l l i o n available i t s e l f . But there .is ..all the difference i n 
the world between r e l i e f given by,the Guardians and an equivalent 
expenditure by the State. The Guardians borrow temporarily, 
ultimately, from the rates and the effect of t h e i r expenditure i s to 
force ratepayers to save. The State i s i n a f a r less ef f e c t i v e 
position to enforce such savings„„if the State were to provide the 
money i t would in e v i t a b l y come from the creation of a r t i f i c i a l c r e d i t 
and not from savings."^ 
The correct remedies f o r the unemployment s i t u a t i o n were therefore, according to 
Niemeyer, the t r a d i t i o n a l ones: balanced budgets, repayment of debt, reduced 
government expenditure, increased private savings. His advice to the Chancellor 
continued to be along these lines throughout h i s time.at the Treasury, and he 
3 
remained deeply concerned with the problems of debt repayment. 
Niemeyer impressed his contemporaries as being essentially a r i g i d and 
i n f l e x i b l e man, though j u s t and humane too. One colleague, whose appointment 
to a Private Secretary post, with an appropriate salary allowance, had to be 
blocked because the work on which he was engaged was too important f o r him to 
1. P.R.Cv, To172/1208, memo, by Niemeyer, para, v i ; undated, but i n t e r n a l 
evidence suggests that i t was wr i t t e n i n October, 1921. 
2. I b i d . 
3.. See, f o r example, P.R.O., T. 171/196, memo, by Niemeyer on Permanent Debt 
Charge, 11 Feb., 1922, and another on the u n d e s i r a b i l i t y of abolishing the 
Sinking Fund i n P.R.O., T. 17.1/205, 22 Apr., 1922. 
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leave i t , found that Niemeyer had arranged f o r him to receive, f o r the time being, 
an allowance equivalent to that which he would, have received had the move taken 
place. Grigg, who was fer v e n t l y i n favour of the Gold Standard, wondered whether 
the 1 9 3 1 .crisis would have pushed us o f f . i t i f "the stout-hearted and resourceful 
2 
Niemeyer had s t i l l been at the Treasury". Hawtrey, however, who was more worried 
about the deflationary problems which the e f f o r t s to return to gold exacerbated, 
3 
found Niemeyer r i g i d , and unimpressed by Hawtrey's forebodings. One colleague 
summed him up as being both decisive..and obstinate, and likened him i n both 
respects to Neville Chamberlain,^ while-another described him as "a t e r r i f i c 
worker of outstanding a b i l i t y : who was r a r e l y challenged when he had spoken 
f i r m l y . " 5 
For half Niemeyer's time-as Controller of Finance, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer was Winston Churehill, -Examples of the stormy nature of t h e i r r e l a t -
ionship abound, p a r t i c u l a r l y over the return to the Gold Standard.^ One interesting 
episode occurred during the preparation of the ..Budget of 1 9 2 5 , when Niemeyer was 
becoming concerned at the l e v e l of the estimates of government expenditure, and 
was t r y i n g to persuade Churchill of the need to exhort his colleagues to economy. 
He wrote a note to Churchill on the subject which i s abrupt and peremptory i n tone: 
I t suggests that there were two pioints of pri n c i p l e which would have to be adhered 
to with determination. These were that expenditure must be cur t a i l e d , and that no 
tax concessions must be given, since there was p r a c t i c a l l y no margin of safety i n 
the Estimates. F i n a l l y , Niemeyer suggested: 
"You make l i k e , when of f e r i n g your ..Budget to the Cabinet, to demand the 
support and collaboration of your colleagues i n r e a l i s i n g these 
propositions.'^ 
1 „ Private information to the author. 
2 „ Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p. 2 5 9 . 
3 . Information given to the author i n conversation with Sir Ralph Hawtrey. 
4„ Private information to the author. 
5* I b i d . 
7. I b i d . 
5 Niemeyer to Churchill,, 6 Apr., 1 9 2 5 . 
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Thus the impression formed both from the w r i t t e n material and from the 
evidence of contemporaries' recollections i s of a r i g i d and rather austere man, 
e f f i c i e n t and able, who adhered to his own beli e f s and opinions to the point of 
i n f l e x i b i l i t y . I t i s also worth noting that during the years of his tenure of 
the Controllership, l i t t l e w r i t t e n material submitted by his Deputy to the 
Chancellor i s to be seen on the f i l e s , although when Niemeyer himself was Blackett's 
Deputy t h i s i s not the case, and .'there i s a good deal of material w r i t t e n by 
Niemeyer i n the papers of the Chancellor's Office. His three-year partnership 
with Blackett seems to have been a f a i r l y harmonious one, since their" approaches 
and temperaments tended to complement one another, and t h e i r general principles 
were the same. However, one colleague has commented that although the two were 
f a r more often i n accord than not, Blackett was not one to hesitate i f he wished 
1 
to advise a Minister i n a d i f f e r e n t sense from Niemeyer. 
The organisation of the Treasury underwent, as we have seen, a complete 
revision i n the year following the end of the war, and i n October 1919 Sir Warren 
Fisher came from the Inland Revenue to take over the position of Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, Blackett and Niemeyer served under him, but t h e i r 
appointments ranked equal i n pay and status to that of Permanent Secretaries i n 
a l l other Departments, and they were responsible d i r e c t l y to the Chancellor. The 
one time at which Fisher seems to have taken a d i r e c t and c o n t r o l l i n g i n t e r e s t 
i n the f i n a n c i a l side of the Treasury's work was at the very beginning of his term 
of o f f i c e , during the great economy campaign of 1919> which we s h a l l be examining 
2 
m d e t a i l later.. From his actions at t h i s time i t i s apparent that i n so f a r 
as he concerned himself with f i n a n c i a l - a f f a i r s he was as r i g i d l y orthodox as 
Niemeyer, and held a nineteenth-century c i v i l servant's view of government expend-
i t u r e . Addison was not alone among Ministers i n his complaints to the Prime Minister 
1. Private Information to the author. 
2. See below, pp. 182-203, 
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about the obstructive attitude of Treasury o f f i c i a l s i n t h i s respect, as Lloyd 
1 
George's papers show. 
Despite his general lack of i n t e r e s t i n the d e t a i l s of the work of the 
Finance Department, Fisher does seem to have been consulted verbally by some of 
his subordinates on pa r t i c u l a r issues. An instance of t h i s i s the discussion of 
the Blackett plan f o r the solution of the i n t e r s A l l i e d debt problem i n 1 9 2 0 ; 
Blackett addressed his. d r a f t version of the plan to Fisher, .adding the words, 
2 
"This i s an attempt to put down the conversation we had t h i s morning." Fisher 
duly read the d r a f t and passed , i t to .the Chancellor f o r his comments. But t h i s 
was unusual; the bulk of the w r i t t e n material submitted by the Controller to the 
Chancellor was addressed to him d i r e c t . 
I t may not be an accident that the instance given was one i n the f i e l d of 
foreign a f f a i r s , i n which Fisher, had a-.profound .and. l i f e l o n g i n t e r e s t . He was 
a strong believer i n the merits of the Gold Standard,.and Lord Francis Williams 
has recorded how, i n 1931 when a monetary c r i s i s seemed imminent, he was rash 
enough to suggest to .Fisher that B r i t a i n .might be forced to leave the Gold Standard. 
Fisher replied: 
"To suggest that we should leave the gold.standard i s an a f f r o n t not 
only to the national honour but also to the personal honour of every 
man and woman i n the country. 
Fisher was on excellent terms with Baldwin, having got to know him well 
during his long period as Financial Secretary; i n view of Fisher's own rather 
autocratic nature, I t may be s i g n i f i c a n t that Baldwin was at that time most 
unwilling to take decisions on his own, without the support and advice of others.^ 
After Baldwin became Prime Minister, he s t i l l saw and corresponded with him 
frequently, and on at least two occasions disregarded a l l o f f i c i a l and 
1. Lloyd George Papers, F/1 /5/9, Addison to Lloyd George, 27 Feb.., 1919; 
see above, p„ 32. 
2. P.R.O., Cab.24/97. C.P.5&4, Blackett to Fisher, 12 Feb., 1920. 
3. Lord Francis Williams, A Pattern of Rulers (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1965), pp. 111-2. 
4. See below, p. 68 Q 
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parliamentary conventions to .bring certain pecadllloes of Churchill, his Chancellor, 
to Baldwin's at t e n t i o n . During the preparation of the 1925 Budget, Fisher wrote to 
Baldwin enclosing a copy of a memorandum by Niemeyer on the subject of the Old 
Sinking Fund: 
"The occasion f o r i t s fthe memo5s| preparation i s the oft-repeated 
threat (not so f a r however made I n my presence) by Winston that i n 
spite of everyone he is' going to seize and d i v e r t from debt 
redemption any surplus there may be on the present year 192 .4 . -5 . •«•«when 
the time comes I am going to t e l l Winston i n my own language what I 
think about i t . " ' ' 
On the whole, however, i t seems from the evidence of colleagues that Fisher 
was more l i k e l y to intervene i n .a finance question to protect-the .Chancellor- . 
from the importunasy of his o f f i c i a l s , rather than the reverse; he tended to 
maintain the rather aloof, Olympian.attitude which.has been described, and only 
to descend on an issue, as he did over the Economy Campaign, when pa r t i c u l a r 
pressures made i t necessary. Fisher ..always received a copy of material from 
Finance which went d i r e c t to the Chancellor,- .and he would intervene i f he thought 
Treasury advice was tending to push the Chancellor i n t o a. corner, especially i n 
terms of the p o l i t i c a l aspects of issues, or i f the Chancellor was uneasy about 
2 
Treasury advice. 
Before he went to the Inland Revenue, Fisher had been a prominent member 
of the Insurance Commission; indeed, t h i s was where he 'made his name', as did 
many of his contemporaries i n that forcing-house of o f f i c i a l t a l e n t s . But after 
he went to the Treasury he ceased to be such an innovator, and concentrated on 
consolidating the work of the newly-formed Establishments Department. I t was 
Fisher who, af t e r one or two disappointing entrants into the Treasury through the 
normal examination channel i n the l a t e 2 0 ss., decided on a change of policy i n t h i s 
respect (he i s reputed to have said "no more f i r s t s " ) and i n i t i a t e d the practice of 
3 
taking new Treasury r e c r u i t s from among the best juniors i n other Departments. 
1 . Baldwin Papers, Vol.3? JP/2/3. Fisher to Baldwin, 13 Mar., 1 9 2 5 ; see also 
P.R.CI., TB176/21, Fisher to Baldwin, 2 5 May, 1 9 2 5 . 
2 . Private information to the author. 
3 . I b i d . 
5 5 . 
Fisher was thus, l i k e Niemeyer, ..a..man of r i g i d .and orthodox mind, but with 
these q u a l i t i e s compounded by.a somewhat..autocratic a t t i t u d e ; one colleague has 
commented that he was a man who .was concerned that- others should observe the forms 
and protocol, towards him, but who f e l t able to disregard these f o r m a l i t i e s himself 
i n the treatment of others„ However, .with rare exceptions, he was during our 
period concerned p r i m a r i l y with-Establishments Work,/.and not"with Finance „ 
Among the changes made i n the 1 9 1 9 reorganisation was the appointment of 
Ralph, l a t e r Sir Ralph Hawtrey as Director of Financial I n q u i r i e s . Sir Ralph 
had joined the Treasury i n 1904-, having spent , a year on the s t a f f of the Admiralty 
- - - -- '" " ' 2 " ~ 
a f t e r leaving Cambridge. ' Hawtrey's positi o n seems to have been essentially a 
research post, and there _are ..a number of memoranda i n the Treasury f i l e s , some 
3 
of which w i l l be referred to l a t e r . While a t the Treasury Hawtrey wrote a 
considerable amount on economic and f i n a n c i a l topics, and much of his work 
consisted.in propounding^a b e l i e f i n the ..monetary theory of the trade cycle as 
a fundamental pr i n c i p l e of economics. This: being, so., he was a staunch defender 
of the 'Treasury view 5 of p'iblic works as unnecessary, i r r e l e v a n t and possibly 
even harmful i n reducing •unemployment. 
"..„.. expenditure on public works, i f accompanied by a creation of 
c r e d i t , w i l l give employment. But.., „a creation of cred i t unaccompanied 
by any expenditure on public works \rould be equally e f f e c t i v e i n giving 
employmento 
The public works .are merely-a piece of r i t u a l , convenient to 
people who want to be able to say that they are doing something, but 
otherwise i r r e l e v a n t . To stimulate an expansion of credit i s usually 
only too easy. To resort f o r the purpose to the construction of 
expensive public works i s to burn the house down for the sake of the 
roast pig.M 
Hawtrey regarded the unemployment problem, as essentially subsidiary to the 
phenomenon "of the trade cycle, and he was a f i r m believer i n the Gold Standard. 
. 1 . Private information to the author. 
2° Who's Who, 1970. pp. 2 2 9 4 - 5 . 
3 . See below, pp. i o ^ 3N, 3i7. 
Ua R.G. Hawtrey, Tr_a^_and_Credit (London: Longmans, Green and Co,., 1928), p.112. 
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"The problem of unemployment.., as we knew i t before the war, i s the 
problem of the trade cycle,, .„ 0 The true solution of the problem i s to 
be found i n the s t a b i l i s a t i o n of prices..„.0in my opinion the trade 
cycle can be eliminated, or. at any rate so reduced i n extent as to 
avoid epidemics of unemployment, without any departure from the 
gold standard, provided the banking authorities of the d i f f e r e n t 
gold standard countries co-operate f o r that object. 
Even without t h i s refinement, a gold standard i s an 
approximation to s t a b i l i t y . " ^ 
I n l a t e r years, Hawtrey came to have doubts about the wisdom of de f l a t i o n , 
2 
and c r i t i c i s e d the monetary policy of the period. Immediately af t e r the war, 
however, Hawtrey was with his -colleagues strongly i n favour of measures to curb 
i n f l a t i o n , and with them advocated~a ri s e i n the Bank Rate i n the spring of 
3 . . . 
1920, Indeed, he adduced a further -.argument to that of the other o f f i c i a l s , 
suggesting that because the attractions of f i x e d - i n t e r e s t bearing securities 
tended to be lessened by i n f l a t i o n and enhanced I n periods of d e f l a t i o n , dear 
money would thus make the.problem, of funding the short-term debt easier, 
"..ofor the success of: future funding loans deflationary measures 
are essential. And every week that such measures are deferred makes 
the e v i l s to be cured greater., "^ 
In addition, Hawtrey suggested that the disadvantage of dear money to the Treasury, 
that i t raised the price the Government would have to pay f o r loans, was very much 
a short-term problem, since i n t e r e s t rates would not have to be maintained at a 
penal l e v e l f o r very long. By the spring of 1923, Hawbrey f e l t that the d e f l a t -
ionary process had gone on long enough, and that further d e f l a t i o n should be 
avoided.,"* but by then the Bank Rate had come down to 3%,^ the f l o a t i n g debt had 
7 
been reduced by one-third from i t s 1920 peak, and the rigorous d e f l a t i o n of 
the early twenties was over. However, from t h i s time on Hawtrey maintained his 
1 0 R.G, Hawtrey, Trade and Credit (London: Longmans, Green and Co.., 1928),pp„78,80 
2, K. Hancock, "Unemployment and the Economists i n the 1920s", Economica XXXVII 
(1960), p.309. 
3« P.R.0., To172/1384. "Cheap or Dear Money", memo, by Hawtrey, 4 Feb,, 1920. 
4 . I b i d . 
.5. P.R.0.., T.I76/5, memo, by Hawtrey, 5 Mar., 1923. 
6. See below, S t a t i s t i c a l Appendix, Table 2. 
7. I b i d . , Table 3 . 
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stand against d e f l a t i o n , and continued to argue t h i s i n harness w i t h a b e l i e f 
i n the Gold Standard„ His views, are well summarised by a passage from a memorandum 
wri t t e n i n March 1 9 2 3 : 
" ( 1 ) We must avoid any furt h e r d e f l a t i o n , and with a view to the 
early absorption of our unemployed a moderate degree of i n f l a t i o n , 
such as has been experienced i n the l a s t twelve months i n America, 
wpuld.be desirable:; . J 
( 2 ) We must restore s t e r l i n g to. .its. -gold par as soon as possible." 
Hawtrey realised that these twin objectives could hardly be realised without 
co-operation from other countries, .and p a r t i c u l a r l y from America; t h i s acceptance 
of the need f o r j o i n t action _was. one of the prime f a c t o r s " i n the -preparation of 
the Currency Resolutions f o r the Economic Conference at Genoa i n 1 9 2 2 , i n which 
Hawtrey took a leading part. The ...acceptance of these proposals, which called 
f o r a return throughout .Europe to balanced budgets and stable currencies, 
including a return to the Gold Standard i n every country as soon as was feasible, 
at the pre-war p a r i t y i f humanly possible, was at that time regarded as a major 
step forward i n the reconstruction of Europe,, and as some compensation f o r the 
2 
f a i l u r e of the Conference I n most other respects. 
During the discussions over the return to the Gold Standard i n the spring 
of 1 9 2 5 s Hawtrey maintained t h i s a t t i t u d e , but to no a v a i l . I n his reply to 
Churchill's ."exercise", he mads I t clear that he f e l t that a ris e i n Bank Rate 
would not be necessary to a restoration of the Gold Standard, and. would be 
damaging to the i n t e r n a l economy: 
"No active measures at a l l need ba taken. I t i s to be hoped that 
the exchange w i l l come to par of i t s e l f . I f i t does not, a credit 
contraction i s s t i l l undesirable. We should be prepared, i f 
necessary, to export gold i n case of a threatened reaction a f t e r 
par has been reached... ..If the gold exports are i n s u f f i c i e n t , i t 
would be better to l e t s t e r l i n g f a l l to a discount fthan to raise 
Bank RateX" 3 
1. .P.R.O., T„ 176/5. memo., by Hawtrey, 5 Mar.., 1923. 
2. See P.R.D.., T.172/246. Cab^JLlA. 
3. P.R.O., T . 1 7 2 7 l 4 9 9 B . memo, by Hawtrey, 2 Feb.., 1925. 
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However, Hawtrey's advice on t h i s p o i n t , although apparently i n agreement w i t h 
C h u r c h i l l ' s own opinions, was ignored by Norman, as was h i s p r e r o g a t i v e a t t h a t 
1 
time, Hawtrey has t o l d how 
"...on the 6 t h March Bank Rate was put up t o 5« On t h a t day I 
encountered Montagu Norman i n Niemeyer's room at the Treasury. 
Norman s a i d he had become something of. a popular character i n 
the City;, f o r the p r i c e of wheat .had..fallen, ,What he said I do 
not remember, but i t breathed reproaches., .and I f e a r I had 
s a c r i f i c e d the g o o d w i l l f o r m e r l y gained by my advocacy of dear 
money."'' 
Hawtrey's general r o l e i n the Treasury i s a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h , 
p a r t l y because i t was. a personal one., i n the sense t h a t no other man before or 
since ever held t h a t precise post,, but p a r t l y also because h i s r o l e seems t o have 
changed over the years.,, .The impression ono. gains i s -that from the time Bradbury 
made the appointment i n 1919 u n t i l B l a c k e t t ' s departure i n 1922, Hawtrey tended 
to be consulted as a matter of course; during.Niemeyer 3s term as C o n t r o l l e r h i s 
i n f l u e n c e waned, and by the 1930s h i s .memoranda tended t o be volunteered, or else 
requested as an a f t e r t h o u g h t . But i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d concrete evidence f o r 
3 
t h i s . I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t whereas there i s a good deal of Hawtrey m a t e r i a l 
i n the general f i l e s i n the e a r l y 'twenties, much of the m a t e r i a l he wrote i n 
Niemeyer's time went i n t o Niemeyer's own p r i v a t e papers, .and since i n many cases 
i t i s what appears t o be the top copy t h a t i s f i l e d t h e r e , ^ i t seems l e g i t i m a t e 
t o surmise t h a t these documents got no f u r t h e r than Niemeyer. I t i s impossible, 
i n the absence of Blackett?s papers, t o do anything other.than speculate about 
t h i s . But apparently C h s r e h i l l , a t any rate,, f e l t t h a t the Treasury d i d not make 
s u f f i c i e n t use of Hawtrey cs powers. Grigg remembers C h u r c h i l l 
".o.demanding from time t o time t h a t the learned man should be released 
from the dungeon i n which we were said t o have immured him, have h i s 
chains s t r u c k o f f and the straw brushed from h i s h a i r and clothes and 
be admitted to the l i g h t and warmth of an argument i n the Treasury board 
room w i t h the g r e a t e s t l i v i n g master of argument."5 
1. I n f o r m a t i o n t o the author from S i r Ralph Hawtrey; Leith-Ross, Money Talks, p.95. 
2. I n f o r m a t i o n t o the author from S i r Ralph Hawtrey. 
3. P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n to the author confirms t h i s impression f o r the l a t e r p e r i o d . 
4.. See, f o r example, P.R.O., T., 176/13 p t . I , "The C r e d i t S i t u a t i o n " , memo, by 
Hawtrey w i t h notes by P h i l l i p s , 5 Dec.., 1925. 
5. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p. 82. 
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However, some of the Treasury o f f i c i a l s d i d make use of Haw-trey's t a l e n t s 
i n d iscussion: n o t a b l y F r e d e r i c k ( l a t e r S i r Frederick) P h i l l i p s , who had a 
penchant f o r developing h i s own views by c o n t r a d i c t i o n , and used Hawtrey as a 
1 
'chopping block'. There i s a f a s c i n a t i n g example of t h i s i n a memorandum 
w r i t t e n by Hawtrey i n December 1925, -attacking a recent r i s e i n Bank Rate. 
The paper i s annotated i n the margin i n - P h i l l i p s ' t i n y , spidery w r i t i n g , and 
2 
includes some f a i r l y p i t h y comments, such-as " t h i s i s nonsense" and "bunkum". 
However, since a r i s e i n Bank Rate .-.at a time of f a l l i n g p r i c e s and hi g h unem-
ployment was perhaps not the best of policies,, t h i s episode embodies an apparent 
hardening of Treasury a t t i t u d e s over the i n f l a t i o n controversy immediately before 
and f o l l o w i n g the r e t u r n to- g o l d , and i t is-perhaps no accident t h a t the waning 
of Hawtrey's i n f l u e n c e seems t o have been ..a p a r a l l e l development. 
I n the policy-making p a r t of the Treasury f u n c t i o n s , the j u n i o r o f f i c i a l s , 
as we have seen, played l i t t l e . p a r t . Some, names crop up i n the f i l e s from time 
t o time; t h a t of .Grigg,, f o r i n s t a n c e , who was throughout most of our p e r i o d the 
Chancellor's P r i v a t e Secretary, ..and who has w r i t t e n an autobiography, as d i d 
another man, then a j u n i o r posted overseas, who was t o become successful and 
well-known l a t e r i n l i f e , Leith-Ross-. Ernest, l a t e r S i r Ernest Rowe-Dutton was 
f o r p a r t of t h i s p e r i o d i n the Home Finance Section, then moved t o 2D, the Foreign 
Section of Finance, from which he went as the Treasury Representative on the 
3 
funding mission t o Washington i n 1923, w i t h Baldwin, Norman and Grigg. Rowe-Dutton 
w i t h Leith-Ross, SDD„ (Xater S i r .David).Waley and Henry ( l a t e r S i r Henry) Wilson 
Smith together provided considerable c o n t i n u i t y i n the f i e l d of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s 
d u ring the whole i n t e r ~ w a r p e r i o d , during which time they served c o n t i n u a l l y 
e i t h e r i n 2D, as P r i v a t e Secretary t o the. Chancellor, or i n the Treasury missions 
overseas, i n c a p i t a l s such as B e r l i n , Washington and P a r i s . P h i l l i p s i s another 
1. P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n to the author. 
2. See, f o r example, P.R.O.., T. 176/13,.pt.I. "The Cred i t S i t u a t i o n " , memo, by 
Hawtrey w i t h notes by P h i l l i p s , 5 Dec, 1925. 
3. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p. 98; /• r ; V' 
I am informed t h a t Rowe-Dutton kept a d i a r y of t h i s journey,' which has 
u n f o r t u n a t e l y been destroyed, 60. 
man whose memoranda appear o c c a s i o n a l l y on the f i l e s on t e c h n i c a l matters, and 
who l a t e r rose to high p u b l i c o f f i c e . But beyond the bare c h r o n i c l e s of Who's Who 
i t i s very d i f f i c u l t t o g a i n any r e a l knowledge of these men, and v i r t u a l l y a l l 
the o f f i c i a l s who served i n Finance d u r i n g our period are no longer a l i v e . Those 
t h a t have w r i t t e n autobiographies tend t o be more concerned w i t h events than 
w i t h people, and i t i s thus d i f f i c u l t t o form much of an impression of the younger 
men as i n d i v i d u a l s . However, i n view of the f a c t t h a t as f a r as one can judge 
from a l l the evidence a v a i l a b l e , the younger men d i d not p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e 
i n the f o r m a t i o n of p o l i c y , t h i s i s perhaps not a serious d i f f i c u l t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
because of another aspect of the Treasury environment t o which reference w i l l be 
1 - - -
made l a t e r . 
I t would be incomplete t o conclude t h i s s e c t i o n w i t h a b r i e f reference 
t o Montagu Norman. During our per i o d t h i s strange and incomprehensible man was 
a t the h e i g h t of h i s powers. He played a major p a r t i n two of the most important 
issues i n which the Treasury o f f i c i a l s were also concerned, namely the r e t u r n t o 
the Gold Standard and the American debt settlement. Like them, he r e s t r i c t e d 
h i s a c t i v i t i e s t o what he deemed t o be the province of the Bank, and d i d not 
concern himself w i t h the impact of h i s actions on problems outside h i s terms of 
reference. Norman f e l t t h a t h i s p r i n c i p a l task was t o t r y t o r e s t o r e normal 
f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n s i n t h i s country and i n Europe, which included p u t t i n g B r i t a i n 
back on the Gold Standard as soon as p o s s i b l e . 
"True t o h i s inhe r e n t weakness f o r never trespassing i n t o t e r r i t o r y 
f o r which others were responsible, Norman d i d not worry unduly about 
the cost i n human misery t h a t might r e s u l t at home i f t h i s outward-
l o o k i n g C i t y p o l i c y were c o n s i s t e n t l y pursued. The p l i g h t of the 
unemployed was p r i m a r i l y a matter f o r the Government." 
1„ See below, p. 76. 
2. A„ Boyle, Montagu Norman, p. 139. 
For a sympathetic discussion of Norman's views a t t h i s time, see D. Williams, 
"Montagu Norman and Banking i n the Nineteen-Twenties", Yorkshire B u l l e t i n of 
Economic and Social Research XI (1959). 
61. 
Norman's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Treasury were e x c e l l e n t , and indeed he must have 
come as something of a r e l i e f a f t e r the bombastic and unpredictable C u n l i f f e , w i t h 
1 
whom, i t w i l l be seen, Treasury r e l a t i o n s were l e s s than c o r d i a l , Norman was 
also, as f a r as one can judge, on..good terms w i t h the Chancellors d u r i n g our 
2 
peri o d ; Home admired and trusted.- him, C h u r c h i l l , a t any r a t e i n the e a r l y p a r t 
3 
of h i s term of o f f i c e , was f r e q u e n t l y host t o Norman, and Baldwin, too, o f t e n 
i n v i t e d Norman t o h i s home,^ i n both cases t o an extent beyond what was r e q u i r e d 
by convention. Relations between C h u r c h i l l and Norman cooled g r a d u a l l y during 
C h u r c h i l l ' s term of o f f i c e , p a r t l y .because of C h u r c h i l l ' s i n c r e a s i n g d i s q u i e t . _. 
over the Gold Standard, and p a r t l y because, as Niemeyer s a i d , 
5 
"Winston w i l l never r e a l i s e t h a t he i s not Governor of the Bank..." 
and he was unable to accept the f a c t t h a t at t h a t time the Bank was an autonomous 
i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h independent c o n t r o l over i t s own discount r a t e . 
These, then, were the p r i n c i p a l o f f i c i a l experts w i t h whom the Chancellors 
i n the 'twenties had t o deal. I t i s appropriate t h a t we should now examine, i n 
such d e t a i l as i s p r a c t i c a b l e , the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and working methods of these 
Chancellors. 
The Chancellors 
The Chancellors whom t h i s group of men advised during the p e r i o d under review 
were on the whole inexperienced and i n o f f i c e f o r a very short time. By the end 
of our p e r i o d , only three of the seven men who served as Chancellor d u r i n g t h a t 
time had held o f f i c e f o r more than eleven months; of those t h r e e , Bonar Law, 
Si r Austen Chamberlain and Home, only Chamberlain had p r e v i o u s l y served as 
Chancellor. Bonar Law was the f i r s t of the Chancellors of our pe r i o d ; he held 
1. See below, pp. 86-87. 
2„ Boyle ? Montagu Norman, p„ 150. 
3.o I b i d . 
A . Chartwell Papers, F i l e 18/2, C h u r c h i l l t o Baldwin, 12 Dec, 1924; quoted i n 
Moggridge, The Return t o Gold, p. 4-0. 
5. Leith-Ross, Money Talks, p. 95« 
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o f f i c e from December 1916 t o January 1919 9 but during t h a t time he was also a 
member o f the War Cabinet, and thus was much pre-occupied w i t h problems 
concerned w i t h the m i l i t a r y and s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n of the war. He l e f t the 
Treasury w e l l before the 'bonfire o f controls-' became int e n s e , but there i s l i t t l e 
t o suggest t h a t t h i n g s would have been otherwise had he stayed; f o r Bonar Law, 
according t o h i s biographer, 
"...held the view, unfashionable today, t h a t there e x i s t s a wide 
f i e l d of human a c t i v i t y i n which Government i n t e r v e n t i o n does no 
good and may only make matters worse."1 
Bonar Law was succeeded by Sir Austen Chamberlain-, -who -held the Chancellorship 
from January 1919 u n t i l A p r i l 1921, and thus covers a l a r g e r p a r t of our pe r i o d 
than any other Chancellor.. -Chamberlain's c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c seems to have been 
his complete honesty: and i t i s , a n . i n t e r e s t i n g comment on the House of Commons 
of 191.8-1922 t h a t a t l e a s t one observer, a young backbencher elected during the 
l a t t e r p a r t of t h a t .Parliament, judged him to-be...mar.ked out by t h a t q u a l i t y as 
"dating." obviously from an e a r l i e r era. 
"...the most representative-and t h e . m o s t - a t t r a c t i v e of these 'dating' 
f i g u r e s was Austen Chamberlain........he was already almost alone i n h i s 
sense of parliamentary s t y l e . I f t h a t s t y l e i n c l i n e d a . l i t t l e t o the 
pompous, so much the b e t t e r ; the House of Commons was too august f o r 
.Business statements; i t deserved t c be t r e a t e d i n the grand ..manner. 
And t h i s grand manner was not j u s t a matter of form; i t was the 
expression of a very conscious f e e l i n g f o r the e s s e n t i a l v i r t u e s of 
B r i t i s h p u b l i c l i f e . . . T h e sox-t of i n t e g r i t y we demand from our s t a t e s -
men i s an i n t e g r a t i o n o f p r i v a t e w i t h p u b l i c honour. Austen Chamberlain 
was, above a l l , the embodiment of t h a t i n t e g r i t y . He once said t h a t his 
only conception of d i p l o m a t i c n e g o t i a t i o n was t o l a y h i s cards on the 
t a b l e . That i s almost a d e s c r i p t i o n of h i s career, the e x p l a n a t i o n of 
his honourable successes and h i s s t i l l more honourable f a i l u r e s . " ^ 
This complete i n t e g r i t y i s demonstrated i n the most r e v e a l i n g way i n an 
episode which i s of immediate i n t e r e s t f o r t h i s study because i t appears t o be the 
only instance d u r i n g our p e r i o d of a Chancellor a c t u a l l y changing h i s mini on an 
1. R. Blake, The Unknown Prime M i n i s t e r (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), 
p. 4-99. 
2» Lord Percy of Newcastle, Some Memories (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958), 
p. 79. 
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issue of major importance, because he a t f i r s t disagreed w i t h h i s adviser, and 
then came t o the conclusion t h a t the o f f i c i a l was i n f a c t r i g h t ; t h i s was over the 
American debt problem, where B l a c k e t t , then C o n t r o l l e r of Finance, put forward a 
h i g h l y o r i g i n a l plan f o r d e a l i n g w i t h the problem. At f i r s t Chamberlain r e j e c t e d 
the advice because he f e l t t h a t - i t would antagonise the Americans, but the 
arrogant behaviour of the United States Treasury caused him t o change his mind, 
and he backed B l a c k e t t ' s plan i n the Cabinet against Lloyd George, then 
i 
Prime M i n i s t e r . 
Chamberlain was fo l l o w e d by S i r Robert Home, who was Chancellor from _ 
A p r i l 1921 u n t i l October 1922, when the C o a l i t i o n Government f e l l ; Chamberlain 
moved t o the P r i v y Seal's O f f i c e when he l e f t the Treasury, much t o the b e n e f i t 
of h i s own temper and the detriment of Hornets, as Thomas Jones, who was present 
at the f i r s t Cabinet meeting, a f t e r the r e s h u f f l e , recounted i n a l e t t e r t o 
Bonar Law: 
" I l i k e the new Privy.Seal f o r the simple reason t h a t he i s now much 
les s overwrought than when as C. .Of .Ex. £sic}' he had d a i l y t o oppose 
the demands of h i s p r o f l i g a t e colleagues. He i s now .almost gay and 
debonair w i t h l e i s u r e f o r a joke and- a t a l e the one I l i k e d best 
being the one about the P.M. Qjloyd George^ i n h i s inaccurate budget 
days using f i g u r e s ' l i k e a d j e c t i v e s ' . A„C„ ^ l k s more i n Cabinet 
than you d i d and i s less e l a s t i c i n mind than you appeared t o be] 
Home has also changed countenances w i t h Chamberlain and can only 
smile w i t h d i f f i c u l t y . The coal business, the dread of a budget 
speech (now removed), [Chamberlain d e l i v e r e d the speech, which had 
l a r g e l y been prepared before he l e f t the Treasury] the u n f r i e n d l y , 
s a l l i e s of Churchill,, and' too few holidays have u n i t e d f o r the moment 
to rob the new Chancellor of h a l f h i s buoyancy and made the miners 
take him f o r a h a r d - f i s t e d owner."2 
Home came from a business background, entered the Commons as a Conservative i n 
the General E l e c t i o n of 1918, and was immediately brought i n t o the Government, 
f i r s t as M i n i s t e r of Labour, and then as President of the Board of Trade, before 
going t o the Treasury i n 1921. He was thus much le s s experienced, both as a 
Member of Parliament and as a M i n i s t e r , than e i t h e r Bonar Law or Chamberlain had 
1. See below, pp. ZZS-U6, 2 3/-i3fc. 
2. Jones, W h i t e h a l l Diary. V o l . I , 1916-25, p. 152, 
Jones t o Bonar Law, 24- Apr., 1921. 
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been when he became Chancellor.,, During the summer of 1921, the demand f o r 
'Economy' was again heard l o u d l y i n the Commons and i n the Press, and the 
business world was even more emphatic.than usual about the need to reduce 
expenditure so as t o ease t a x a t i o n , i n the face of the severe depression i n 
the economy. Grigg commented, 
".„... Horne showed himself very ready t o l i s t e n s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y t o 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s and demands of the t r a d i n g community. At times, 
indeed, I thought t h a t he .was too s e n s i t i v e t o t h e i r woes and I 
daresay. I said so. But, w i t h the lamentable r e s u l t s , which the 
coal s t r i k e was producing, d a i l y before h i s eyes, the Chancellor 
i n s i s t e d on making a number of easements."'' 
I t should not be thought., however , t h a t . GriggJ s opinion-of Horne was 
g e n e r a l l y unfavourable. I n August 192.1, Horne. went t o Paris f o r a meeting of 
the Supreme. Council of the. League of. Nations,: and-Grigg accompanied him. Away 
from the problems t h a t threatened t o overwhelm .him i n B r i t a i n , Grigg was able t o 
form a b e t t e r impression of h i s master: 
"Now t h a t the more pressing of M s .anxieties were removed, I saw 
him i n h i s t r u e l i g h t . . He.was quick .and, intelligent.,.good-humoured 
and c o n c i l i a t o r y , .an extremely competent advocate, most l o y a l t o h i s 
subordinates.and .appreciative of ..what they d i d f o r him.,.,:.I suppose 
i t could be said t h a t he ; l i k e d the good t h i n g s of the m a t e r i a l l i f e -
who doesn't?...He was a novus homo i n t h a t he appeared i n the House 
of Commons f o r the f i r s t time as a M i n i s t e r of the Crown.... | l n 
a d d i t i o n t o the p r e j u d i c e which t h i s , aroused] .Horne had a s l i g h t l y 
harsh voice which was apt to_,.give a f a l s e impression of him. But 
long before he went t o the House of Lords he had become a very popular 
member of the Commons, not only because the House had come t o recognize 
h i s fundamental considerateness, but owing also t o h i s q u i t e unusual 
m e r i t s as a mimic and a raconteur. I s t i l l laugh a t h i s i m i t a t i o n of 
Curzon r e j e c t i n g w i t h contumely the claims t o advancement of a c e r t a i n 
p o l i t i c i a n on the ground t h a t he had married ! a woman, of c o l o s s a l 
f o r t u n e , i t i s t r u e , but of calamitous appearancec„"^ 
Others had a l e s s elevated o p i n i o n of Horne: 
"Horne was a competent businessman but not a successful Chancellor; 
indeed he was r e a l l y out of h i s depth i n p u b l i c f i n a n c e , and, what i s 
worse, tended t o show i t . There i s a s t o r y t h a t Birkenhead was asked 
whether Horne should be replaced, and Birkenhead r e p l i e d , ' I don't 
t h i n k i t ' s worthwhile changing asses i n mid-stream,,' "3 
1„ Grigg, Prejudice and Judgements p. 65. 
2° I b i d . . p. 72. 
3. Leith-Ross, Money Talks, p. 81. 
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One l a s t p o i n t of note about Horne concerns h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
Governor of the Bank of England, which was e x c e l l e n t . Norman's biographer 
r e f e r s t o 
"Si r Robert Horne, a f a i r l y malleable character, whose d o c i l e r e a c t i o n s 
to the magnetic charm of the Governor resembled those of a f a v o u r i t e 
p u p i l t o a benevolent headmaster..."^ 
and quotes from a l e t t e r w r i t t e n by Horne to Norman i n A p r i l 1922: 
"...you give me such service and such companionship i n my tasks t h a t I 
daren't t e l l you a l l i t means t o me...I am very g r a t e f u l t o you.- and 
no less f o r your f r i e n d s h i p than f o r your counsel.-"^ 
The p i c t u r e t h a t emerges., then, i s of a competent businessman, w e l l - l i k e d 
by h i s f e l l o w s , but r a t h e r i n c l i n e d t o be overawed by magnetic p e r s o n a l i t i e s 
l i k e Lloyd George and Montagu .Norman, and w i t h o u t the .capacity or the experience 
to make a complete success of the Chancellorship. F u r t h e r . l i g h t on t h i s p e r i o d 
and on Home's r e l a t i o n s w i t h h i s o f f i c i a l s i s .gained from the events l e a d i n g up 
3 
to the p u b l i c a t i o n of the B a l f o u r Note i n 1922, which w i l l be examined l a t e r . 
The next Chancellor was Baldwin, who held o f f i c e i n Bonar Law's M i n i s t r y 
from October 1922 u n t i l May 1923, and then combined the o f f i c e w i t h t h a t of Prime 
M i n i s t e r u n t i l August 1923. Baldwin had long had close connections w i t h the 
Treasury; he. was Bonar Law's Parliamentary P r i v a t e Secretary from 1916 t o 1917, 
F i n a n c i a l Secretary t o the Treasury from 1917 u n t i l 1921, and President of the 
Board of Trade from 1921 u n t i l 1922. For a few months i n 1923, and then from 
November 1924- onwards, he was Prime M i n i s t e r . Thus, except f o r the p e r i o d of the 
Labour Government, Baldwin was connected w i t h the work of the Treasury t o a g r e a t e r 
or a lesser degree throughout our p e r i o d . Yet, apart from the American debt 
settlement, made by Baldwin while he was Chancellor s he seems i n f a c t t o have 
made l i t t l e impact on the course of economic p o l i c y i n t h i s country during our 
p e r i o d . Two notable f a c t s about Baldwin emerge from the biographies and 
1. Boyle, Montagu Norman, p. 150. 
2. Ibid.. 
3. See below, pp. 2.45-254-. 
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contemporary records: whether they.,are connected or not must be a matter f o r 
i n d i v i d u a l judgement. One i s t h a t he was, while at the Treasury, and a f t e r , 
d u r i n g h i s years as Prime M i n i s t e r , on e x c e l l e n t terms w i t h the Treasury o f f i c i a l s ; 
h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Fisher has already been mentioned, as a p a r t i c u l a r instance, 
and he was also on e x c e l l e n t terms w i t h Montagu Norman. Evidence f o r t h i s 
abounds. Norman's biographer records the existence of a rambling club of 
Treasury o f f i c i a l s , c a l l e d 'the Tramps', who, on weekends i n the l a t t e r p a r t of 
the 'twenties, would meet Baldwin.and Norman at a convenient pub, and then go t o 
Baldwin's house t o sing madrigals; these gatherings were p u r e l y s o c i a l ones, and 
1 
no-'shop-' was t a l k e d . 
Fisher was, as we have' seen, a f i r m f r i e n d and supporter of Baldwin from 
h i s e a r l y Treasury days, and was d e l i g h t e d when he became Prime M i n i s t e r i n 1923. 
Thomas Jones has recorded h i s experiences on the day Baldwin took o f f i c e : 
"...we trooped along t o No. 11 [ t h e Chancellor's residence^) t o o f f e r 
our c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s . . On the way we ran i n t o .Warren Fisher and Boyd 
Carpenter on the same errand.„.,..We found the new P.M. very s e l f -
conscious i n h i s f r o c k coat, surrounded by h i s w i f e and daughters. ^ 
'Thank God,' shouted Warren Fisher w i t h the f e r v o u r of an Archdeacon." 
Fisher r e t a i n e d h i s close contacts w i t h Baldwin, and continued t o keep him 
informed on f i n a n c i a l matters; some of the l e t t e r s on the Treasury f i l e s , and i n 
Baldwin's p r i v a t e papers, suggest a degree of d i r e c t communication, bypassing 
the Chancellor, which one would judge not t o be i n accord w i t h normal o f f i c i a l 
3 
p r o t o c o l . Other o f f i c i a l s , t o o , seem t o have l i k e d and admired Baldwin; there 
i s , f o r i n s t a n c e , a l e t t e r i n Baldwin's p r i v a t e papers frem S i r John Bradbury, 
c o n g r a t u l a t i n g him on the Budget of 1923, which Bradbury judged t o be a sound one. 
He recommended t h a t Baldwin should pay no heed t o c r i t i c i s m from other q u a r t e r s , 
since i n h i s experience a good budget was n e a r l y always unpopular, and a popular 
budget n e a r l y always a bad one.^ 
1 0 Boyle, Montagu Norman, p. 191. 
2. Jones, W h i t e h a l l Diary. Vol. I , , 1916-25. p. 237, e n t r y f o r 22 May, 1923. 
.3. See above, p., 21. 
4. Baldwin Papers, v o l . 159, Bradbury t o Baldwin, 19 Apr., 1923. 
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The other p r i n c i p a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which i s of g r e a t i n t e r e s t t o us i s the 
very great d i f f i c u l t y which Baldwin had i n coming t o a d e c i s i o n on any given matter 
without c l e a r d i r e c t i o n from others. This seems to have been very pronounced i n 
h i s e a r l y days; Andrew ( l a t e r S i r Andrew) MacFadyean, who served under Keynes i n 
!A ! d i v i s i o n during the war, has recorded an i n c i d e n t which i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s 
p o i n t ; 
" I remember Keynes e x p a t i a t i n g once on the obvious d i f f i c u l t y Baldwin 
had i n making up h i s mind f o r h i m s e l f . Ti r e d of making i t up f o r him, 
Keynes wrote a memo on a question of some importance which he suggested 
M i n i s t e r s must decide. There were two courses between which a choice 
must be made; the pros and cons of each course were Jfull-y-set out "and 
by no h i n t d i d Keynes, suggest-which i n .his ..opinion was the b e t t e r 
cours"e„ i n due.time the -file..reached .Baldwin, and when he had r e a d . i t 
he sent f o r Keynes. For h a l f an hour the matter was discussed from 
every angle u n t i l , when Keynes had volunteered no o p i n i o n of h i s own 
Baldwin s a i d , ' I f you were i n my place would you do A or B? 1 Keynes 
was not o f t e n beaten, but on t h a t occasion he capitulated!"'' 
Baldwin was F i n a n c i a l Secretary a t t h i s time*, but h i s r e p u t a t i o n f o r being 
slow t o make decisions remained at l e a s t u n t i l h i s appointment t o the Premiership. 
Thomas Jones, i n the d i a r y e n t r y already.quoted, comments: 
-At 3.30 t o No. 10 .^ Downing-...St.„3 and discovered t h a t Stanley Baldwin 
had been summoned t o the •.Pa\laee;„...„.ahd ,was to be the new P.M. ...All of 
us astonished a t the swiftness .,of h i s ascent.. .Six years i n o f f i c e . . .A 
p l a i n man, domesticated l i k e B.L. fB6nar-.Law3, fond of books and..musie 
and walks i n the...country. . N o t h i n g - l i k e B.L. 's b r a i n - much slower and 
always eager, t o consult one or two others before coming t o a d e c i s i o n ; 
but stands by h i s d e c i s i o n onGe taken."2 
I t i s impossible i n the compass of a page or two to sum up adequately the 
character of such a complex and i n many ways unknown man,, even t o h i s f r i e n d s . 
Grigg, who was on the best of terms w i t h him, comments t h a t "many of those who 
knew him best f e l t there was i n him .a reserved chamber i n t o which they could 
3 
never e n t e r . " One can only hope t o attempt a .glimpse of p a r t i c u l a r f a c e t s of 
such a p e r s o n a l i t y which have importance f o r t h i s study. 
1. MacFadyean, Recollected i n T r a n q u i l l i t y , p. 63. 
2. Jones, W h i t e h a l l Diary. Vol. I . 1916-25, p. 237, e n t r y f o r 22 May, 1923. 
3o Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p. 107. 
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One important aspect was h i s l a c k of sureness of touch i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 
One who knew him w e l l a t t h i s time., Lord Eustace Percy., has r e l a t e d an I n c i d e n t 
i n 1928, I n which President Coolidge had issued an. ill-mannered statement about 
the Anglo-French naval agreement. Percy proposed sending an explanation of the 
f a c t s , r a t h e r than a c u r t r e t o r t ; Baldwin r e p l i e d , "Don't argue w i t h a man who 
i s n ' t a gentleman when he loses h i s temper." ..Grigg, who was one of Baldwin's 
most ardent admirers, has commented: 
"Mr. Baldwin's successes were u s u a l l y i n the domestic sphere, while 
h i s f a i l u r e s were o u t s t a n d i n g l y i n the f i e l d of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . . . . W i t h ^ 
f o r e i g n e r s , he was n o t - a t homes He-did not understand them and was 
prone t o d i s t r u s t them."? 
Other f a c e t s of Baldwin's p e r s o n a l i t y , which-are c l o s e l y l i n k e d , are 
i n d i c a t e d i n a s i g n i f i c a n t passage of Percy's, commenting on Baldwin's a t t i t u d e 
t o Lloyd George, and h i s experiences i n the C o a l i t i o n Government: 
"...he t o l d me how he had sat i n t h a t Cabinet as a 'new boy', saying 
l i t t l e , but watching what went on, and wondering whether the 
government of England 'would ever be clean again'... [ t h i s judgement^ 
a f f e c t e d h i s whole subsequent a t t i t u d e t o p o l i t i c a l problems. His 
pre-occupation... . w i t h the education of the Labour party' as the source 
of the a l t e r n a t i v e government of the f u t u r e , arose from a sense, not 
merely of the Labour p a r t y ' s rawness, but r a t h e r of the moral r i s k s 
run by a l l p a r t i e s i n the t r a n s i t i o n between an o l d order and a new. 
I n t h a t connection, h i s mind played c o n s t a n t l y round the half-myth of 
the ' l o s t generation' - the idea t h a t t h e gradual supersession of age . . 
by youth, the n a t u r a l way i n which t r a d i t i o n Is. preserved and t r a n s m i t t e d , 
had been almost f a t a l l y i n t e r r u p t e d by the c a s u a l t i e s of the war. 
Indeed, I t h i n k t h a t - t h e c h i e f c r i t i c i s m t h a t might be made of 
Baldwin's record i s t h a t he tended t o measure a l l problems by t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n t o the i n t e g r i t y of the p a r t y which he led...when l a t e r , i n 
discussing the I n d i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problem, he expressed t o me h i s 
determination not t o allow the Conservative p a r t y t o be s p l i t over 
I n d i a as the o l d L i b e r a l p a r t y had been s p l i t over I r e l a n d , I confess 
t h a t , although I agreed w i t h h i s I n d i a n p o l i c y , I almost gasped at the 
apparent inadequacy of the motive. 
I s o l a t i o n i s m , an obsession w i t h moral r e c t i t u d e and w i t h the we l l b e i n g of the 
Conservative g a r t y , and a deep consciousness of the ravages of the war upon the 
generation of h i s j u n i o r s : t h i s passage has been quoted at l e n g t h because i t 
1. Percy, Some Memories, p. 34« 
2. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p„ 108. 
3. Percy, op. c i t . . pp. 89-90. 
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summarises so many of Baldwin's p r i n c i p a l q u a l i t i e s . Another w r i t e r has seen 
elements of the l a s t aspect i n Baldwin's 'anonymous' c o n t r i b u t i o n of £120,000 
towards the repayment of the N a t i o n a l Debt i n 1920, suggesting t h a t the gesture 
"expresses the r a t h e r desperate s a c r i f i c i a l mood i n which responsible 
men approached the f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , a mood i n which there was much 
anguished t a l k about Treasury control."'' 
The i m p l i c a t i o n i s c l e a r l y t h a t those who had had t o allow others' t o s u f f e r f o r 
them i n wartime f e l t a need t o atone f o r t h e i r f e e l i n g s of g u i l t by v o l u n t a r i l y 
undergoing a u s t e r i t y i n peacetime 0 
C e r t a i n l y Baldwin's a t t i t u d e s while at the Treasury accord w i t h t h i s judgement 
and suggest t h a t he was i n complete agreement w i t h the o f f i c i a l view of p u b l i c 
expenditure. For instance, i n a paper c i r c u l a t e d t o the Cabinet i n November 1922, 
urging economy and t h r i f t on h i s colleagues, he asserted: 
"Money taken f o r Government purposes i s money taken away from trade 
and borrowing w i l l thus tend t o depress trade and increase unemployment."^ 
Baldwin's per i o d as Chancellor, b r i e f though i t was, saw a c o n t i n u a t i o n w i t h 
considerable success of the p o l i c y of reducing the f l o a t i n g debt; i n the t e n 
months of Baldwin's tenure of o f f i c e the volume of Treasury b i l l s was reduced 
from £735 m i l l i o n t o £599, and the t o t a l of f l o a t i n g debt from £922 m i l l i o n t o 
3 1 £797 m i l l i o n . There seems l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s c o n t i n u i n g r e d u c t i o n i n 
N a t i o n a l Debt, as w e l l as being a c e n t r a l p a r t of Treasury p o l i c y , was also 
i n accordance w i t h Baldwin's own views. 
" I n the l i g h t of Treasury p o l i c y at the time, these reductions must 
be regarded as considerable successes. Whether the aims themselves were 
best f o r the economy as a whole is- another matter. No Chancellor of the 
peri o d questioned the assumptions aor d i d Baldwin assert h i s independence, 
even i f he had wished t o , during h i s short seven months of o f f i c e . " ^ 
1. Roseveare, The Treasury, p. 259. 
2. P.R.O., Cabo24-/l4.0, C.P.4-314-, note by Baldwin on the necessity f o r 
N a t i o n a l Economy, 20 Nov., 1922. 
3. E.V. Morgan, B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 191A-1925 (London: Macmillan and Co., 
1952), p. 147. 
4o Middlemass, K., and Barnes, J„, Baldwin (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1969), p. 156. 
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The man who f o l l o w e d Baldwin as Chancellor, N e v i l l e Chamberlain, was only 
i n o f f i c e f o r f i v e months, and l i t t l e o f note happened during h i s p e r i o d as 
Chancellor,, Grigg served under him during t h i s period,.and d u r i n g h i s second, 
much longer term of o f f i c e as Chancellor was i n close contact w i t h him. He 
comments: 
"...he was clear-sighted.and competent w i t h perhaps a l e a n i n g t o 
orthodoxy and a d i s l i k e . o f h i g h - f l y i n g . He was a pleasant c h i e f 
though shy and reserved, so t h a t those who worked f o r him could 
r a r e l y d i s c e r n the humanity .and k i n d l i n e s s t h a t were undoubtedly 
t h e r e . Sometimes they shone through the cloud...Nevertheless, 
reserve was the normal a t t i t u d e and I am not sure t h a t i t d i d not 
lead t o a c e r t a i n f a l l i b i l i t y i n h i s judgement of- persons ancTas~ 
a c o r o l l a r y t o a l a c k of sureness i n appraising p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n s . 
Another colleague has commented t h a t on the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e level, , the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
2 
between Chamberlain and h i s o f f i c i a l s was "almost p e r f e e t , i f somewhat s o u l l e s s . " 
N e v i l l e Chamberlain l e f t the Treasury i n .January T92/+ when, a f t e r a General 
E l e c t i o n h a s t i l y c a l l e d by Baldwin on the p r o t e c t i o n issue, the Labour Party formed 
a government f o r the f i r s t time. The new Chancellor was P h i l i p Snowden. The 
advent of a Labour Government might have been expected t o cause some f l u t t e r i n g 
i n the Treasury dovecotes, but Snowden soon a l l a y e d a l l qualms. 
" I n the f i s c a l and f i n a n c i a l , realm, Government p o l i c y was e n t i r e l y 
dominated by Mr. Snowden. This meant t h a t i t was more r a d i c a l than 
s p e c i a l i s t and p r e t t y orthodox r a d i c a l a t that...New s o c i a l expend-
i t u r e was on a safe and unflamboyant scale, and both the r a t h e r 
tiresome outbiddings of the L i b e r a l s and the grumbles of the Clyde 
about n o n - f u l f i l m e n t of pledges were taken p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . The 
most i n the way of rashness Mr. Snowden ever permitted himself was 
t o accept a p r i v a t e member's motion i n p r i n c i p l e , while making i t 
p l a i n t h a t f u l f i l m e n t must await the appearance of more money. 
Snowden's a c c e p t a b i l i t y on a p o l i t i c a l l e v e l was matched by h i s q u a l i t i e s as an 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r and a M i n i s t e r . Grigg describes him as a man of courage, s u r p r i s i n g 
charm and humour, and complete i n t e g r i t y , and goes on: 
1„ Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p. 119. 
2. P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o the author. 
3. Grigg, op. c i t . . p. 133. 
71. 
"Of a l l the M i n i s t e r s I have ever known.,,- he .was e a s i l y the most 
popular w i t h the C i v i l Servants who Worked f o r him„ This i s not 
very s u r p r i s i n g . . I n the f i r s t place he was the i d e a l of what a 
M i n i s t e r should be i n t h a t he ..gave a c l e a r l e a d on a l l questions 
of p o l i c y , i n t e r f e r e d r a r e l y , " i f a t a l l , i n matters' of admin i s - • 
t r a t i o n , gave decisions q u i c k l y and unequivocally, and.then 
defended h i s ' d e c i s i o n s against a l l comers w i t h confidence and 
vigour - and u s u a l l y w i t h success. C i v i l Servants, i n f a c t , 
knew e x a c t l y where they were w i t h him and could r e l y a b s o l u t e l y 
on h i s courage, and good f a i t h t o defend h i s own act i o n s and 
t h e i r s . When there i s added personal charm, humour and r e a l 
k i n d l i n e s s and, t o h i s subordinates,,, gentleness as w e l l as 
s t r e n g t h , can i t be wondered t h a t he i s the most beloved of a l l 
the many M i n i s t e r s I have served or known?"'' 
This d e s c r i p t i o n o f Snowdon as being beloved of h i s C i v i l Servants i s 
confirmed by another colleague, "who remembers h i s being doubly welcome on h i s 
r e t u r n t o the Treasury i n 1929, f i r s t f o r h i s own q u a l i t i e s , and secondly as a 
contra s t t o h i s predecessor: the Snowden p e r i o d gave.the Treasury a chance t o 
recover from "the t u r b u l e n t and unpredictable Winston C h u r c h i l l regime which had 
2 
de f i e d a l l normal assessments." Snowden's f i r s t p e r i o d of o f f i c e l a s t e d only 
u n t i l October 1924, t o be succeeded by C h u r c h i l l , who remained i n o f f i c e u n t i l 
1929. Quite e a r l y i n h i s term of o f f i c e Thomas Jones recorded t h a t "Grigg has 
not found Winston so malleable as Horne or Snowden" and there i s abundant evidence 
t o suggest t h a t the G h u r c h i l l p e r i o d was something of a traumatic experience f o r 
a l l concerned. An example i s the discussions which took place i n ; the months 
immediately before the r e t u r n t o the Gold Standard i n 192.5, which w i l l be discussed 
i n d e t a i l l a t e r . I t seems, t o o , t h a t the problem was not a l l on one sid e : t o begi: 
w i t h , a t l e a s t , C h u r c h i l l was no happier w i t h h i s new environment than h i s new 
colleagues were w i t h him. 
"When I held other o f f i c e s under the Crown, I could always f i n d out 
where I was. Here I'm l o s t and reduced t o groping."4 
1. Griggj Prejudice and Judgements p. 133. 
2. P r i v a t e i n f o r m a t i o n t o the author. 
3. Grigg, op. c i t . . p. 315» 
4-o Boyie, Montagu Norman, p. 189; recounted t o Boyle by Lady Asquith. 
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Niejiieyer's sometimes peremptory a t t i t u d e , and Fisher's h a b i t of going behind 
1 
C h u r c h i l l ' s back t o 'rep o r t ' t o Baldwin must have exacerbated the problems; even--
i f C h u r c h i l l was not a c t u a l l y apprised of Fisher's a c t i v i t i e s , i t i s hard t o 
imagine t h a t he can have been t o t a l l y unaware of h i s Permanent Secretary 5s 
a t t i t u d e „. 
However, some o f f i c i a l s were more adaptable than others, and Grigg soon came 
to appreciate the q u a l i t i e s of his new chief,, C h u r c h i l l ' s working methods were 
q u i t e u n l i k e anything Grigg had ever encountered before, and he was allowed a 
l a t t i t u d e of expression t h a t was also something new to the .Private- Secretary,- — 
"fWinston^ d i s l i k e d g i v i n g snap decisions on cases stat e d o r a l l y . 
Nevertheless, he d i d indulge i n a great deal of personal d i s c u s s i o n 
during which he could t a l k himself i n t o a knowledge and understanding 
of any t o p i c or problem which came before him. The l a s t duty of his 
p r i v a t e o f f i c e a t n i g h t was t o f i l l a box w i t h the papers and 
correspondence which r e q u i r e d h i s d i r e c t i o n , so t h a t i t could be put 
a t h i s bedside w i t h h i s breakfast when he woke i n the morning. I n 
t h i s he would browse f o r , say, an hour u n t i l a shorthand w r i t e r came 
t o get the r e s u l t s of h i s ruminations. He would then d i c t a t e minutes 
on the papers i n the box or on anything else which occurred t o him -
l a r g e or small, grave or gay. The range of h i s o f f i c i a l i n t e r e s t s 
alone was extraordinary,.,.The morning minutes were, of course, the 
primary agency f o r a i r i n g the ideas, many of them o r i g i n a l , some of 
them s t a r t l i n g l y o r i g i n a l , which sprang up i n t h a t teeming b r a i n . 
They were intended t o go t o the appropriate branch or department f o r 
examination and r e p o r t . . One of, the jobs of the more s p e c i f i c a l l y 
Treasury p r i v a t e secretary was t o suggest t o h i s master t h a t not a l l 
of these-were' Worthy of "serious" examination or t h a t t° i n v e s t i g a t e so 
many at the same time would. place ..an impossible burden on the o f f i c i a l s 
concerned. Occasionally I was allowed, a f t e r argument, to suppress" h i s 
minutes, but more o f t e n than n o t , Winston refused t o abandon a p r o j e c t 
u n t i l the department experts had convinced him t h a t i t was worthless or 
inexpedient. And q u i t e a number of them were never abandoned but 
survived, though perhaps modified considerably, t o become p a r t of h i s 
adopted p o l i c y . " ^ 
One can understand, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the o f f i c i a l s must have found C h u r c h i l l 
a somewhat wearing master. Even Grigg was c r i t i c a l of C h u r c h i l l ' s l a c k of 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n : 
1* See above, pp. 54-55. 
2i Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, pp. 175-6. 
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" I have sometimes thought t h a t h i s c r i t i c a l f a c u l t i e s stopped s h o r t of 
h i s own c h i l d r e n , and t h a t the best service those who worked f o r him 
could provide was t o ensure t h a t he was given time t o discover f o r 
himself which were- the weaklings among the o f f s p r i n g of h i s own b r a i n . 
This process of Spartan exposure was sometimes a rough one f o r what he 
c a l l e d the a l g u a z i l s as w e l l as f o r the i d e a s } and many of my r e c o l -
l e c t i o n s are of heated and even v i o l e n t arguments w i t h Winston. On 
h i s side, the heat n e a r l y always disappeared the moment the argument 
was suspended, and sometimes he showed an unexpected measure of patience 
and p l a c i d i t y w i t h h i s too p e r s i s t e n t servants. On one occasion I 
r e c a l l having been provoked i n t o r e t o r t s which went f a r beyond the 
l a t i t u d e allowed t o equals l e t alone subordinates, but i n s t e a d of 
g e t t i n g the sack, as I deserved, a l l t h a t happened was a somewhat 
pained look over the top of h i s spectacles and the m i l d e s t of exhort-
a t i o n s : 'Don't be so c o n t r o v e r s i a l . 1 " ' ' 
Grigg goes on t o quote another in s t a n c e , t h i s time of a note w r i t t e n t o him by 
the Chancellor a f t e r one of these b a t t l e s % 
"P.J.: Always be assured t h a t our f r i e n d s h i p i s proof against a l l 
minor t i f f s . But make allowances f o r the e f f e c t of suddenly p u l l i n g 
me up w i t h a round t u r n , and f o r c i n g me t o some measure of s e l f -
defence - however m i l d . 'Cet animal. ..etc.'- Yours ever. W." 
Grigg c e r t a i n l y found such experiences s t i m u l a t i n g , but they could be f r u s t r a t i n g 
too: 
"Altogether, nothing can. take, away from the g r a t i t u d e f o r the f r a n k 
and equal intimacy which Winston allowed me. When I say equal, I 
mean only t h a t the ..master d i d not take advantage of h i s p o s i t i o n of 
a u t h o r i t y and t h a t he conceded the utmost freedom of speech. On the 
other hand he also exercised the utmost freedom of speech and as he was 
a magnificent r h e t o r i c i a n , the servant was very o f t e n worsted =- sometimes 
even when he was r i g h t . " 3 
Despite h i s a f f e c t i o n f o r C h u r c h i l l the man, the d i f f i c u l t i e s which Grigg 
experienced w i t h C h u r c h i l l the a d m i n i s t r a t o r and policy-maker are evident i f one 
reads between the lines.- A man of i n d i s c r i m i n a t e enthusiasms, who l i k e d t o have 
a l l the arguments f o r and against a d e c i s i o n put to him at l e n g t h and i f necessary 
discussed i n t e r m i n a b l y , and w i t h the a b i l i t y t o debate so e f f e c t i v e l y t h a t he o f t e n 
won the argument even when he was, from the o f f i c i a l s ' p o i n t of view, i n the wrong, 
inconsistent,, t u r b u l e n t , and fond of r h e t o r i c : such a man can h a r d l y expect t o be 
w e l l regarded by the average c i v i l servant w i t h a job t o do. 
1. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p. 176. 
2. I b i d , 
3. I b i d . , P.. 177. 
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One l a s t comment by Grigg w i l l suffice both to conclude our b r i e f look at 
Churchill's behaviour i n office., and our survey of the Chancellors i n general. 
Grigg served as Private Secretary to a l l the Chancellors of our period except 
Bonar Law and Austen Chamberlain; looking back over t h i s time he comments: 
" I notice that, with Winston's advent, the character of my recollections 
changes. Instead of being centred mainly on events and only second-
a r i l y on persons. I f i n d them clustered round a single dominating 
personality. 
This i s hardly surprising, but i t lends some support to the supposition that 
during our period the Chancellors succeeded one another i n such baffling_ r a p i d i t y 
that the continuity provided by the o f f i c i a l s became unusually 
important, and that Churchill, who only took o f f i c e f i v e months before the l a s t 
major policy event of our period, the return to the Gold Standard, was the only 
one of our Chancellors r e a l l y to impress his own personality upon policy-making 
i n the Treasury during the 'twenties. 
Treasury Attitudes 
Perhaps the most important and obvious point to be made i n summarising the 
evidence of t h i s material on the structure, organisation and attitudes of the 
Treasury, i s the significance of t r a d i t i o n a l influences and h i s t o r i c a l precedents 
within the Treasury. This i s demonstrated i n a number of d i f f e r e n t ways. F i r s t l y , 
as we have seen, before a decision could be taken on a p a r t i c u l a r problem, any 
relevant material on that and similar cases had to be collected together f o r the 
benefit of the person taking the decision. The search f o r similar cases was not 
r e s t r i c t e d to the recent past: i t w i l l be remembered that one of the papers 
commissioned during the discussions over the return to the Gold Standard was on 
the subject of the return to the Gold Standard af t e r the Napoleonic Wars. There 
was thus a strong i n b u i l t tendency f o r patterns of decision-making to remain 
1. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement, p. 174-. 
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unchanged. Secondly, the way i n which junior entrants to the Treasury were 
trained tended to i n s t i l i n t o them the t r a d i t i o n s of the Department by gradual 
stages i n a f a i r l y painless way; ..at l e a s t . i n the Finance Divisions, there were 
normally two Principals to. one..Assistant Pr i n c i p a l , and the junior would be 
j o i n t l y responsible to his two seniors. Thirdly, and linked with t h i s , the 
way i n which business was carried out l e n t i t s e l f to the .absorption of t r a d -
i t i o n a l methods by the younger members'. Drafts' which they, had w r i t t e n f o r 
letters- or memoranda would be annotated or corrected by the senior man, and the 
d r a f t remained on the f i l e , so that the junior could see each time he read the 
f i l e how his ideas,and suggestions d i f f e r e d from those of his superiors'. One 
contemporary remembers that when he ..was an Assistant Principal, he had an o f f i c e 
which was located i n between the offices of his two Principals, with connecting 
doors to each,.and when he. wrote a draft-which needed .amending the senior would 
come i n t o his room and discuss the problem with him informally, and leave 
the d r a f t f o r alterations to be made. One can see how such a system i s l i a b l e 
to enhance the importance of t r a d i t i o n and precedent, and i t i s the view of 
several of those who served i n the Treasury at the time that t h i s was i n f a c t 
the case. This emphasis on. t r a d i t i o n had, of course, many disadvantages, even i n 
terms of the o f f i c i a l s ' a b i l i t y to cope with problems presented .to -themj the lack 
of adaptability which i t tended to produce or encourage seems to- have been a 
contributory factor i n the d i f f i c u l t i e s which the Treasury encountered during 
Winston Churchill'-a term of o f f i c e . 
Another factor which i s not immediately obvious but which emerges quite 
f o r c i b l y both from the f i l e s and from the evidence of contemporaries i s the 
importance of the p i v o t a l position of the Chancellor's Private Office. The 
young men who staffed t h i s part of the Treasury acted as a buffer between t h e i r 
Chancellor and a l l comers, including, on occasion, senior o f f i c i a l s i n t h e i r own 
Department. When Parliament was s i t t i n g , they would accompany t h e i r chief to the 
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House i n the afternoons, and often would be the only Treasury o f f i c i a l s available 
to give advice to the Chancellor when matters concerning his province came up 
unexpectedly. As we have noted, t h i s p i v o t a l position was of p a r t i c u l a r importance 
i n r e l a t i o n to the c l i e n t departments of the Treasury,, the Boards of the. Inland 
Revenue and of Customs and Excise. The continuity of holders of the Private 
Secretary posts during our period must have enhanced s t i l l f urther the importance 
of t h i s already prominent -Office. 
One facet of Treasury l i f e which seems to have ..undergone some change during 
the war i s the position of the Financial Secretary. The influence of t h i s post 
waned during the war, and t h i s Minister tended to be l e f t with the 'hack' work, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when his relationship with the Chancellor was not too c o r d i a l . This 
si t u a t i o n persisted after the -war, .and i t i s rare to f i n d documents i n the f i l e s 
on policy matters which have been through the Financial Secretary's hands, as f a r 
as one can judge. 
Relations with other Departments and with the Bank seem on the whole to have 
been cordial at the senior l e v e l during our period; the f a c t that the Treasury 
i s a senior Department, and the Chancellor usually .a man of considerable 
m i n i s t e r i a l experience and weight i n his-party, tends to contribute to t h i s 
harmony. The main exceptions during, our period occurred with the 'new' Departments 
set up during the war, where the arguments about levels of expenditure reached much 
higher i n the Treasury echelons than was normal with such matters, l a r g e l y because 
what was at stake was by no means of the 'candle-ends' type of savings which the 
Treasury was normally engaged .in t r y i n g to extract from other Departments. 
As we have seen, the work of the Treasury involved three main categories: 
these were dealt with by, respectively, the Departments of Supply, Establishments 
and Finance. Of these, the work of the Supply and Establishments Departments was 
rarel y concerned with the making of policy; occasionally t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s would 
have the effe c t of negating a policy decision made i n some other Government 
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Department, but as f a r as policy-making i n a positive sense i n the economic sphere 
i s concerned, i t i s prim a r i l y the Finance Department with which we.have to deal. 
From the point of view of personalities, a consideration of the Finance Divisions 
f a l l s i n t o three phases i n our period: the f i r s t , from the end of the war u n t i l 
the reorganisation of Treasury structure i n 1919. i s one i n which several.men are 
active, but no_one man has impressed .his stamp oh the period. Following t h i s 
are the two phases during which the Finance Department i s dominated by the 
personality of i t s Controller, the more so since., as we .have noted, the Treasury 
was even at t h i s stage very 'security conscious-'-,- and i t was therefore primarily 
with these men that the Chancellors would discuss o f f i c i a l policy. Despite the 
in d i v i d u a l personality differences, however, the two men, together with Bradbury, 
who was much involved i n the post-war period, and Fisher, who was Permanent 
Secretary from the time Bradbury l e f t u n t i l a f t e r 1925, had a great deal i n 
common i n terms of background-and education. Two of them were educated at public 
schools, the other two .at schools of the 'directr.grant' type; a l l four had 
received the benefits of a. classical education .at either Oxford or Cambridge. 
This commonality of education and experience, which was shared by most of t h e i r 
juniors, was another very strong.factor i n promoting the homogeneity of the 
Department and the consistency of i t s advice. 
Thus the impression which one gains from an examination of the Treasury 
during the period from 1918 to 1925 i s of a small;, f r i e n d l y place, i n which 
most of the s t a f f had much common experience, and i n which t r a d i t i o n played a 
very important part. I t might be thought that t h i s emphasis on t r a d i t i o n would 
be rather s t u l t i f y i n g to a junior; on the whole, t h i s seems not to have been the 
case. The commonality of experience must have helped; so, too, did the insidious 
nature of the absorption process, so that a junior did not r e a l l y notice how l i k e 
his superiors he was becoming. Another point i s that the contact between seniors 
and juniors was so close, and the seniors' knowledge of the juniors' work and 
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a b i l i t y so great, that on the whole merit and hard work were rewarded by 
appropriate promotion,. and they tended to f e e l that t h e i r a b i l i t i e s were being 
recognised. 
One point which has been impressed upon me by several contemporaries i s the 
importance of the personality of the Chancellor., .and the extent to which the 
Minister could affe c t the character, of the Treasury and-its policy. 
"Because the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer-is so senior -
usually ranking as second or t h i r d i n the Cabinet - the Treasury 
normally gets' the kind of Minister i t needs ..and wants. A Minister 
of i n t e l l i g e n c e and decisiveness, of considerable p o l i t i c a l and 
Parliamentary and other experience, of stature .and authority i n 
his party, i n the House of Commons, and i n the Cabinet. What i t 
d i s l i k e s most i s a weak .and indecisive Chancellor with insuf-
f i c i e n t influence and authority •- which fortunately rarely happens.-
Despite recurrent suggestions that a Chancellor of the Exchequer 
becomes a prisoner of the Department (and especially of the 
'Treasury Knights' at the top) a Chancellor who f a l l s within the 
above description as most do i s clear l y the boss."'' 
At f i r s t glance, t h i s stress on the importance of the personality of the 
Chancellor may seem to contradict the supposition that during our period i t was 
the o f f i c i a l s who had an unusual influence over policy formation. However, 
closer examination suggests -a rather d i f f e r e n t conclusion. The f i r s t of our 
Chancellors, Bonar Law, f u l f i l s the necessary requirements for. a strong Chancellor,, 
as does Sir. Austen Chamberlain; but Bohar Law was much preoccupied with the problems 
of the waging of war during his term' of office., and f o r much of Chamberlain?s time 
as Chancellor he was also deputising f o r Lloyd George during the . l a t t e r ' s absence 
at the Peace Conference. Of the Chancellors who followed him, only Churchill had 
had substantial previous M i n i s t e r i a l experience; t h i s was of course a somewhat 
unusual period p o l i t i c a l l y , covering the ,'government of the second eleven' and 
the f i r s t Labour Ministry, but t h i s does not a l t e r the f a c t s . Thus, whether the 
Treasury l i k e d i t or not, during v i r t u a l l y a l l our period i t had a Chancellor who 
1o Private information to the author. 
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was either much pre-occupied with.problems outside the Treasury, or else had very 
l i t t l e previous experience of o f f i c e . As a r e s u l t , there was a strong tendency 
f o r the factors normally contributing to the superiority of the Chancellor over 
his subordinate o f f i c i a l s to be missing. However, as we have seen, there i s 
l i t t l e evidence that any of the Chancellors-were i n .any sense 'railroaded 5 i n t o 
making decisions with which they were i n fundamental disagreement: a l l the 
evidence suggests' that the Chancellors-, apart from Churchill, who seems to have 
been an exception to every r u l e , were-as orthodox..as the o f f i c i a l s who advised 
them, on matters of economic and f i n a n c i a l policy. 
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Note on Sources f o r t h i s Chapter 
The sources of information necessary to construct t h i s chapter have presented 
some special d i f f i c u l t i e s . Much of the information i s by i t s very nature not 
recorded i n the formal documents of state. Because of t h i s , I have had to r e l y 
heavily on or a l information from some of the few men s t i l l alive who remember 
the period w e l l , and to them I have already expressed my gratitude. Several of 
those who helped me i n t h i s way expressly asked that I should preserve t h e i r 
anonymity, and I have therefore endeavoured to a t t r i b u t e remarks to pa r t i c u l a r 
individuals only where specific permission has been given to me to do so. For 
the re s t , I have had to make extensive use, to a degree which one would not 
normally have considered necessary, of quotations from the works of other p a r t i c -
ipants i n these events, many of whom were either closely involved i n Treasury 
a c t i v i t y , or else knew well some of the people who were. Without the use of 
such information i t would have been v i r t u a l l y impossible to attempt to assess 
some of the more intangible and personal factors involved i n t h i s study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
CURRENCY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGES AFTER 
THE WAR OF 1914-1:8 
Introduction 
The Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges aft e r the War was 
set up i n January 1918 under the j o i n t auspices of the Treasury and the 
Ministry of Reconstruction. I t s Chairman was Lord Gunliffe, r e t i r i n g 
Governor of the Bank of England, and the Committee i s f a m i l i a r l y referred 
to by his name* I t s other members were la r g e l y bankers, the exceptions 
being Sir John Bradbury, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, and 
Professor Pigou, who held the Chair of Economics at Cambridge University., 
The Committee brought out a f i r s t interim- Report, .which contains "the 
1 
bulk of i t s recommendations, i n August 1918, and the f i n a l Report i n 
2 
December 1918. The f i n a l report echoes the e a r l i e r one i n v i r t u a l l y 
every respect. The two main differences are that by the time the second 
Report appeared the Committee considered that the time had come to imple-
ment certain proposals which i t had previously put forward- without sugg-
esting a date f o r t h e i r inception, and that the f i n a l Report extends the 
application of the principles enunciated i n the interim Report to the 
Scottish and I r i s h Banks. The importance of these two Reports" i n any 
consideration of the B r i t i s h Government's f i n a n c i a l and economic policy 
a f t e r the F i r s t World War i s considerable, and an examination of them i s 
an essential preliminary to any detailed discussion of Government policy 
i n other parts of the economic sphere, since the principles on which much 
of t h i s policy i s based are expressed i n t h e i r s t r i c t e s t form by the 
Reports" of the Cunliffe Committee„ 
The Reports' were accepted by the Government, with minor reservations, 
3 
i n December 1919. Their central recommendation was that B r i t a i n should 
return to the Gold Standard as soon as' possible. That t h i s return should 
1. Cd.9142 (LondomH.M.S.Q.,1918). 
2. CmcL4M (London:H„M,S.Q.,1919). 
3. House of Commons Debates, 1919, „CXXIII,cols. 43-46. 
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be at the pre-war p a r i t y was only stated by implication, since the 
question of p a r i t i e s was not discussed. The Committee regarded a 
reduction i n the f l o a t i n g debt and a rapid return to 'normal' 
conditions - that i s , those conditions which were normal before the 
war broke out - i n the f i e l d s of credit creation, State expenditure 
and industry ( p a r t i c u l a r l y those sections most concerned with the 
export trade) as essential prerequisites of t h i s policy. Government 
policy, with only s l i g h t deviations from the straight and narrow, 
proceeded along these lines from the publication of the Report u n t i l 
the return to the _Go I d Standard, which --was -the central recommendation " 
of the Reports, was achieved i n A p r i l 1925. The Report, then, i s of 
special importance i n any consideration of Government action,' especially 
i n 'monetary-,- policy i n the period up to 1925-
The Background to the Reports' 
The Cunliffe Committee was set up as a r e s u l t of discussion between 
the Treasury and the Ministry of Reconstruction as to the best form of 
enunciating policy about currency, cre d i t and the foreign exchanges 
afte r the war was over. Originally a single Committee was intended, but 
Addison suggested that the provision of credit f o r industry should be 
considered independently, and as a resul t t h i s problem was given to a 
1 
separate Committee called the Financial F a c i l i t i e s Committee. • 
Originally the idea that such a Committee or Committees was necessary 
seems to have originated with Lord Balfour's Committee on Commercial and 
2 
In d u s t r i a l Policy a f t e r the War. The f i r s t i nterim Report was presented 
j o i n t l y to the two departments, but by the time the f i n a l Report appeared 
1. The Final Report of the Financial F a c i l i t i e s Committee was issued 
as Cd.9035 (London:H«,M.S.O.,1918). 
2. Cd.9227 (London;H.M.S.0..1918). 
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the Ministry of Reconstruction had been wound up and the Committee had 
come e n t i r e l y under the aegis of the Treasury,, There1 i s some suggestion 
i n the Treasury material on the setting up of the Committee that the 
t o t a l orthodoxy of the Reports" was not e n t i r e l y accidental, and Dr. 
Addison's move to separate the provision of i n d u s t r i a l c r e d i t from the 
Currency problem may have been an astute manoeuvre designed to prevent 
worries about i n f l a t i o n from overshadowing the needs of industry f o r 
1 
reconstruction c a p i t a l . Writing to Sir Austen Chamberlain to ask him 
to take the Chairmanship of the new Committee, Sir John Bradbury notes 
Addison' s i n c l i n a t i o n towards comprehensive and expensive reconstruction 
schemes, and comments: 
"...the primary condition of sound reconstruction i s that 
we should cut our coat according to our cloth and that t o 
embark on a l l sorts of ambitious' programmes of expenditure 
before securing the groundwork of stable finance would be 
to b u i l d upon the sand." 2 
Chamberlain, however, did not i n the event take the chair; that position 
was offered to Walter, f i r s t Baron Gunliffe, who was Governor of the 
Bank of England from 1913 to 1918, and he accepted. 
The Chairman of the Committee 
In his f i n a n c i a l views, Lord Cunliffe had a reputation as a s t r i c t l y 
orthodox Governor. In. his dealings w i t h other men, including the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, he was extremely high-handed. He very nearly came to 
an open breach with Bonar Law i n 1917, over the a c t i v i t i e s of Sir Robert 
Chalmers and. Keynes i n the Exchange control f i e l d . Gunliffe f e l t that 
Keynes and Chalmers were usurping the functions of the London Exchange 
Committee, of which he was chairman; he was p a r t i c u l a r l y v i t r i o l i c about 
1. P-R-0.,T.1/1238/4228. 
2. Ibid... 
Keynes1 behaviour, since.he had been given a verbal promise by McKenna, 
Bonar Law's predecessor, that Keynes "should not meddle again i n City 
matters". Gunliffe therefore wrote d i r e c t to Lloyd George, who was 
his personal f r i e n d , complaining of the a t t i t u d e of these Treasury 
2 
o f f i c i a l s . Bonar Law was extremely angry at t h i s move, reinforced as 
i t was by a l e t t e r from Cunliffe to Bonar Law himself e f f e c t i v e l y 
demanding Chalmers' resignation.' The Chancellor replied, i n uncom-
promising tones, that i n e f f e c t Cunliffe was demanding Bonar Law's own 
resignation, since both o f f i c i a l s were working under his authority, and 
he was responsible f o r t h e i r o f f i c i a l conduct.^ Cunliffe_then committed, 
an inexcusable and i r r e t r i e v a b l e blunder. 
Earlier i n the war, large stocks of gold had been transferred to 
Ottawa f o r safe keeping. Cunliffe wired the Canadian Government that 
i n future no gold was to be given to the B r i t i s h Treasury representative 
i n Canada on demand, and that the whole hoard was to be transferred to 
the Bank of England's account with J0P„ Morgan i n New York. When Bonar 
Law protested, Cunliffe replied i n terms which made i t clear that the 
sole reason f o r t h i s high-handed behaviour was that i t wa.s an act of 
5 
'reprisal' f o r the Treasury's actions over exchange. Further, Cunliffe 
opened and read to the Treasury Committee of the Bank, the telegram i n 
reply from Morgan's - which was addressed to Bonar Law i n person.^-
Bonar Law was furious. He discussed the s i t u a t i o n with the Prime Minister, 
and then set down his views i n w r i t i n g . He was not prepared, he said to 
1 . A. Boyle, Montagu Norman (Cassel & C O 0 , 1 9 6 7 ) S p.1 1 7 . 
2. R„"Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
1 9 5 5 ) , pl352. Cunliffe to Lloyd George, 3 July, 1 9 1 7 . 
3. Boyle, ...op.cit,, pp.1 1 7 - 1 1 8 . 
4-. Blake, Sp. cit.„ p. 3.52. 
5 . I b i d . , p.353. 
6 . Boyle, MpJj__.cit.-, pp. 1 1 8 - 9 . 
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continue as Chancellor without having i n his possession a l e t t e r signed 
by Cunliffe o f f e r i n g to resign at Bonar Law's behest. Cunliffe tempor-
ised at f i r s t , but even Lloyd George could not persuade the Chancellor to 
accept an apology alone, and eventually he got the l e t t e r he had demanded. 
Montagu Norman was at t h i s stage working f a i r l y closely with Cunliffe 
and Boyle's account of Cunliffe's l a s t few months at the Bank gave a p i c t -
ure of a man of extreme arrogance whose behaviour at times had strong 
megalomaniac tendencies." Early i n the autumn he was apparently attemp-
t i n g to ensure that he was allowed to remain as Governor u n t i l the end 
of the war, and to t h i s end he himself collected a Memorial from the 
Clearing Bankers urging that Cunliffe should continue.^ At his f i n a l 
meeting of the Bank's Court, he read a long and embarrassing speech which 
Norman described as 
"eulogizing the Bankers, bum-sucking the press, promising as 
Chairman of the Currency Committee changes by statute i n the Bank 
Charter and Act of 184-4.. .even Cockayne much disgusted with such 
an unfriendly f i n a l e . A dangerous and insane colleague."5 
Norman was not alone i n t h i s view of Cunliffe; other colleagues at the 
Bank also had grave doubts about his behaviour at t h i s period.^ Cert-
ainly he had become t o t a l l y incapable of discussing a problem or of 
allowing his wishes to be questioned: 
"Clear that a l l must bow down to the Governor or r i s k being 
crushed..."7 
wrote Norman i n March 1918. This unwillingness to l i s t e n to others i s 
occasionally apparent i n the Minutes of Evidence of the Cunliffe Comm-
g 
i t t e e , and leading questions were frequently put to witnesses. This 
1. R. Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
1955), PP. 353-354. 
2. A. Boyle, Montagujtorman (Cassel & Co.,1967), pp.119-120. 
3. Boyle, op.cit., pp.120-123. 4-. Boyle, op.cit., pp.121-122. 
5. I b i d . , p.123, entry i n Norman's diary f o r 21 Mar., 1918. 
6. I b i d . . p„120. 
I b i d . , p.122, entry i n Norman's diary f o r 3 Mar., 1918. 
8. See, f o r example, P.R.O., T.185/1, Minutes of 15th meeting, 
27 May, 1918. 
conviction of his own i n f a l l i b i l i t y was to some extent borne out by his 
experience; his formative years at the Bank had been during the period when 
the Gold Standard was working at i t s classical best, and when circumstances 
were p a r t i c u l a r l y favourable to i t s smooth operation. 
The Members of the Committee 
Of the remaining members of the Committee, only three were not bankers 
by profession. None was currently working i n Commerce or Industry; i t had 
early been decided that i t would have been impossible adequately to represent 
commercial and i n d u s t r i a l interests i n the membership of the Committee without 
2 
making i t large and unwieldy. I t was therefore decided to f u l f i l t h i s 
purpose by c a l l i n g witnesses from these quarters. The non-bankers were 
Sir John ( l a t e r Lord) Bradbury, Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 
Lord Inchcape, and Professor Pigou, who held the Chair of Economics at Cambridge. 
Bradbury had been appointed i n 1913 to be Joint Permanent Secretary with special 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Finance, and he remained i n that o f f i c e u n t i l 1919, when he 
was appointed B r i t i s h representative on the permanent Reparations Commission 
set up after the Peace Conference. He was succeeded by Sir Basil Blackett, who 
also took his place on the" Cunliffe Committee f o r the l a s t few meetings. Apart 
from the deliberations of the Committee, the main source of evidence f o r 
Bradbury's opinions are to be found i n the Treasury f i l e s and i n the evidence 
3 
he gave to various Commissions and Committees. Of these l a t t e r , perhaps 
the most important and well-known i s the Macmillan Committee on 
1„ An episode often referred to i n t h i s connection i s the gold loss of 1907, 
when a r i s e i n Bank Rate to 7% brought about a spectacular reversal of the 
flow which "impressed i t s e l f deeply on the minds of the Directors of the 
Bank..." S. Pollard, The Development of the B r i t i s h Economy 1914-1950 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1962), p. 17. 
2. P.R.O., T. 1/1238/4228. Bradbury to Minister of Reconstruction, 23 Jan.,1918. 
3. See above, pp, 4-2-46. 
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•Finance and Industry, which reported i n 1931, and on which he served as 
a member. He found himself unable to sign the Report even with reserv-
ations, and wrote a dissenting report expounding his own views. I t was 
a classic exposition of the orthodox approach; 
" I t i s to the best interests of t h i s country to continue to 
adhere to the inte r n a t i o n a l gold standard at the exi.sti.ng 
p a r i t y , but e f f o r t s should be made to secure by inte r n a t i o n a l 
agreement a better working of that standards.„"2 
I n the domestic f i e l d his views were equally orthodox; 
"The best contribution which the State can make to assist 
industry and to promote employment i s s t r i c t economy i n 
public expenditure and lightening the burden of debt by 
prudent f i n a n c i a l administration,, Attempts_ to give positive. 
- -assistance- by •'diverting 1 i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade from i t s natural 
channels, the State financing of enterprises other than the 
ordinary public s e r v l c e S j or the a r t i f i c i a l cheapening by 
State guarantees of the supply of .capital to particular 
undertakings are more l i k e l y to retard than to accelerate 
the restoration of a healthy and progressive economy." 3 
As to the particular economic d i f f i c u l t i e s which might be expected 
to confront B r i t a i n a f t e r the end of the war, Bradbury was convinced that 
one of the most important was the problem created, by the size of the 
Government-.' s f l o a t i n g debt. I n a memorandum w r i t t e n i n answer to one 
from Addison urging the importance of providing adequate finance f o r 
reconstruction purposes;, i n which i t was implied that t h i s was "not compat-
i b l e with a big e f f o r t at f l o a t i n g debt redemption, he suggested that i n 
fact these two aims were not i n opposition. He stated that the rai s i n g of 
money by taxation to be used to pay o f f debt involves simply a transfer of 
purchasing power from one member of the community to another, and i n so 
fa r as the money taken from the tax-payer i s money which would have been 
spent on consumer a r t i c l e s , and that given to the investor i s re-invested 
i n securities, the c a p i t a l stock of the nation i s actually increased. 
1. Report published as Cmd.3897 (London; H.M.S.O., 1931).. 
2. Cmd.3897, p.281, para.36(l)r 
3» I b i d . , p.281, para.36(5). 
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"The creation of a substantial sinking fund f o r the war debt 
out of revenue i s therefore thoroughly sound from the econ-
omic point of view and w i l l I t s e l f assist the re-establishment 
of industry by r e s t r i c t i n g consumption and increasing the 
demand f o r and making funds available f o r the production of 
new c a p i t a l goods." 1 
Unfortunately t h i s exposition takes no account of the fact that to a 
large extent repayment of the f l o a t i n g debt, and i n particular of Ways 
and Moans advances from the Bank of England, involved an actual destr-
uction of purchasing power. This salient f a c t was recognized by members 
of the Treasury, notably by Blackett, i n other contexts, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
2 
when credit i n f l a t i o n was under discussion. But.Bradbury, -at any- rate, 
seems not to have realised that i f increases i n the f l o a t i n g debt are 
i n f l a t i o n a r y and imply Increases i n purchasing power, decreases i n 
f l o a t i n g debt must involve a f a l l i n purchasing power and d e f l a t i o n . 
Blackett, who replaced Bradbury, was, as we have already noted, a 
rather d i f f e r e n t sort of Treasury man; his evidence before the Select 
Committee on War Wealth i n 1920 shows that he was conscious of the dangers 
inherent i n a rapid def.lat3.on by means of reducing purchasing power 
through a reduction i n the f l o a t i n g debt. 
"Anyone responsible i n any degree f o r a- policy of de f l a t i o n 
must guard with the most careful eye against doing more harm 
than good.." 3 
After" Blackett l e f t the Treasury, he became more and more convinced of 
the dangers inherent to the economic system i n frequent and drastic 
changes i n the value of money, and eventually became a convert to planned 
money. But he was present at only a few meetings of the Cunliffe Committee-, 
and that a f t e r the F i r s t Interim Report had already been published. I n 
1. P.R.O., T.170/125. memo, by Bradbury, 21 Feb., 1918. 
2. Minutes of evidence of Mr. B.-P..; felackeff, takeri ' . ... 
before the Select Committee on Increase i n Wealth (War), House of 
Commons Papers. 1920. (Londons H„MoS„0„, 1920), No. 102... 
3» I b i d . , Minutes of evidence of Mr. B.P. Blackett, Q.154-6. 
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t h a t f i r s t Report considerable s t r e s s i s l a i d on the importance of 
repaying the f l o a t i n g debt as soon as p o s s i b l e , and no mention i s 
made of the possible dangers of such a policy„ I n the F i n a l Report, 
which B l a c k e t t signed, the o n l y mention of t h i s i s a paragraph i n 
r a t h e r l e s s strong terms on the need f o r a b o l i s h i n g Bank Ways and 
Means as a method of escape from a l l but the most temporary d i f f i c -
2 
u l t y . Whether there i s any s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h i s i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
assess, since the discussion of the form the Reports were t o take were 
not recorded i n the Minutes«, 
The second committee member who was not a p r o f e s s i o n a l banker was 
the o n ly economist i n the group, Professor Pigou„ The presence of an 
economist of h i s eminence makes some of the Committee ss omissions, 
notably the f a i l u r e t o q u a l i f y i n any way t h e i r e x p o s i t i o n of the 
•automatic 1 o p e r a t i o n of the Gold Standard i n pre-war days, the f a i l u r e 
t o consider the 'par' question, and the absence of any comprehension of 
the macro-economic i m p l i c a t i o n s of some of t h e i r recommendations, a t 
f i r s t seem r a t h e r remarkable„ But Pigcu i n the years before the war had 
been p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h p a r t s of the d i s c i p l i n e not connected w i t h 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l economics, n o t a b l y i n the w r i t i n g of h i s book on the Econ-
omics of Welfare, During the W<aar he had, indeed, w r i t t e n a book on War 
3 
Finance, but i n t h a t and i n much other w r i t i n g he was p r i m a r i l y concerned 
w i t h the i n e q u i t i e s and i n i q u i t i e s of Government f i n a n c i n g of the war. His 
view was t h a t the extent t o which i n f l a t i o n had taken place, and the more 
dubious ways i n which the Government had expanded c r e d i t f o r i t s own purpose, 
f o r instance by backing Ways and Means advances w i t h t h e i r own s e c u r i t i e s , 
were e n t i r e l y r eprehensible. He also believed t h a t t o pay f o r the war by 
1° 2 ^ 2 1 ^ . p a r a J 7 . 
2„ Cmd.,4.64. para. 5« 
3. A„ Pigou. The^Ecojiamy__and Finance of War (London; J o M „ Dent & Sons, 
1917). 
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borrowing t o the extent the Government had done was h i g h l y i n e q u i t a b l e , 
since i t created an asset which would remain a f t e r the war, and f o r the service 
of which a l l , even the poorest, would be taxed. Since war-costs are a once-
f o r - a l l expenditure, he argued, i t would not be s e r i o u s l y d i s i n c e n t i v e t o t a x 
the r i c h very h e a v i l y i n war-time, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the e f f i c a c y o f 
appeals t o p a t r i o t i s m a t t h a t t i m e. Pigou d i d not, however, develop ways i n 
which the harshness of the debt burden could be averted once i t had been i n c u r r e d . 
I t seems l i k e l y t h a t , i n h i s preoccupation w i t h the dubious nature of Government 
f i n a n c e , Figou became convinced of the necessity of ending t h i s " "'rake's progress 1 
by r e s t o r i n g normal c r e d i t c o n d i t i o n s and by repaying a l a r g e p o r t i o n of the 
Na t i o n a l Debt, w i t h o u t considering f u l l y the harmful e f f e c t s which would 
r e s u l t from the d e f l a t i o n which such a course, e s p e c i a l l y i f p r e c i p i t a t e , 
would produee. 
The other non-banker was a man very well-known i n the C i t y , Lord Inchcape. 
He was o r i g i n a l l y a merchant, was a partner or a D i r e c t o r i n numerous f i r m s 
concerned i n t r a d i n g w i t h the Far East, i n c l u d i n g the Peninsular and Orie n t 
Company, x)f which he was chairman, and had been on numerous o f f i c i a l Committees 
and Commissions before and du r i n g the war. He was a member of the Committee of 
2 
I m p e r i a l Defence i n 1917, and he was a frequent speaker i n the House of Lords. 
His c h i e f pre-occupation i n the Chamber was w i t h Government spending and 
extravagance, which on the whole he seems t o have regarded as necessary 
concomitants of one another. Later he was t o be a member of the famous 
Committee under S i r E r i c Geddes, which wielded the s o - c a l l e d Geddes Axe- w i t h 
3 
such vigour i n 1921-2. His 
1. Pigou, The Economy and Finance of War, pp. 66-83o 
2. D i c t i o n a r y of N a t i o n a l Biography (O.U.P., 1949), Supplementary volume 
f o r 1931-1940, pp. 573-575o 
3. N a t i o n a l Expenditure Committee, Reports published as Cmd.1581 
1582. 1589 (London: H.M.S.O., 1922). 
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o p i n i o n on f i n a n c i a l matters was thus a t any r a t e h i g h l y orthodox, and perhaps 
r e a c t i o n a r y , even i n terms of o p i n i o n i n the 1920s. 
The remaining members of the Committee were a l l bankers of d i f f e r e n t k i n d s ? 
drawn from among the various i n t e r e s t s i n the C i t y . Two- were members of 
p r i v a t e banking f i r m s , among them Rupert Beckett, of the Yorkshire Banking 
house which was one of the few remaining p r i v a t e banks w i t h the r i g h t of note-
issue, and which f i n a l l y merged w i t h Westminster group i n 1920. There was 
one member repres e n t i n g S c o t t i s h banking i n t e r e s t s , and two those of the 
Dominions, from the Banks of Montreal and A u s t r a l a s i a r e s p e c t i v e l y . The- -
merchant banking houses supplied Gaspard F a r r e r , of Baring Brothers and the 
banks w i t h overseas i n t e r e s t s S i r Charles Addis, of the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation. F i n a l l y , t h e re was Goschen, Chairman o f the N a t i o n a l 
P r o v i n c i a l Bank and of the London Clearing Banks Committee. 
P o l i t i c a l and Economic Background t o the Committee's Discussions 
The p e r i o d i n which the Committee was set up and deliberated.was a c r u c i a l 
one f o r the whole h i s t o r y of the i n t e r - w a r p e r i o d . During 1918 and 1919, 
and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the s i x months a f t e r the A r m i s t i c e , p u b l i c o p i n i o n 
g r a d u a l l y turned from p o s i t i v e ideas of Reconstruction towards f e e l i n g t h a t 
the sooner the Government ceased t o i n t e r f e r e i n the economic l i f e of the country 
more than was a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l even i n peace-time, the b e t t e r i t would be f o r 
i n d u s t r y and f o r the economy i n general. Another i n c r e a s i n g l y popular pastime 
was c r i t i c i s m of Government extravagance; demands f o r economy are common i n the 
2 
e d i t o r i a l s of the leading papers of the day. C r i t i c i s m on t h i s count was also 
strong i n the 
1» Economist. XCI, 18 Dec., 1920. 
2. Notably i n the Economist; there i s a leader on the subject i n almost every 
issue i n 1918. 
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Houses of Parliamento Both these ideas found favour w i t h the G u n l i f f e 
Committee, .and on the whole t h e i r a t t i t u d e on these questions, seems to 
have been, very much i n tune w i t h those cu r r e n t a t the t i m e 0 
On the economic f r o n t the period during which the Committee was 
r e p o r t i n g was one of considerable upheaval.,, The absorption of r e t u r n i n g 
s o l d i e r s was completed w i t h remarkably l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y , and the p o s t -
2 
wax* boom gathered way. Prices continued t o r i s e f a s t . From .the p o i n t 
of view of the d e l i b e r a t i o n s of the G u n l i f f e Committee one very important 
event was the de f a c t o abandonment of the Gold Standard i n March 1919 
when the expert of gold was prohibited, except 'under l i c e n c e „ But there 
i s l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n i n the F i n a l Report t h a t the Committee members were 
very conscious of the changes which had taken place between the times of 
the i n t e r i m and f i n a l Reports: and indeed t h i s i s one of the c r i t i c i s m s 
3 
which was made of the f i n a l Report a t the time;, For f u r t h e r e l u c i d a t i o n 
i t i s necessary now t o turn, t o a con s i d e r a t i o n of the evidence given t o 
the Committee, i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n s , and the conclusions which i t reached. 
The Minutes of Evidence of the ,Gunll£fe J^QjMiittees P r e l i m i n a r y Discussion 
The Committee began by devoting several meetings t o a general d i s c u s s i o n 
of the problems f a c i n g them.. They then c a l l e d a number of witnesses, and 
at the same time set up a small sub-committee t o d r a f t p r e l i m i n a r y 
proposals* These proposals and the evidence given so f a r were diseussed 
a t two meetings a t which no minutes were taken, and the f i r s t Report was 
published almost immediately; only f i v e months elapsed between the f i r s t 
meeting and the p u b l i c a t i o n of the f i r s t Report, During the autumn of 
1918 and spring o f 1919 G u n l i f f e was f u l l y occupied w i t h -Reparations 
1. See below, pp 0 182-183. 
2„ The M i n i s t r y of Labour Cost of L i v i n g Index rose from 185 i n January 
1918 t o 225 i n December 1919 ( J u l y 1914-100), Morgan, Studies i n 
B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y .1914--25, p0284.„ 
3, Economist, , ' 0I,XXXIX, 20 Dec, 1919. 
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problems, and the committee d i d not meet again f o r almost a year. Then 
again the same p a t t e r n was followed., w i t h witnesses being c a l l e d , and 
a d i s c u s s i o n of the F i n a l Report a t which no minutes were taken. The 
witnesses were drawn about- e q u a l l y from banking and from commerce and 
i n d u s t r y , w i t h i n a d d i t i o n a number of s p e c i a l i s t s from other f i e l d s . 
No r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of labour i n t e r e s t s was among them; indeed most of 
the Committee's d e l i b e r a t i o n s i n d i c a t e a f e e l i n g t h a t the matters under 
discussion were l a r g e l y the province o f the C i t y and t o a much l e s s e r 
extent of other commercial i n t e r e s t s . 
- - T h e " f i r s t t en meetings, held" ."during February and March 1918, were 
devoted t o general discussion. At the f i r s t meeting Pigou, supported 
by Bradbury, suggested t h a t the question of the exchanges should be 
considered f i r s t , p a r t i c u l a r l y the problem of whether i t would be b e t t e r 
to attempt t o maintain c e r t a i n r a t e s of exchange or t o leave the pound t o 
f l o a t . However, C u n l i f f e , while i n favour of m a i n t a i n i n g the value of 
the pound by o f f i c i a l a c t i o n , thought t h a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o make 
suggestions about t h i s i n advance of the event, and proposed t h a t the 
Committee should consider banking problems f i r s t , and i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
Bank Charter Act of 1844. He was supported, by the other bankers, and 
1 
the proposal accepted. 
One of the p r i n c i p a l problems which, occupied the Committee, o f t e n 
at g r e a t l e n g t h , was the best way of d e a l i n g w i t h panic c a l l s on the Bank, 
which had p r e v i o u s l y l e d on several occasions t o the suspension of the 
2. 
Acto I t was s t r o n g l y f e l t i n the C i t y t h a t a system which was not 
s u f f i c i e n t l y f l e x i b l e t o allow f o r c r i s e s was i n need of -overhaul. 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r the bankers, none of them could agree as t o the best 
1. P .R.O. , T.185/1. minutes of the evidence of C u n l i f f e Committee, 
1st day, 
2 . S i r A l b e r t Feavearyear, The_Pound.^Sterling (2nd edn.; Oxford:Clarendon 
•Press,, 1963), pp,284-286, 293-295, 301 -303. 
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way of p r o v i d i n g f o r c r i s e s , and e v e n t u a l l y the Committee decided t o 
recommend t h a t the Act be retained„ Lord G u n l i f f e had a suggestion of 
h i s own; he wanted the J o i n t Stock Banks t o be compelled, t o hold a 
certain, p r o p o r t i o n of t h e i r l i a b i l i t i e s i n short-term Government stock, 
which could then be discounted a t the Bank a t a penal r a t e i n an 
1 
emergency. There were tw.o main o b j e c t i o n s t o t h i s scheme; one was 
t h a t i t o n l y catered f o r c r i s e s where the p u b l i c demand was f o r notes, 
not f o r c r e d i t only, and the other t h a t i t was i r r e l e v a n t i n .circum-
stances where the banks already held l a r g e balances at the Bank, They 
could then draw on these t o such an extent as t o f o r c e the-Bank-to - ask~~ 
f o r suspension of the "-Act before any penal r a t e notes had been drawn at 
2 
a l l . ' I n any event, G u n l i f f e was not successful i n promoting t h i s scheme, 
and most of the others which were suggested came t o g r i e f f o r s i m i l a r 
reasons, o r because they made i t too easy f o r c r i s i s measures t o be taken 
where no c r i s i s i n f a c t existed.-
Bradbury was l e s s concerned w i t h general problems, and more w i t h the 
post-war . s i t u a t i o n . He had more success w i t h h i s p r o j e c t s , l a r g e l y 
because they were not new ideas at a l l y but consisted i n ur g i n g the 
current orthodoxies w i t h vigour and persistence„ His p r i n c i p a l concern 
was t o r e s t o r e the e f f i c a c y of Bank Rate, and the connection between an 
e x t e r n a l d r a i n and the supply of money i n the domestic market„ 
While other members of the Gommittee took some p a r t i n these d i s c -
ussions, C u n l i f f e , f o l l o w e d by Bradbury and Pigou 3 were the p r i n c i p a l 
contributors„ .Pigou, however, made h i s suggestions mainly i n the form 
of memoranda f o r discussion, and h i s ideas,, though l a r g e l y a toned-down 
v e r s i o n c f the orthodox, do not seem t o have made much impact - perhaps 
1. P .R.O. , T. 1 8 5 / 1 . Minutes of evidence of C u n l i f f e Committee, 2nd day. 
2. I b i d . , appendix t o minutes f o r 2nd day. 
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because people cannot be f o r c e d t o read memoranda, although they are 
o b l i g e d t o l i s t e n t o f e l l o w Committee members' speeches. Pigou-'s main 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i n the e a r l y stages was a memo on the f i d u c i a r y issue a f t e r 
the war, and on c r e d i t c o n t r o l . He was anxious t h a t c r e d i t should not 
be allowed t o continue t o expand a f t e r the war., since the more i t d i d the 
-j 
more d i f f i c u l t i t would be t o d e f l a t e eventually„ A paper on t h i s 
subject was also submitted by Bradbury, who had s i m i l a r a n x i e t i e s , 
although he was p r i n c i p a l l y concerned w i t h the importance of the expansion 
of the note issue„ He suggested t h a t since the p u b l i c had become used t o 
notes i t should be accepted t h a t _ a . r e t u r n t o - t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of gold c o i n 
was unnecessary, and indeed undesirable since increased g o l d reserves 
2 
would be needed.,, I t would t h e r e f o r e be easy t o c e n t r a l i s e a l l the banks' 
gold holdings a t the Bank of England. He f u r t h e r suggested t h a t the 
3 
uncovered note issue should, be reduced, whenever possible^ and t h a t t h i s 
p o l i c y should be • continued u n t i l a reserve of not less than £1.50 m i l l i o n 
gold had been b u i l t up and maintained f o r a t l e a s t a year.'^-
The next few meetings were concerned, w i t h discussing the form o f 
the Bank-Ss accounts, the p o s s i b i l i t y of merging the Banking and Issue 
departments, and the forms and frequency of the accounts issued by the 
J o i n t Stock Banks, At t h i s p o i n t the Committee members decided t h a t 
they could not adequately discuss the Bank of England without being able 
t o discuss i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n ; i t was f o r instance mooted t h a t the Bank 
should have one permanent o f f i c i a l as an a s s i s t a n t t o the Governor, t o 
provide c o n t i n u i t y . The terms of reference of the Committee were t h e r e f o r e 
1 0 P.R.O., T.-185/1, memo, by Pigcu on the f i d u c i a r y issue, 2.6 Feb., 1918. 
2„ I t was g e n e r a l l y accepted i n many of the Committee's discussions t h a t 
the Bank's gold reserves were i n s u f f i c i e n t l y l a r g e before the war. 
3* The d i f f i c u l t y of b u i l d i n g up a reserve of anything approaching t h i s 
f i g u r e pre-war was discussed, w i t h Gokayne, P.R.O., T.185/2, minutes 
of evidence of C u n l i f f e Committee, 21st day. 8 Jul y , 1918. 
4-o P.R.O., T.185/14 memOo by Bradbury on the f i d u c i a r y i s sue, 9 Mar.,1918. 
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modified by the Chancellor, a t C u n l l f f e : s requests, t o include the 
1 
c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Bank,, 
A small sub—committee had been appointed by the Committee at i t s 
f i f t h meeting i n March y and towards the end of t h a t month i t produced 
some p r o v i s i o n a l conclusions f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the Committee, 
although they were not i n fact- discussed u n t i l the end of May. This 
sub—committee consisted of C u n l i f f e , Bradbury, Goschen, and Jeans of 
the Bank of Australasia,, The p r i n c i p a l recommendations of importance . 
were t h a t c r e d i t i n f l a t i o n must be reduced, t h a t government borrowing 
must cease at _once and a-sinking-fund be" e s t a b l i s h e d , t h a t the i n t e r e s t 
r a t e l e v e l should be manipulated w i t h regard t o t h a t i n the other 
p r i n c i p a l f o r e i g n t r a d i n g c o u n t r i e s , and t h a t the uncovered note issue 
should be reduced„ Gold import should be u n c o n t r o l l e d , but g o l d exports 
should onLy be permitted i f the gold had been obtained from the Bank of 
England f o r t h a t purpose; t h i s proposal i s t i e d i n w i t h the recommendation 
t h a t i n t e r n a l gold c i r c u l a t i o n should not be resumed. A r e t u r n to the 
Gold. Standard i s simply assumed; i t i s not e x p l i c i t l y suggested, but i t 
i s c l e a r from the other proposals t h a t the sub-committee took, t h a t one 
2 
f o r granted. 
At the t e n t h meeting the matter of \ 1ritnesses was discussed; numerous 
suggestions were made, and about h a l f o f these were acted upon„ I t was 
suggested t h a t a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of labour i n t e r e s t s should be i n c l u d e d , 
but t h i s d i d not i n f a c t happen. I t was also suggested t h a t each witness 
should be asked t o answer a qu e s t i o n n a i r e , but t h i s proposal was r e j e c t e d . 
Some witnesses put i n memoranda on. which they were questioned; but those 
who d i d not, and o f t e n those who d i d , were asked a set of questions t o 
1. P .R.O. , T .185 /1. minutes of evidence of the C/anliffe Committee, 
9 t h day, 19 Mar'!, 1918. 
2. I b i d . , minutes of evidence of the C u n l i f f e Committee, Appendix 
t o 9 t h meeting„ 
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bsgin w i t h , the form of which became q u i t e standard, and e f f e c t i v e l y 
asked f o r the witness's agreement t o the proposals of the sub-committee,, 
One witness who could not attend, was i n f a c t sent a questionnaire on 
these l i n e s . So t h a t the p r i n c i p a l q u e s t i o n i n g , which was done by 
G u n l i f f e , had become q u i t e f o r m a l i s e d on matters of p r i n c i p a l f a i r l y 
e a r l y on, and witnesses were e f f e c t i v e l y being askf-d t o rubber-stamp 
the sub-committee 5s statements of p r i n c i p l e . I t should be added t h a t 
most witnesses had no h e s i t a t i o n i n answering unequivocally i n the 
a f f i r m a t i v e when asked t o support these p r i n c i p l e s , but i t may be wond-
ered, i f -some of the answers might have been a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t i f the 
questions had. not been so 3 l o a d e d s . I t I s of course common, knowledge 
nowadays t h a t the answers given t o questions can be markedly a f f e c t e d , 
both by the answers which the respondent knows are expected of him i f 
such there be, and by the form i n which the question i s p u t , i t being 
apparently a basic human preference t o r e p l y i n the a f f i r m a t i v e r a t h e r 
than the negative,, 
The Minutes of Evidence of the,^,.Gj^iXfe MCo^ittejB: Hearing of Witnesses 
The f i r s t witness t o be examined was S i r W i l l i a m Holden, chairman 
of Barclays' Bank, and a prominent f i g u r e i n the C i t y . His views on 
currency and. exchange were orthodox i n the extreme, but not so h i s ideas 
on banking. He deplored the suggestion t h a t the c i r c u l a t i o n of g o l d c o i n 
should not be resumed a f t e r the war, and the idea t h a t the J o i n t Stock 
Banks should be asked t o deposit.; a l l t h e i r gold holdings at the Bank of 
England. He f e l t t h a t both these sources of g o l d acted as a 'hidden 
reserve' i n times of gold shortage, although h i s opponents on the Committee 
suggested and. held to the view t h a t i n f a c t c e n t r a l i s a t i o n of the g o l d 
1 . Professor J. Shield Nicholson, see below, pp 0 104--5. 
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reserves would be more economical i n times of" c r i s i s . Holden seems t o 
have been unduly obsessed w i t h the problems which had a r i s e n pre-war i n 
maintaining an adequate reserve.. The C i t y had become used t o a customary 
reserve which was lower than t h a t which the Bank would l i k e t o have kept, 
and thus expected i n t e r e s t r a t e s t o f a l l when t h a t l e v e l was reached; 
they were able t o put pressure on the Bank t o reduce r a t e s i n accordance 
w i t h t h e i r expectations, and so the reserve never reached the l e v e l the 
Ba,nk would have l i k e d . 
Holden acceded t o the ideas of the sub-committee on i n f l a t i o n , but 
suggested t h a t the only way t o put the. exchanges r i g h t was t o increase 
exports a f t e r the war was over. He urged t h a t i t was worth accepting a 
temporary worsening i n the exchange p o s i t i o n w h i l e large imports of raw 
m a t e r i a l s w i t h which t o make the exports came i n , i n order t o l a y a sound 
foundation f o r the f u t u r e . He was f o l l o w e d by S i r F e l i x Schuster, another 
prominent C i t y f i g u r e , and the author of several books, i n c l u d i n g one on 
2 
the Bank of England l a r g e l y i n favour of the Bank Charter Act. S i r F e l i x 
agreed w i t h C u n l i f f e t h a t the only way t o reduce i n f l a t i o n was f o r the 
Government t o cease borrowing, but he urged, t h a t the c a l l i n g i n of currency 
notes should not be done too p r e c i p i t a t e l y or too soon, since t h i s would 
have a bad e f f e c t on commerce. He also agreed w i t h G u n l i f f e ' s suggestions 
about improving the exchange p o s i t i o n by i n c r e a s i n g short-term i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s . This, together w i t h the encouragement of exports t o Europe i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , should be s u f f i c i e n t t o Improve the exchange p o s i t i o n ; he 
was not i n favour of p i ' o h i b i t i n g the export of go l d a f t e r the war.. He 
was not so f e r v e n t l y i n favour of the removal of Government r e s t r i c t i o n s 
as some witnesses; he suggested t h a t c o n t r o l over C a p i t a l Issues should 
1. P.R.0.,T,J8£/1., evidence of S i r W i l l i a m Holden. before the C u n l i f f e 
Committee, 11th day, 8 Apr., 1918. 
2. S i r F e l i x Schuster, The Bank of England and the State (Manchester: 
The U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1923). 
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be r e t a i n e d f o r two years a f t e r the war ended,' 
Most witnesses paid l i p - s e r v i c e t o the need:"? of i n d u s t r y f o r finance 
f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n purposes, but t h i s was u s u a l l y expressed i n very 
general terms„ One witness who made more e x p l i c i t suggestions, and some 
of whose ideas c a l l t o mind i r r e s i s t i b l y the s t r i c t u r e s of the Macmillan 
Committee on the shortage of investment c a p i t a l i n some areas of business,' 
was A.M„ Samuel, an M.P. and a member of the Norwich Chamber of Commerce. 
He submitted a memorandum from his Chamber, advocating a series of reforms 
i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the Bank of England, i n c l u d i n g amalgamation o f the 
Banking and Issue departments and the appointment; of a permanent sub-
Governor f o r a term of seven years„ He also suggested t h a t f i n a n c i n g 
o f major investment p r o j e c t s was a, b i g problem f o r the small and medium 
size business, which was not l a r g e enough t o f l o a t an issue of i t s shares 
on the Stock Market. The banks were u n w i l l i n g t o lend f o r long or f i x e d 
periods, and such businesses were c o n s t a n t l y i n danger of sudden bank-
3 
r u p t c y i f they attempted t o finance expansion by means of o v e r d r a f t s . 
G u n l i f f e d i d not see the need f o r any s o r t of c e n t r a l lending 
i n s t i t u t i o n such as the one Samuel proposed, which was t o be based on 
c r e d i t g iven t o customers f o r approved p r o j e c t s by the banks, subject 
t o a Government guarantee. Samuel suggested t h a t f o r the banks t o le n d 
under the aegis of such an i n s t i t u t i o n would solve the problems of both 
sides, since the banks would be able t o r e g a i n a measure of l i q u i d i t y i n 
an emergency, while the borrowers would not be subject t o r e c a l l of loans 
at very short n o t i c e . But he was a t cross-purposes w i t h G u n l i f f e and 
Pigou, who used the word 3 c a p i t a l ' t o mean c a p i t a l goods and services* 
while Samuel meant investment money, i . e . the purchasing power w i t h which 
1. P.RoOB,Ts185,/l, evidence of S i r F e l i x Schuster before the C u n l i f f e 
Committee, 12th day, 9 Apr., 1918. 
2B Committee on Finance and I n d u s t r y , 1931: Report published as Cmd.3897 
3, P.R.0..,TJ85j^l, memo, by"A.M.' Samuel to the C u n l i f f e Committee-, 
md. 7 
26 Apr , 1918. 
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t o o b t a i n these goods,. C u n l i f f e thought t h a t such a scheme would lead 
t o a honeycoming of c r e d i t which would be f a t a l i n a c r i s i s 5 Pigou 
suggested t h a t i t was i n any case unnecessary, as what was fundamental 
was the p r o d u c t i o n of c a p i t a l goods, not the p r o v i s i o n of the means of 
payment. 
Samuel: I t h i n k i t i s fundamental machinery.' 
The confusion was never resolved, and t h i s gap i n the p r o y i s i o n of 
business c r e d i t . f a c i l i t i e s remained:; 
Several of the C i t y witnesses favoured a movement by the Bank 
towards the s o r t of o r g a n i s a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d by the Federal Reserve 
Board i n the United States; one of the most cogent was Nugent, the 
Chairman of the Discount Houses. He suggested t h a t there should be 
more Treasury l i n k s w i t h the Bank, and perhaps Treasury r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
on the Bank's decision-making bodies. He f e l t t h a t , i n the l a t t e r case, 
such a body could have charge not o n l y of note issue r e g u l a t i o n , but 
also of the f o r e i g n exchanges i n general and of the Government debt. 
Nugent was aware -of the dangers inherent i n too r a p i d a p r i c e f a l l , 
and f e l t t h a t i t might be possible f o r n e g o t i a t i o n a t c e n t r a l bank 
l e v e l t o provide the Bank w i t h some o f the g o l d i t would need f o r the 
increased reserved which would be required", r a t h e r than f o r the Bank t o 
attempt t o a t t r a c t a l l the gold i t needed i n the open market by means of 
a sharp r i s e i n the discount r a t e s immediately the war was over. For 
much the same reason he was i n favour of r e s t r i c t i n g gold exports f o r 
a time a f t e r the war, although he would on p r i n c i p l e have p r e f e r r e d an 
open market i n g o l d . He was also i n favour, as were many C i t y witnesses, 
of a more f l e x i b l e f i d u c i a r y issue. 
Pigou: S t i l l I t h i n k you do agree w i t h me t h a t t h i s i p l a r 
rather machinery, and the other thing Tsupply of c a p i t a l 
goods! i s fundamental? 
1 
1. 
Committee, 13'th day, 6 May, 1918. 
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Like v i r t u a l l y a l l -the witnesses, Nugent stressed the importance 
of i n c r e a s i n g exports. 
"The a f f a i r s o f a n a t i o n are much l i k e those of an i n d i v i d u a l , 
and...«, we are .......spending more than we can earn."'' 
But he agreed xd-th Bradbury t h a t before exports could be increased, 
p r i c e s must f a l l r e l a t i v e t o other c o u n t r i e s , and t h a t t o r e s t r i c t c r e d i t 
and so induce a f a l l i n money p r i c e s would be a l e s s d r a s t i c remedy than 
t o allow the exchanges t o f l o a t , causing a f a l l i n r e a l p r i c e s . This 
dictum was not questioned by the other members of the Committees and 
i t i s on t h i s t h a t the assumption of the economic advantages of r e t u r n i n g 
t o the Gold Standard at the pre-war p a r i t y depend. 
One other i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e o f Nugent's evidence i s h i s emphasis 
on the l i k e l y changes i n the mode of opera t i o n of Bank Rate a f t e r the 
War.. Unlike the pre-war days, he says, B r i t a i n i s no longer a major 
c r e d i t o r , a t any r a t e i n the short-term. So a r i s e i n the Bank r a t e w i l l 
not take e f f e c t by causing a slowing down i n the r a t e of o u t f l o w of funds, 
but w i l l have t o operate t o increase the i n f l o w of f o r e i g n funds t o 
B r i t a i n . This observation i s one which has since been, f r e q u e n t l y made 
by c r i t i c s of the Committee-'s r e p o r t s ; apparently Mr. Nugent's observ-
a t i o n s made l i t t l e impact on i t s hearers at the time. 
Another C i t y witness who favoured the Bank moving towards the Federal 
Reserve system was Dr. Lea,f, Chairman of the Westminster Bank group. He 
also favoured the repeal of the Bank Charter Act and i t s replacement by 
a system which would allow more f l e x i b i l i t y i n emergencies. I n every 
other respect he adhered t o the usual orthodox opinions, and agreed t o 
a l l C u n l i f f e ' s l e a d i n g questions on i n f l a t i o n and Government debt. 
C u n l i f f e was by now beginning these standard questions w i t h the words 
1. P.R.D., T.185/1, evidence of C.. Nugent before the C u n l i f f e 
Committee, 14th day, 7 May, 1918. 
- 100 -
1 you do agree Leaf was anxious about the amount of c r e d i t t i e d 
up i n Government stock, and s a i d t h a t they would have t o l e t some 
Treasury B i l l s r un o f f i n order t o be able t o accommodate i n d u s t r y . 
Among the commercial r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s was the vice-President o f 
the London Chamber of Commerce, a stockbroker, Mr. F. F a i t h f u l l Begg. 
His Chamber was p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the banking i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
the Committee's terms o f r e f e r e n c e , and they made two main suggestions; 
one t h a t the f i d u c i a r y issue should not be f i x e d i n money terms but 
should bear a f i x e d r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the q u a n t i t y of g o l d i n the Bank -
the Bank should hold, a t l e a s t one t h i r d "of" t h e value of the notes i n 
g o l d - and t h a t note c o n v e r t i b i l i t y should be i n t o bars o f , say, £1,000 
value, so t h a t payment i n g o l d would be possible f o r e x t e r n a l purposes, 
but gold c o i n would not be put i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n . The former suggestion 
included a r i d e r t o the e f f e c t t h a t t h i s p r o p o r t i o n could he reduced i n 
an emergency on payment of a t a x , i n s i m i l a r way t o the Federal Reserve 
scheme.^ 
One of the witnesses the Committee wished t o c a l l , Professor J„ 
Shield Nicholson, was unable t o attend i n person, and he was sent a 
quest i o n n a i r e . The form of the questions i s a f o r m a l i s a t i o n of those 
which had been put t o the other witnesses, and some of them are an 
i n t e r e s t i n g i n d i c a t i o n of the e x t e n t t o which the Committee - or a t any 
r a t e the Chairman - had been decided about the nature and causes of the 
problems they were considering from the beginning. 
Question: Would you agree t h a t t h e re i s now considerable 
c r e d i t i n f l a t i o n ? I f so, can you suggest any 
means by which i t might be reduced a f t e r the War? 
1. P.R.O., T.185/1. evidence o f Dr. W. Leaf before the C u n l i f f e 
Committee, 15th day, 27 May, 1918. 
2. P.R.O., T.185/2, evidence o f F. F a i t h f u l l Begg before the 
C u n l i f f e Committee, 20th day, 11 June, 1918. 
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To t h i s Shield Nicholson r e p l i e d t h a t he d i d agree, and t h a t since the 
chi e f cause was the excessive Government borrowing, the remedy was f o r 
t h i s t o be reduced, and f o r the currency note i s s u e , t o be contracted. 
Question: Would you agree t h a t f o r t h i s purpose i t i s d e s i r a b l e 
t h a t Government borrowing should cease at the e a r l i e s t 
possible moment and t h a t expenditure should be 
reduced w e l l w i t h i n revenue so t h a t there w i l l be a 
s u b s t a n t i a l s i n k i n g fund f o r the r e d u c t i o n of debt?^ 
I n view of h i s r e p l y t o the previous question, i t was ha r d l y s u r p r i s i n g 
t h a t Shield Nicholson should agree wholeheartedly, but he thought t h a t 
t h i s might not be possible a t once, since f a l l i n g p r i c e s and p r o f i t s 
which would be i m p l i e d by _the desired d e f l a t i o n Wo'uld also mean reduced 
revenue from which t o provide a s i n k i n g fund. 
Question: What a c t i o n should i n your o p i n i o n be taken t o r e s t o r e 
and maintain the Foreign Exchanges a f t e r the War?^ 
Shield Nicholson was I n favour of r e s t o r i n g c o n v e r t i b i l i t y as soon as 
poss i b l e , of d e f l a t i n g so as t o encourage exports and make imports 
r e l a t i v e l y more expensive, and of reducing Government debt t o a s s i s t 
i n both these aims. But he d i d not agree w i t h another of C u n l i f f e ' s 
suggestions, t h a t higher money r a t e s should be maintained i n B r i t a i n 
than i n those countries w i t h whom we had an adverse trade balance. I n 
hi s view, such an a t t r a c t i o n t o f o r e i g n funds would be a f a c t o r i n h i n d -
e r i n g the necessary p r i c e f a l l and would i n the long run do more harm 
than good. He was i n favour of an eventual r e t u r n t o an i n t e r n a l gold 
c i r c u l a t i o n , and the maintenance of the Bank Charter Act. As t o the 
dangers of c r i s i s , he f e l t t h a t increased reserves of gold should be 
3 
kept t o avoid having t o suspend the Act. 
1. P.R.Q., T.185/2, memo, of evidence by Professor J. Shield Nicholson, 
15 June, 1918. 
2. This apparently s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d question i n f a c t contains the 
assumption t h a t the s t e r l i n g exchange should be restored t o par 
a f t e r the war. 
3. P.R.O., T.185/2, memo, of evidence of Professor J. Shield Nicholson 
t o the C u n l i f f e Committee, 15 June, 1918. 
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One of the l a s t witnesses t o be heard was S i r B r i a n Gokayne, 
C u n l i f f e ' s successor as Governor o f the Bank of England. Montagu Norman 
was by t h i s time Deputy Governor, and h i s biographer suggests t h a t 
1 
Cokayne's b r i e f was prepared by Norman. There i s no doubt t h a t the 
evidence Cokayne gave i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s ; i t i s t r e n c h a n t l y 
orthodox. He agreed w i t h C u n l i f f e over the increase i n the volume of 
c r e d i t , and w i t h the suggestion t h a t the Government should cease b o r r -
owing and begin repayment of debt a t once. But he d i s t i n g u i s h e d bet-
ween the pure c r e d i t c r e a t i o n i n v o l v e d w i t h Government borrowing by 
Ways and Means advances from the Bank of.-England,- and Government debt 
held by genuine i n v e s t o r s . 
Cokayne also urged the importance of B r i t a i n e xporting more and 
importing l e s s ; d e f l a t i o n by means of dear money would h e l p , and Cokayne 
advocated a s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n f o r the r e d u c t i o n i n the f i d u c i a r y i s s u e . 
Discussion on t h i s p o i n t l e d t o Cokayne suggesting as a basis f o r t h i s 
2 
what has since come t o be known as the 1 C u n l i f f e limit'„ Gokayne 
favoured the e x i s t i n g idea of a f i d u c i a r y issue as opposed t o the issue 
3 
of currency notes i n p r o p o r t i o n t o the Bank's gold stock. I t should 
be added t h a t the evidence of the Bank assumed wi t h o u t argument t h a t 
the r e s t o r a t i o n of the Gold Standard i n a l l i t s pre-war g l o r y was a 
sine qua non. of B r i t i s h post-war recovery. 
The memorandum submitted by the F.B.I, l a r g e l y agreed w i t h t h i s . 
The importance of r e s t o r i n g the exchanges by achieving a l a r g e export 
surplus was stressed. So, t o o , was the need f o r i n d u s t r y t o be f r e e d 
from c o n t r o l s , and f o r d e m o b i l i s a t i o n t o proceed w i t h a l l p ossible speed. 
1. Boyle, Montagu Norman, p.128. 
2. See below, p. 120 o 
3. F.R.O.,T.185/2, evidence of S i r B r i a n Cokayne before the C u n l i f f e 
Committee, 21st day, 8 J u l y , 1918. 
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However, some control over the disposition of raw materials should be 
retained i n order tp give p r i o r i t y to exporterso I t was also urged 
that some repayment of Government debt was essential,, 
"Serious e f f o r t s must be made to deflate the currency by the 
ext i n c t i o n of debt. I t should be borne i n mind that most of 
t h i s debt was incurred at a time when the currency was i n f l a t e d , 
and the repayment must be based, i f possible, on such a system 
that the i n f l a t e d value should be maintained during the 
extinction of the debt."'' 
This l a s t was a consideration not evident to any other witnesses, nor, 
apparently, to any member of the Committee; that i f the process of 
contraction were to be achieved, not by a f a l l i n r e a l prices through 
the devaluation of s t e r l i n g , but by a f a l l i n money prices through 
i n t e r n a l d e f l a t i o n , the burden of the contraction would f a l l not on 
the community as a whole but only on those whose incomes were not 
fi x e d i n terms of money. A substantial f a l l i n prices would actually 
benefit the large numbers of debt holders who had acquired t h e i r govern-
ment paper l a t e i n the war when the currency was already heavily debased. 
But t h i s consideration received no attention i n the Committee's reports. 
The second series of meetings, during the l a t e summer and autumn 
of 1919, were concerned pr i m a r i l y with examining witnesses from the 
Scottish and I r i s h banking i n t e r e s t s , and w i t h dealing with City c r i t i c s 
2. 
of the decision not to a l t e r the Bank Charter Act. L i t t l e discussion 
took place on the changed conditions accompanying the end of the war 
and the post-war boom, although the Committee became more worried than 
ever about the process of i n f l a t i o n , and recommended that drastic 
measures should be taken to control i t . The considerable exchange 
problems created by the vast sums demanded i n reparation from Germany, 
1, P.RoOc,T„185/2,memo, by the Federation of B r i t i s h Industry to the 
Cunliffe Committee, 19 July, 1918„ 
2„ Bradbury t o l d the Committee that City opinion on t h i s was so divided 
that the Government were having d i f f i c u l t y i n accepting the Report, 
minutes of evidence of the Cunliffe Committee, 27th day, 23 July,1918. 
- 107 -
and the huge i n t e r - A l l i e d debts, were not allowed to modify the Committee 
opinions on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of returning to the Gold Standard at the 
pre-war par„ Indeed, the B r i t i s h debt to America constituted one appar-
ently excellent reason f o r doing so, since the debt was fixe d i n terms 
of gold. 
The Minutes of Evidence of the Cunliffe Committee: Production of i t s 
Reports 
I t i s unfortunate that there i s no record of the Committee's 
discussions of the F i r s t -Interim or Final Report. I t r s , however, 
apparent from the evidence that i s available that the Committee was 
largely unanimous on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a return to the Gold Standard,, 
of the reduction i n the National Debt, p a r t i c u l a r l y the f l o a t i n g debt,, 
and, at any rate by inference, of the relinquishing of government 
control over economic l i f e . As f a r as the return to gold i s concerned, 
i t has been suggested that i t s advocacy by the Committee was the only 
possible course f o r them: 
"...anyone rash enough then to have advocated a d i f f e r e n t 
course might well have been locked up and c e r t i f i e d as Insane...... 
the opinion advanced by Norman i n the Bank's name that a return 
to the gold standard was essential to the Cunliffe Committee 
was nat u r a l l y invested with the q u a l i t y of dogma, accepted as 
such by informed opinion.....Here was an a r t i c l e of f a i t h as 
unassailable as the universal b e l i e f of mankind before the time 
of Copernicus and Gallileo that i t was the sun which moved, not 
the earth."1 
Nor was there any change i n t h i s attitude when the consequences of dear 
money became obvious, and the unemployment queues lengthened. For the 
financiers, headed by Montagu Norman, believed that B r i t a i n could only 
regain her economic strength when the City of London had regained i t s 
pre-war place as the centre of inte r n a t i o n a l finance. 
1. Boyle, Montagu Norman, p.128. 
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"A strong pound had f i r s t to be ensured. No doubt t h i s spelled 
temporary s e l f - s a c r i f i c e f o r many B r i t i s h Businessmen and 
industrialists„„„„Norman did not worry unduly about the cost 
i n human misery that might resu l t at home i f t h i s outward-
looking City policy were consistently pursued. The p l i g h t of 
the unemployed was pri m a r i l y a matter f o r the Government„ 
Thus the deliberations of the Committee and the evidence i t received were 
largely i n accordance, on the major issues, with one another and with 
a l l accepted opinion at the time. On the Gold Standard, the one a v a i l -
able economist who might have t e s t i f i e d on more unusual l i n e s to the 
Committee was not called, despite the fa c t that he was doing war service_ 
i n the Treasury at the time, Bradbury had early on made i t clear that 
no witnesses from the Treasury would be required, since he himself was 
2 
a member of the Committee, So that body did not have the advantage 
of the advice of J„M„ Keynes, Keynes was at that time i n favour of the 
Gold Standard, but was by no means as convinced as Bradbury that to 
restore the equilibrium with world prices by allowing the s t e r l i n g 
exchange to become devalued was a bad thing. He wrote a memorandum to 
t h i s e f f e c t early i n 1918, f o r Bradbury's benefit though not apparently 
at his suggestion, setting out an ingenious scheme whereby a measure of 
3 
free c o n v e r t i b i l i t y could be brought about at current price levels," 
The d e t a i l s of the scheme are not important, since i t never saw the 
l i g h t of day; but i n essence the plan was f o r the B r i t i s h authorities 
to accept that B r i t i s h prices were about 10$ above the American l e v e l , 
and to impose a duty of that proportion on the export of gold. The 
scheme was devised i n such a way that the f u l l ']0% would only i n effec t 
be charged i f the demand f o r gold f o r export were s u f f i c i e n t l y great to 
warrant i t , and quantities of gold equivalent to amounts imported would 
1. Boyle, Montagu Norman, p.139-
2. FoR.Q„,Ta185/1, minutes of evidence of the Cunliffe Committee, 
10th day, 22 Mar,, 1918, 
3. P.R.O, ,T,170/129, memo, by Keynes,., A Jan,., 1918, 
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have been allowed out free of duty. The percentage duty could be varied 
by Order i n Council by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Such a scheme 
might have been a most useful one, either i n i t s own r i g h t , or as a 
means of gradually reducing the s t e r l i n g discount on New York by redu-
cing the percentage duty i n small stages. But the scheme d i d not reach 
the Cunliffe Committee, and t h e i r sole assistance from the Treasury came., 
as we have seen, from Sir John Bradbury. To a detailed consideration of 
the Reports which t h i s Committee produced, we must now tur n . 
F i r s t Interim Report of the Cunliffe Committee 
The f i r s t • i n t e r i m Report of the Cunliffe Committee begins by 
setting out what i t intends to do, and why i t has not completed i t s 
labours with one Report. The f i r s t Report i s to be concerned pr i m a r i l y 
with the problems of the currency a f t e r the war; while the general 
principles which the Committee w i l l lay down w i l l be applicable both 
to currency and to foreign exchange, the Committee feels that the 
emergency proposals f o r dealing with foreign exchange problems immed-
i a t e l y a f t e r the war could more rea d i l y be dealt with l a t e r , as could 
the application, of the principles of the Report to Scotland and Ireland, 
The Report then goes on to outline the currency system i n B r i t a i n 
before the war„ The next two paragraphs, which outline the mechanics 
2 
of the domestic system, are lar g e l y uncontentious. The description 
then moves to the way i n which the system operated externally, and there 
follows what i s generally regarded as a classical exposition of the 
workings of the Gold Standard f o r B r i t a i n immediately p r i o r to the 
F i r s t World War. 
1. Cd.9182,para.1. 
2„ Ibid..paras, 2,3. 
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"One of the most i n f l u e n t i a l models of pre-"! 914- gold standard 
operation has been that presented i n the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l 
Command Paper, The Interim Report of the Committee on 
Currency and Foreign Exchanges <,..." 1 
The Report describes the process by which the operation of the Gold 
Standard acted apparently automatically upon gold movements. 
"When the exchanges were favourable, gold flowed f r e e l y i n t o 
t h i s country and an increase i n legal tender money accompanied 
the development of trade." 
However, when the balance of trade was adverse and exchanges were 
unfavourable, i t became pr o f i t a b l e t o export gold. Gold being obtain-
able on demand from the Bank, the Bank would withdraw-gold -from i-ts - -
Issue Department i n exchange f o r i t s notes, taken out of i t s banking 
reserve, 
"«,„...with the r e s u l t that i t s l i a b i l i t i e s to depositors 
and i t s banking reserve were reduced by an equal amount, 
and the r a t i o of reserve to l i a b i l i t i e s consequently f e l l . " 3 
The description continues, ou t l i n i n g the process by which such an outflow 
of gold could be corrected i f i t became serious: 
" I f the process was repeated s u f f i c i e n t l y often to reduce 
the r a t i o i n a degree considered dangerous, the Bank raised 
i t s rate of discount. The raising of the discount rate had 
the immediate effect of retaining money here which would 
otherwise have been remitted abroad and of at t r a c t i n g 
remittances from abroad to take advantage of the higher 
rate, thus checking ^ he outflow of gold and even reversing 
the stream." A 
The Report goes on to say that i t i s self-evident that i f such gold 
movements were due to adverse exchange conditions not merely of a 
seasonal and temporary nature, but were rooted i n a more permanently 
adverse balance of trade, t h i s process would 
1. A.G. Ford, The Gold Standard 1880-191A: B r i t a i n & Argentina 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p,1. 
2« Gd.9.182, para, 4. 
3» Ibido 
4-. I b i d , 
- 111 -
"have resulted i n the creation of a volume of short-dated 
indebtedness to foreign countries which would have been 
i n the end disastrous to our cre d i t and the position of 
London as the f i n a n c i a l centre of the world„" 1 
The Bank Rate had i t s e f f e c t not merely on foreign lending but on the 
domestic i n t e r e s t rate structure as w e l l . 
",.*the raisin g of the Bank's discount rate and the steps 
taken to make i t effective i n the market necessarily led 
to a general r i s e of in t e r e s t rates and a r e s t r i c t i o n of 
c r e d i t . New enterprises were therefore postponed and the 
demand f o r constructional materials and other c a p i t a l goods 
was lessened." ^ 
As a r e s u l t of t h i s lessening a c t i v i t y , employment and therefore consum- -
ption-would f a l l ; and as the money rates tightened i t would become less 
p r o f i t a b l e to hold stocks and these would be unloaded on a f a l l i n g market. 
"The r e s u l t was a decline i n general prices i n the home 
market which, by checking imports and stimulating exports, 
corrected the adverse trade balance which was the primary 
cause of the d i f f i c u l t y . " 3 
Combined with a similar chain of events caused i n the event of an 
exogenous r i s e i n the volume of domestic cred i t - since t h i s would lead 
to a r i s e i n prices followed by an increase i n the demand f o r le g a l 
tender money and thus reduce the r a t i o of reserve to l i a b i l i t i e s and 
force up the rate of discount - t h i s system gave ;the country, i n the 
opinion of the Committee, 
"an automatic machinery by which the volume of purchasing 
power i n t h i s country was continuously adjusted to world 
prices of commodities i n general." 4-
The r e s u l t of these operations was t h a t : 
" . . . t h i s country was provided with a complete and effective 
gold standardo"^ 
1. 
2. 
3 . 
4 . 
9182, para. f j . Cd 
I b i d * 
I b i d . , para. 6. 
I b i d . , para. 7* I b i d . 
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This completes the Committee8s description of the workings of the 
pre-1914- Gold Standard as i t affected B r i t a i n . This model was construc-
ted f o r a purely B r i t i s h purpose; but i t nevertheless ignores a number 
of aspects of i t s operation which seem v i t a l l y important f o r B r i t a i n , 
and together with a number of i n t e r n a l anomalies a good deal of c r i t i c i s m 
of the model i s possible. Since the remainder of the Report i s b u i l t 
upon t h i s foundation, i t w i l l be necessary to examine i t s defects a 
l i t t l e more closely. 
F i r s t l y , the system was manifestly not f u l l y automatic, even i n 
the Report's description, since a decision to raise or lower Bank Rate 
has quite frequently to be taken; t h i s involves a judgement as to 
whether an outflow of gold i s a merely temporary a f f a i r or whether i t 
i s evidence of an underlying maladjustment. Secondly, even i n the 
opinion of contemporaries, the Report glossed over certain other matters 
which rendered the system less automatic than the Committee considered 
i t . The chief example of t h i s i s the f a c t that the Committee dismisses 
i n half a sentence the process of making Bank Rate e f f e c t i v e ; whereas 
at least one contemporary commentator thinks that t h i s glosses over a 
number of problems which the Bank experienced i n making Bank Rate 
effective i n the past, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i t s action on the cost and 
a v a i l a b i l i t y of cred i t i n the domestic market. Again,, i t s comments 
on the adjustment of an adverse trade balance makes i t clear that the 
Committee thinks purely i n terms of price effects on the trade balance; 
changes i n demand patterns, i n e l a s t i c i t i e s of demand, i n world trading 
habits, to mention only a few other variables, together with the 
prevailing l e v e l of world trade as a whole, are not susceptible to 
simple changes i n the discount rate, 
1. Economist, , oLSOOni, 2 Nov.., 1918. 
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I n addition to these defects w i t h i n the analysis i t s e l f " , there are 
a number of important matters on which the Report i s completely s i l e n t . 
F i r s t of a l l , the operation of the Gold Standard i s considered purely 
from a B r i t i s h point of view, despite the int e r n a t i o n a l nature of the 
standard and the importance of t h i s f a c t to B r i t a i n . Although B r i t a i n 
was the hub of the system, she was not operating i n a vacuum. 
"The world's main short- and long-term c a p i t a l markets were 
centred in^ London, together with the world gold market and 
produce markets, so that t h i s concentration reinforced the 
key ro l e of B r i t a i n i n world trading relations and i n the 
working of the gold standard before 1914-. Nevertheless, 
the existence of other developed monetary centres 3 p a r t i c -
u l a r l y Paris and B e r l i n , must-not- be ignored., f o r they 
possessed l i q u i d resources which flowed to ease stress i n 
times of stringency, the Bank of France even being known 
as the Bank of England's second gold reserve." ^  
This matter of central bank co-operation i s not one to which the Reports 
devote any space, yet by the summer of 1918 i t must have been obvious 
that i n view of the destruction of l i f e and property assets brought 
about by the war, and the huge volume of int e r n a t i o n a l indebtedness 
which existed independent of r e a l assets, t h i s co-operation would be 
much more v i t a l than before 1914* 
Not only did the co-operation of other central banks help the 
smooth working of the system on very small reserves pre~-1914o A number 
of other factors, some of which had been seriously changed by the war, 
also assisted the working of the standard, i n B r i t a i n . I t was common 
practice before the war f o r colonial and dominion countries which had 
trade surpluses with B r i t a i n simply to allow t h e i r bank balances i n 
London to r i s e . With the shortage of l i q u i d resources to be expected 
after the war., together with the d i f f i c u l t i e s primary producers — as most 
of these countries then were - experienced i n the 1920s, t h i s was no 
longer so common. 
1. Ford, The International Gold Standard 1880-1934- ; B r i t a i n and 
Argentine, p„19. The remainder of t h i s c r i t i q u e owes much to 
t h i s l u c i d exposition. See also W.M. Scamine 11, "The Working 
of the Gold Standard", Yorkshire B u l l e t i n of Economic and Social 
Research X7II(1965). 
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A similar process was often operated by foreign banks, and could 
equally ce r t a i n l y not be expected to continue a f t e r the war. Another 
way of easing strains, whereby creditors were paid simply by the 
process of s h i f t i n g assets from the credit of a domestic to a foreign 
owner, could not so often be possible after the war, p a r t l y through 
diminished l i q u i d i t y , and p a r t l y because New York had become equally 
important as a f i n a n c i a l centre. 
Another of the important planks of the Gold Standard, the process 
known as 'playing by the rules of the game", although much less 
1 -important than i t i s often -regarded, nevertheless went much more by 
default a f t e r the war. This i s the process by which central banks 
allow gold movements to have t h e i r f u l l e f f e c t on the i n t e r n a l credit 
s i t u a t i o n . There i s much evidence to support the view that France and 
the United States were very lax about t h i s between the wars. 
In addition, i t seems l i k e l y that the Committee over-estimated the 
extent to which shor-t-term funds were i n f a c t responsive to i n t e r e s t 
rates even before 1914 ; 
"Movements of private short-term funds were more complex i n 
nature and motivation than i s customarily assumed i n standard 
treatments of the pre - 1914 system. Unquestionably, short-term 
i n t e r e s t d i f f e r e n t i a l s and exchange-rate fluctuations played 
a dominant role i n directing the flow of private short-term 
funds, even i f the degree of m o b i l i t y of the funds so motivated 
has sometimes been exaggerated. But by no means a l l private 
short-term c a p i t a l movements can be explained i n these simple 
terms." 2 
According to t h i s authority, other factors to be considered included 
preferences as to lenders or to markets f o r loan placement not based 
1 . I t had been estimated that on a yearly average basis about 60% 
of movements i n central bank assets were i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n 
to that which would have made the domestic economy f e e l the effects 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l asset movements; A.I.. Bloomfield, Monetary Policy 
under, the International Gold. Standard 1880-1914 (New York; 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1959) ? pp.4.8-50. 
2 . AXBloomfield, Short-Term Capital Movements under the Pre--1914 
Gold Standard (Princeton; Princeton University, 1 9 6 3 ) ? p.90.. 
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on i n t e r e s t or exchange rate considerations; the a v a i l a b i l i t y , as d i s t i n c t 
from the cost, of credit; the requirements of external debt service; and 
considerations of banking l i q u i d i t y . A l l these factors together exerted an 
influence which may at times have been more powerful than i n t e r e s t - and 
1 
exchange-rate factors. 
As well as 'normal' movements of funds, there were other possible 
upsets; 
"Capital movements and other 'abnormal' movements of l i q u i d funds 
were, moreover, of greater importance than i s usually believed. 
And even when of a 'normal' character, private short-term c a p i t a l 
movements were by no means always eq u i l i b r a t i n g i n t h e i r balance 
of payments e f f e c t s . " 2 
Another t r a d i t i o n a l l y held view of the Gold Standard which has l a t e l y 
been challenged, and which i s of great importance i n the l i g h t of post-war 
experience, i s that which ascribes most new foreign borrowing i n the pre--
1914- period to the reinvestment of funds earned abroad on previously 
invested c a p i t a l . Recent research suggests that i t i s much more viable to 
regard the overseas loan i n t e r e s t and repayments reaching t h i s country as 
part of the stream of income to be saved or spent at w i l l , than as i n some 
sense 'reserved' f o r further investment. Two facts seem to bear t h i s out; 
f i r s t l y , foreign investment was often followed, rather than preceded, by an 
improvement i n the balance of payments; and secondly recent analysis suggests 
that fluctuations i n the volume of overseas lending bears a much closer r e l a t -
ionship i n the r a t i o between exports and imports than to the l e v e l of income 
3 
payments on overseas investments. I n the post—war period i t i s common 
fo r more c a p i t a l investment abroad 
1. Bloomfield, Short-Term Capital Movements under the Fre-1914 Cold Standard. 
2 . I b i d . , p. 91o 
.3. A.G. Ford, "The Transfer of B r i t i s h Foreign Lending, 1870-1913", 
Economic History Review, second series, XI, (1958). 
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to be undertaken than i s j u s t i f i e d by current balance of payment 
surpluses; and these investments, unlike those pre-1914-j seem not to 
generate an improvement i n the balance of payments i n the same way,, 
I t may w e l l be that t h i s i s associated p a r t l y with the increasingly 
inter-governmental nature of loans post-war. I n any case, whether 
we associate the volume of overseas lending with export-import r a t i o s , 
income on previous investments, or both, the great decline i n both these 
factors over the war period meant a considerable weakening i n the Gold 
Standard mechanism. For before the war- the volume of funds going over-
seas was considerable, and Bank Rate was expected to have' i t s e f f e c t at 
least i n i t i a l l y on these funds when the Bank was losing gold. After the 
war i t was necessary not only to stop funds leaving but also to a t t r a c t 
1 
foreign funds to London, a much more--difficult task. 
Thus the Committee's analysis of the pre-war gold standard contains 
a number of errors and omissions s u f f i c i e n t l y s i g n i f i c a n t to a f f e c t the 
v a l i d i t y of t h e i r conclusions. This i s the more so i n the l i g h t of 
t h e i r survey of the way i n which the war has affected the working of 
the system. For of these changes, the Report gives primary importance 
to those affecting domestic policy and consequent upon Government policy; 
the changes which affected the International Gold Standard receive one 
paragraph suggesting that most of the actual movements: of the exchanges 
which had taken place would have done so even i f a true gold standard 
2 
had been maintained, because of the peculiar circumstances of war-time; 
and three sentences at the end of the l a s t paragraph i n t h i s section., 
the l a s t two of which state that 
1. One witness before the Cunliffe Committee was aware of t h i s problem, 
see P.R.O.,T.185/1. evidence of C. Nugent before the Cunliffe 
Committee, H t h day, 7 May, 1918. 
2. Cd.9182, para. 8. 
" I t i s not possible to judge to what extent le g a l tender 
currency may i n f a c t be depreciated i n terms of bullion,. 
But i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y certain that there" has been some 
depreciation,, and to t h i s extent, therefore, the gold 
standard has ceased to be e f f e c t i v e , " ^  
Among the domestic changes, the Committee was most concerned with 
the i n f l a t i o n a r y developments. The Report describes the process by 
which the banks are able to buy unlimited legal tender currency from -
the Bank of England without the Bank's proportion thereby being red-
uced, under the powers given by the Currency and Bank Notes Act 1914-. 
This Act enabled the Treasury, through the Bank of England, to issue 
to the commercial banks l e g a l tender to a t o t a l of 20% of the Bank's 
l i a b i l i t i e s on current and deposit accounts. The o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n 
was that these .drawings should be advances chargeable f o r i n t e r e s t at 
the current Bank Rate, But the banks' deposits became so swollen by 
the deposits of Government contractors and so on that they were able 
to buy the notes outright with cash transferred from t h e i r accounts 
at the Bank to the credit of the Bank's" currency note account„ 
This i n f l u x of cash was i n i t s e l f i n f l a t i o n a r y , since the banks 
were enabled to lend to four or f i v e times the amount of cash o r i g i n -
a l l y deposited and s t i l l maintain t h e i r customary cash r a t i o of around 
20%. I n addition, the cash which the banks had deposited with the Bank 
of England i n payment f o r currency notes was borrowed by the Government 
and i n substitute the Bank was given government securities. Since the 
i n i t i a l increase i n Government disbursements had often come from Ways 
and Means advances by the Bank, the whole edifice was frequently b u i l t 
upon pure credit creation. I n addition, i t frequently happened that 
instead of making advances f o r productive purposes, a bank would use 
part of i t s increased lending capacity to buy government securities or 
1. Gd. 9182. para. 14.. 
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lend to a customer who wished to do so; so that quite often the 
Government was paying i n t e r e s t f o r the privilege of borrowing sums 
which i t had i t s e l f created. 
Such a process would normally have very rapidly depleted the Bank 
of England's gold stock, but since notes became legal tender at the 
outbreak of the war, and the export of gold was prohibited i n practice, 
1 
the demand f o r gold was very low.' 
The Report then goes on to outline i t s recommendations as to future 
currency and exchange policy. I t s fundamental proposal i s that the 
Gold Standard be restored. - -
"...the conditions necessary to the- maintenance of an 
effective gold standard i n t h i s country no longer e x i s t , 
and i t i s imperative that they be restored without delay... 
Unless the machinery which long experience has shown to be 
the only effective remedy f o r an adverse balance of trade 
and an undue growth of credit i s once more brought i n t o 
play, there w i l l be a very grave danger of a cre d i t expan-
sion i n t h i s country and a foreign drain of gold which 
might jeopardise the c o n v e r t i b i l i t y of our note-issue and 
the international trade position of the country." 2 
Apparently a l l the Committee's witnesses agreed on t h i s : 
"We are glad to f i n d that there was no difference of opinion 
among the witnesses who appeared before us as to the v i t a l 
importance of these matters." 3 
The remainder of the Report i s largely concerned with the means by 
which the return to gold should be brought about; the two p r i n c i p a l 
items are that the Government must cease borrowing as soon as possible, 
and must begin thereafter to repay a substantial amount of the secur-
i t i e s i n the hands of the banking system, p a r t i c u l a r l y of Treasury B i l l s 
and that t h i s debt reduction must not be matched by new borrowing f o r 
ca p i t a l purposes, f o r reconstruction.^ Other recommendations relate to 
1. Cd.9182. p a r a . H „ 
2 » J M d . . p a r a . 15. 
3 o I b i d . , p a r a . 1 5 . 
4-. I b i d . , p a r a s . 16 & 17. 
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the bringing of the note issue system back to normal, and here i s 
introduced the famous f C u n l i f f e l i m i t 5 , whereby the actual maximum 
of the f i d u c i a r y issue i n any one year becomes the legal l i m i t i n 
1 
the next. Most of these recommendations are inherent i n the basic 
principle on which the Committee operated, that t h e i r aim should be 
to.make the post-war monetary and currency system as l i k e the pre-
war as possiblev 
Final Report of the Cunliffe Committee 
I t was o r i g i n a l l y intended that the Final Report of the Committee 
should go i n t o d e t a i l on the emergency measures to be used to deal with 
the exchange s i t u a t i o n after the war. The f i n a l report actually contains 
only two paragraphs on t h i s , largely repeating, material already i n the 
f i r s t Report on the importance of a sound system of currency i n restoring 
the exchanges to health, and the e v i l s i n t h i s respect of the expanded 
system of credit then pertaining. This Report was signed at the height 
of the post—war boom and i t i s understandable that the Committee should 
have f e l t these anxieties.- The only other recommendations of note are 
that Government Ways and Means borrowing be checked at once; that the 
'Cunliffe l i m i t 1 now be introduced: and that the pre-war s i t u a t i o n i n 
2 
Scotland and Ireland be restored. 
Thus the guiding p r i n c i p l e of the Gunliffe Committee Reports i s the 
restoration of pre-war conditions as f a r as possible, and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the restoration of the pre-war Gold Standard. Unfortunately the Report 
i s rendered less valuable than i t could have been by two factors. 
F i r s t l y , the working of the pre-war Gold Standard was I n s u f f i c i e n t l y 
1. The whole of t h i s section of the report makes certain assumptions 
about the principles of sound Government finance, of which the most 
important i s that budgets should always at least be balanced, which 
are never discussed, but remain i m p l i c i t . 
2„ Cmd.4.84, (London : H.M.S.O., 1919). 
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understood. Secondly, the Gommlttee apparently had almost no under-
standing of the extent to which conditions had been permanently 
altered during the war, 
"An outstanding feature of the Cunliffe Report i s i t s 
unshakeable confidence i n the t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h methods 
of c o n t r o l l i n g credit and supporting the exchanges. I t i s 
a trumpet-call f o r a return to normal techniques* Yet i t 
was the teaching of the war years that techniques must 
change as conditions change." 1< 
The f i r s t factor i s exemplified by the f a c t that i n the whole of both 
Reports there i s no mention whatever of the pre-war par rate of 
exchange; and no discussion of whether i t would be the correct rate 
at which to return to the Gold Standard, I t apparently did not occur 
to the Committee that t h i s was a matter f o r question. Yet t h i s implies 
not only that 4.866 dollars to the pound, £3. 17s, TOijd. a standard 
ounce of gold, were rates which could stand f o r a l l time; i t also 
showed a b e l i e f i n the absolute nature of the Gold Standard which i s 
d i f f i c u l t nowadays to comprehend, 
"«<,.<, the essential r e l a t i v i t y of the problem was l o s t sight 
of and the world had to pay dearly f o r i t s f a i t h i n the 
existence of an absolute standard of value," ^ 
I n essence t h i s i s the fundamental error of the Report s„- The 
misunderstandings of the working of the pre-war Gold Standard are 
serious errors, as i s the f a i l u r e to take into account the nature 
and extent of war-time changes i n conditions - the vast f a b r i c of 
inter-governmental debt, the coming problems of reparations, the 
great dislocation i n trade and trading patterns, the increasing decen-
t r a l i s a t i o n of world f i n a n c i a l power, the destruction of assets and 
the encashment of foreign investments, and the needs of reconstruction, 
1, W„A„ Brown Jnr,, The International Gold Standard Reinterpreted 
1914-34 (2 vols,. New York : N.B.E.RT, 1940), v o l . I , p.168. 
2. I b i d . . p.174= 
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to name only a fewj the lack of cognizance of the need to make the 
Gold Standard serve the B r i t i s h and the world economy rather than the 
reverse, the losing sight of the 'essential r e l a t i v i t y of the problem' 
that i s the cardinal error. Since B r i t i s h policy was based on that 
error f o r many years thereafter, B r i t a i n did indeed pay dearly f o r 
her ' f a i t h i n the existence of an absolute standard of value5-. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DECONTROL AND RECONSTRUCTION OF THE 
ECONOMY AFTER THE 
GREAT WAR. 1918-1920 
Government Control of Industry during the 1914-18 War 
At the outset of the war, government control and influence over 
the B r i t i s h economy was minimal. I t was the largest single purchaser 
of supplies i n the market, but the proportion of the national income 
spent by the Government was small; i n 1913—14 net government expend-
i t u r e was £190 m i l l i o n out of a National Income of approximately 
£2,200 m i l l i o n . By the end of the war the s i t u a t i o n had changed drama-
t i c a l l y : i n 1918-19 government expenditure accounted f o r about half the 
national income. I t i s apparent that such a great change could not 
have taken place without either the i n i t i a t i o n of a comprehensive system 
of controls, or a complete d i s t o r t i o n of the economic system accompanied 
by unrest and disorder, or a combination of the two. I t was not obvious 
at the beginning of the war that changes on t h i s scale would be necessary, 
since many people i n well-informed ci r c l e s believed that the war would be 
a short one, l a s t i n g perhaps six months. I n addition nobody had any r e a l 
idea of what sort of war i t would be, since B r i t a i n had not fought a major 
war since the Napoleonic War a century before. Very few people foresaw 
the impact which i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was to have on the methods and scale 
of waging war. Thus the need f o r a comprehensive plan of reorganisation 
of the economic l i f e of the country to put i t on a war footing was not 
foreseen i n 191-4? and would almost c e r t a i n l y have been p o l i t i c a l l y 
impossible even had the Government had t h i s foresight,, 
Largely as a resu l t of t h i s absence of foresight, and also because 
the Government, i n sympathy with public opinion, was i n any case unwilling 
to overturn the nineteenth century principles regarding 'holding the r i n g 1 
Studies i n 
1. E.V. Morgan, B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1914-25 (London : Macmillan 
& Co., 1952), pp. 104-5, 
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i n economic l i f e which had hitherto governed i t s relations with the 
economy, those controls which were eventually implemented came int o 
existence i n a haphazard fashion, i n response to particular situations, 
notably shortages of various kinds„ Some r e s t r i c t i o n s were of course 
imposed at the outbreak of the war, such as those pr o h i b i t i n g trading 
with the enemy. Exports of essential foods and materials were prohib-
i t e d from the beginning, and control over the export- of many important 
commodities was soon put int o e f f e c t . The Government took over control 
of the railways at once, but mainly f o r m i l i t a r y rather than economic 
reasons o T-he same logic l a y behind the powers given to the Admiralty 
to r e q u i s i t i o n shipping, although these were l a t e r used to control 
shipping on a wider basis when the Ministry of Shipping was set up i n 
1 9 1 6 . The Army Council was given powers to r e q u i s i t i o n essential stores 
and supplies of food. The Royal Commission on Sugar Supplies was set up 
to take the purchase and d i s t r i b u t i o n out of private hands; our main 
pre-war suppliers of sugar had been Germany and Austria, so t h i s was 
obviously a necessary move,J 
For the time being the Government continued to r e l y on the market 
to supply unaided i t s main needs. But before long i t became obvious 
that; p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the f i e l d of munitions supplies, the free market 
was incapable of quickly readjusting i t s e l f to the needs of a major 
twentieth century war. The revelations of the shocking absence of 
ammunition and guns on the Front i n France, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the short-
age of shells, was the main force behind the f a l l of the Liberal Govern-
ment i n May 1 9 1 5 , and the setting up of the F i r s t Coalition,, with Lloyd 
George as Minister of Munitions. Before Lloyd George took over., the 
1 . Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1 9 1 4 - - 1 9 2 5 * p p ? 3 5 - 3 6 . 
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War Office had. continued to r e l y on the small number of private firms 
who had supplied the Army i n peace-time, and who had been unable to 
supply the increased quantities needed„ Their s i t u a t i o n was not helped 
by the lack of control over enlistment, which meant that large numbers 
of s k i l l e d workers were recruited f o r the forces whom the munitions' 
firms found i t impossible to replace. The solution was found i n the 
setting up of National Factories s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r munitions production, 
and a form of organisation of munitions volunteer labour 0 But organ-
i s a t i o n of related supplies and war materials was s t i l l absent, and a 
network of regulations grew up enabling the Ministry of Munitions to 
1 
cope with the s i t u a t i o n . 
Shortages of t h i s kind also beset the Service departments, and 
similar ad hoc arrangements were slowly made to enable the War Office 
to obtain the supplies needed. Labour shortages i n the industries 
supplying these soon became a serious problem, and a system of selective 
recruitment designed to leave behind the s k i l l e d men, without whom 
industry could not operate, was slowly evolved. Other early problems 
concerned essential imports'j shortage of shipping space led to a r i s e 
i n f r e i g h t s to f i v e times t h e i r pre-war l e v e l during the f i r s t year of 
the war, and as a result import r e s t r i c t i o n s were d r a s t i c a l l y tightened 
2 
early i n 1916, The menace to B r i t i s h shipping by the German submarine 
offensive, which became effe c t i v e i n the spring of 1917, was the main 
reason f o r the setting up of universal r e s t r i c t i o n s and the bringing of 
import control under the aegis of an i n t e r - A l l i e d body, the A l l i e d Maritime 
Transport Commission,, The German submarine threat and the shortage of 
shipping space together contributed to the need f o r obtaining supplies 
1. Morgan, ^ Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 19U-1925, pp.37-4-0. 
2 0 I b i d . , p.4-1. 
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from the nearest rather than the cheapest source; the l a t t e r cause was 
a big factor i n our increased purchases from the United States, and helped 
to aggravate the already d i f f i c u l t exchange position. This d i s t o r t i o n 
i n the pattern of demand f o r imports also contributed to the post-war 
balance of payments problems. 
Thus the pressure of government demand led to a considerable increase 
i n i t s control over the economic l i f e of the nation. Industry could not 
supply the necessary goods s u f f i c i e n t l y f a s t without control and direction.. 
Inevitably large amounts of productive resources were diverted from 
peace- to war-time production needs. Together with the necessary controls 
on imports, shortage of goods f o r c i v i l i a n consumption i n e v i t a b l y arose, 
and even had the quantity of purchasing power i n the hands of the public 
stayed s t a t i c prices must have risen. But the f i n a n c i a l policy pursued 
by the Government i n fact led. to an increase i n available purchasing power. 
The avowed aim of the Government became to cover out of revenue normal 
peace-time expenditure together with the cost of servicing the debt i t 
incurred i n covering the rest of i t s expenditure. As a resul t the 
Government's d e f i c i t on i n t e r n a l current account was nearly one-third 
of the national income i n 1915--16 and about f o r t y per cent i n 1.917-18, 
Such huge sums could manifestly not be wrung from the r e a l savings of 
the people, and considerable i n f l a t i o n resulted. Price rises i n a l l 
sections of the economy began to give r i s e to serious alarm and discontent 
among the workers. The Ministry of Labour Cost of Living Index rose by 
60% between the outbreak of the war and the summer of 1916, and food 
prices had risen to double the pre-war l e v e l a year l a t e r . Food prices 
then settled down a l i t t l e , and by the Armistice were only 10$ higher 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 191 lyA925, pp.4-0-4-1 ° 
2. Ibid.,'pp .41, 104-105. 
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than they had been eighteen months earlier,, By t h i s time Government 
control of prices had become f a i r l y widespread. But the impetus to 
r i s i n g prices remained, p a r t l y because the Government's f i n a n c i a l policy 
continued to be i n f l a t i o n a r y , and p a r t l y because the lack of control i n 
the early years of the war had led to greatly enlarged p r o f i t s and wages,. 
2 
and therefore m purchasing power, i n certain sectors of industry. 
The spread of government control, which had received one accretion 
of power when the f i r s t Coalition Government was formed, got another when 
Asquith's Coalition f e l l and was replaced by Lloyd George's i n December 
1 9 1 6 . From t h i s time the controls increased f a s t , and by the end of the 
war had spread in t o every walk of economic and f i n a n c i a l l i f e . The legal 
framework within which the controls were implemented was as ad hoc as the 
controls themselves. Most of the controls were implemented under the 
aegis of the Defence of the Realm Act, passed i n 1 9 1 4 and amended several 
times. This provided f o r the framing of Orders i n Council under which 
regulations f o r r e q u i s i t i o n and control could be issued. I n i t i a l l y compen-
sation f o r r e q u i s i t i o n under these regulations was on the basis of market 
price, and t h i s contributed to the tendency of prices to r i s e ; but by the 
end of 1 9 1 6 a basis of cost plus the pre-war rate of p r o f i t had been gener-
a l l y accepted. Unfortunately t h i s generally meant that the rates were f i x e d 
with regard to the least p r o f i t a b l e firms i n the industry, and many more 
e f f i c i e n t firms made big p r o f i t s , although i n some industries pooling 
arrangements were evolved. Price f i x i n g as such never received le g a l 
sanction, but was done under the authority given by a number of regulations, 
notably D . 0.R.R . 2 E . , framed i n February 1 9 1 6 , to regulate and license the 
sale, production and use of food, stores and 'war materials', which was 
3 
interpreted f a i r l y widely.' 
1 . Quoted by Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 2 5 . 
p.. 2 8 4 o 2 . I b i d . . pp. 4 1 - 4 3 ° 
3. Framed 1 5 t h Feb., 1 9 1 6 under the Defence of the Realm Act 1 9 1 4 , 
4 & 5 Geo. V, C h „ 2 9 . For a f u l l discussion of the le g a l framework 
of control, see E.M. Lloyd, Experiments i n State Control (Oxford: 
Claj?endon''Press,.'1924]r-PP« 5 0 - 6 4 « 
The administrative structure of the controls was complex i n the 
extreme, p a r t l y because, l i k e Topsy, they 'just growed 'o The structure 
of the controls can be divided i n t o seven main types. F i r s t l y there was 
the control of productive capacity. This took several forms. For the 
munitions industry one of the main ones was f o r the Government to build 
i t s own fact o r i e s ; the Ministry of Munitions b u i l t about 120 during the 
course of the war, and took over a similar number from private firms. 
The Government also took over a number of other industries en bloc, 
notably the coal mines, and, as we have already seen, the railways. 
Since the extent to which the Government interfered with the running 
of such enterprises was not great, the effect was similar to that i n 
cases where the Government bought the whole output of a f i r m , which 
was another method of achieving control over productive capacity. I n 
addition there were voluntary agreements i n some industries as to prices 
to be paid f o r raw materials, and quantities of goods to be supplied at 
agreed prices to the Government. Fourthly, production i n some industries 
was regulated i n some industries, f o r instance vehicles and beer prod-
uction, by a system of licensing. 
The Government also became active in. the purchase of raw materials, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y food. The goods concerned were mainly imported ones, and 
the reasons tended to be either because the Government was such a large 
d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t user that i t needed control over supply, or, as i n 
the case of food, to ensure e f f i c i e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n . Control became very 
widespread i n some sectors; f o r instance the Ministry of Food was buying 
85% of our imported foodstuffs by the end of the war. I n addition to the 
control of the supplies themselves, a good deal of influence was exercised 
through controls oyer dealings; t h i s control was sometimes just.over the 
import and export dealings i n a commodity, sometimes over domestic dealings 
as w e l l . Control was exercised by means of licensing, and extended over 
1 
a wide range of food, raw materials and manufactures. 
Another important element i n Government control was priee~fixing„ 
Apparently the normal method was to allow a cost-plus" basis, the plus-
being based on {normal 5 pre-war p r o f i t s . There was provision f o r a r b i t -
r a t i o n i n some cases, but that t h i s was very r a r e l y invoked suggests- that 
prices were probably s l i g h t l y higher than could have been obtained from 
independent a r b i t r a t i o n . The area i n which the consumer was most-affected 
was i n food prices; attempts to control the price of manufactured consumer 
goods were lar g e l y unsuccessful because of the variety of goods involved, 
2 
and the few attempts at standardisation were largely unsuccessful. Price 
control over food was supplemented by control over i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n ; t h i s 
was obviously essential, since the normal market regulation of supply and 
demand had been suspended, and i t was to be expected that supply would 
exceed demand. Individual rationing was only introduced i n the l a s t year 
of the war, and never played the central role which i t did during and 
after the Second World War. Prior to t h i s control was exercised l a r g e l y 
by ensuring equality of d i s t r i b u t i o n between d i f f e r e n t geographical areas, 
3 
i n which licensed dealers operated as Government agents. 
Some i n d i r e c t control over the expansion of firms whose a c t i v i t i e s 
were not contributing to the war e f f o r t was achieved through the control 
of capital issues, A v i r t u a l p r o h i b i t i o n on lending to foreign countries 
was imposed, and most of the lending which was i n fa c t done was f o r loans 
to a l l i e s , which had received Government approval. Domestic issues of 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1914-1925, pp,4-8-50. 
2. I b i d . , pp.50-51. 
3. I b i d , , pp.51-52, . 
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c a p i t a l were prohibited unless the approval of the Capital Issues 
Committee, set up soon a f t e r the Stock Exchange reopened i n January 
1915, had been obtained, and t h e i r value f e l l to about one f i f t h of 
the pre-war l e v e l f o r each year of the war. 
Direct control of labour was only attempted over those e l i g i b l e f o r 
m i l i t a r y service. I n i t i a l l y the Forces r e l i e d on volunteers, but consc-
r i p t i o n was f i n a l l y introduced i n March 1916. To prevent the calling-up 
of s k i l l e d men whose loss would have been detrimental to the productivity 
of industry various systems of 'reserving' occupations were t r i e d . But 
while some control, largely unsuccessful was attempted over the employ-
ment of these men, none was t r i e d with the women, the older men, and 
those u n f i t f o r active service; public opinion would not have permitted 
any form of i n d u s t r i a l conscription. Some measure of ' d i l u t i o n ' , whereby 
semi-skilled workers were allowed to do jobs t r a d i t i o n a l l y reserved f o r 
men with c r a f t apprenticeship q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , was achieved by v i r t u e of 
the Treasury Agreement of March 1915, under which the unions agreed to 
suspend r e s t r i c t i v e practices f o r the duration of the war, but i n 'controlled 
establishments' only. I n addition the agreement contained a clause by 
which the unions agreed to submit disputes to a r b i t r a t i o n , but t h i s was 
only p a r t i a l l y e f f e c t i v e , and the course of the war was marked by a number 
of strikes i n essential industries. These were usually settled on terms-
acceptable to the workers, since the Government could not afford to lose 
2 
th e i r labour f o r any length of time. 
Thus the structure of control with which the Government ended the war 
had come in t o existence i n a piecemeal- and ad hoc fashion, as and when 
shortages or discontent arose. I n some sectors the control exercised was 
1. Midland Bank Review, quoted i n Morgan, Studies_in B r i t i s h Financial 
Policy 19U-1925. p .264. 
2. Morgan., op.cit., pp.52-56. 
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considerable. By the end of the war p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the inland and sea 
transport of Great B r i t a i n was under the contrgl of the Government through 
the operations of the Ministry of Shipping, the Railway executive, and the 
Canal Control Committee. Raw material supplies and the size of labour 
forces came under Government all o c a t i o n schemes; p r o f i t and price control 
was very widespread, purchase, transport and d i s t r i b u t i o n of 90% of imports' 
was la r g e l y under Government supervision, and through the melieu of the 
Ministry of Munitions the Government owned and operated 250 facto r i e s 
employing two m i l l i o n people, and supervised a further 20,000 works i n 
the same industry, But many of the controls were loose and only p a r t l y 
e f f e c t i v e . Those operating over d i r e c t i o n of manpower and the prices of 
manufactured goods were weak and lar g e l y unsuccessful. Furthermore, the 
form of many of the controls was such as to make i t easier to drop them 
at the end of the war than to r e t a i n them. The bulk of the controls were 
exercised by Ministries - Munitions, Food, Shipping - which were expected 
2 
to be temporary creations. The higgledy-piggledy nature of the controls 
i n e v i t a b l y meant that there were considerable i n j u s t i c e s involved i n exer-
cising some of them. The fact that the controls had been set up purely i n 
response to the exigencies of war provided a powerful argument f o r t h e i r 
dismantling. F i n a l l y , the legal structure of control was such that the 
continuation of them beyond, i n most cases, 1921 would have required special 
l e g i s l a t i o n . The Defence of the Realm Act, under which much of the regul-
ation had been made, provided f o r regulations to l a s t only 'for the duration 
of the present war 1, and those controls and new machinery which were set 
up by statute were f o r the most part scheduled to come to an end a year 
aft e r the end of the war. So the onus was lar g e l y on those who wanted to 
1. D. H„ Aid o r o f t , Studies i n the Abolition of Economic Controls i n B r i t a i n 
a f t e r Two World Wars (Thesis presented f o r Ph.D. at Manchester 
University, 1962), pp."9-11. 
2. For the f i g h t to turn the Ministry of Munitions in t o a permanent 
Ministry of Supply, see below, pp. 1 4-4.-1 5"5. 
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r e t a i n the controls to demonstrate t h e i r usefulness„ As we s h a l l see,, 
they f a i l e d signally, and the vast apparatus' of control which has been 
described was very largely dismantled w i t h i n a year of the Armistice,, 
The Process of Decontrol 
The most s t r i k i n g thing about the process of decontrol a f t e r the 
war was i t s r a p i d i t y . The bulk of the controls had either been removed 
or ceased to function wi t h i n a year of the signing of the Armistice; of 
those which remained, the vast majority disappeared i n the next two 
years; and the bulk of the small remnant f e l l to the Geddes Axe i n 
1922. Comment on t h i s process customarily contrasts the high hopes 
with which the Government entered the reconstruction period with the speed 
with which i t drew i n i t s horns as soon as i t became apparent that there 
was l i t t l e public support f o r the retention of controls. I n some instances 
the facts support t h i s view, notably i n the case of the demise- while s t i l l 
i n embryo of the plan to create a Ministry of Supply out of the Ministry 
of Munitions. But on the whole the processes of decontrol and of recon-
stru c t i o n seem to have been seen by Ministers as two separate parts of 
th e i r policy, and i t only became apparent l a t e r , f o r instance with the 
p a r t i a l f a i l u r e of Addison's housing policy, that the two were intertwined. 
As has already been pointed out, the process by which the Government 
took control over the economy largely consisted i n a series of responses 
to external s t i m u l i ; control over production was taken i n response to a 
shortage of supplies, control over prices began as a reaction to increased 
costs to the Government and labour unrest caused by increases i n the cost 
of l i v i n g . There was no th e o r e t i c a l or doctrinal j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r these 
vast esctensions of Government a c t i v i t y . I n so f a r as there was e x p l i c i t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n by the Government of moves to control p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t i e s , 
i t took the form of explaining that the action taken was the r e s u l t of a 
specific s i t u a t i o n having arisen, 
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"Like factory and public health l e g i s l a t i o n i n the l a s t century, 
each j u s t i f i e d every additional advance as an exceptional 
concession to some specific emergency, which;,, because i t was 
exceptional, raised no question of p r i n c i p l e . Thus a c o l l e c t -
ivism was established which was e n t i r e l y doetrineless. The 
most extensive and i n t r i c a t e scheme of state intervention i n 
economic l i f e which the country had seen was brought in t o 
existence, without the merits or demerits of state intervention 
even being discussed."^ 
Having set up t h i s vast network of controls without having considered 
the presence or absence of a theoretical j u s t i f i c a t i o n , of i t 5 the 
Government was very much a prey to the pressure of the various i n t e r e s t 
groups which surrounded i t both i n and out of Parliament-,, 
"Being without any general view, the Government was ready to be 
pushed. The pressure of business i n t e r e s t s , the clamour of i t s 
supporters ? the noise made by the Press, the advice of the 
Treasury, the economic s i t u a t i o n , and- s t i l l more- the prevalent 
i l l u s i o n s about the economic s i t u a t i o n , a l l pushed i n one 
di r e c t i o n . " ^ 
Had the economic situation, a f t e r the Armistice been d i f f e r e n t , i t i s 
possible that there would have been a stronger demand f o r the retention 
of at least those controls which might have been supposed to assist the 
Government i n the provision of employment and the maintenance of indus-
t r i a l profits'. But the recovery of the economy af t e r the end of the War 
was remarkably s w i f t . I n March and A p r i l 1 9 1 9 the numbers drawing the 
out-of-work donation were around the one m i l l i o n mark; a year l a t e r they 
were half that f i g u r e . This i s not an accurate estimate of the number 
unemployed, since the e a r l i e r figure includes a large number of married 
women who were e n t i t l e d to the benefit, but did not intend to return to 
work, and the l a t t e r i s affected by the extent to which men had exhausted 
3 
t h e i r e l i g i b i l i t y , , But i t serves as an ind i c a t i o n ; and the apparent 
prosperity backed up the clamour of the vast majority of businessmen who 
1 . R.H.Tawney, "The Abolition of Economic Controls, 1 9 1 8 - - 2 T ' 1 , 
Economic History Review;. X I I I ( 1 9 4 3 ) ? p » 7 . 
2» Ibid.„ p . 1 3 » 
3 . A, Pigou, Aspects of British.Economic HistorxJ,9JjHt9.25. (London; 
MacMillan and Co9, 1 9 4 8 ) , p „ 2 * 8 . 
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believed that the promised land lay j u s t around the corner, i f only they 
could persuade the Government to give them a free hand i n achieving i t . 
"The great staple industries of the past, shipping, i r o n and 
stee l , engineering, t e x t i l e s , and coal - though the l a t t e r 
had l a t e r some reservations to make - were emphatic as to the 
blessings to be anticipated, once the nation had ceased, i n 
the words of the Economist, 3 t o pay people f o r putting 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the way of private enterprise. " 1 
I n company with most other journals, the Economist was indeed strongly i n 
favour of releasing industry from the coils of Government control. I n 
a Leader w r i t t e n after the signing of the Armistice, i t commented; 
"The f i r s t requisite of industry i s the restoration of freedom." ^ 
The clamour of the press was reinforced by the Government's own supporters 
i n Parliament. This was a most important fac t o r , f o r Lloyd George had 
i n the nature of things to be very careful with his followers i n the 
House, being dependent as he was on the Conservatives, who as repres-
entatives of the business i n t e r e s t were natural l y not i n favour of 
Governmental control of industry, although subsidy and protection were 
d i f f e r e n t matters. 
Furthermore, as we have noted, the nature of the structure of the 
controls was such as to make t h e i r disappearance an easier matter than 
th e i r maintenance. I n the vast majority of cases, they had either been 
brought i n t o being by regulations framed under the Defence of the Realm 
Act, f o r the duration of the war, or they had been i n i t i a t e d a f t e r l e g i s -
l a t i o n f o r the purpose, which frequently provided f o r the operation of the 
Act to lapse a year or six months after the end of the war. I t i s l i t t l e 
wonder that i n the event Government policy followed the l i n e which was not 
only the one recommended by a l l but a few, and they the least audible, of 
the available voices, but which was also that which required no e f f o r t and 
l i t t l e action on i t s part. 
1 . Tawney, The Abolition of Economic Controls 1918-1921, p. 14-. 
2. Economist (~- 7 LXXXVTI, 16 Nov., 1918. 
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"Decontrol, i n short, which required only inaction,, was the l i n e 
of least resistance. Though i t dissolved an imposing f a b r i c of 
organised a c t i v i t y , i t was the continuance of an accepted policy, 
not the reversal of i t . 
That f a c t , though of minor significance, was not wholly 
unimportant. I t meant that the burden of proof was thrown, not 
on the advocates of de-control, but on i t s opponents, and that 
the Government, i f i t desired to perpetuate beyond the statutory 
l i m i t any part of the machinery of economic regulation existing 
at the Armistice, would be obliged f o r that purpose to seek fresh 
authority from Parliament." 1 
In the event, decontrol proceeded with speed and smoothness. Controls 
over exports were obvious candidates f o r early removal; a r t i c l e s whose 
export was prohibited f e l l from 1,000 i n number at the Armistice to 248 
by March 1919j and those which remained on the prohibited l i s t were 
mainly food and raw materials. Imports were also freed soon after the 
end of h o s t i l i t i e s , with the licensing system f i n a l l y coming to an end 
i n September 1919. There were, however, exceptions here; food imports 
remained p a r t l y i n the hands of the Government, who was s t i l l the largest 
importer i n 1920, and a further seventeen classes of goods remained under 
licence, most of them receiving a permanent measure of protection i n 1921, 
The import controls which were retained were i n fact largely protect!onary 
i n e f f e c t , except f o r some of those on food imports. Control over food 
imports and prices was retained largely because of public unease over the 
2 
price rises of mid-1919, and food control was only f i n a l l y l i f t e d i n 1921. 
Control over new issues of cap i t a l f o r domestic purposes was formally 
removed i n A p r i l 1919? but the Committee had. been allowing v i r t u a l l y every 
application through f o r some months previously, and t h i s was a good 
example of controls becoming defunct because of the attit u d e of those 
who operated them, i n t h i s case notably Lord Cunliffe, ex-Governor of 
1. Tawney, The Abolition of Economic Controls 1918-1921, p.12. 
2. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1914-1925, pp. 62-63 <> i n v 191 1 
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the Bank of England, The figures of domestic issues i n 1918 had 
recovered to t h e i r pre-war l e v e l , although only i n money terms, and 
were about f i v e times those of the previous year. The following two 
years each showed a sharp r i s e i n the figures. 
Control over i n d u s t r i a l production was relinquished very quickly. 
By June 1st 1919 v i r t u a l l y a l l control on the manufacture and d i s t r i b -
u tion of goods i n B r i t a i n by the Ministry of Munitions, the War Office 
and the Board of Trade had come to an end except i n the case of a few 
goods. I t had o r i g i n a l l y been intended to r e t a i n some control over the 
disposal of war materials, to make sure that export firms got p r i o r i t y 
f o r raw materials, but eventually the Government decided to release a l l 
i n d u s t r i a l raw materials, and as a result the War P r i o r i t i e s Committee 
which had been converted to c i v i l i a n use by changing i t s name to the 
C i v i l Industries Committee, was wound up i n January 1919 as i t had 
2 
become superfluous. 
The bulk of the munitions factories which had been i n private hands 
were returned to t h e i r owners; those which had been b u i l t by the Govern-
ment were mostly sold. Projects f o r turning them over to peace work.., 
which had been approved i n p r i n c i p a l by the War Cabinet i n the autumn of 
3 
1918, foundered on the problem of whether they were to be competitive 
with private industry i n the general market, A Cabinet decision of 
January 1919 that the factories could only produce goods i f the State was 
to be t h e i r sole buyer and i f , i n the production of them, the State would 
not compete with private firms, e f f e c t i v e l y sealed t h e i r f a t e , since the 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 191A--1925. p.264. 
Control, over foreign issues was released p a r t l y i n August and f u l l y 
i n November, and the r e s t r i c t i o n s on the banks deposit rate : was also 
l i f t e d i n August, The whole matter was discussed by the Finance 
Committee of the Cabinet, see P.R.O., Cab.27/71, Minutes of the 
Finance Committee of the Cabinet, 1st meeting, 2L, July 1919. 
2. P.R.O., Reconj/52, 
3. P.R.O,, Cjb^J/g7~Minutes of War Cabinet meeting No, 491, 
2U Oct.," 1918, 
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Government did not use any such goods i n s u f f i c i e n t quantity f o r i t to 
only three of the factories were retained permanently, and these became 
2 
the f i r s t Royal Ordnance Factories at the outbreak of World War I I . 
One of the few industries where some, measure of control was main-
tained f o r a time was coal; the reasons were mainly the shortage of 
coal supplies and the unwillingness of the miners to see the return of 
pre-war conditions. Export conditions other than those on price were 
withdrawn i n 1919, and minimum prices were substituted f o r f i x e d ones, 
which enabled the industry to take advantage of the shortage on the 
Continent to make considerable p r o f i t s i n that year. Because part of 
the process of control had involved a Government-guaranteed p r o f i t 
standard, above which l e v e l the Inland Revenue received 80% of the p r o f i t s , 
the Government received a p r o f i t of £170 m i l l i o n i n 1918-19. I t had o r i g -
i n a l l y been intended to continue the agreement between the owners and the 
Government on p r o f i t s and wages u n t i l August 1921, largely as a re s u l t of 
the Government's indecision over the recommendations of the Sankey Comm-
ission. By the end of 1920, however, sales and prices were becomming less 
favourable, and i n January 1921 expenses exceeded receipts by £4.8 m i l l i o n , 
and by £4.5 m i l l i o n the following month. The Cabinet, worried at the 
thought of the alarming amounts of money they might lose, panicked and 
abandoned control, at a month's notice, on March 31st, f i v e months e a r l i e r 
3 
than planned. 
Another area of control which remained f o r some time i n f u l l and 
which had l a s t i n g results was the Liquor industry. There was considerable 
1. E.R.O., Cab. 2.3/9. W.G.514, 8 Jan., 1919, 
2. Aidcroft, Studies i n the Abolition of Economic Controls i n B r i t a i n 
a f t e r Two World Wars, p.21. 
3. Tawney, The Abolition of Economic Controls 1918-1921, pp.22-23, 
be economical to r e t a i n factories f o r t h e i r production. 1 Eventually 
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p u b l i c support f o r t h i s on the grounds t h a t the operations of the Liquor C o n t r o l 
Board had been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the considerable r e d u c t i o n i n drunkenness 
during the war, and i t was also making a p r o f i t - 12Jj$> on i t s c a p i t a l 
Apr i l 1918 - Ap r i l 1921„ But vested i n t e r e s t s i n the trade p r e v a i l e d , and the 
Board was wound up i n 1921, although two of i t s three centres c a r r i e d on 
business under the c o n t r o l of the Home O f f i c e . A Licensing Act was also 
passed, under which hours of opening were considerably reduced from the 
pre-war l e v e l c The l i q u o r centres were f i n a l l y abolished i n 1922, f o l l o w i n g 
the recommendations o f the Geddes Committee, which was a f r a i d they might make 
1 
a l o s s i n the f u t u r e . 
The r a i l w a y s were not f o r m a l l y handed back t o the owners u n t i l 1921, 
w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t when the railwaymen threatened t o s t r i k e i n the autumn 
of 1919 over a proposed wage c u t , i t was the Government which had t o deal 
w i t h the s i t u a t i o n d i r e c t l y . As one w r i t e r r a t h e r u n k i n d l y puts i t , 
"Lloyd George allowed Auckland Geddes, President of the Board 
of Trade, t o provoke the s t r i k e by h i s i n t r a n s i g e n c e ; then 
stepped i n and s e t t l e d i t on the railwaymen's terms. This was 
a great stroke f o r the N a t i o n a l Union of Railwaymen...It was 
also a great stroke f o r Lloyd George. 
But t h i s manoeuvre d i d a t l e a s t prevent the e f f e c t i v e i n v o c a t i o n of the 
T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , at a time when a j o i n t s t r i k e of railwaymen, t r a n s p o r t 
workers and coalminers would not only have been economically but also 
p o l i t i c a l l y disastrous' f o r the C o a l i t i o n , caught i n the middle as they 
would have been. 
Controls over food were maintained longer than i n any other sphere. 
I t had o r i g i n a l l y been intended t o phase them out d u r i n g 1919, and the 
M i n i s t r y of Food was scheduled t o disappear i n September of t h a t year. 
But the alarming r i s e i n food p r i c e s i n the summer of 1919 caused the 
1. Tawney, The A b o l i t i o n of Economic Controls 1918-1921, pp.2A-25j A l d e r o f t , 
Studies i n the A b o l i t i o n of Economic Controls i n B r i t a i n a f t e r Two World Wars 
pp.21-25. 
2. A.J.P. Taylor, English H i s t o r y T9U-25 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 196$), p . U 1 
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Government t o have second thoughts, and i n J u l y i t was announced t h a t 
the M i n i s t r y would continue f o r the time being. Control over some 
imports was reimposed, elements of i t c o n t i n u i n g u n t i l March 1921, and 
food r a t i o n i n g was rei n t r o d u c e d . Meat r a t i o n i n g was again dispensed 
w i t h i n December 1919 a f t e r o n ly three months, but b u t t e r remained 
r a t i o n e d u n t i l May 1920, and sugar u n t i l September„ Price c o n t r o l s 
l a s t e d longer than physical, c o n t r o l s , and l i k e these, l a s t e d longer f o r 
food than f o r other m a t e r i a l s and goods„ Contr o l over coal p r i c e s 
remained u n t i l June 1920, bread and f l o u r were c o n t r o l l e d u n t i l October 
2 
1920, b u t t e r u n t i l March 1921, Since t h i s normally i n v o l v e d the 
a u t h o r i t i e s i n s e l l i n g below the market p r i c e , and o f t e n below cost, 
these operations made a considerable l o s s f o r the Government. The 
Sugar Commission l o s t £22 m i l l i o n i n 1919 and 1920„ The Wheat Commission, 
which, imported f o r e i g n cereals and sold them t o the m i l l e r s at the Food 
Commissioner's p r i c e f o r the n a t i v e product, who then sold the f l o u r 
below cost t o the bakers, made an average l o s s of £50 m i l l i o n per year 
3 
between September 1917 and December 1920„ 
Such c o n t r o l s over labour as e x i s t e d were used t o c o n t r o l unemploy-
ment. I t had o r i g i n a l l y been intended t o demobilise the most s k i l l e d 
workers f i r s t , i n an attempt t o get peace-time i n d u s t r y going again as 
soon as p o s s i b l e , but since these were n e a r l y always the l a s t t o have 
been c a l l e d up, the resentment caused was considerable, and when C h u r c h i l l 
took over the War O f f i c e i n January 1919 he abandoned the idea i n favour 
of 1 f i r s t i n , f i r s t out'.^" I n any case, the process of d e m o b i l i s a t i o n was 
achieved so s w i f t l y t h a t such considerations very q u i c k l y became academic. 
1 . Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 191A-1925. pp 0 62-63o 
2 . Ibid„ 
3 . Tawney, The A b o l i t i o n of Economic Controls 1918-192T, pp,19-20. 
4-. W.S.Churchill, The Aftermath (London;MacMillan & Co„ ,194-1) ,pp .53-6„ 
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I n the f i f t e e n months f o l l o w i n g the Armistice over f o u r m i l l i o n men were 
released from the f o r c e s , but more than h a l f of these were out by March 
1919, and 'by the end of June the p r o p o r t i o n was around t h r e e - q u a r t e r s . 
At the same time, the munitions workers were g r a d u a l l y released, w i t h 
those who normally worked i n the i n d u s t r y the l a s t t o go; overtime and 
payment by r e s u l t s were suspended, and discharged workers were given a 
2 
f r e e passage home. Because of the general optimism about c o n t i n u i n g 
good prospects f o r trade a f t e r the war, absorption i n t o peace-time 
i n d u s t r y was s w i f t ; w i t h i n e i g h t months of the end of the war, munitions 
work had ceased, about s i x m i l l i o n war workers and- fo r c e s personnel had 
been released and n e a r l y 90% of them had e i t h e r been absorbed i n t o 
3 
i n d u s t r y or withdrawn from the labour market al t o g e t h e r ^ 
One of the few more permanent legacies o f the war was the r e t e n t i o n • 
of some p r o t e c t i v e measures. C e r t a i n i n d u s t r i e s had been found t o be 
e s s e n t i a l t o B r i t a i n f o r defensive reasons, and t h e i r growth had been 
encouraged i n wartime t o supply a number of e s s e n t i a l a r t i c l e s which we 
had p r e v i o u s l y imported almost e n t i r e l y ; a not-able instance was the 
d y e s t u f f s i n d u s t r y . Several of these nascent i n d u s t r i e s received a 
measure of p r o t e c t i o n through the Safeguarding of I n d u s t r i e s Act i n 1921 </ 
I n a d d i t i o n the MacKenna d u t i e s , imposed by tne then Gnancellor i n Sept-
ember 1915 5 which consisted of a 33% ad valorem t a x on a number of manuf-
actured a r t i c l e s , notably motor cars and b i c y c l e s , were r e t a i n e d u n t i l 
1924. The Free Trade lobby f u l m i n a t e d against what i t regarded as a 
f i r s t step towards p r o t e c t i o n , ' but the trade and defence i n t e r e s t s won 
the day. 
1 . Morgan, Studies JLn_British, F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 191U--1925, p . 65 -
2 . I b i d . 
3o I b i d . , pp.65-6. 
4» I b i d . , p.64.0 
5. The Economist, t r a d i t i o n a l l y a staunch Free Trade paper, was among 
the leaders i n the p r o t e s t s against permanent measures of import and 
export r e g u l a t i o n ; See, f o r example, Economist,vol.LXXXIX, 
22 Nov.., 1919, leading a r t i c l e . 
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Thus by the autumn of 1919? o n l y a year a f t e r the A r m i s t i c e , the 
vast bulk of the apparatus of war-time c o n t r o l had already been disman-
t l e d , and only i s o l a t e d instances remained. These were l a r g e l y i n areas 
where t h e i r removal., r a t h e r than r e t e n t i o n , would a t t h a t time have 
caused a p u b l i c outcry; the obvious example i s c o n t r o l over the p r i c e 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n of food. That t h i s 'bonfire of c o n t r o l s ' was l a r g e l y 
i n l i n e w i t h the Government's pre-Armistice i n t e n t i o n s - i s reasonably 
apparent. I n the meetings of the War Cabinet of l a t e 1918, the d i s c -
ussions on r e c o n s t r u c t i o n centre on the p o s i t i v e aspects, such as 'homes 
f o r heroes', r a t h e r than the negative one of r e t a i n i n g i n f l u e n c e over 
some p a r t s of the economic l i f e of the country by d i r e c t c o n t r o l s . 
"Economic conditions a t the Ar m i s t i c e d i d not appear t o 
j u s t i f y the r e t e n t i o n of c o n t r o l s f o r any l e n g t h o f time 
and i n f a c t there was never any question t h a t c o n t r o l s 
would be r e t a i n e d any longer than was a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l . 
Many of them operated under temporary l e g i s l a t i o n anyway, 
which was due t o expire soon a f t e r the d e c l a r a t i o n of 
peace and i t would have r e q u i r e d an unusual Government t o 
have d r a f t e d l e g i s l a t i o n t o extend t h e i r lease of l i f e f o r 
any l e n g t h of time. I n any case the p o l i c y of the Govern-
ment was mapped out before the Armistice and i t f o l l o w e d 
f a i r l y c l o s e l y the recommendations regarding c o n t r o l s cont-r 
ained i n the various trade r e p o r t s . Once s t a r t e d , the f i r e 
of d e c o n t r o l was fanned by the mounting pressure of p u b l i c 
o p i n i o n against any form of r e s t r i c t i o n s on economic a c t i v i t y 
and by the r a p i d d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the various i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
schemes of Government c o n t r o l . . „„11 
During the f i r s t h a l f of 1919 Lloyd George was absent f o r n e a r l y a l l the 
time a t the Paris Conference, and since Austen Chamberlain was the only 
member of the War Cabinet who remained i n England the whole time Lloyd 
George v i r t u a l l y dispensed w i t h i t s formal meetings, and decisions were 
taken l a r g e l y on an ad hoc b a s i s T h e process by which the d e c o n t r o l of 
i n d u s t r y was accelerated i s t h e r e f o r e extremely d i f f i c u l t t o f o l l o w , and 
1 . A l d c r o f t , Studies i n the A b o l i t i o n of Economic Controls i n B r i t a i n 
a f t e r Two World Wars, pp .18-19. 
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much of the important m a t e r i a l i s contained i n the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s 
correspondence f i l e s r a t h e r than i n the f o r m a l Cabinet minutesj t h i s 
tendency was encouraged by the absence w i t h Lloyd George i n Paris of 
the Secretary t o the Cabinet, S i r Maurice Hankey. But on the whole the 
Government's approach seems t o have been most i n f l u e n c e d by the employ-
ment prospects. Chamberlain, speaking a t a war Cabinet meeting i n 
October 1918, said of the plans f o r running down production i n the 
Munitions f a c t o r i e s : 
"Generally, the p r i n c i p l e t o be borne i n mind was t h a t every 
l e g i t i m a t e e f f o r t should be made t o prevent unemployment, and 
i t s accompanying demoralisation. I t was f a r b e t t e r t o run 
the r i s k of manufacturing commodities which would not be 
r e q u i r e d , and t o resolve them i n t o t h e i r elements l a t e r , 
than t o have m u l t i t u d e s i n r e c e i p t of unemployment benefit."'' 
A f u r t h e r complication a t t h i s stage was t h a t u n t i l the Government knew 
the Armistice terms i t could not be sure what i t s peace-time munitions 
needs would be, nor would i t have any c e r t a i n t y t h a t h o s t i l i t i e s would 
not be recommenced. This u n c e r t a i n t y was l a r g e l y removed i n the course 
of the w i n t e r , and t h i s , combined w i t h the apparent ease w i t h which men 
were being absorbed i n t o i n d u s t r y , was a f a c t o r i n the d e c i s i o n t o get 
r i d of the Munitions f a c t o r i e s more q u i c k l y than had been envisaged 
i n the autumn of 1918. 
As t o the d i s p o s a l of the l a r g e volume of excess stores which the 
Government had i n i t s possession at the end of the war, t h i s was c a r r i e d 
out w i t h a l l p ossible speed where the m a t e r i a l s were needed t o get 
i n d u s t r y going again; one of the p o i n t s which Addison stressed was 
the need f o r t h i s . 
"The r a p i d i t y w i t h which these people unemployed during the 
t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d could be absorbed would mainly depend on 
the supply of raw m a t e r i a l s . „ .."^  
1. P.R.Q., Cab.23/8, W.C.491(1), 24 Oct., 1918. 
2 . I b i d , Addison was s t i l l M i n i s t e r of Reconstruction a t t h i s t i m e . 
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But .care was also taken not t o f l o o d the market and d i s t o r t p r i c e s too 
much. .In the event, 83% of the surpluses d i s c l o s e d by a l l Departments 
to the Disposal Board of the M i n i s t r y of Munitions, which handled the 
t r a n s a c t i o n s , were disposed of by June 1920, f o r a t o t a l of £504 m i l l i o n , 
and a f u r t h e r £300 m i l l i o n worth remained t o be s o l d . 
Such, i n b r i e f o u t l i n e , was the process by which the Government 
r e l i n q u i s h e d i t s p h y s i c a l and f i n a n c i a l hold over the country i n the 
year f o l l o w i n g the A r m i s t i c e . Lloyd George had f u l f i l l e d h i s e l e c t i o n 
pledge of October 1918, i n which he acknowledged t h a t 
" I n d u s t r y w i l l r i g h t l y c l a i m t o be l i b e r a t e d a t the e a r l i e s t 
possible moment from Government c o n t r o l . " ^ 
But the Government had also pledged i t s e l f t o a programme of Reconstruction, 
aimed at. i n c r e a s i n g the e f f i c i e n c y of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Government, 
at a l l e v i a t i n g many of the s o c i a l e v i l s of the age, and at m a i n t a i n i n g a 
high l e v e l of • 'employment. On the p o l i c y of d e c o n t r o l , there had been 
few d e t r a c t o r s ; i n . t h e f i e l d of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n the s i t u a t i o n was r a t h e r 
d i f f e r e n t . 
Problems of Reconstruction; The M i n i s t r y of Supply 
One of the f e a t u r e s of war-time Government c o n t r o l of the economy 
had been the extent t o which i t had been necessary t o set up new Departs 
ments t o take charge of the various new f u n c t i o n s of the Government. 
True t o i t s t r a d i t i o n a l d i s l i k e of swollen bureaucratic establishments, 
t h i s was one aspect of Government expansion which the House of Commons-
was f i r m l y of the o p i n i o n should be cut back as soon as peace came. 
3 
This clamour, which was i n p a r t bound up w i t h the anti-waste campaign, 
was r e i n f o r e e d by the opinions of the general p u b l i c , and also by many 
1. Tawney, The A b o l i t i o n of Economic Controls 1918-1921, pp.19-20. 
Lloyd George Papers, F/> 
See below, pp. 182-203* 
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of the Government's advisers. Sir Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary 
to the Treasury, w r i t i n g to Lloyd George about the economy campaign, 
urged that 
"War time Departments should, I suggest, be wound up as soon 
as possible and not continued - with the exception of those 
engaged on an inevitably continuing service which could 
either maintain a separate existence, e.g. the Ministry of 
Pensions, or be absorbed i n t o some pre-War Department. The 
Ministry of Munitions i s the most spectacular case for 
dissolution, but there are others, , ! ^  
Some of the war-time creations were rendered redundant by the coming of 
peace almost automatically; the need f o r a Ministry of Food was 
obviously no longer there after the ending of food price and d i s t r i b -
ution controls, and the Ministry of Shipping was no longer needed when 
the req u i s i t i o n i n g of ships and shipping space ceased. Even the Ministry 
of Reconstruction, being a co-ordinating Department without executive 
power, could safely be wound up once i t had discharged i t s functions 
of ensuring that the other Departments' schemes f o r post-war reconstruction 
were properly integrated. 
The Ministry of Munitions might at f i r s t sight seem to be i n similar 
case; f o r , as we have seen, i t had ceased to exercise executive power 
over more than a few factories by the summer of -1919. the vast majority 
of i t s workers had been disbanded, and i t s one remaining major concern, 
the disposal of war stores, could have been taken care of by transferring 
the Disposal Board to the care of another Department, probably the Board 
of Trade. But one of i t s major functions during the war had been the 
co-ordination of the supply of munitions of War to a l l the Service 
departments and the armed forces which they managed-. While Ghurehill was 
s t i l l at the Ministry he conceived a plan f o r turning the Ministry of 
Munitions i n t o a peace-time Ministry of Supply, which would co-ordinate 
underlining m the o r i g i n a l . 
, Fisher to the Prime Minister, 3 Sep 1919, 
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purchases not only of m a t e r i a l f o r the waging of war on behalf of the 
f i g h t i n g s e rvices, but also a l l bulk stores f o r the c i v i l i a n and 
m i l i t a r y departments as w e l l . Such a plan would, C h u r c h i l l submitted, 
b r i n g great savings through bulk purchase, the r e d u c t i o n i n the amounts 
of stores would be needed i f these were t o be c e n t r a l i s e d , and a r a t i o n -
a l i s a t i o n of the systems of payment and of d i s t r i b u t i o n . I t would also 
prevent competition between Departments, which"tended t o r e s u l t i n the 
rj 
Government paying higher p r i c e s than i t - need. 
This p l a n gained some support from the recommendations *pf a Committee 
headed by Lord Inchcape, which recommended t h a t supply be brought under 
the c o n t r o l of a s i n g l e department. This Committee had been set up by 
the Chancellor t o consider how the c o n t r a c t business of the f o r c e s might-
best be co-ordinated; i t r e p o r t e d i n March 1918, and Lord Inchcape 
afterwards made i t c l e a r t o the Admiralty t h a t he had intended h i s recom-
mendations t o apply only i n wartime. But t h i s was not s t a t e d e x p l i c i t l y 
i n the Report, and when the M i n i s t e r of Munitions, Lord I n v e r f o r t h , 
.canvassed the o p i n i o n of the other members i n November 1919 they disagreed 
2 
w i t h Inchcape's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Backing also came from an a d m i n i s t r a -
t i v e v i e w p o i n t , through the Haldane Committee on the Machinery of Gover-n-
3 
ment. The subject was discussed i n Cabinet i n October and November 1918, 
i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the proposals f o r continuing Government ownership of 
the Munitions f a c t o r i e s . 
The proposal t o transform the M i n i s t r y of Munitions was contained 
i n a Cabinet paper c i r c u l a t e d t o h i s colleagues by C h u r c h i l l i n October 
1918. I n i t he argued t h a t such a Department would b r i n g considerable 
1. Lloyd George Papers, F/28/5/17. C h u r c h i l l ' s memorandum was w r i t t e n 
i n February 1918. 
2. Lloyd George Papers.F/28/V17. I n v e r f o r t h t o Lloyd George, 26 Nov.,1919. 
3. Report of the Committee on the Machinery of Government. - Cd,; _,.?_23Cf 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1918). 
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peace-time advantages i n economy both of money and time. He supported 
h i s arguments by c i r c u l a t i n g a t the same time a copy of a r e p o r t by the 
Munitions Council Committee on Demobilisation and Reconstruction, which 
also urged t h a t as soon as peace was declared, steps should be taken t o 
t u r n the M i n i s t r y i n t o a M i n i s t r y o f Supply. General approval was 
2 
given t o t h e i r recommendations i n October, and the s p e c i f i c proposal 
about the M i n i s t r y o f Supply was discussed a t another Cabinet meeting i n 
November. At t h i s meeting, S i r Austen Chamberlain was s t r o n g l y i n favour 
of the proposal, and the r e s t of the War Cabinet was i n agreement, 
although S i r E r i c Geddes expressed some re s e r v a t i o n s as t o the i m p l i c -
a t i o n s f o r Departmental autonomy. The M i n i s t e r o f Munitions was i n s t r -
ucted t o draw up a d r a f t B i l l f o r the s e t t i n g up of a M i n i s t r y o f Supply, 
which would have t r a n s f e r r e d t o i t the powers of the M i n i s t r y o f Munitions.o~' 
This was d u l y done, and the d r a f t c i r c u l a t e d t o the Cabinet a t the end of 
March. I t was, as had been intended, a skeleton enabling B i l l ; the 
powers of the M i n i s t r y o f Munitions would be t r a n s f e r r e d t o i t , together 
w i t h e x i s t i n g powers c u r r e n t l y held by other M i n i s t r i e s by Order i n Council 
as occasion warranted 
At t h i s stage i t became apparent t h a t the Service departments were 
extremely w o r r i e d about the whole idea. The d r a f t was diseussed by the 
Home A f f a i r s Committee on March 3 1 s t 1 9 1 9 , and the breadth of powers 
which the M i n i s t r y could have was objected t o , p a r t i c u l a r l y by the M i n i s t e r 
5 
of Works, S i r A l f r e d Mond. This was har d l y s u r p r i s i n g ; the powers of 
t h a t o f f i c e were bound t o be encroached upon by the new M i n i s t r y , and 
1. P.R.O., Cafe.24/67, G.T.6041, 18 Oct., 1918. 
2 . P.R.O., Cab.23/8, W.C.491, 24 Oct., 1918. 
3. P.R.O., Cab.23/8. W.C.500, 8 Nov., 1918. 
4. P.R.O., Cab.2Z/77. G.T.7007, 20 Mar., 1919. 
5. P.R.O., Gab.26/lT Minutes of the Home A f f a i r s Committee of the 
Cabinet, 2 5 t h meeting, 31 Mar. 3 1919° 
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indeed i t was at one p o i n t suggested t h a t i t should absorb the O f f i c e 
of Works completely. I t was decided t h a t the B i l l should be r e d r a f t e d 
i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the other Departments concerned. . I t was n o t , 
however, easy t o reach agreement. The Services i n general contended 
t h a t since they would have considerable surplus stocks of arms a f t e r 
the war the need f o r purchase of these i n bulk would not be s u f f i c i e n t 
on i t s own t o j u s t i f y the existence of the Department. The i n d i v i d u a l 
f o rces had t h e i r own s p e c i f i c grumbles as w e l l . 
The Admiralty objected t o the proposal p a r t i c u l a r l y on the grounds 
t h a t they could not consent t o another department t a k i n g over t h e i r 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the v i c t u a l l i n g and supplying of stores t o s h i p s . 
The A d m i r a l t y c i r c u l a t e d a Paper on these l i n e s t o the Cabinet i n May, 
ajscompanied by a l e t t e r from the F i r s t Lord, Walter Long, who said t h a t 
the proposals, i n the o p i n i o n of h i s colleagues on the Board of M m i r a l t y , 
"would make i t impossible f o r the Board t o exercise t h e i r cons-
t i t u t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the e f f i c i e n c y of the Navy." ^ 
The memorandum made a great p l a y w i t h the f a c t t h a t the recommendations 
of Lord Inchcape, which had been adduced by the B i l l ' s supporters as 
being on t h e i r side, were intended by him t o r e l a t e t o war-time o n l y . 
I n the o p i n i o n of the Admiralty, ships' stores and supplies should be 
completely i n the hands of the Admiralty. I t was also d o u b t f u l about 
drawing d i s t i n c t i o n s between the commi.ssion.lng of experimental a r t i c l e s 
of war and of those of proven and accepted value." A l l the f o r c e s f e l t 
s t r o n g l y about t h i s thorny problem; but i n the case of the Army i t had 
been solved during the war by making the War O f f i c e responsible f o r design, 
and f o r research and development i n design, while the M i n i s t r y o f Munitions, 
1 . Lloyd George Papers, F/J&JS/Y/^ I n v e r f o r t h t o Lloyd George, 2.6 Nov., 1919. 
2„ P.R.O., C a b l e t t e r by F i r s t Lord of the Admiralty covering 
GoT.7193, dated 3 May, 1919. 
3 . I b i d . , G.T.7193, 2 May, 1919. 
was responsible f o r production and f o r research i n t h i s area. A memo-
randum supporting the proposed scheme was c i r c u l a t e d by Edwin Montagu, 
Secretary of State f o r I n d i a , and opposing the e f f o r t s of the A i r Force 
t o keep the p r o d u c t i o n of aeroplanes out of the proposed M i n i s t r y ' s 
sphere of c o n t r o l . The argument of the A i r service was s i m i l a r t o the 
Admiralty argument over design - t h a t the two could not be separated, 
and t h a t the A i r M i n i s t r y must have sole c o n t r o l over the design and 
production of aeroplanes. Montagu pointed out t h a t t h i s argument had 
already been decided, a f t e r exhaustive discussions, i n favour of g i v i n g 
the M i n i s t r y of Munitions c o n t r o l over a i r c r a f t p roduction, and he could 
see no reason why the M i n i s t r y of Supply should not perform t h i s f u n c t i o n 
e q u a l l y w e l l . This was a very important p o i n t , since i n Montagu's view 
i t would not be a good idea t o make exceptions on any scale. 
"....every supply which i s taken or excluded from the M i n i s t r y 
of Supply d e t r a c t s from these advantages...." ^ 
C h u r c h i l l , who had been the main d r i v i n g f o r c e behind the scheme 
at i t s o u t s e t , now began t o have r e s e r v a t i o n s . His move t o the War O f f i c e 
i n January 1919 had also given him c o n t r o l over the A i r M i n i s t r y ; i n t h i s 
s i t u a t i o n he was bound both by h i s p r o x i m i t y t o them and by h i s o b l i g a t i o n s 
t o them as t h e i r M i n i s t e r i a l head t o be i n f l u e n c e d by the arguments o f 
h i s two service c h i e f s . At a Cabinet meeting i n May the problem of a i r -
c r a f t supplies was discussed, and C h u r c h i l l announced t h a t he had changed 
h i s mind about the d e s i r a b i l i t y of c e n t r a l i s i n g the production of non-
standard t e c h n i c a l supplies as a r e s u l t of a r e p o r t of a Committee whose 
chairman was the Surveyor General of Supply a t the A i r M i n i s t r y , S i r James 
Stevenson. This Committee considered t h a t the Aeronautical Supply D i v i s i o n 
1. Lloyd George Papers, F/28/5/17., I n v e r f o r t h t o Lloyd George, 
26 Nov., 1919. 
2. P.R.O., Cab.24-/79, G.T.7250, 12 May, 1919* 
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of the M i n i s t r y of Munitions was r e a l l y a p a r t of the A i r M i n i s t r y f o r 
a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, and thus the argument t h a t a i r c r a f t supply and 
production had been c e n t r a l i s e d d u r i n g the war under the c o n t r o l of the 
M i n i s t r y of Munitions was n e i t h e r w holly accurate or r e l e v a n t t o peace-
time c o n d i t i o n s . The Committee t h e r e f o r e recommended t h a t the design 
and p r o d u c t i o n of non-standard t e c h n i c a l supplies should be the respons-
i b i l i t y o f the A i r M i n i s t r y . 
With C h u r c h i l l no longer supporting him. S i r Austen Chamberlain was 
by now f i g h t i n g v i r t u a l l y a lone b a t t l e i n the War Cabinet on behalf of 
the M i n i s t r y of Supply, and the Cabinet decided t o r a t i f y the recommend-
a t i o n of Stevenson's Committee subject t o the approval of the Prime 
M i n i s t e r , who was away i n P a r i s . Chamberlain recorded h i s f o r m a l d i s s e n t 
1 
from t h i s conclusion. 
The d r a f t B i l l s e t t i n g up the M i n i s t r y of Supply was discussed a t 
2 
two meetings of the Home A f f a i r s Gommittee i n the course of the summer, 
and i t was agreed t h a t l i t t l e progress could be made u n t i l a d e c i s i o n on 
services supplies i n general had been reached. I t was apparent t h a t t h i s 
d e c i s i o n would be c r u c i a l t o the chances of e s t a b l i s h i n g such a M i n i s t r y , 
and i t i s i r o n i c t h a t , as we have j u s t seen, G h u r s h i l l , who had been the 
o r i g i n a t o r of the scheme, was i n hi s capacity as Secretary f o r War and f o r 
A i r obliged, t o advocate m o d i f i c a t i o n s t o the p l a n which were i n the end 
t o prove of c e n t r a l importance i n undermining the desire of the Cabinet 
t o i n s t i t u t e the new M i n i s t r y . But i n a d d i t i o n t o p o s i t i v e d e t e r r e n t s t o 
the new M i n i s t r y , there were other problems, p a r t i c u l a r l y the dropping of 
the clause i n Government c o n t r a c t s which made i t o b l i g a t o r y on f i r m s doing 
such work t o make t h e i r books a v a i l a b l e t o i n s p e c t i o n , f o r an important 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/10, W.C.564, 8 May, 1919. 
2. P.R.O., Cab.26/1, H.A.C.28, 16 May, 1919; H.A.C.35, 18 J u l y , 1919. 
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asset i n the bargaining process which took place when Government 
contracts took place was thus l o s t . 
With the coming of the autumn a l l proposals which i n v o l v e d the 
increase or the maintenance of present l e v e l s of expenditure began t o 
f a l l under the in c r e a s i n g disapproval of the Prime M i n i s t e r , at the 
i n s t i g a t i o n of and backed by the Treasury. The clamour f o r reductions 
i n Government expenditure was loudest i n the Commons, and i t i s c e r t a i n 
t h a t a B i l l t o continue the existence of the M i n i s t r y of Munitions would 
have received short s h r i f t . We have already noted the comment of the 
Permanent Secretary t o the Treasury on the M i n i s t r y of Munitions; many 
M.Ps.. agreed w i t h him„ The cause was not helped by the r e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
of the Cabinet, f i r s t i n January 1919, which had deprived the scheme o f 
the wholehearted advocacy of C h u r c h i l l , and l a t e r of October 1919? i - n 
which the M i n i s t e r of Munitions l o s t h i s seat i n the Cabinet. C h u r c h i l l 
had been replaced at Munitions by Lord I n v e r f o r t h , who only stayed i n the 
Government out of l o y a l t y t o Lloyd George; he made several attempts t o 
r e s i g n before the M i n i s t r y f i n a l l y disappeared i n 1921. But he was 
wholehearted i n his,advocacy of a M i n i s t r y of Supply. I n r e p l y t o Lloyd 
2 
George's c i r c u l a r l e t t e r on economy, he stressed the extent t o which the 
M i n i s t r y had already shed most of i t s war-time f u n c t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l -
i t i e s , and put forward the view t h a t the g r e a t e s t service the M i n i s t r y 
could now make t o economy would be t o become a M i n i s t r y of Supply. This 
M i n i s t r y would be responsible f o r both bulk purchase and f o r h o l d i n g 
stocks f o r other Departments; t h i s would r e s u l t i n economies i n purchase, 
and i n space, f r e i g h t costs, a d m i n i s t r a t i o n costs, and i n the f i n a n c i a l 
1. 
2. 
costs a t t r i b u t a b l e t o hol d i n g l a r g e supplies i n stock; stocks could be 
considerably reduced f o r those a r t i c l e s which were needed by sever a l 
departments. The f i g h t i n g services were most r e l u c t a n t t o agree t o such 
a development ; but i t was important t h a t pressure should be brought t o 
bear.'' 
The f o l l o w i n g month, I n v e r f o r t h wrote a f u l l - s c a l e memorandum t o 
Lloyd George s e t t i n g out f o r m a l l y the case f o r a M i n i s t r y of Supply. He 
traced the steps by which the idea had developed, and attempted t o deal 
w i t h the various o b j e c t i o n s . A M i n i s t r y of Supply would, he suggested, 
lead t o great e r e f f i c i e n c y and economy. I t would remedy many of the 
defects of the e x i s t i n g system of purchase and storage, notably I n stop-
ping the competition between Departments, which enabled c o n t r a c t o r s t o 
pla y one o f f against another. The defects which he o u t l i n e d were n o t , 
i n h i s view, p e c u l i a r t o war c o n d i t i o n s . Neither could he accept the 
argument of the Admiralty t h a t the p r o v i s i o n i n g of ships was a s p e c i a l 
case; the evidence d i d not support t h e i r c o n t e n t i o n . As Montagu had 
noted, a l l increases i n M i n i s t r y of Munitions ..functions during the war 
had been f i e r c e l y opposed, but had been found t o make supply more e f f e c t i v e . 
I n v e r f o r t h then attempted t o reb u t the o p p o s i t i o n outside the Cabinet. 
•That of the Press was p a r t l y , he s a i d , a v i r t u a l r e f l e x a c t i o n , a r e s i s t -
ance t o the c r e a t i o n of new m i n i s t r i e s i n general. Their o b j e c t i o n s t o 
the r e t e n t i o n of the M i n i s t r y of Munitions on the grounds of i t s e x t r a -
vagance i n war-time, and the suggestion t h a t i t was simply an excuse f o r 
keeping on s t a f f , ignored the f a c t t h a t the peace-time aims of the M i n i s t r y 
would be d i f f e r e n t . I n war-time, the aim had been production at a l l costs; 
e f f i c i e n c y had had t o take a back seat. But peace-time r e o r g a n i s a t i o n 
1 . Lloyd George Papers, F/28/5/16, I n v e r f o r t h t o Lloyd George, 28 Oct., 
1919. 
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would enable the M i n i s t r y t o produce savings i n Government supply which 
would make the cost of the M i n i s t r y worthwhile. F i n a l l y , he stressed 
t h a t there was no i n t e n t i o n of resuming any form of i n d u s t r i a l c o n t r o l 
by the M i n i s t r y . 
" 0...there i s no i n t e n t i o n whatever of r e v e r t i n g , under the 
normal con d i t i o n s of peace-time, t o the p o l i c y of i n d u s t r i a l 
c o n t r o l and i n t e r f e r e n c e which was f o r c e d upon the Government 
by the exigencies of war." 
The fo l lowing day, the Finance Committee of the Cabinet met, and discussed 
the f u t u r e of the M i n i s t r y of Munitions. I t was f e l t t h a t Parliamentary 
o p p o s i t i o n to the r e t e n t i o n of the M i n i s t r y would be considerable, and 
i t was decided t o recommend t o the' Cabinet t h a t a Select Committee of 
the House o f Commons be set up t o consider the best form of o r g a n i s a t i o n 
2 
f o r supplies r e q u i r e d by the Government. But when t h i s came up f o r 
d e c i s i o n a t a Conference of M i n i s t e r s e a r l y i n December, i t was pointed 
out t h a t since so many members of the Government had a t one time or another 
been M i n i s t e r of Munitions, the combined experience of the Cabinet was 
greater than t h a t of any Select Committee could ever be. I n a d d i t i o n , 
the f a c t t h a t the i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of such a Committee would uncover ser-
ious d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n among M i n i s t e r s was f e l t t o be a severe draw-
back and might prove embarrassing. 
The Conference then went on t o discuss the general question of the 
m e r i t s of s e t t i n g up a M i n i s t r y of Supply. According t o the usual prac-
t i c e the record of the d i s c u s s i o n i s shrouded i n anonymity, but i t i s 
s t a t e d t h a t a number of M i n i s t e r s had changed t h e i r minds on the subject 
since the end of the war. I t was pointed out t h a t the Army and A i r Force 
would be l i v i n g on t h e i r surplus stores f o r the next f i v e years, and the 
number of purchases t o be made would not j u s t i f y the existence of a 
26 Nov 1919 
2. P.R.O., Cab.27/71, F.C.17, 27 Nov., 1919 
, I n v e r f o r t h t o Lloyd George, 
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separate o r g a n i s a t i o n * I n a d d i t i o n , the f o r c e s would r e q u i r e s t a f f s t o 
focus t h e i r demands, and the M i n i s t r y would r e q u i r e personnel t o v e t them, 
which would l e a d t o considerable d u p l i c a t i o n of s t a f f . There was the 
d i f f i c u l t y , t o o , of producing accurate estimates. This had caused serious 
problems d u r i n g the war, because Munitions M i n i s t r y estimates of costs 
kept changing, and the Service departments f e l t t h a t they could not take 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r estimates i f purchasing were t o be done by a 
separate department. F i n a l l y , the A i r M i n i s t r y would not r e l i n q u i s h 
c o n t r o l over the production of a i r c r a f t , since design could not be separ-
ated from supply unless a i r c r a f t were t o be produced i n very l a r g e numbers, 
which was not l i k e l y t o be the case over the next few years. Another, 
argument was added t o those of the Services, t h a t concerning the great 
d i f f i c u l t y i n v o l v e d i n attempting t o pass through Parliament a B i l l 
' i n v o l v i n g the r e t e n t i o n of the vast o r g a n i s a t i o n of the M i n i s t r y of 
Munitions.' 
From the nature of the arguments, and from the evidence provided 
by the s i m i l a r discussions i n May 1919, i t seems apparent t h a t one of 
the M i n i s t e r s who had 'changed h i s mind' was .Churchill. I t also seems 
very possible t h a t another was Chamberlain, the o n l y member o f the War 
Cabinet who had u n t i l then s t e a d f a s t l y supported the scheme. Chamberlain 
was by t h i s time, though not i n October 1918 when the discussion began, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. I n a d d i t i o n , between. May 1919 December 
had come the great economy campaign. As we have seen, Chamberlain's 
Permanent Secretary at the Treasury was strenuously opposed t o any attempt 
t o perpetuate the existence of the M i n i s t r y of Munitions. I t may be t h a t 
the combined e f f e c t s of the advice of h i s Treasury o f f i c i a l s , caused 
Chamberlain t o have second thoughts about the a d v i s a b i l i t y and desirab-
i l i t y of having a M i n i s t r y of Supply. 
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There was, however, considerable r e s i s t a n c e by the supporters o f 
the measure; the Cabinet had. by t h i s time resumed i t s normal peace-
time s i z e , and t h i s was the f i r s t o p p o r t u n i t y which many of i t s members 
had had t o discuss the measure i n Cabinet, The arguments which they 
adduced were i n the main those put forward by I n v e r f o r t h i n h i s memor-
andum,. I n the end i t was decided t o ask the f i g h t i n g Services t o draw 
up l i s t s of a r t i c l e s which might be purchased j o i n t l y , and t h a t the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of combining the O f f i c e of Works, the S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e and 
1 
the nucleus of a new buying o r g a n i s a t i o n should be i n v e s t i g a t e d . 
However, these moves came v i r t u a l l y t o n o t h i n g . In"January, 
I n v e r f o r t h was s t i l l w r i t i n g t o Lloyd George advocating the new m i n i s t r y , 
and urging t h a t i t be created by amalgamating the O f f i c e of Works, the 
2 
S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e and p a r t s of the M i n i s t r y of Munitions, But o p i n i o n 
was hardening as the post-war boom gathered way, and the a t t e n t i o n of the 
Cabinet was f u r t h e r d i s t r a c t e d by the problems of Woolwich Arsenal, one 
of the remaining Munitions f a c t o r i e s i n Government hands, about which 
numerous papers were c i r c u l a t e d . The bad o r g a n i s a t i o n of the Arsenal 
was\ discussed at l e n g t h a t a meeting i n March a f t e r cursory references 
3 
t o the supply problem. F i n a l l y , i t was decided t o leave the e x i s t i n g 
supply o r g a n i s a t i o n alone, apart from the c r e a t i o n of a j o i n t Supply 
Committee by the three Services, and t o allow the M i n i s t r y of Munitions 
to disappear as was provided f o r i n e x i s t i n g l e g i s l a t i o n ; , and the d e c i s i o n 
was announced i n Parliament i n A p r i l , 
1, P.R.O., Cab,23/18, Conference of M i n i s t e r s held 9 Dec.., 1919. 
.2, Lloyd George Papers, F/28/5/22, I n v e r f o r t h t o Lloyd George, 
5 Jan,, 1920. 
3, P.R.O., Cab,23/20. Conference of M i n i s t e r s held 16 Mar,., 1920; 
P.R.O.., Cabl24^ 2 5 , CP,372, 30 Dec,, 1919? Cab,24-/98., CP.616, 
5 Feb 0, 1920,'CP,657, U Feb,, 1920; Cab„2^/99, CPV76A-, 
27 Feb., 1920; Cab.24-/100. CP.810, 8 Mar,., 1920, C . P . . 8 2 4 , 
9 Mar.,'1920. 
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Problems of Reconstructions Trade P o l i c y 
Before the war, B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y on overseas trade had been fundam-
e n t a l l y a f r e e - t r a d e one; but the war-time need t o r e s t r i c t t r a d i n g , 
p a r t l y f o r economic reasons concerned w i t h conserving shipping space and 
supplies, and p a r t l y as a p a r t of the blockade of Germany and her a l l i e s , 
meant t h a t B r i t a i n ended the war w i t h a considerable s t r u c t u r e of e x t e r n a l 
trade r e g u l a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , there were two classes of i n d u s t r y which 
f e l t they had a r i g h t t o p r o t e c t i o n ; the f i r s t was those which had not 
ex i s t e d i n any la r g e sense before the war and which had been set up i n 
response t o war-time demands f o r goods which would normally have been 
imported., The second was the class of nascent i n d u s t r i e s which had i n 
the main received some measure of p r o t e c t i o n from the McKenna d u t i e s ; 
these were mostly on ' l u x u r y 1 goods. There was l i t t l e d i s c u s s i o n of the 
merits of p r o t e c t i n g the second class as an e n t i t y , but the McKenna d u t i e s 
were allowed t o remain with o u t e i t h e r f u r t h e r sanction or o p p o s i t i o n . But 
there remained the e s s e n t i a l goods which were needed f o r defence purposes 
and i t was s t r o n g l y f e l t i n many quarters t h a t although i t might not make 
economic sense t o p r o t e c t these i n d u s t r i e s from f o r e i g n competition, i t 
was e s s e n t i a l from a s e c u r i t y p o i n t of view„ 
A good deal of discussion and submission of papers on t h i s subject 
went on i n the course of 191S,o The Treasury was not d i r e c t l y concerned, 
but the p i c t u r e of post-war decontrol and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s incomplete 
without a cursory examination of the problem,. The matter was discussed 
1 
several txmes by the Economic Defence and Development Committee of the 
Cabinet i n Ju l y and August 1918, and the Committee decided t o submit the 
1» PoR.Oo, Cab.2A/?7.. minutes of the Economic Defence and Development 
Committee of the Cabinet, 2nd meeting, 2 J u l y , 1918, 4 t h meeting, 
16th J u l y , 1918, 7 t h meeting 20 Aug., 1918„ 
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problem t o a subcommittee w i t h Austen Chamberlain i n the c h a i r . Among 
the documents considered by the Committee were memoranda by Mond, F i r s t 
Commissioner of Works, and by the Board of Trade, I n a d d i t i o n the Comm-
i t t e e had been asked t o consider the observations on the subject o f Lord 
Balfour of Burleigh's Committee on Commercial and I n d u s t r i a l P o l i c y a f t e r 
the war. Mond put very s t r o n g l y the case t h a t N a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y was more 
important than n a t i o n a l wealth. I n h i s view there was also another prob-
lem t o be solved; t h a t of preventing harm t o our home i n d u s t r i e s from 
the o p e r a t i o n of harmful p o l i c i e s by other n a t i o n s . Dumping might be a 
serious problem a f t e r the war, since i t was very l i k e l y t h a t enemy 
countries i n p a r t i c u l a r would attempt t o r e s t o r e t h e i r i n d u s t r i e s by 
g i v i n g b i g export bounties i n one form or another. Mond also supported 
Empire Free Trade, although he d i d not favour the imposing of t a r i f f s 
on the imports of other c o u n t r i e s s o l e l y f o r the purpose of g i v i n g the 
Dominions rebates. But he d i d f e e l t h a t strenuous e f f o r t s should be made 
1 
f o r a considerable measure o f s e l f s u f f i c i e n c y w i t h i n the Empire, 
The Board of Trade recommendations f o l l o w e d s i m i l a r l i n e s on dumping 
and on the safeguarding of i n d u s t r i e s , but they took a much narrower view 
of the number of i n d u s t r i e s which needed p r o t e c t i o n i n accordance w i t h 
the recommendations of the Balfo u r Committee Report, As t h a t Committee 
had recommended, the form of the p r o h i b i t i o n of import except under 
l i c e n c e , and t h a t a 'Special I n d u s t r i e s Board' should be set up t o r e p o r t 
t o the Board of Trade on i n d u s t r i e s which needed safeguarding. I t was 
also suggested t h a t a rebate of o n e - t h i r d the normal customs duty should 
2 
be allowed on imports from the Empire. 
1, P.R.O., Cab,27/4ii., Economic Defence and Development Committee of 
the Cabinet paper 18, 2 Ju l y , 1918, 
2. I b i d . , E.D.D.C'. paper .33, 20* Aug., 1918, 
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The sub-Committee r e p o r t e d back t h a t i t recommended the adoption 
1 
of the Board of Trade's memorandum, and t h i s was agreed. Trade p o l i c y 
was discussed on a number of occasions during the next few months, w i t h -
2 
out any concrete decisions being taken. F i n a l l y , i n the summer of 1919 
Lloyd George decided t o t r y t o formulate a s e r i e s of basic p r i n c i p l e s 
f o r the Government's economic p o l i c y , and a s e r i e s o f Cabinet meetings 
on the subject were held d u r i n g the summer recess. I n the meantime the 
Government had set up y e t another committee on the subj e c t , which had 
held a se r i e s of discussions on the subject. The President of the Board 
of Trade, now S i r Auckland Geddes, had attempted t o embody the decisions 
of the Committee i n t o a memorandum<, which although the Committee had not 
sent i t he believed t o embody the substance of t h e i r ideas. This paper 
was submitted t o the Cabinet, and formed the basis of the subsequent 
3 
discussion. 
The subject of the p r o t e c t i o n of key i n d u s t r i e s , and of the prev-
e n t i o n of dumping, was becoming urgent,, as the "bonfire of c o n t r o l s 
would soon begin t o p l a y havoc w i t h the wartime system o f p r o t e c t i o n . 
As f a r as the products of key i n d u s t r i e s were concerned, the Board of 
Trade planned t o keep the r e s t r i c t i o n s cn import when the general c o n t r o l s 
on import were removed, and t o introduce a system of l i c e n c e fees f o r the 
issue of l i c e n c e s t o import these products. The main source of f r i c t i o n 
on t h i s subject was the extent of the p r o t e c t i o n t o be granted,, and i t 
was decided t o leave i t t o the sub-Committee t o draw up a l i s t of products 
which should be protected i n t h i s way* I t was urged by the f r e e t r a d e r s , 
n otably C h u r c h i l l , t h a t the l i s t should c o n t a i n only those i n d u s t r i e s 
. 1 . P.R.D. , Cab,27/44. E„D,D.C,7? 2 0 Aug., 1918, 
2 , See, f o r example, P.R.O.., C a b , 2 3 / l 0 , W , C 5 5 3 , 3 Apr„.„ 1919; 
Qab j j ^ Z l l j W„C,61 OA, 8 Aug,, 1919., ' 
3 , P .R.O. , Cab,24/86. G.T.7974, 12 Aug,. 1919. 
which were both e s s e n t i a l t o our means of making war, and which were 
e i t h e r non-existent a t the beginning of the v&r, or else producing goods 
i n q u a n t i t i e s which bore no r e l a t i o n t o the volume i n which they were 
re q u i r e d i n war-time.'' 
But the r e a l problems which arose concerned the proposals on dumping„ 
The c h i e f d i f f i c u l t y was t h a t , i n view of the problems involved i n f o r m u l -
a t i n g an e f f e c t i v e " p o l i c y , b e t t e r r e g i s t r a t i o n of imports would be needed 
than was customary i n peace-time. Even the r e t u r n s based on Customs 
re p o r t s were l a r g e l y unreliable.. Geddes emphasised t h a t there was a t t h a t 
time no method o f ob t a i n i n g the i n f o r m a t i o n which would be r e q u i r e d t o 
e s t a b l i s h t h a t dumping was t a k i n g place, or t o prevent i t . Chamberlain 
also suggested t h a t proper r e g i s t r a t i o n would be worthwhile simply on the 
grounds of improving the Customs r e t u r n s . But the general f e e l i n g was 
t h a t the o p p o s i t i o n i n Parliament t o any general scheme of r e g i s t r a t i o n 
would be considerable, and i t was decided t h a t no p u b l i c mention should 
be made of the matter a t present; i f such r e g i s t r a t i o n were needed, 
clauses p r o v i d i n g f o r i t could be i n s e r t e d i n the anti-dumping B i l l when 
i t was d r a f t e d . Lloyd George also suggested t h a t i t would be wise t o 
look a t the p o s s i b i l i t y of improving the Customs r e t u r n s i n other ways, 
which could be done by l a y i n g orders before the House of Commons, r a t h e r 
2 
than needing new l e g i s l a t i o n . 
A d r a f t B i l l was du l y drawn up along the l i n e s of Geddes.' suggestions, 
and presented t o Parliament i n the autumn. The p r i n c i p a l f e a t u r e s were 
t h a t i t provided f o r the p r o h i b i t i o n of import of goods which were i n the 
view of the Board of Trade being s o l d i n B r i t a i n below the ' f o r e i g n 
value-', but w i t h a p r o v i s i o n f o r the Customs t o overlook such an offence 
1 . P.R.O., CabJ^ASj W.C . . 6UA, U Aug.., 1 9 1 9 . 
2. I b i d . 
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on payment of a f i n e which represented the d i f f e r e n c e the p r i c e paid 
and the B r i t i s h p r i c e ; and the p r o h i b i t i o n of import of goods on the 
schedule of key i n d u s t r i e s , and of a l l goods from countries where the 
exchange had collapsed, subject t o a proviso t h a t the Board of Trade 
had power t o allow such imports under l i c e n c e . 
The Treasury was not happy about the B i l l , but the Board of Trade 
suggested t h a t i t was the best t h a t could be done i n the circumstances, 
and t h a t i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t i t would be much invoked, since i t would 
be a s u f f i c i e n t d e t e r r e n t j u s t t o have i t on the s t a t u t e book. The 
Treasury d i d not l i k e the way t h a t d u t i e s were e f f e c t i v e l y being i n t r o -
duced i n a disguised form, nor the anomaly by which the Board of Trade 
were t o c o l l e c t f i n e s i f the goods were not detected a t the p o i n t o f 
2 
e n t r y . But t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s were over r u l e d , and the B i l l e v e n t u a l l y 
became law. I t d i d n o t , however, have much e f f e c t on the s i t u a t i o n i t 
was meant t o c o n t r o l , and i t s o p e r a t i o n had t o be strengthened by a 
f u r t h e r measure, the Safeguarding of I n d u s t r i e s Act, 1 9 2 2 . 
Problems of Reconstructions the M i n i s t r y of ReoonstragtigE 
The problems which would occur during the t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d which 
would f o l l o w the end of the war had begun t o occupy the minds of the 
Cabinet as e a r l y as 1916; Asquith set up a Cabinet Committee on the 
subject towards the end of the year, and i t continued t o meet u n t i l the 
M i n i s t r y was set up i n the summer of 1917. Among the problems which 
were t o occupy f i r s t the Committee and then the Ministry,, one of the 
1 . Summarised i n P.R.O., T.I6o/21/712„ 
2» Ibid,»j memo, by B l a c k e t t , 7 Oct., 1919= This memorandum was accom-
panied by a l e t t e r t o the Chancellor from Warren Fisher, who grumbled 
about ''the immense powers which the b i l l confers on a bureaucracy t o 
i n t e r f e r e w i t h the business world and incorp o r a t e s the p r i n c i p l e of 
l i c e n s i n g exceptions t o the general r u l e s ..„,. which businessmen so 
l e g i t i m a t e l y d e t e s t . ! 
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most important was employment. I t was e a r l y recognised t h a t the d i s l o c -
a t i o n caused by the War i n the p a t t e r n of output and employment, combined 
w i t h the absence of m i l l i o n s of men i n the armed f o r c e s , cause grave 
employment problems when peace came, An e a r l y memorandum drawn up f o r 
the Committee i n March 1917 suggested t h a t the M i n i s t r y of Munitions 
should f i n d out the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of using some of the N a t i o n a l f a c t o r i e s 
on peace-time production, t h a t the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , other Government 
Departments, f o r e i g n and c o l o n i a l governments should a i l be approached 
about t h e i r l i k e l y post-war needs f o r men and goods, and t h a t the M i n i s t r y 
of Housing should meet the l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s and draw up d e t a i l e d plans 
on the basis of t h e i r estimates of needs. Another Committee, t h i s time 
of economists, set up by the Board of Trade t o consider the probable 
c o n d i t i o n s of i n d u s t r y a f t e r the war, also c a l l e d a t t e n t i o n t o the problem 
of employment* They, however, thought t h a t the immediate post-war p e r i o d 
would., a f t e r a short period of adjustment/ be one of f u l l employment, 
because o f the pent-up demand f o r c i v i l i a n goods released a t the end of 
the war. But they also recommended t h a t employment schemes should be 
drawn up, t o be put into' e f f e c t as employment d e c l i n e d , a f t e r the f i r s t 
b u r s t of post—war enthusiasm had been d i s s i p a t e d , Then^ as unemployment 
i n the r e l e v a n t areas, f o r example b u i l d i n g , d e c l i n e d , the Government's 
b l u e - p r i n t s could be put i n t o practice,'' 
Other areas were also regarded as important; Housing f o r i t s own 
sake as w e l l as f o r i t s employment p o s s i b i l i t i e s , e l e c t r i c i t y supply, 
road, b u i l d i n g , as p a r t of the longer term spectrum: improved channels 
of communication between Government and i n d u s t r y , and between employer 
and worker, b e t t e r working co n d i t i o n s i n i n d u s t r y , improvements i n r u r a l 
1 , Lloyd George Papers, dated 15 Mar., 1917. 
2 , Lloyd George Papers, f / 8 8 / 3 / 1 M a y 1917-
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l i f e , on the s o c i a l side; and a m u l t i t u d e of problems concerned w i t h the 
t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d . The M i n i s t r y of .Reconstruction was from the f i r s t an 
advisory department, w i t h o u t executive powers; i t s job was t o make plans 
i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Departments which would have to c a r r y them out. 
The f i r s t M i n i s t e r was Dr. Christopher Addison, who had p r e v i o u s l y been 
M i n i s t e r of Munitions; he was an energetic mar., f u l l of ideas ar;d enthus-
iasm, and close t o Lloyd George-) l i k e him, he was a L i b e r a l i n a mainly 
Conservative Government, But h i s M i n i s t r y had no r e a l power; he could 
i n s t r u c t , advise and w r i t e angry l e t t e r s t o h i s heart's content, but he 
could not f o r c e Departments t o c a r r y out h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s , as he appar-
e n t l y found t o h i s cost when he l e f t t o become President of the Local 
Government Board i n January 19?9« 
Addison began by sending a d u p l i c a t e l e t t e r - t o each Department 
asking f o r a summary of t h e i r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n plans.'' At t h i s stage the 
Treasury seems t o have taken l i t t l e i n t e r e s t ; they were among a number 
of Departments to whom Addison p r o t e s t e d two months l a t e r t h a t he had 
2 
received no r e p l y t o bis l e t t e r . But i t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t , once the 
process of evolving long-term p o l i c y got under way, the question of 
expenditure should a r i s e , and the Treasury began t o take an i n t e r e s t i n 
the M i n i s t r y ' s a c t i v i t i e s . These ranged across a wide f i e l d , as can be 
seen from one of the many pamphlets issued by h i s Department on the subject 
of Reconstruction - Addison was an e x c e l l e n t p u b l i c i s t - du r i n g 1917 and 
191So This one was e n t i t l e d 'the Aims of Reconstruction' and was issued 
e a r l y i n 1918. 
1. P.R.O., Recon.pl/4-8, M i n i s t e r of Reconstruction t o a l l other Heads 
of Departments, 11 Aug., 1917, 
2 . P.R.O., Re con . 1 / 48 . M i n i s t e r of Reconstruction t o c e r t a i n Departments, 
16 Oct., 1917. These were the Departments, such as the Treasury and 
M i n i s t r y of Munitions, who had. not r e p l i e d t o the e a r l i e r l e t t e r of 
11 Aug., 1917. 
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The document began by setting out the aims of the Ministry i n general 
terms. Originally., i t stated, the tasks of reconstruction had been seen 
i n terms of a simple return to the position of 1 9 1 4 « But as a r e s u l t of 
the experience of war, i t said, 
"People haye begun to doubt whether, after a l l , the s o c i a l and 
i n d u s t r i a l system i n pre-War days was so harmonious and so w e l l -
organised as to deserve to be revived i n i t s e n t i r e t y -- whether, 
indeed, i t was i n a l l respects worthy of the men and women who 
l i v e d under i t , or compatible with the id e a l s for which so many 
of our best have given t h e i r l i v e s . " 1 
So, gradually, the idea of returning to pre-war days had been gradually 
supplanted by 
2 
"the larger and worthier i d e a l of a better world af t e r the War." 
Thus the aims of reconstruction were i n the main two: to provide for the 
conditions which w i l l a r i s e when the war ends and the nation returns to 
the a c t i v i t i e s of peace-time; and also to provide for wider and longer-
term needs, i n keeping with the national mood0 " 
" I t (Jhe work of reconstruction] has to give shape and s a t i s -
f a ction to the strong feeling which has arisen i n a l l sections 
of the community, among men and women of the most widely 
d i f f e r i n g opinions and outlook, that there i s very much to be 
ashamed of when we look back to the conditions of July 1 9 1 4 - j 
and that out of j u s t i c e to the l i v i n g and out of reverence to 
the dead, we are c a l l e d to rebuild the national l i f e on a 
better and more enduring foundation." 3 
The pamphlet then went on to outline the various tasks with which the 
work of reconstruction would be concerned. F i r s t there was shipping,. 
Detailed plans would be d i f f i c u l t to make u n t i l i t was known what the 
situa t i o n as to supplies and the position of ships at the cessation of 
h o s t i l i t i e s wasj i t would also obviously make a difference what season 
of the year peace was declared, and so on 0 But i t had to be remembered 
that the problems of reconstruction i n general, and of shipping i n 
1 o P o R o O o , R e c o n 0 l / 8 2 part 2 , Aims of Reconstruction, pp Q 3~Ao 
2 o Ibid.,. p 0 4o 
3 o Ibid.,. . . .. , . 
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p a r t i c u l a r , were not exclusively B r i t i s h i n nature,, but affected a l l the 
belligerents, and i t might be necessary to keep the i n t e r - A l l i e d control 
of shipping going i n the post-war period. (This was rendered impossible 
mainly by the Americans, who were anxious to disband a l l such j o i n t 
agencies as soon as possible.^) 
The next, problem was that of raw materials„ Spme form.of p r i o r i t y 
over the release of stocks of raw material would be needed to ensure 
that the most urgent claims from a national point of view were s a t i s f i e d 
f i r s t . The transport of stores and of goods i n general was another 
matter which the Government was investigating^ the roads had been neg-
lected during the war, and a renewal programme would be needed at an 
2 
estimated cost of £ 6 0 m i l l i o n . 
On demobilisation, the Ministry f e l t that the aims of c i v i l industry 
were of paramount importance, and plans had been made for the release of 
3 
those who were most urgently needed i n t h e i r peace-time occupations f i r s t . 
The utmost e f f o r t s would be made to get men back into employment as soon 
as possible, but for those who had to suffer an interim period of unem-
ployment there would be unemployment benefit*, As to i n d u s t r i a l conditions? 
the policy outlined i n the Whitley Report, which recommended the setting up 
of Joint Councils of employers and workers i n a l l highly-organised indus-
t r i e s , to discuss mutual problems, 
"[has]been adopted by the Government as the cornerstone of 
i t s reconstruction policy." 4-
These bodies would also be able to f u l f i l the necessary function of prov-
iding a channel of communication between the industries and the Government, 
. 1 . See, for example, Tawney, The Abolition of Economic Controls 1 ? 1 8 - 1 9 2 1 
p . 1 9 o 
2 . P.R..0., R e c o n . 1 / 8 2 part 2 „ Aims of Reconstruction,, p . 8 . . 
3 o Ibid p . , p » 9 » This proved to be a most troublesome provision, and was 
done away with by Churchill'as soon as he went to the War Office i n 
January 1 9 1 9 ? See above, p D T 4 0 . o 
U. I b i d p < , 1 0 o • 
- 1.64 -
Where the two sides of i n d u s t r y were not s u f f i c i e n t l y h i g h l y organised 
f o r these j o i n t councils t o be set up on a permanent b a s i s , the M i n i s t r y 
was promoting the s e t t i n g up f o r the post-war per i o d I n t e r i m Reconstruc-
t i o n Committees, which might then provide t h i s f a c i l i t y f o r j o i n t 
industry-Government co-operation„ 
The paper repeated, the Government's pledge t o r e s t o r e Trade Union 
cond i t i o n s which had been v o l u n t a r i l y suspended e a r l y i n the war, but 
i t was of course open t o the workers t o decide whether a l l such c o n d i t -
ions were necessary i n the l i g h t of the way t h i n g s had proceeded, i n t h e i r 
absence. The problems of the land were not f o r g o t t e n , e i t h e r . The 
M i n i s t r y was concerning i t s e l f w i t h the expansion of f o r e s t r y work, land 
r e s e t t l e m e n t , the reclamation of waste land, and other important matters 
1 
designed t o rejuvenate the l i f e of the countryside. And, j u s t i n case 
the importance of s o c i a l problems had escaped anyone's a t t e n t i o n , the 
pamphlet ended i t s catalogue of endeavour by promoting the caus.e of the 
main s o c i a l services, housing, h e a l t h and education. 
Health improvements would need new l e g i s l a t i o n , t o b r i n g together 
the m u l t i p l i c i t y of e x i s t i n g s e r v i c e s , at t h a t time supervised by a v a r i e t y 
of d i f f e r e n t bodies, o f t e n a t loggerheads w i t h each oth e r . 
" I n the work of reducing t h i s t a n g l e , which has grown up b i t 
by b i t during the l a s t century, t o gr e a t e r order and usefulness, 
the M i n i s t r y [ o f Reconstruction! i s n a t u r a l l y c a l l e d t o p l a y a 
lead i n g p a r t , f o r a l l Reconstruction p o l i c y must be based upon 
a hea l t h y and vigorous p o p u l a t i o n . . . " ^ 
Improvements i n the stock of housing a v a i l a b l e would be another important 
problem t o be solved i n the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d ; and considerable 
a t t e n t i o n would have t o be paid t o education, 
" f o r upon the extent t o which the country develops and makes use 
of the innate a b i l i t i e s of i t s c i t i z e n s , i t s f u t u r e p r o s p e r i t y 
and happiness depend." 3 
1 . P.R.O., Recon 0l/82 p a r t 2, Aims of Reconstruction,, p.13o 
2o I b i d . , p.14.. 
3 . . I b i d . 
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Having .set out the social, and ecsor-omio problems., the pamphlet then 
came to t h a t of finance. But not as might be imagined;, the problem of 
f i n a n c i n g i t s schemes; the d i f f i c u l t i e s were those of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g 
the f i n a n c i a l sector i t s e l f . I n t h i s connection the M i n i s t r y had s e t 
up two Committees, one, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Treasury, on currency 
and exchange, and the other on f i n a n c i a l f a c i l i t i e s . 
F i n a l l y , the paper drew a t t e n t i o n t o the importance of a consid-
e r a t i o n which i t had urged a t the beginning; t h a t of remembering the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l nature of the problem. 
"No s i n g l e problem of Reconstruction can be solved i f i t i s 
regarded s o l e l y as a domestic problem; t o d e a l w i t h the 
task i n f r o n t of them when peace i s made w i l l demand from 
the A l l i e s the same good f a i t h and l o y a l t y , the same f o r e -
thought f o r each other and themselves, t h a t has maintained 
t h e i r union during the War."1 
The problem of f i n a n c i n g the schemes of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n was of course 
mainly the concern of the Department which was t o spend the money. But 
Addison concerned himself w i t h i t on a general l e v e l . I n February 1918 
he wrote t o the Treasury on the su b j e c t , asking f o r approval i n general 
terms of h i s schemes, and f o r an assurance 
" t h a t measures which are agreed upon as e s s e n t i a l i n order t o 
give the country a s a t i s f a c t o r y s t a r t on a peace f o o t i n g w i l l 
not be delayed or refused sanction on the grounds of expense <,,,,c 
He was not i n a p o s i t i o n t o f u r n i s h the Treasury w i t h d e t a i l e d estimates 
of the cost of the plans he had drawn up, although they would soon be 
ready, but t h a t was not the p o i n t ; as a p o i n t of p r i n c i p l e , there was 
no p o i n t i n drawing up d e t a i l e d plans i f there was no prospect of being 
able t o c a r r y them out. 
1 . P.RoO., Recon.1/82 p a r t 2, Aims of Reconstruction, p.'16. 
2. P.R.O., RecQn.1 A O „ memo, by Addison on r e c o n s t r u c t i o n f i n a n c e , 
10 Feb.., 1918. 
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Addison then proceeded to outline the main headings under which 
expenditure would be incurred. F i r s t , there was the housing programme. 
This would involve purchase of land and materials on a large s c a l e . 
Then finance would be required for the transfer to public ownership of 
land for small holdings, s o l d i e r s ' resettlement, and afforestation. 
The transport system was i n need of reconstruction and repair.. Certain 
e s s e n t i a l industries might need State f i n a n c i a l assistance for a period. 
Unemployment insurance would have to be extended to cover the period of 
dislocation following i n d u s t r i a l and forces demobilisation. F i n a l l y , 
the strengthening of the health service would require extra money; and 
i t might be necessary, i f the Committee on F i n a n c i a l F a c i l i t i e s so recom-
mended, to provide State credit guarantees i f the f i n a n c i a l aid of the 
banks proved i n s u f f i c i e n t to help industry back on a peace-time footing. 
However, t h i s l i s t of needs was not exhaustive; and Addison emphasised 
that he had not included costs of food.subsidies, charges a r i s i n g out of 
the dislocation of transport following the end of the war, and other 
matters. What he was concerned with was not the sanctioning of indiv-
idual items of expenditure, but the principle that reconstruction would 
not be hampered by a shortage of funds. 
I n Addison's opinion, i t was e s s e n t i a l for the Government to l a y 
down guidelines about expenditure af t e r the war. He f e l t that there 
were two main l i n e s of argument on t h i s topic. On the one hand there 
were people who f e l t that everything should be subordinated to the paying 
off of debt, and that there was no prospect of a permanent restoration of 
prosperity u n t i l a large part of the war indebtedness had been liquidated. 
From t h i s viewpoint i t followed) Addison said, 
"that the t o t a l expenditure of the State should be kept as low 
as possible, that services such as housing, land settlement, 
and the improvement of the public health and presumably the 
restoration of the transport services to t h e i r f u l l capacity, 
must wait u n t i l efforts at extinguishing debt are reflected i n 
the improvement of national cr e d i t and international exchange. 
1. P.R.O..Reeon.1/70. memo., by Addison on reconstruction finance, 
10 Feb.,, 1918, p.3. _ 16,7 ~ 
He f e l t that there would be more force i n t h i s argument i f i t could be 
shown f i r s t l y how expenditure of the kind he suggested involved the 
withdrawal of c a p i t a l from production, and secondly how i t would i n any 
case be possible to pay off ; debt and restore the national cr e d i t i f the 
maximum possible effort were not put into developing our resources so 
as to achieve the maximum output i n the minimum possible time; and he 
urged 
"that c a p i t a l expenditure on every one of the subjects I have 
cite d i s as v i t a l to e f f i c i e n t production as i f i t were 
invested i n machinery or factory buildings. To say that the 
workman must .be healthy and must have a house i s simply to -
state two of the prime; factors i n the scheme of production' 
which we a l l desireo - -The means for r e a l i s i n g i t w i l l not .be 
forthcoming, except from.the State and so f a r from withdrawing 
from industry the c a p i t a l i t requires the State i n performing 
i t s obligations towards i t s c i t i z e n s W i l l be discharging a 
function which i s e s s e n t i a l to industry. " 1 -
So, Mdison urged, i t was v i t a l that i n order to restore the economic 
machine to proper working order the Government should be prepared to 
spend money, i n large sums i f necessary, though with careful regard to 
gaining value for money. I f t h i s were not done, the transfer from war 
to peace wOuld be accompanied by widespread d i s l o c a t i o n and, unrest, and 
there would be agitation for the immediate implementation of the sort 
of schemes which iddison was proposing, but i n haste and without proper 
consideration. 
" I t w i l l be no defence to say that v i t a l proposals were not 
enacted for want of. money,, Nobody W i l l believe i t . . We s h a l l 
be told that the money would have been forthcoming i f i t had 
been required for the- War and we s h a l l be pressed to accept . 
a l l manner of wild proposals and to devise h a s t i l y exterapor-' 
ised. expedients which w i l l s a t i s f y nobody0 I hope that we 
s h a l l not have to l e g i s l a t e and to spend money for reconstruc-
tion purposes i n an atmosphere of panip engendered by violent 
agitation and'well-founded discontent, but I do most seriously 
suggest that t h i s i s , an alternative that cannot be disregarded 
i f our plans are l a i d for a half-hearted tentative scheme of 
reconstruction based on the view that we cannot a f f o r t to 
prepare for peace."2 
1 0 P.R.Oo.Recon.1/70. memo, by Addison on reconstruction finance, 
10 Febc, 1918, p „ 3 o 
2° I b i d o P . 5 Q •• 
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In view of the events of early 1919, that l a s t sentence i s p a i n f u l l y 
prophetic, although there i s no evidence that the Treasury was e n t i r e l y 
1 
or even l a r g e l y to blame. 
Addison;'s memorandum was circ u l a t e d to the Cabinet^ and considered 
at a meeting on February 26th„. By t h i s time the o f f i c i a l Treasury view 
2 
had been propounded i n a memorandum by Bradbury, As was to be expected, 
Bradbury was not at a l l happy about the idea of giving a carte blanche 
to reconstruction expenditure„ He disagreed with Addison :s view that 
there was a clearcut d i v i s i o n of opinion between people who gave f i r s t 
importance to paying off the National Debt, and who believed that t h i s 
was an e s s e n t i a l prerequisite to the recovery of the economy to i t s pre-
war prpsperlty, and on the other hand those who f e l t that the only means 
of repaying the debt l a y i n giving f i r s t p r i o r i t y to stimulating production 
to the maximum degree possible by dint of capital, outlay on a large scale.. 
He f e l t that the idea that the f a s t e r production developed the greater 
would be B r i t a i n ' s a b i l i t y to restore her c r e d i t and repay her debt was 
common ground.- However, he f e l t that behind Addison's c r i t i c i s m of the 
more cautious school, who believed i n patting debt repayment f i r s t , was 
the idea that repayment of i n t e r n a l debt i n some way involved the expend-
i t u r e of c a p i t a l j and t h i s S i r John regarded as f a l l a c i o u s * 
Bradbury then proceeded to- put forward the orthodox view of debt 
repayment, that i s ? that i t involves a transfer of purchasing power from 
one member of the community to another,- and i n so f a r as the t r a n s f e r 
was from taxpayers who might otherwise be expected to spend the money 
to rentiers' who would almost c e r t a i n l y reinvest i t , the o v e r a l l stock 
of c a p i t a l would be increased. 
See below, pp, 177-182. 1. 
mam P.R.Q., T J 7 0 / J 2 5 . memo* by Bradbury reconstruction finance- 21 Feb*, 1918. o on Addison's views on 
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" I t i s clear t h e r e f o r e t h a t provided the burden o f t a x a t i o n of 
p r o f i t s i s not c a r r i e d to: the p o i n t of s t r a n g l i n g e n t e r p r i s e , 
t a x a t i o n f o r the purpose of repayment of domestic debt tends by 
a process of compulsory t h r i f t t o increase r a t h e r than d i m i n i s h 
the c a p i t a l resources of the nation... The c r e a t i o n of a sub- ' 
s t a n t i a l s i n k i n g fund f o r the war debt out of revenue i s t h e r e -
f o r e thoroughly sound from the economic p o i n t of view and w i l l 
i t s e l f a s s i s t the re-establishment of i n d u s t r y by r e s t r i c t i n g 
consumption and in c r e a s i n g the demand f o r and making^funds 
a v a i l a b l e f o r the production of new c a p i t a l goods." ' 
This argument he regarded as unassailable.- But i t was a separate 
question whether a t the same time as the Government was repaying debt 
out of revenue the State should also be borrowing on a lar g e SGale f o r 
c a p i t a l purposes* 
On t h i s p o i n t , Bradbury f e l t i t was not possible t o give a categ-
o r i c a l judgement as t o the correctness of such a procedure. But he f e l t 
t h a t t h e r e were several reasons f o r proceeding w i t h extreme caution.. The 
f i r s t was t h a t the supply of c a p i t a l a f t e r the war was l i k e l y t o be con-
s i d e r a b l y below the demand. This was b a s i c a l l y not because of a shortage 
of currency or c r e d i t , f o r the p o t e n t i a l , purchasing power which the banks 
could l e n d t h e i r customers on the basis of o r d i n a r y banking p r a c t i c e 
would be on a scale e n t i r e l y w i t h o u t precedent.. But the volume of goods 
t o s a t i s f y the demand was simply hot t h e r e , and i f bankers used a l l the 
powers a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t o create purchasing power p r i c e s would be f o r c e d 
2 
up t o a l e v e l which *would d i s l o c a t e a l l economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s 1 .•• There-
f o r e , any Government borrowing a f t e r the war would i n v o l v e not the c r e a t i o n 
of new c r e d i t but the d i v e r s i o n o f purchasing power from p r i v a t e i n t o 
Government hands. Bradbury questioned whether t h i s was wise: 
1 . P.R.Q., T. 170/125.. memo, by Bradbury on Addison 5s views on recon-
s t r u c t i o n f i n a n c e , 21 Feb,, 1918, p.2, The a n a l y s i s , i n a pre -
Keynsian world, i s accurate w i t h i n l i m i t s ^ But even i n the context 
of the times, i t ignores two problems; f i r s t the d e f l a t i o n a r y 
nature of some forms of debt repayment, i n which purchasing power may 
a c t u a l l y be destroyed, and secondly the Imperfections i n the c a p i t a l 
jnarket „ 
2. E.R.Q., T.170/125. memo, by Bradbury on r e c o n s t r u c t i o n finance,: 
21 Febo, 1918, p.3. 
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"The question therefore resolves i t s e l f into t h i s 7 s h a l l a 
portion of the i n s u f f i c i e n t supplies of raw materials which 
are available be diverted from the channels in t o which the 
ordinary laws of supply and demand would carry them to s p e c i a l 
purposes which i n the opinion of the Government are desirable 
for s o c i a l betterments and s h a l l a c e r t a i n part of the labour 
which i f economic forces were allowed to- operate f r e e l y would 
undoubtedly be employed for purposes; of the most pressing-
economic necessity,-., be diverted to c e r t a i n s e r v i c e s which 
however desirable from a s o c i a l point of view are c e r t a i n l y ^ 
l e s s pressing from the point of view of econe-mic necessity." 
I n Bradbury's view, the likelihood of unemployment on a large scale 
except very temporarily a f t e r the war was most unlikely, 
"While there i s considerable danger of the r e s t o r a t i o n of 
industry being impeded by purely mechanical causes r e s u l t i n g 
from the war disturbance of the markets, uncertainty of the 
developments of demand and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of demobilisation,, 
the general world shortage of commodities of a l l . kinds* 
c a p i t a l and consumable, i s quite s u f f i c i e n t to absorb for some 
time to- come the maximum production which can be made p r' • 
available," ^ 
In addition to the economic arguments against considerable Government 
borrowing for c a p i t a l pur-poses a f t e r the war-, there was of course the 
administrative one,-- Since for many years a f t e r the war the Government 
would i n any case have a heavy programme of maturity of shorts-term- bor-
rowing to cope with, any additions to the burden would only harm the 
economy i n the long run by making the load of debt even more in t r a c t a b l e ^ 
However, Bradbury did not rule out altogether the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
r a i s i n g moderate amounts f o r some reconstruction purposes a f t e r the 
conclusion of peace But considerable care would be necessary„ 
"...the amount which can be so raised without grave r i s k to the 
whole f i n a n c i a l f a b r i c within any given period can only be deter-
mined from time to time as events develop and to deside "that 
measures which are agreed upon as e s s e n t i a l i n order to give the 
country a s a t i s f a c t o r y s t a r t on a peace footing s h a l l not be 
delayed or refused sanction on the grounds of expense' would be 
to follow the h i s t o r i c a l precedent set up by King Canute i n 
r e l a t i o n to the a c t i v i t i e s of the tides^"3 
1, P„R.„Q., T. 170/125,, memo, by Bradbury on reconstruction finance y-
21 Feb..-, 1918, P . 4 . 
2, I b i d . . . . 
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The matter came before the Cabinet on 26th February j, and i t was 
decided that the problem should be se t t l e d by discussion between .Addison 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. No record of these t a l k s has come 
to l i g h t ? but i n any case the problem did not r e a l l y become pressing 
u n t i l the spring of 1919° Up to that time the problem was cne of 
planning rather than execution. During the remainder of h i s time at 
the Ministry Addison continued to pursue the problems of reconstruction 
with energy and enthusiasm, dealing with such issues as the date for the 
ending of the war (an important issue because much of the authorisation 
of emergency action contained a proviso that the powers only extended 
to the tperiod of the present war 5), the formation of Joint I n d u s t r i a l 
Councils, f a m i l i a r l y known as Whitley Councils, of Interim Reconstruction 
Committees,, relinquishing of Government control, sale of surplus Govern-
ment property, and numerous others-- There i s l i t t l e evidence of further 
c o n f l i c t with the Treasury i n the earliex- part of t h i s period, since 
most of Addison's work did not d i r e c t l y involve expenditure; as we have 
T 
noted, h i s was not an executive department„ 
One of Addison's major achievements at t h i s time was the promotion 
of a unified Ministry of Health. This was an issue which had vexed 
B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s for years, since the various vested i n t e r e s t s involved 
2 
took diametrically opposed views. But the experience of the war won 
many converts to the Importance of unifying the nation's health services,, 
and the Ministry f i n a l l y came into being i n July T919e The f i n a l decision 
on the inception of the Ministry was one of many which Addison had 
1„ P.R.Q., Reeon.1/70. part 1. 
2. A detailed, a n a l y s i s of the events leading up to the creation of 
the Ministry of Health i s to be found i n F» Honigsbaum, The Struggle  for the Ministry of Health, (to be published as) Occasional Papers 
on S o c i a l .administration No. 37 (London: G. B e l l & Sons) 
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considerable d i f f i c u l t y i n obtaining- from Lloyd George j- i t was a 
perpetual complaint of .Addison's that Lloyd George spent too l i t t l e 
time on reconstruction problems and that he allowed h i s determination 
to win the war to exclude the necessary consideration of other problems. 
During October 1918 he wrote to Lloyd George several times asking for 
his support i n getting urgent problems of reconstruction s e t t l e d by 
1 
the Cabinete For part of t h i s period Lloyd George was absent i n France| 
he was also much taken up with the problems' of the forthcoming election,, 
F i n a l l y , on the 29th of October Addison wrote to Lloyd George i n France 
with a- long l i s t of matters requiring urgent Cabinet decision,,- Lloyd 
George responded by setting up a Committee with power to- mako the 
, . . 2 
necessary decisions. 
This did not however solve his problems at once. On the one hand 
he was s t i l l dogged by unwillingness to- take decisions - despite the 
fact that Lloyd George had expressly given the Committee power to take 
decisions i n the name of the War Cabinetj, i t was unwilling to- de-side on 
5 
the question of redeeming war pledge^, p a r t i c u l a r l y those on labour use,,-
and eventually Addison had to cable Lloyd George to reassure i t s members 
3 
that they were e n t i t l e d to make a decision* On the other^- he met 
obstruction from the Departments. The Treasury deputation at a discussion 
on out-of-work benefit proposed 14-/= plus marriage and ch i l d allowances 
as a s u f f i c i e n t weekly sum; Addison wanted 20 / - plus allowances* He was 
not pleased at the Treasury reaction. 
1. Lloyd George Papers, F./t/£/27, 2$ O e t i s 1918; C Addison, Four and 
a Half Years (2 vols; London; Hutchinson & Ca„-S 1934) •> v o l . I I , 
PP.583-585. 
2. Addison, oj^«oito> p<>585o 
3. I b i d . , p.586. 
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"„..their chief- spokesman was i n h i s most insolent mood. „•„ 
I told him that i f he were to go to the Tommies i n the trenches 
and t e l l them he thought 14-/- would be enough for them to l i v e 
on i f they could not get a job after demobilisation,, he would 
probably be strung up to the nearest post and would deserve it»"^ 
As well as opposition,,, he also had problems caused by inaction,, He and 
General Smuts, who was co-operating with him on the Committee, had an 
interview with senior o f f i c i a l s from the Local Government Board en the 
progress of t h e i r housing plans - a n important election issuer on which 
Lloyd George was l a t e r to pronounce 
"A big housing scheme i s one of the p r i n c i p a l features of the 
Government5'S avowed programme."2 
Mdison was appalled by the sit u a t i o n which the o f f i c e r s demonstrated 
pertained at the Board, 
"Our interview...was the most shocking revelation of incompetence 
that I have ever experienced„ 
I t was not long before he got the chance to remedy the position himself. 
The decision to set up the Ministry of Health f i n a l l y taken,, Mdison 
presented the B i l l enabling i t to Parliament under the ten-minute rule 
on November 6th, and three days l a t e r Lloyd George summoned him to-
Downing Street to offer him the new Ministry i n the Government reorgan-
i s a t i o n which was to take place i n January following the election..^ 
However, the authority for the new Ministry was not complete 9 and i t was 
not to come into existence u n t i l July, so u n t i l that time Mdison was to 
be President of the Local Government Board,, Under the Ministry of Health 
Act, t h i s department was then merged with the National Insurance Gomm-
i s s i o n , and took over the powers of the Board of Education with regard 
to the medical treatment of schoolchildren. 
1. Lloyd George Paper s.E/l. A/27. 25 Oct., I918j Addison, Four and a 
Half Years. Vol.11, p.585. 
2. Lloyd George Paperg.F/8 /2A2. speech notes dated 20 Nov., 1918. 
3. Mdison, op.cit., p.586. 
A« I b i d . , p.588. 
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The President of the Local Government Board had u n t i l early 
November been W. Hayes Fisher ( l a t e r Lord Downham). He was obliged 
by Lloyd George to resign over the t o t a l inadequacy of the r e g i s t e r s 
of voting of men serving with the forces^ and S i r Auckland Geddes, then 
Minister of Reconstruction, was asked, temporarily to replace Downham as 
well, i n order to prepare the voting r e g i s t e r s for the Election with a l l 
possible speed. Thus Geddes spent two months at the Board, while s t i l l 
also Minister of National S e r v i c e y on an inter-regnum basis to do a 
p a r t i c u l a r job for Lloyd George. Geddes seems not to have seen the 
situation quite i n that l i g h t , and being highly d i s s a t i s f i e d with the 
organisation which he found when he arrived, made plans to change i t . 
Addison was not pleased, and wrote to Lloyd George protesting i n h i s 
2 
usual vein. However, the sit u a t i o n seems to have been smoothed over, 
and Addison went to the Board i n January as planned, there to begin a 
considerable programme of re-organisation, which included the wholesale 
removal of the senior o f f i c i a l s on the Health side - most of them were 
prematurely r e t i r e d . He found that the Board's organisation and plans 
on housing were lamentably inadequate. Nothing had been done to carry 
out the Reconstruction Committee s s instructions about the Housing Plan,: 
although the l o e a l authorities were well disposedo^ Addison decided 
that he would need a l l support he could get from other Departments, and 
wrote to Lloyd George along these l i n e s i n the hope that he would emph-
5 
a s i s e Addison's needs. Despite the f a c t that housing was a cen t r a l 
plank i n the Government's p o l i c y 5 Addison was s t i l l having problems with 
1 . Frank Owen, Tempestuous. Journey (LondonsHutchinson & Co*, 1954)? 
PPO503-4« Lloyd George wrote an angry l e t t e r to Fisher, which Bonar 
Law begged him to tone down. The response was uncompromisings 'The 
P.M. doesn't care i f he i s drowned i n Malmsey wine, but he must be 
a dead chicken by tonight ',, 
2. Lloyd George Papers„F/1 A/30., 22 Nov., 1918; F/1 A/31. 25 Nov., 1,9*18. 
3„ See Honigsbaum, The Struggle for the Ministry of Health (to be 
published.) 
A. Lloyd George Papers, F/1 /5/3O Addison to Lloyd George, 22 Jan., 1919* 
5. I b i d . 
the Treasury over finance^ t h i s time of the increased s t a f f which would 
be necessary i f the L.G„B„ were to carry out the housing programme0 
Addison had written to the Treasury, t e l l i n g them of h i s schemes^ and 
had at f i r s t had no reply. When approached again, a Conference at the 
Treasury was arranged. The behaviour of the Treasury o f f i c i a l s towards 
the senior members of Addison's Department angered the l a t t e r consid-
erably, and he wrote to Lloyd George i n protest. 
" S i r James Carmichael Fpirector General of Housing^ was subjected 
by a junior o f f i c e r o fHhe Treasury to a cross-examination on 
such points as to whether he and h i s deputy could not share- a 
t y p i s t . He has now, I am sorry to say, formally resigned h i s 
o f f i c e , as he t e l l s me i t i s u t t e r l y impossible for him to get 
on with the work, and I agree with him, i f he i s to be subjected 
to- miserable t r i f l i n g s and delays of t h i s kind„"^ 
While Addison was struggling to introduce order and action a t the 
L.G.B., h i s place at Reconstruction had been taken by S i r Auckland Geddes, 
who was now combining t h i s Ministry with National Service^ both Minis-
t r i e s were wound up during the course of the e a r l y summer, and Geddes 
became President of the Board of Trade. Views as to the e f f i c a c y of 
the Government's reconstruction programme so f a r were varied. Addison i n 
his book quotes a l e t t e r from a friend at the B r i t i s h Embassy i n Washington 
"Everyone I have seen i s amazed at the completeness and e f f i c i e n c y 
of the B r i t i s h Reconstruction programmes and they are a l l bewailing 
the f a c t that they have not been able to produce anything them-
selves on these lines„ 
Not everyone agreed, and c e r t a i n l y i n the f i e l d of Reconstruction i n 
which the State might conceivably compete with private industry there 
seem to have been conf l i c t i n g aims of policy,, As we have seen, the 
Government decided i n October 1918 to investigate the prospects of con-
verting some of the Government f a c t o r i e s to peacetime purposes; i t also 
1.. Lloyd George PapersvF/l A/9. Addison to Lloyd George, 27 Feb 0, 1919. 
2. Addison, Four and a Half Years. Vol.11, p.604-, Dec 1918. 
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apparently intended that the operation of Break clauses i n Munitions 
contracts and the l i k e should take into account the probability of 
1 
numbers of men being thrown out of workc However, the i n d u s t r i a l s i t u -
ation at the Armistice did not seem to j u s t i f y too much worry on t h i s 
account, and the Treasury view was s t i l l that propounded by Bradbury 
e a r l i e r i n the year, that the greater the resources which could be 
transferred to c i v i l i a n production, and the quicker such transfers could 
be made, the better. Accordingly, i t was decided that even i f c a n c e l l -
ation of contracts involved the s a c r i f i c e of expenditure already incurred, 
the completion of munitions of war which were no longer required would be 
a bad thing, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the f a c t that the materials which 
would be used would be badly needed i n c i v i l i a n production. I n many 
instances the Break clauses were not invoked, and negotiations for compen-
sation instead began. The influence of the Treasury seems to have been 
reinforced by the attitude of Lord Inverforth, who succeeded Churchill 
at the Ministry of Munitions i n January; i n c i v i l i a n l i f e he was a 
merchant, and seems to have been very half-hearted about the advantages 
of using Government resources i n the production of goods which could 
2 
equally well be undertaken by private firms. 
Thus, at the beginning of 1919 considerable headway had been made 
i n 'liberating' areas of industry from Government intervention, and 
rather an unsteady beginning had been made i n the problems of s o c i a l 
reconstruction about which Lloyd George f e l t so strongly. Addison was 
already making i t p l a i n to h i s chief that the s o c i a l l y orientated recon-
struction plans, notably the Housing programme, were not as f a r advanced 
as they should have been. I n addition,, some industries were not. finding 
the t r a n s i t i o n to peacetime production a l l that easy, mainly apparently 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/8. W,C.4.91S 24 Oct., 1918. , 
2. Eigou, Aspects of B r i t i s h Economic History 1918-1925 „ pp922.=.25„ 
because of uncertainty as to the future course of demand. These tw& 
factors> combined with the huge increase i n employable labour caused- by 
the r a p i d i t y of demobilisation,, are demonstrated by the course of unem-
ployment i n the spring of 1919. The available figures are for those 
receiving out-of-work donation^ these rose from l e s s than 700 ? 000 i n 
January to over 1 m i l l i o n by April„ The sit u a t i o n i s complicated by the 
f a c t that v i r t u a l l y a l l those i n employment i n August 1918 were e l i g i b l e 
for benefit, and i t seems clear that numbers' of women who had i n f a c t 
no intention of reapplying for work after t h e i r war work ceased did draw 
the donation for the period to which they were e n t i t l e d . But t h i s would 
only account for part of the r i s e , and the s i t u a t i o n soon began to give 
-t 
the Government cause for concern. 
The problem of unemployment was accompanied by a r i s e i n i n d u s t r i a l 
unrest, l a r g e l y associated with agitation for improved wages,T hours and 
conditions of work„ There were s t r i k e s on the Clyde and i n B e l f a s t i n 
January, and a violent Forty Hours s t r i k e i n Glasgow early i n February. 
Lloyd George was absent i n Paris at the time, and as Hankey was with him 
Thomas Jones was acting as Secretary to the Cabinet i n h i s place. He 
wrote to Lloyd George ear l y i n February, urging L„G„ to r e i t e r a t e h i s 
aims on s o c i a l policy and to ginger up the a c t i v i t i e s of the departments 
on t h i s . As usual at t h i s period, the Bolshevik spectre rose i n every-
one's minds whenever the i n d u s t r i a l situation began to look at a l l unpleas-
ant, but i n Jones' view Bolshevik propaganda i n B r i t a i n was only ef f e c t i v e 
where the men had genuine grounds for t h e i r grievances,- and i n such cases 
the Government should do a l l i t could to remedy them. In h i s opinion the 
main trouble was that the Union leaders were out of touch with the men, 
and t h i s was not helped by the Governments unavoidable policy of nego-t-
2 
i a t i n g only with accredited leaders', 
1 . Pigou, Aspects of B r i t i s h Economic History 1918~1925,pp.29,32,2T8o 
2 . Thomas Jones,- Whitehall Diary, Vol.I, 1916-1925, ed. K.Middlemass 
(London sO.U. P., 1969),; pp .73-74, T. Jones to Prime Minister y 8 Feb . ,1919 . 
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Strikes and unrest continued during February; Union recognition, 
notably for the Railway clerks and the police, were among the causes.-
Jones 1 l e t t e r s to Hankey i n France contain some amusing references to 
the stubborness of employers i n general., and the other-worldliness of 
some of the Ministers,, Of a Cabinet discussion on a s t r i k e of Tube 
t r a i n d r i v e r s , he notes: 
" . . . i t was announced at the very outset that the Railway 
executive and the men had agreed to accept a p a r t i c u l a r formula, 
but, a l a s , t h i s formula was unacceptable to the Cabinet, and we 
had the spectacle.„.of about 25 people trying to draft an agree-
ment of two sentences long which would at once placate the 
managers and men and save the face of the Government„.„If a 
verbatim note of t h i s discussion had been published l a s t week-
the c o a l i t i o n would have collapsed. „ ..The whole wrangle was over 
the ordinary, reasonable physical requirements of the men and 
the precise number of minutes required to s a t i s f y them, the 
estimate varying from none upwards. I am very curious to know 
whether or not Curson and Long have ever been i n a Tube and am 
thinking of referring the question to the Ministry of Research."'' 
Nevertheless, the i n d u s t r i a l s i t u a t i o n was c l e a r l y becoming serious,, and 
Lloyd George decided to return to England to see for himself. The f o l l -
owing day he received a memorandum from S i r Auckland Geddes on measures 
taken by the Government to provide for unemployment. Among these were 
housing schemes, to be undertaken by the Local Authorities,- whose l i a b -
i l i t y to the difference i n cost between the market price and what could 
be obtained i n rent from the tenants should be limited to Td rate, the 
r e s t being met by the Government; public works, of which £10^- m i l l i o n -
worth had already,been sanctioned and a further £30 m i l l i o n work of 
proposals were under consideration; and big extensions to the road system. 
The Prime Minister was apparently anxious to hear how the detailed exec-
ution of these and other programmes planned by the individual departments 
were progressing, and he summoned a conference of a l l the Ministers 
3 
concerned. 
1. Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol.1, 1916-1926, p.75 . 
2. Lloyd George Papers nf/Z3B, memo, by S i r Auckland Geddes, 11 Feb.,1919. 
3. L o c . c i t . .,,E/17/5/25. Lloyd George to Geddes r 14- Feb., 1919. 
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This conference was the f i r s t of a series; the o r i g i n a l one was 
under the chairmanship of Lloyd George himself, but i t was' then decided 
to hold a number of meetings under Geddess who would have power to make 
decisions i n the name of the War Cabinet i f necessary, and would produce 
1 
a detailed report f o r Lloyd George as soon as possible,, Apparently there 
were doubts about the d e s i r a b i l i t y of the Prime Minister's social policy 
i n the minds of some of his Ministers; Jones says of the f i r s t Conference 
on Unemployment, 
"...the P.M. was splendid on Tuesday. Several were drawing rather 
long faces and p i l i n g up the f i n a n c i a l bogey and the P.M. forced 
the Ministers to t e l l him how much they could spend i n the next 
twelve months. The b i l l came to £71,000,000. He then asked; 
'Supposing the War had. lasted another year, could we not have 
raised somehow or other another £2,000,000,000?*. I t was blank 
nonsense to t a l k of a bagatelle l i k e £71,000,000 - a cheap 
insurance against Bolshevism,," ^ 
At t h i s stage, with the King's speech newly drafted and approved by the 
War Cabinet f o r the opening of the new Parliament, containing a number 
3 
of pledges on the Government's reconstruction programme, and with r i s i n g 
unemployment i n industry with numbers of soldiers s t i l l to be demobilised, 
Lloyd George's policy was undoubtedly expansionist. His views at t h i s 
time seem to have been close to those of one of his Liberal Ministers", 
Edwin Montagu, who had w r i t t e n to him during the Election period, sugg-
esting that Lloyd George should be his own Minister of Reconstruction and 
that t h i s o f f i c e and that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer would have 
to be the most important i n the post—war Government. I n Montagu's view, 
the Chancellor: 
"must be a man who w i l l not be afr a i d to spend money, perhaps 
(who knows?) as la v i s h l y as during the war, to raise reconstruc-
t i o n or peace loans instead of war loans, who w i l l not- be af r a i d 
to face, as I think we sha l l have t o , a levy on cap i t a l to get 
r i d of heavy taxation." 4 
1. P.R.O..Cab.,24-/75,G.T.6820. 17 Feb., 1919. 
2. Jones, Whitehall Diary.. Vol.1. 1916-1925. pp.79-80. 
3. E.R.O.,C^7^2,JW.C.530, lol'eb., 1919. 
4-. Lloyd George Papers, FAo/2/24-. Montagu to Lloyd George, 16 Dec.,.1918. 
Gedd.es performed his task rapidly, and the Committee reported at 
the beginning of Ap r i l . The report was discussed by the War Cabinet on 
the 3rd, and the main r e s u l t of t h i s was the setting up of the Cave 
Committee on relatio n s between Government and Industry. The object of 
Geddes1 exercise had been b a s i c a l l y to act as a ginger group, to get the 
other Departments going, and i n t h i s he seems to have been l a r g e l y succ-
e s s f u l . Schemes which had been some time i n the planning began to come 
to f r u i t i o n ; during Lloyd George's short time i n London i n February and 
early March, for instance, the Cabinet discussed and approved B i l l s or 
Departmental action on E l e c t r i c i t y Supply, Housing, Land Settlement, 
Transport and Health. However, although finance for schemes evolved 
by l o c a l authorities had been eased i n December, i t was s t i l l subject to 
3 
Treasury approval until. A p r i l , and Addison was s t i l l having d i f f i c u l t i e s 
with the Treasury over housing and public works finance,- as the records of 
Gedd.es' committee show. Chamberlain was prepared to give immediate 
sanction to only a small part of Addison's schemes;- he did not intend 
to give him carte blanche ."^  
In the early spring of 1919 P therefore, the problems of unemployment 
and i n d u s t r i a l unrest loomed large i n everyone's minds, and the important 
thing seemed to be to get industry going again and to stLmulate employment 
at a l l costs. By the time Lloyd George returned full-time to the London 
scene i n August, (he had come back to B r i t a i n a f t e r the signing of the 
terms with Germany on the 26th June,, to spend some time on holiday a t 
Griccieth) the. situation had changed. F i r s t of a l l , the unemployment 
1. P.R.Q., Cab.-23/10. W.G.553, 3 Apr., 1919. 
2. P.R.Q., Gab."23/97 W.C.534, 19 Feb..,. 1919, W.C.536, 25 Feb.,. 1919, 
W.C.539, 3 Mar., 1919, W.G.54-1, 4 Mar.,. 1919. 
See also Jones, Whitehall Diary. Volpi..1916^1926,pp.79-80. 
.3. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l Policy 1914-1925, p.265. 
4. See, for example, P.R.Q., Cab .27758^ G.237, 14 Mar.. 1919. Report 
by S i r Auckland Geddes on Unemployment and the State of Trade, 
Appendix XLV. 
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bogey had f o r the time being been l a i d . From being over a m i l l i o n i n 
March and A p r i l , the figures of those drawing unemployment donation f e l l 
r a pidly to ju s t over half a m i l l i o n i n July; and while these figures do 
not t r u l y represent the s i t u a t i o n , because a number ceased to be e l i g i b l e 
f o r benefit, they were v i r t u a l l y the only r e l i a b l e figures of unemploy-
ment available. Further, the signs of increased prosperity were unmist-
akable; estimates of the dates at which the various sectors - of industry 
experienced the beginning of the up-swing of the boom suggest that the 
majority of consumer goods producers were on the mend by early 1919, 
while the capital goods industries a l l started t h e i r recovery i n the 
1 
spring, mostly i n March. 
Post-War Problems; the Economy Campaign 
The upturn i n employment, and the growing i n d u s t r i a l prosperity, 
were not the only d i f f e r e n t features i n the s i t u a t i o n confronting Lloyd 
George on his return. Partly as a r e s u l t of t h i s improvement, the 
ordinary grumbles about government extravagance and expense had grown 
in t o a strong campaign. Throughout the debates on the Finance B i l l 
during the summer session the recurrent theme i s one of decrying the 
levels which government expenditure has reached, despite the f a c t that 
the war was over. One Member went so far as to c a l l on the Chancellor 
to resign i f he could not carry his colleagues with him on the need to 
recover control over expenditure. Chamberlain's answer to t h i s was that 
Members themselves were not helping him i n his task; despite t h e i r c a l l 
f o r economy i n general terms, there was always a majority i n favour of 
2 
spending money on any in d i v i d u a l item. I n June, a Motion was proposed 
1.. Pigou, Aspects of B r i t i s h Economic History 1918^l9_2j5_, p.218,, 
2. Ho of C Debates. 1919. Vol, 116, Gol.l6„ Debate on'the Second 
Reading of the Finance'Bill, 20 May, 1919. 
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c a l l i n g the attention of the House to the l e v e l of Government expend-
it u r e and advocating s t r i c t economy. Chamberlain again complained that 
the House was advocating economy with one hand and sanctioning new 
expenditure with the other. 
Public opinion as exhibited by the newspapers and journals r e i n -
forced the Members' complaints. The Economist ran a leader on some 
aspect of t h i s theme i n v i r t u a l l y every issue i n 1919« I n May, the 
/ 
paper took advantage of the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor 
General on the Ministry of Munitions to make a slashing attack on the 
department, on the counts of allowing i t s c l i e n t firms to make excess 
p r o f i t s when manufacturing and making excessive losses i t s e l f when 
2 
trading,, I t also frequently c r i t i c i s e d the Treasury for i t s unwill^ 
ingness to take over the t r a d i t i o n a l function of oversight of expend-
3 
itu r e with regard to newly•created Departments, although t h i s apparently 
had been remedied by May 1919.^* When Chamberlain asked for Parliamentary 
sanction for a new loan i n June, the Economist commented that i t was a 
5 
necessary and advisable step,, and urged i t s readers to invest i n it<; 
But when i t proved not as successful as had been hoped;, i t reacted by 
remarking on a statement by Chamberlain that revenue was not coming up 
to expectations while expenditure was greater than had been hoped, that 
t h i s j u s t i f i e d those who had refused to contribute to the Victory Loan 
on the grounds that the funds would be used not for Funding but for further 
extravagance. Again, i n August, i t commented on a speech of Lloyd George-*,s-
whiGh the Economist had hoped would give the nation a lead over the neces-
s i t y for economy but f a i l e d to do so: 
1. H. of C. Debates. 1919, Vol.116, col.2159, A June, 1919. 
2o Economist. l.IJCXXvTII, 17 May? 1919. 
3 . Ibid... vol.LXXXVI. 2 Feb.;, 1918. 
4. H. of C. Debates. 1919. vol.CXV, eol o1l01, Statement by Chamberlain. 
5. Economist. ^ : .LXXXVIII, 7 June ? 1919. 
6. I b i d . . .16" Aug„? 1919. 
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" I f verbal exuberance were a saleable commodity the Prime 
Minister would have given the nation a great example by 
his speech.. 0" 
By midsummer, the behaviour of prices was reinforcing the public 
clamour for economyj i t began to be apparent that the boom was underway0 
Both the S t a t i s t and the Economist index of wholesale prices rose by 
nearly 12$ between A p r i l and the end of July, and the mean for August 
2 
was 1 8 points higher than that for Julys the July figure was 24 .0. 
The price of food rose nearly as f a s t ; the Ministry of Labour index rose 
3 
from 2 0 4 - at the end of May to 2 1 7 at the end of July, 6% i n two months. 
This was a major factor i n the postponement of the removal of food price 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n controls.^ 
Nor was the Chancellor unaware of the growing public f e e l i n g . 
Throughout the earl y part of the summer, he was constantly protesting 
at Cabinet meetings about the extravagant habits of h i s colleagues,, At 
one meeting i n ear l y July, he protested about the cost of the proposed 
Peace celebrations, on the grounds that the Government should set an example 
to the nation over expenditure. He told h i s fellow Ministers that, at a 
meeting he had held to urge subscriptions to the Victory Loan, he had been 
expressly told by many businessmen that the public would not lend i f i t 
thought the money was being used extravagantly, and he eventually pledged 
that the money raised by the Victory Loan would be used, riot for new 
expenditure, but s o l e l y for debt repayment. At the present rate of sanc-
5 
tion of expenditure, he would not be able to keep to h i s pledge. Again, 
during discussion on the future of the coal mines, Chamberlain drew 
attention to the extent to which revenue was not coming i n to the extent 
he had hoped, and Government expenditure was exceeding estimates. 
1 . Economist. . . .LXXXVTII, 23 Aug,, 1 9 1 9 . 
2 , Pigou, Aspects of B r i t i s h Economic History 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 2 5 . P . 2 3 4 - , 
Average for 1 9 1 3 = 1 0 0 . 
3 o I b i d . . p „ 2 3 0 . Average for July 1 9 U = 1 0 0 . 
4, See above, pp. 1:39~T40<, 
5 , P.R.O., Cab.2 3 / 1 1. W . C . 5 8 9 , 8 July, 1 9 1 9 c 
6, I b i d . 
Jones commented: 
"The Chancellor of the Exchequer drew a most l u r i d picture 
of the country's f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n . " ^ 
Another feature of the sit u a t i o n which was causing grave anxiety for 
the Chancellor was the attitude of the Forces Departments to peace--
time commitments. One problem was the Admiralty's plans for new ship xs; 
i n Jones' view, the Sea Lords were aiming at equality with America, and 
he deliberately delayed consideration of the problem by the Cabinet 
2 
u n t i l Lloyd George was able to be present. Another thorny problem was 
that of Forces' pay, A Committee had reported to Cabinet, suggesting hew 
rates of pay for both Officers and other ranks i n the Army and Air Force, 
and another on the Navy, The recommendations included large increases 
for a l l personnel, and the Service Departments, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Admiralty," 
were adamant that the increases were e s s e n t i a l to national secu r i t y . The 
subject was discussed at length and with some heat at the War Cabinet on 
July 15th, i n the Prime Minister's absence, Bonar Law pressed for the 
debate to be adjourned u n t i l the Prime Minister could be present, but the 
Admiralty were determined that the matter should be postponed; nor would 
Long give way then over a proposal that a portion of the increase i n pay 
should be accounted a Cost of Living Bonus, revisable i n the l i g h t of 
changes i n the cost of living,, After some argument, during which Churchill 
became w i l l i n g to agree to the cost of l i v i n g scheme, and which involved 
Chamberlain and Bonar Law as the protagonists of economy with the members 
of the Service Departments ranged against them, i t was agreed that d i s c -
ussion would be postponed u n t i l the next day,^ By that time Long had 
1. Jones, Whitehall Diary. Vol.1. 1916-1926. p.89. 
2. I b i d , 
3. Long had apparently threatened to resign from his post as F i r s t Lord 
of the Admiralty i f the pay scales proposed were not approved. Lloyd 
George Papers, F/23/4./59. Thomas Jones to J.T.Davies, 6 May, 1919, 
4. P.R.Q., Cab.23/11. W.C.593. 15 July, 1919. 
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apparently r e a l i s e d that i t would be very d i f f i c u l t for him to push the 
matter against the combined opposition of Chamberlain and Bonar Law, 
esp e c i a l l y as Lloyd George was known to be determined to keep Forces 
expenditure down0 He agreed that 20% of the pay scales should be 
regarded as due to the high cost of l i v i n g , and that the scales should 
be revised every f i v e years with t h i s proviso i n mind. Ch u r c h i l l , who 
i t w i l l be remembered was responsible for both the Army and the Air Force, 
concurred, and after Bonar Law had obtained Lloyd George's approval over 
1 
the telephone, the scales were agreed upon. 
Chamberlain and Lloyd George were now equally worried about the 
f i n a n c i a l situation, and the l a t t e r asked the Chancellor to prepare a 
statement on the country's f i n a n c i a l position. This he duly did, and i t 
was circulated to the r e s t of the Cabinet accompanied by a l e t t e r from 
2 
Chamberlain. He urged h i s colleagues to pay heed to the extent to which 
expenditure was going ahead much fa s t e r than had been expected; current 
estimates exceeded Budget estimates by £134- m i l l i o n , and estimates of 
receipts were l e s s than expected to the extent of about £70 m i l l i o n . 
Since a Budget d e f i c i t of £250 m i l l i o n was already planned for, i f nothing 
were done the t o t a l d e f i c i t would be over £450 m i l l i o n , i n the current 
year. The biggest increases i n expenditure came from the Service depart-
ments. Between them the Army and Admiralty estimates showed an increase 
of £67o5 m i l l i o n , and the Air Force another £8 m i l l i o n . The only other 
domestic Ministry or individual item to increase by more than £5 m i l l i o n 
was the cost of the Goal subsidy, which would i f continued at the present 
rate cost an extra £6<>4 mi l l i o n , although the Cabinet could prevent part 
of t h i s , depending on when the agreed increase i n the price of coal was 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/11. W.C.594-, 16 July, 1919 = 
2 . P.R.O., Cab„2A/8A. G.T.7729, 18 July, 1919<> 
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t o take e f f e c t . The cost of A l l i e d debts was the other b i g item t o have 
increased; because of f a u l t y e s t i m a t i n g , t h i s t o t a l was up £32 m i l l i o n 
from the estimates. As t o the diminished r e c e i p t s , t h i s was mainly 
accounted f o r by the c o n t i n u a t i o n of food r a t i o n i n g and c o n t r o l , which 
meant t h a t i n s t e a d of simply s e l l i n g o f f stocks the M i n i s t r y of Food was 
having t o l a y out money on new purchases as w e l l . 
I n the circumstances, Chamberlain ls a n x i e t y was h a r d l y surprising,, 
He had j u s t f i n i s h e d drumming up support f o r the V i c t o r y Loan campaign; 
t h i s had r a i s e d £4-50 m i l l i o n , of which £250 m i l l i o n would be r e q u i r e d t o 
cover the planned d e f i c i t . I f no reductions i n expenditure were made, 
the whole sum would disappear i n t h i s way. Chamberlain was i n no doubt 
e i t h e r as t o the r e a c t i o n he could expect from the p u b l i c i n t h i s event, 
or the d i f f i c u l t i e s which h i s o f f i c i a l s would experience i n p l a c i n g 
Government debt i n the market as i t came up f o r renewal,, 
"This i s the road t o r u i n . I n the present temper of the p u b l i c , 
whether r i c h e r or poorer, no f u r t h e r issue would have the l e a s t 
chance of success. Every e f f o r t t o secure support f o r the Loan 
was met by the c r y of 'Government extravagance'," 1 
Two of the items of government expenditure which caused a gre a t deal 
of p u b l i c comment were S t a f f and Cars. The extent t o which the s t a f f of 
Government departments, swollen i n numbers by the needs of war| had not 
been s w i f t l y cut back as soon as the h o s t i l i t i e s ceased, was a. frequent 
cause of p u b l i c a g i t a t i o n . Since most of the M i n i s t r i e s d i d i n f a c t have 
ne a r l y as much t o do u n t i l the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n and d e c o n t r o l p e r i o d was over, 
t h i s was r a t h e r a strange a t t i t u d e ; but i t was a l l p a r t of the f e e l i n g t h a t 
the Government should r e l i n q u i s h i t s hold on the economy as soon as p o s s i b l e . 
I f the Government l e f t the economy t o get on by i t s e l f , i t would not need 
so many s t a f f t o run i t s o f f i c e s . The curr e n t image of the C i v i l Service 
as spending most of i t s time d r i n k i n g cups of t e a at the Taxpayers' expense 
1. P.R.Q., Cab.2A/8A. G.T.7729, 18 J u l y , 1919. 
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was a popular one. So was the f e e l i n g t h a t the use of Government cars had 
become widespread and was unnecessary. Both these problems were discussed 
a t the Cabinet i n July, and Chamberlain continued t o remind h i s Cabinet 
colleagues of the need f o r economy. At a meeting on J u l y 22nd, on s t a f f 
accommodation, he suggested t h a t most decisions of t h a t k i n d should await 
a considerable r e d u c t i o n i n s t a f f , and t h a t i t was not p r a c t i c a b l e t o 
plan f u t u r e accommodation needs on the basis of the present swollen 
1 
establishments. 
The subject of government cars was discussed the f o l l o w i n g week, and 
again Chamberlain urged the importance on c u t t i n g down p a r t i c u l a r l y on 
ost e n t a t i o u s items of expenditure such as t h i s . I t was e v e n t u a l l y decided 
t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s should no longer be a l l o t t e d cars, and t h a t each Depart-
ment should l e t the War O f f i c e know i t s minimum requirements f o r t r a n s p o r t , 
2 
so t h a t a pooling system could be operated. The question of s t a f f i n g came 
up again on the 3 1 s t , and t h i s time the Prime M i n i s t e r was present, having 
returned from C r i c c i e t h . I t was decided t h a t the Cabinet should h o l d an 
enquiry i n t o the size of s t a f f s i n each Department r e l a t i v e t o the pre-war 
establishment, and make suggestions as to how many could be dispensed w i t h 
i n the near f u t u r e . Chamberlain produced some rough estimates of increased 
s t a f f s , and Lloyd George was astonished a t the extent t o which i t had not 
been possible t o reduce s t a f f s since the A r m i s t i c e . I n h i s view i t should 
be possible t o aim a t reducing the numbers by about h a l f i n the succeeding 
3 
s i x months. The Departmental r e p l i e s were t o be submitted by August 7 t h . 
1 . P.R.O.., Cab.23/11 . W.C.597, 22 J u l y , 1919. 
2 . I b i d . , W.C.602, 30 J u l y , 1919. 
3. I b i d . . W.C.603. 31 J u l y , 1919. Chamberlain f e l t t h a t the Departments 
c h i e f l y a t f a u l t were the Service Departments and the M i n i s t r i e s o f 
Shipping, Pensions, Labour and Munitions. 
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About t h i s time Chamberlain c i r c u l a t e d another and more d e t a i l e d 
memorandum on the f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n , accompanied by a l e t t e r which 
not only s p e l t out the dangers of the p o s i t i o n but which asked the 
Cabinet t o consider how the s i t u a t i o n could be remedied. 
"The p o s i t i o n grows d a i l y more grave. No estimates hold good, 
and the Cabinet sanctions increase a f t e r increase w i t h , as i t 
seems t o me, an i n s u f f i c i e n t a p p r e c i a t i o n of the aggregate 
r e s u i t . . . I f we cannot balance..revenue and expenditure next year 
our c r e d i t - n a t i o n a l and i n t e r n a t i o n a l - w i l l be shaken and 
the r e s u l t s may be d i s a s t r o u s . Any estimate which i s framed now 
must be l a r g e l y h y p o t h e t i c a l , but we are heading s t r a i g h t f o r 
a d e f i c i t of £200 m i l l i o n . W i l l my colleagues consider what 
t h i s means and how i t i s t o be provided f o r by new ta x a t i o n . . . ? " ^ 
As we have seen, Lloyd George was e f f e c t i v e l y absent, from:Cabinet 
discussion f o r almost the whole of the p e r i o d from January t o the end 
of J u l y 1919o Apart from short s p e l l s he had been i n Paris most of the 
time u n t i l the Peace Treaty was signed a t the end of June, and afterwards 
he had gone t o C r i c c i e t h , h i s country home i n Wales, f o r a r e s t before 
2 
resuming h i s normal d u t i e s i n f u l l . He decided t o take advantage of h i s 
r e t u r n t o take a f r e s h look at Government p o l i c y i n general. Accordingly, 
the f i r s t two weeks i n August must have been some of the b u s i e s t some of 
hi s colleagues had encountered; there were s i x meetings of the Cabinet 
i n secret session (those meetings which are recorded i n the 'A' minutes) 
and seven i n o r d i n a r y session i n the f i r s t week alone. The f i r s t i m p o r t -
ant session took place on Tuesday, August 5 t h , and there Lloyd George 
o u t l i n e d a t l e n g t h the l i n e s upon which he thought discussion should take 
3 
place as t o f u t u r e p o l i c y . 
Lloyd George thought t h a t there were two important f a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g 
the economic l i f e of the country, which were a change from pre-war. One 
was the increased prevalence of s t r i k e s , and the other was d i m i n u t i o n of 
1. P.R.O., Cab.2£/5. G.257, 26 Jul y , 1919. Presumably he meant an 
e x t r a £200 m i l l i o n - see above, p.183. 
2. Jones, W h i t e h a l l Diary. Vol.1. 1916-1925. pp.72-91. 
3» P.R.0..~Cab.23/l5. W.C.606A. 5 Aug.. 1919. 
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output. Both were important from the i n d u s t r i a l p o i n t of view, p a r t i c -
u l a r l y as the need f o r increased production was obvious f o r both home and 
overseas markets. The t r a d i n g p o s i t i o n of the country was serious;- we 
were now a debtor n a t i o n where before the war we had been a c r e d i t o r 
n a t i o n (he apparently means simply i n terms of having an o v e r a l l d e f i c i t 
on the balance of payments f o r 1919, not on t o t a l c a p i t a l assets b a s i s ) . 
He then went on t o o u t l i n e some more p a r t i c u l a r problems needing d e c i s i o n , 
such as p r o f i t e e r i n g , n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of c o a l , housing, and r u r a l 
r e g eneration. On housing, Lloyd George was anxious t h a t immediate steps 
should be taken t o improve the stock of houses a v a i l a b l e , 
" I t was not t h a t houses were bad, but the f a c t t h a t houses were 
a b s o l u t e l y unobtainable.„.So f a r the people had seen nothing done. 
They saw Housing B i l l s , but every Government had Housing B i l l s . 
What they wanted was t o see the houses a c t u a l l y being b u i l t . 
On the other hand, he was also anxious t h a t the problem of the huge l e v e l 
of Government expenditure should receive a t t e n t i o n . 
" I t looked as though our normal expenditure would be about f o u r 
times what i t was before the War, and a l l t h i s expenditure was 
not r e - p r o d u c t i v e . We could not go i n as we had been doing,, 
and i t was necessary f o r us t o r e a l i s e t h a t we could not have 
the best of e v e r y t h i n g . 
The Prime M i n i s t e r f e l t t h a t the main area i n which economies would have 
t o be made was i n the expenditure of the Service Departments* I t would 
be impossible f o r us t o mai n t a i n a much l a r g e r Army than before the war, 
because i f the Government d i d , people would say t h a t e i t h e r the war had 
been a f a i l u r e , or else the country was arming t o f i g h t an imaginary f o e . 
What the Government must do was t o t e l l the Services what the m i l i t a r y 
o b j e c t i v e s f o r the next f i v e or t e n years were t o be and then allow them 
t o budget on t h a t basis. 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/15. W.C.606A, 5 Aug., 1919. 
2. I b i d . . 
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" I n f i v e or te n years' time i t would be necessary t o review the 
s i t u a t i o n ; b u t , so f a r as e x t e r n a l foes were concerned, he 
Jthe- P.M.J f e l t t h a t r i s k s could be taken. No r i s k s , however, 
could be taken i n respect of the h e a l t h and labour of the 
people 0 We had t o l a y a t once the sure foundations of n a t i o n a l 
h e a l t h and i n d u s t r i a l p r o s p e r i t y . " ^ 
The Prime M i n i s t e r ' s s t r i c t u r e s about expenditure were discussed i n 
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h Chamberlain's paper on the economic s i t u a t i o n and the 
estimates f o r 1919-20- C h u r c h i l l , Secretary f o r War", said t h a t he thought 
Chamberlain's estimates a l i t t l e on the h i g h s i d e , and i t was never taken 
i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the extent t o which War O f f i c e expenditure had been 
d i c t a t e d by events. Demobilisation was s t i l l proceeding, and ..there were 
l a r g e r g a r r i s o n s t o be maintained i n many c o u n t r i e s , notably I r e l a n d and 
Mesopotamia. I t was f o r the Cabinet t o enable the War O f f i c e t o make 
economies by deciding the f u t u r e size of such g a r r i s o n s . He also 
suggested t h a t 
" I t was f o r the War Cabinet c l e a r l y t o define the various 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the f i g h t i n g services; i n other words, 
they must s t a t e t h a t there would be no great European War 
f o r the next f i v e or t e n years. " 2 
3 
This i d e a had already been put forward by Chamberlain, and i t was t o be 
a cornerstone of B r i t i s h defence spending p o l i c y i n the ensuing years. 
C h u r c h i l l seems at t h i s time t o have been t a k i n g a very c o n c i l i a t o r y 
l i n e about the expenditure of the Departments f o r which he was re s p o n s i b l e . 
He suggested t h a t the expenditure of 1914- should be taken as a datum l i n e 
and t h a t any amounts over t h a t l e v e l should need s p e c i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
The A d m i r a l t y , however, i n the person of Long, the F i r s t Lord, was i t s 
usual s t o n e - w a l l i n g s e l f . He stated t h a t i t was impossible f o r the 
Admiralty t o reduce i t s expenditure a t a l l unless i t s d u t i e s were reduced, 
and he was w i l l i n g t o c i r c u l a t e t o the Cabinet a d e t a i l e d resume of those 
d u t i e s so t h a t the Cabinet might decide our f u t u r e Naval p o l i c y . ^ 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/15. W..C.606A, 5 Aug O J 1919. 
2. I b i d . . c . -, . . . . . . . 
3. P.R.O., Cab„23/11. W.C.593, 15 J u l y , 1919. 
4.0 P.R.Q., Cab023/15. W.C.606A. 
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A f t e r some discussion of the determinants of defence expenditure, 
Chamberlain brought up the question of Cabinet c o n t r o l of expenditure, 
and suggested t h a t the Finance Committee, which had held a few i n f o r m a l 
meetings e a r l i e r i n the year, should be r e c o n s t i t u t e d so t h a t matters 
i n v o l v i n g l a r g e sums could be p r o p e r l y discussed as t o t h e i r f i n a n c i a l 
aspects and i m p l i c a t i o n s before the matter came t o the f u l l Cabineto 
Lloyd George was i n f u l l agreement w i t h t h i s suggestion, and p o i n t e d 
out t h a t o f t e n when i t came t o Cabinet a matter i n v o l v i n g l a r g e sums 
would o f t e n i n v o l v e the Chancellor opposing other M i n i s t e r s on h i s own 0 
I f such a matter had; been decided upon by the Committee' f i r s t , i t would 
be u s e f u l t o have those members t o back him up. Chamberlain agreed, but 
stressed t h a t the problem was not confined t o extravagant e x p e n d i t u r e 0 
He said he f e l t t h a t 
" i t was not extravagance which was our danger so much as t h a t 
we were t r y i n g t o c a r r y i n t o e f f e c t a t one moment more schemes 
f o r the b e n e f i t of the country than we were able t o a f f o r d . " ^ 
I t was e v e n t u a l l y decided t h a t two Committees should be set up, one, 
an ad hoc body, on p r o f i t e e r i n g , and the other a permanent body on Finance, 
which was t o c o n s i s t of Lloyd George, Chamberlain, M i l n e r , Auckland Geddes 
and Bonar Law, the f i r s t two being ex o f f i c i o members. I n a d d i t i o n , 
f u r t h e r discussions were t o be held i n the Cabinet on some of the matters 
already r a i s e d , and the Service departments were to be asked t o draw up 
memoranda of the tasks they expected t o be undertaken by t h e i r departments 
2 
i n the next f i v e or t e n years. 
Further meetings of the Cabinet held i n the next two weeks concen-
t r a t e d h e a v i l y on c o a l , Trade P o l i c y and Housing. The next important 
development i n the economy campaign came on August 13th, when i t was 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/15. W.C.606A, 5 Aug., 1919. 
2. I b i d . 
decided t h a t i n f u t u r e the Cabinet, and the Home A f f a i r s Committee, 
should not discuss proposals i n v o l v i n g expenditure unless they had 
e i t h e r been approved by the Treasury, or had been r e j e c t e d by t h a t 
body and the Department concerned had n o t i f i e d the Treasury t h a t i t 
1 
wished t o appeal t o the Cabinet against the d e c i s i o n . The Finance 
Committee also began t o meet r e g u l a r l y , and a t i t s second meeting on 
the 2 9 t h held a discussion on retrenchment. D e t a i l s of the discu s s i o n 
are not a v a i l a b l e , except of a short statement by Lloyd George, who 
continued t o show much a n x i e t y over the l e v e l s of Government expend-
i t u r e and p u b l i c d i s q u i e t about the sub j e c t . He said t h a t 
"not o n l y i n view of the st a t e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n but because 
of the f i n a n c i a l s i t u a t i o n of the country, r u t h l e s s c u t t i n g 
down of expenditure was imp e r a t i v e . The d i f f i c u l t y the 
Committee had found i t s e l f i n was t o f i x on the s p e c i f i c items 
of waste and extravagance which should be e l i m i n a t e d , and i t 
was here the Treasury could help the Committee. The Committee 
should know what was being expended at the present time, the 
obje c t s of the expenditure, and the persons d i r e e t l y respons-
i b l e f o r the expenditure." ^  
A prolonged discussion f o l l o w e d , and i t was e v e n t u a l l y decided t h a t the 
Treasury should be asked t o prepare an an a l y s i s of abnormal and temporary 
expenditure by the c h i e f spending Departments, and i n p a r t i c u l a r the 
Service M i n i s t r i e s and the M i n i s t r y of Munitions. I n the course of these 
submissions the Departments would be expected t o e x p l a i n and j u s t i f y t h e i r 
3 
expenditure, so t h a t economies could be made wherever p o s s i b l e . 
On the same day as t h i s meeting, the Prime M i n i s t e r wrote a l e t t e r 
which was c i r c u l a t e d t o a l l Government Departments, s e t t i n g out i n d e t a i l 
the sentiments he had already expressed both i n Cabinet and at the Finance 
Committee. 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/11. W.C.613, 13 Aug., 1919. 
2 . P.R.O., Cab.27/71, F,C..3, TO Aug., 1919. 
3. Prime M i n i s t e r ' s c i r c u l a r l e t t e r t o a l l Government Departments, 
2 0 Aug., 1919, p.1: copy i n P.R.O., T. 171/1.70. 
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" I wish t o c a l l the a t t e n t i o n of my .colleagues t o the f e e l i n g 
which e x i s t s i n the House of Commons, i n the Press, and amongst 
a l l classes of the community as t o the necessity f o r immediate 
c u t t i n g down of Government expenditure. A general f e e l i n g 
undoubtedly e x i s t s t h a t expensive and needless establishments 
are being maintained, because o f the reluctance of those a t the 
head of the various branches of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the Government 
Departments t o dismiss any of t h e i r employees."'' 
He went on to instance the recent grumbles about motor-cars, and t o 
p o i n t out t h a t i n t h a t case i t proved possible t o make considerable 
economies wit h o u t damaging the e f f i c i e n c y of Government, 
"or a t any r a t e , w i t h no harm t o the p u b l i c service commensurate 
w i t h t h a t which i s i n f l i c t e d by excessive expenditure. 
The c h i e f place i n which economy could and should take place was, i n the 
Prime M i n i s t e r ' s view, i n the employment of s t a f f . Establishments had 
been very l i t t l e reduced since the A r m i s t i c e , l a r g e l y because the re d -
u c t i o n o f personnel i s such an unpleasant t a s k . But i n Lloyd George's 
view the problem had t o be ta c k l e d immediately and w i t h v i g o u r . 
"The number s t i l l employed i n the p u b l i c services have^ i n the 
aggregate, h a r d l y decreased p e r c e p t i b l y since the war. That 
cannot be defended.. The st a t e of the N a t i o n a l Finances i s such 
t h a t o n l y what i s indispensable t o sound a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ought 
t o be maintained. Everything i n excess of t h i s must be r u t h -
l e s s l y cut down. I n the i n t e r e s t s of economy we must be w i l l i n g 
t o content ourselves w i t h the second best where the best i s too 
c o s t l y . " 3 
I n a d d i t i o n t o the general l e t t e r to a l l Departments, the M i n i s t r i e s 
s p e c i a l l y mentioned at the Finance Committee meeting, those w i t h respon-
s i b i l i t y f o r the Services and f o r Munitions, received another l e t t e r , 
from Austen Chamberlain, asking f o r d e t a i l s , under a number of heads, 
of expenditure t o the end of J u l y , and expected expenditure t o the end 
of the f i n a n c i a l year. He requested t h a t r e p l i e s should a r r i v e i n not 
more than a f o r t n i g h t , t h a t i s by the end of the f i r s t week i n September. 
1. Prime M i n i s t e r ' s c i r c u l a r l e t t e r t o a l l Government Departments, 
20 Aug., 1919, p.2j copy i n P.R.O., T.171/170. 
2. I b i d . 
3. I b i d . . pp.2-3. 
4o P.R.O., T.171/155, Chancellor, of the Exchequer t o M i n i s t e r s respons-
i b l e f o r War O f f i c e , Admiralty, A i r M i n i s t r y and Munitions, 
22 Aug., 1919. 
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This, however, was not quick enough f o r Lloyd George, who wrote t o h i s 
secretary, J„T. Davies, on the 28th, asking him t o f i n d out from the 
Treasury the progress which was being made on the d e c i s i o n of the 
Finance Committee t o f i n d out the s i t u a t i o n i n the Service departments„^ 
Davies got i n touch w i t h S i r Warren Fisher, who c i r c u l a r i s e d the Depart-
ments concerned i n conjunction w i t h S i r Michael Ramsay and Mr» George 
Barstow, who were i n charge of the Establishment and A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
2 
D i v i s i o n s of the Treasury r e s p e c t i v e l y . Fisher also wrote t o Lloyd 
George, t e l l i n g him of t h i s , and e x p l a i n i n g t h a t he had asked the f o u r 
3 
Departments concerned t o r e p l y by the f o l l o w i n g Monday, September 2nd, 
t h a t i s a week i n advance of the time the Chancellor had s t i p u l a t e d . 
I t must not be thought t h a t the Treasury had before the Prime 
M i n i s t e r ' s i n i t i a t i v e came been i n a c t i v e on the subject of s t a f f expend-
i t u r e . S i r John Bradbury had he l d an i n q u i r y i n t o increase of Government 
s t a f f s over the pre-war l e v e l which had r e p o r t e d i n the s p r i n g ; the 
procedure whereby huge sums of money were devoted t o war expenditure 
a f t e r being given by Vote of C r e d i t had been brought t o an end; and when 
being asked t o draw up estimates a l l the Departments had been reminded of 
the n e c e s s i t y of reducing s t a f f s . ^ But as f a r as the b i g spending M i n i s -
t r i e s were concerned, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the Service M i n i s t r i e s , t h e i r 
hands were t o a la r g e extent t i e d by two important f a c t o r s . The f i r s t 
was t h a t because of the accounting system i n operation i t was always much 
easier t o o b t a i n Treasury sanction f o r con t i n u i n g commitments than f o r 
new ones, and f o r the payment of e x i s t i n g s t a f f r a t h e r than f o r the 
1. P.R.O., T.17-1/155. Lloyd George t o J.T. Davies, 28 Aug., 1919. 
2. I b i d . , Fisher t o a l l Government Departments, 2 9 Aug.., 1919. 
3.o I b i d . , Fisher t o Lloyd George, 20 Aug. , 1919. Fisher addresses 
Lloyd George by h i s for m a l t i t l e , F i r ; s t Lord j [ o f the T r e a s u r j ^ ; 
t h i s i s the only example I have seen of the s u r v i v a l of t h i s 
p r a c t i c e . 
4-. Evidence o f S i r Thomas Heath before the Select Committee on 
Nat i o n a l Expenditure, 1919 (May 8 t h ) ; Copy of minutes i n P.R.O., 
T.172/655. 
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engagement of new establishments. I t i s apparent from the evidence of 
the Treasury o f f i c e r s before the Na t i o n a l Expenditure Committees i n 
the l a t t e r p a r t of the war and i n 1919 t h a t the Treasury r a r e l y took 
the i n i t i a t i v e about matters l i k e c u t t i n g down on wages and salaries;, 
and they had l i t t l e power t o enforce the r e d u c t i o n of e x i s t i n g s t a f f s . 
The second problem was caused by the extent t o which the Service Depart-
ments and the M i n i s t r y of Munitions had been allowed t o engage s t a f f a t 
j u n i o r l e v e l s w i t h o u t Treasury sanction. As S i r Thomas Heath pointed 
out t o the Committee on N a t i o n a l Expenditure i n 1919? when new M i n i s -
t r i e s were set up, the enabling B i l l s had u s u a l l y a -provision t h a t the 
M i n i s t e r could appoint such o f f i c e r s and servants as, w i t h the consent 
of the Treasury, he might determine;. I n the c r e a t i o n of the M i n i s t r i e s 
of Munitions, Labour, Shipping, N a t i o n a l Service and Food the r i d e r 'with 
the consent of the Treasury' had been omitted, and thus the o r i g i n a l s t a f f s 
of the M i n i s t r i e s concerned had been engaged w i t h o u t Treasury s u p e r v i s i o n 
as t o numbers. Besides t h i s , the War O f f i c e had f o r a number of years been 
allowed t o engage s t a f f t o a maximum s a l a r y l e v e l of £ 3 0 0 per annum wi t h o u t 
Treasury sanction as t o numbers, and t h i s p r i v i l e g e was extended d u r i n g the 
war t o the M i n i s t r y of Munitions, w i t h s a l a r y exemption l e v e l s of £ 4 0 0 f o r 
o r d i n a r y and £ 5 0 0 p».a«. f.or t e c h n i c a l s t a f f ? and t o the Admiralty f o r s t a f f 
earning up t o £ 2 5 0 p.a. I n S i r Thomas's o p i n i o n the Treasury was now 
g r a d u a l l y r e g a i n i n g c o n t r o l over expenditure, but the extent t o which 
estimates were s t i l l a f f e c t e d by the war would obviously prevent f u l l 
2 
c o n t r o l being resumed a t once. On the same day as Heath was g i v i n g h i s 
evidence, the Chancellor s a i d i n answer t o a question i n the House o f 
1. Select Committee on N a t i o n a l Expenditure, 1919, evidence o f S i r 
John Bradbury., May 7 t h , and S i r Thomas Heath, May 8 t h . Copy i n 
P.R.O., -T.172/655. 
2 . Evidence of S i r Thomas Heath before the Select Committee on N a t i o n a l 
Expenditure, 8 May, 1919, QQ.420=1, 4 2 6 , 4 6 0 , Copy i n P.R.O.. .T. 172 / 6 
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Commons t h a t a l l war-time exceptions t o Treasury c o n t r o l had by then been 
revoked. But the problem of s t a f f r e d u c t i o n s t i l l remained,. 
Fisher r e p l i e d t o Lloyd George's request f.or an i n t e r i m r e p o r t on 
September 3 r d , w i t h a 'bird's eye view-' of expenditure, i n c l u d i n g a 
general appendix on the whole estimates p o s i t i o n , a more d e t a i l e d one on 
the m i l i t a r y departments, and a t h i r d on small items which might but should 
not be overlooked as g i v i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s f.or reductions i n expenditure. 
This s e r i e s of memoranda he accompanied by a long l e t t e r s e t t i n g out some 
2 
of h i s own ideas on the subjeet of economy. He pointed out t h a t the 
scope f o r saving was o n l y great where p o l i c y decisions were concerned', 
and t h a t w h i l e some savings would prove t o be possible i n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
large economies could only come through changes i n government p o l i c y . 
"The b i g money i s of course i n p o l i c y . The margin of d i f f e r e n c e 
between a government machine which i s p e r f e c t l y adjusted f o r the 
execution of t h a t p o l i c y and a machine which i s too l a r g e (because 
of bad o r g a n i s a t i o n and management or of self-importance) i s - i n 
terms of cash - i n s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i v e l y ] j 3 i c j t o the huge f i g u r e s 
of a modern Budget-. The i l l - e f f e c t of swollen C i v i l Service estab-
lishments i s p r i n c i p a l l y a moral one...the e v i l s should be removed 
as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e , but the taxpayer's pocket w i l l not be 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e l i e v e d from t h i s q u a r t e r , however much improvement 
may be made i n the machinery as such. " 3 
Fisher went on t o p o i n t p a r t i c u l a r areas i n which economy could and should 
be made. F i r s t l y there was the Services; he thought i t not unreasonable 
t o suppose t h a t since the recent war was supposed t o have been waged 
against m i l i t a r i s m , the scale of the post-war services could be l e s s 
than pre-war, although p r i c e s and pay increases would s t i l l mean an 
increased money burden. B r i t a i n could not a f f o r d t o spend l a r g e sums 
on a b i g standing army i n many d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the globe. 
1.. H. of C„ Debates. 1919. Vol.CXV, col.1101, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 8 May, 1919.. 
2. P.R.O., T.171/155. Fisher t o the Prime M i n i s t e r , 3 Sep.,, 1919, 
3.. I b i d . , para. 2 „ 
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"As t o the mission of Great B r i t a i n i n the w o r l d , I cannot help 
f e e l i n g t h a t we may overdo the p a r t of f a i r y godmother and t h a t 
the B r i t i s h taxpayer has b e t t e r o u t l e t s f o r h i s energy and h i s 
c o i n than p i c k i n g out of the f i r e chestnuts f o r other people. 
I t i s w i t h d i f f i d e n c e t h a t I express these crude opinions, but 
i t seems t o me t h a t the country can only act as a Don Quixote 
i f i t i s prepared f o r bankruptcy."^ 
Qn the domestic f r o n t , one area i n which economies should be made was 
i n s u b s i d i e s . Fisher f e l t t h a t i n so f a r as the Government intervened 
i n commercial a f f a i r s by p r o v i d i n g s e r v i c e s , these should be paid f o r a t 
an economic r a t e , and t h a t the various p a r t s of i n d u s t r y dependent on 
the Government, such as coal and the r a i l w a y s , the Post O f f i c e and the 
pr o d u c t i o n of bread, should be run on a commercial b a s i s . 
" o . o i f a man wants t o t r a v e l , t o telephone, t o send a l e t t e r or 
consign goods, why should he be allowed t o do so p a r t l y at someone 
else's expense? And now t h a t the Germans are beaten and there i s 
no longer any question of our being fo r c e d t o throw up the sponge 
f o r domestic reasons, why should a man be allowed h a b i t u a l l y t o 
feed a t the expense ( i n p a r t ) of h i s neighbour?" ^ 
Debt charges and the war pensions charges had obviously come t o stay, 
unless there was t o be any question of r e p u d i a t i n g any of the debt. 
This l a t t e r p o s s i b i l i t y Fisher does not go i n t o at a l l . He then goes 
on t o suggest t h a t economies i n Education grants by the c e n t r a l Govern-
ment might be possible at the expense of rate-payers. 
" . . . i f l o c a l r ates were t r e a t e d as the p r i n c i p a l instrument of 
f i n a n c e , t h i s would have ensured i n a more e f f e c t i v e f a s h i o n a 
c o n t r i b u t i o n from the parents who b e n e f i t , the g r e a t m a j o r i t y 
of whom pay Education r a t e s e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y ( i n 
t h e i r r e n t ) but pay nothing i n the way of d i r e c t taxes t o the 
Exchequer. 
Fisher recommended t h a t the Unemployment Donation should be replaced as 
soon as possible by a c o n t r i b u t o r y scheme, and t h a t the new Departments 
which were a c r e a t i o n of war-time needs should be wound up as soon as 
p o s s i b l e . A l l i n a l l , Fisher's suggestions were along the l i n e s t o be 
.1.. P.R.O., T.171/155. Fisher t o the Prime M i n i s t e r , 3 Sep., 1919, para.5. 
2. I b i d . , para.3. 
3. Ib i d . - . 
- 198 -
expected; p u l l back from a c t i v i t y wherever i t was possible t o do so, 
and make a c t i v i t y commercially v i a b l e i f a t a l l f e a s i b l e where i t was not<, 
I n a d d i t i o n t o the Cabinet c i r c u l a r of August 1 s t , and Lloyd George's 
l e t t e r o f the 20th, the Treasury had also sent put a c i r c u l a r requesting 
the Departments t o make urgent e f f o r t s t o reduce s t a f f and asking f o r a 
1 
r e t u r n of s t a f f employed i n each Department. The r e p l i e s t o these 
l e t t e r s were c o l l e c t e d i n t o a ser i e s of papers on the curr e n t f i n a n c i a l 
2 
s i t u a t i o n and the expectations f o r the Budget of 1920-1„ The main 
suggestions of the Treasury were much along the l i n e s o u t l i n e d by Fisher, 
and continued t o emphasise the importance of c u t t i n g down Service expend-
i t u r e , employment c o n t r i b u t i o n s , and subsidies. D e t a i l e d recommendations 
f o r p a r t i c u l a r Departments were incl u d e d , among them the suggestion t h a t 
while the proposal t o t u r n the M i n i s t r y of Munitions i n t o a M i n i s t r y of 
Supply might seem l i k e an economy, the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of g e t t i n g 
i t s p u t a t i v e c l i e n t Departments t o work the scheme p r o p e r l y , w i t h o u t 
b u i l d i n g up expensive stocks and e x p e r t i s e of t h e i r own and short--
c i r c u i t i n g the M i n i s t r y wherever p o s s i b l e , were so great as t o make i t 
l i k e l y t h a t the savings i n v o l v e d would be swallowed up i n d u p l i c a t i o n 
3 
of e f f o r t s 
The extent t o which the Economy campaign was successful i n i n d i v i d u a l 
-Departments i s extremely d i f f i c u l t t o analyse. At the time i t got under 
way, the expected d e f i c i t f o r 1919-20 was about £4-50 m i l l i o n . I n the 
event, the a c t u a l d e f i c i t c a l c u l a t e d on the same basis was £326 m i l l i o n , 
but the improvement was l a r g e l y due t o an increase of revenue r a t h e r than 
a decrease of expenditure. The Budget estimate of expenditure was 
o r i g i n a l l y £1,451 m i l l i o n , which was r e v i s e d i n October t o £1,64-2 " m i l l i o n , 
- I . P.R.O., T. 171/155, Treasury C i r c u l a r , 3 6 7 4 - 3/19, 26 Aug., 1919. 
2. P.R.O., T. 171/1,70. 
3 . I b i d . . 20 Sep.,.1919. 
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and. i n the event was £ 1 , 6 6 . 5 m i l l i o n . Revenue on the other hand was 
o r i g i n a l l y estimated at £ 1 , 2 0 1 m i l l i o n , r e v i s e d t o £ 1 , 1 6 9 m i l l i o n , and 
turned out a t £ 1 , 3 4 - 0 m i l l i o n . So the r e d u c t i o n i n the accounting d e f i c i t 
was e n t i r e l y explained by the increase i n expected revenue. But i t seems 
l i k e l y t h a t i n any case the a g i t a t i o n came too l a t e i n the f i n a n c i a l year 
to have any impact then, and i t s e f f e c t s were f e l t much more s t r o n g l y i n 
the f o l l o w i n g year, when revenue rose t o an a l l - t i m e high of £ 1 , 4 . 2 6 m i l l i o n 
1 
and expenditure f e l l by £4-70 m i l l i o n t o £ 1 , 1 9 5 m i l l i o n . 
The p o i n t s of gr e a t e s t i n t e r e s t f o r t h i s study seem t o be twp. 
F i r s t l y , there was a tremendous change i n emphasis i n Government expend-
i t u r e p o l i c y , and t h i s almost e n t i r e l y on Lloyd George's own p a r t . I n 
the e a r l y s p r i n g , he was s e r i o u s l y concerned about the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
s o c i a l upheaval generated by d i s l o c a t o r y unemployment a f t e r the war* At 
t h a t stage he was t a l k i n g i n terms of r a p i d l y expanding Government 
a c t i v i t y at almost any cost i n order t o mop up some of these unemployed 
and t o get i n d u s t r y moving again. At the Conference he c a l l e d t o discuss 
M i n i s t e r s ' plans f o r de a l i n g w i t h unemployment he urged them, as we have 
already noted, t o move w i t h a l l possible speed and not t o worry about 
f i n a n c i a l problems. Jones expressed the tenor of Lloyd George's f e e l i n g s 
a t t h i s time thus: 
" I t was blank nonsense t o t a l k of a b a g a t e l l e l i k e £71 m i l l i o n -a cheap insurance against Bolshevism."^ 
By the l a t e summer, the 'mere b a g a t e l l e ' had become a sum of considerable 
importance i n the economy campaign. The change of mood was a s w i f t one, 
and seems t o have been actuated l a r g e l y by p u b l i c o p i n i o n and by i n f l u e n t i a l 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1914-1925, p.98; Revised 
Hankey, 27 Feb., 1919o The £71 m i l l i o n was the amount M i n i s t e r s were 
planning t o spend i n 1919 on Public Works, and s i m i l a r schemes. 
Balance Sheet f o r 1919-20 i n P.R.Q 
Jones, W h i t e h a l l Diary. V o l . 1 . 1916-192 5. p.80* quoted i n Jones t o 
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people i n business and the Press. The turn-round i n Lloyd George's 
a t t i t u d e was so s w i f t t h a t i t took even Chamberlain,, who had a l l summer 
been p r o t e s t i n g a t increased spending, by surprise-. Commenting on Lloyd 
George's sense of urgency over the economy campaign, he wrote t o Hankey: 
"But he must give us a l i t t l e time t o produce results. 1 1'' 
Whatever may have been the i n f l u e n c e s upon Lloyd George-, there i s no 
evidence t h a t i n i n i t i a t i n g the economy campaign he had any advice from 
the Treasury other than what Chamberlain might have been expected t o give 
him„ I t seems t h a t the most l i k e l y explanation l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t 
Lloyd George was pu t of the country f o r most o f the f i r s t s i x months of 
the year, and as he s a i d , 
"When he was i n Paris he could not pretend t o be able t o concentrate 
h i s mind on the great problems which were worrying h i s colleagues 
i n t h i s country. "2 
However, on h i s r e t u r n he could not f a i l t o be s t r u c k by the change i n 
the mood of the country. No longer was heavy unemployment an immediate 
t h r e a t . I n d u s t r y was gathe r i n g way, and the c r y everywhere was f o r the 
Government t o leave the economy alone t o c a r r y on i n i t s accustomed 
f a s h i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , and bound up w i t h i t , t here was the st r o n g p u b l i c 
f e e l i n g about what was regarded as excessive expenditure by the Government, 
not a b l y on s t a f f s . The impetus f o r the economy campaign came l a r g e l y , as 
we have seen, from outside the Government? and was imposed on h i s colleagues 
by Lloyd George. 
While i t d i d not p l a y a p a r t i n i n i t i a t i n g the economy campaign, the 
Treasury d i d play an important r o l e i n implementing Lloyd George ss i n t e n -
t i o n s , and, one might say, seized eagerly the chance presented t o enforce 
i t s own ideas upon the other Departments. I t was a common complaint o f 
1, P.R.O., T. 171/170. Chamberlain t o Hankey ? 31 Aug,, .19-19? 
u n d e r l i n i n g i n the o r i g i n a l , 
2 C P.R.D.,, Cab-.23/15. W.C.6Q6A, 5 Aug., 1919. 
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Treasury s t a f f , before as w e l l as during the war, t h a t t h e i r f u n c t i o n 
of overseeing expenditure was very much hampered by t h e i r being overworked 
and u n d e r s t a f f e d . As Fisher put i t i n h i s l e t t e r t o the Prime M i n i s t e r , 
"Up t o the present t i m e . . . i t [the TreasuryJ has always been under-
manned and hopelessly overworked. Delay and i n s u f f i c i e n c y of time 
to t h i n k t h i n g s put or t o get a conspectus have r e s u l t e d , and the 
o f f i c e has t h e r e f o r e been p r e j u d i c e d i n the discharge of i t s 
business. At the same time M i n i s t e r s i n other Departments have 
been able t o s h o r t - c i r c u i t the Treasury o f f i c i a l s ; who - impotent 
on t h a t account t o r e s i s t unreasonable demands a l i k e on major 
issues and i n the s t a f f matters advocated by those M i n i s t e r s -
have perforce tended t o d i r e c t t h e i r c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s i n t o 
somewhat meticulous channels."^ 
Coupled w i t h the exceptions t o Treasury c o n t r o l which had been introduced 
as war-time expedients, these problems made the Treasury's p o s i t i o n a f t e r 
the war very d i f f i c u l t , the more so since the Service Departments, who had 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y been l e a s t amenable t o Treasury c o n t r o l , were also those 
which had had the most leeway allowed them, i n e v i t a b l y , d uring the course 
of the war. But whenever the o p p o r t u n i t y presented i t s e l f , as we have 
seen, the Treasury endeavpured t o exercise i t s t r a d i t i o n a l d e c o n t r o l l i n g 
f u n c t i o n s , and when Lloyd George's r e a l i s a t i o n o f the country's changed 
mood caused him t o introduce the economy campaign, they took f u l l advantage 
of the s i t u a t i o n t o r e s t o r e t h e i r i n f l u e n c e as f a r as was p o s s i b l e , so 
s u c c e s s f u l l y indeed t h a t not again during the i n t e r - w a r p e r i o d was there 
a Budget d e f i c i t . 
Thus d i d the bulk of the c o n t r o l s and much of the p r o j e c t e d recon-
l 
s t r u c t i o n expenditure a l i k e f a l l f o u l of the p u b l i c f e e l i n g of the summer 
of 1919j and the p u b l i c i n c l i n a t i o n was seemingly backed by the cheering 
signs of recovery i n i n d u s t r y . But some of the plans came t o f u l f i l l m e n t . 
Unemployment payments ceased t o be automatic as they had been i n the 
t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d , but the insurance p r i n c i p l e f o r unemployment was 
1. P.R.O., T.171/155, Fisher t o Lloyd George, 3 Sep.., 1919, para.8. 
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extended to cover a considerably larger 'part" of the working population 
than before the war, the Housing Scheme, while i t ran int o severe supply-
problems, and was eventually put r i g h t back i n 1921, was s t i l l at t h i s 
stage going ahead, and the Ministry of Health had at l a s t been created 
aft e r many years of struggle. But much did not come to f r u i t i o n , and 
much that did f e l l to the Geddes Axe i n 1922.. As we saw- at the beginning, 
the Government had no clearl y worked-out plan f o r reconstruction spending, 
and when public pressure became heavy, i t yielded, moving unsteadily but 
d e f i n i t e l y i n the d i r e c t i o n of retrenchment and orthodox economic 
principles. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INTER-GOVERNMENTAL DEBT AFTER THE FIRST 
WORLD WAR: THE BACKGROUND TO THE BALFOUR 
NOTE OF 1922 
Among the problems which bedevilled the in t e r n a t i o n a l scene during 
the inter-war period, one of the most important and intractable was that, 
of inter-governmental debt. Prior to the F i r s t World War, the structure 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l debt had been based on commercial relations,, During the 
war, however, the A l l i e d belligerents b u i l t up among themselves a complex 
structure of mutual indebtedness, which the main debtor countries hoped 
to dismantle by exacting reparation payments from Germany oh a vast scale. 
As a r e s u l t , a l l the belligerents emerged from the war either owing or 
being owed, or both, large sums on an inter-Governmental rather than a 
private l e v e l . Furthermore, these debts did not represent any tangible 
benefit to the wealth of the receiving countries; the money had been 
spent on the materials of war,, The s i t u a t i o n was further complicated by 
the unreal approach to the problem of v i r t u a l l y a l l the Governments 
concerned. The A l l i e s who stood to gain from reparations payments, 
p r i n c i p a l l y France and I t a l y , were b i t t e r l y anti-German; t h e i r opinion 
i s neatly summed up i n the popular cry, "Squeeze Germany t i l l the pips 
squeak". Yet they refused to allow Germany the means of making reparation; 
much of her most valuable i n d u s t r i a l regions were taken from her;, the early 
reparations demands starved her of working c a p i t a l , and the A l l i e s did 
t h e i r best to "safeguard" t h e i r countries against German imports,, 
Thus the reparations problem was complicated by the desire of the 
v i c t o r s , not only reparation, but f o r security. They wanted at one and 
the same time a Germany strong enough to pay huge sums i n reparation, and 
a Germany so weak that she would be incapable of waging another major war 
i n the foreseeable future. The s i t u a t i o n with regard to i n t e r - A l l i e d debt 
was compounded by a somewhat similar a t t i t u d e on the part of the United 
States. America was the only country to emerge from the war with credits 
and no debts r e l a t i n g to the waging of the war. A l l the other A l l i e s owed 
her large sums. These they could only pay by increasing t h e i r exports to 
the United States. But t h i s they were prevented from doing, at any rate 
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p a r t l y by the t a r i f f w a l l behind which American industry sheltered. I n addition, 
1 
although during and af t e r the war America's gold stocks increased considerably, 
i t was the Federal Reserve Board's practice to insulate the domestic price and 
credit system from t h i s gold inflow. In other words they did not play the 
2 
'Gold Standard game', and i n consequence the domestic price l e v e l did not r i s e 
as f a r or as fas t as i t might have been expected to have done i n pre-war 
B r i t a i n under similar conditions, and the benefits to imports which would 
normally have resulted did not occur. 
The other main complicating factor i n the American atti t u d e to the problem 
lay i n the United States Government's refusal either to accept any relationship 
between the amounts the debtors owed her and the amounts they received i n 
reparation, or to t r e a t her A l l i e d debts i n terms of the capacity of the 
A l l i e s to pay. This l a t t e r was despite the fact that America had striven 
from the f i r s t to make France and I t a l y , and some of the B r i t i s h represent-
atives at the Peace conference, see that the terms of German reparations must 
3 
of necessity be linked to German capacity to pay. The more harsh the terms, 
said the Americans, the less l i k e l y a,nyone i s to obtain any benefit, because 
of the d i f f i c u l t y of enforcing such terms upon a whole people. But the U.S. 
persisted i n tr e a t i n g the A l l i e d debt to her as a normal commercial 
obligation, at any rate a f t e r the war.^ The 1 . The U ited States' sh re of the world's gold stocks rose from 28% i n 1913 
to U5% by 1925. Sir Albert Feavearyear, The_Pound Sterling (2nd edn: 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) , p. 364-. 
2 . See above, p. 115, 
3 . Hughes, Cunliffe and Sumner. The l a s t two were widely known,, i r o n i c a l l y , 
as the 'Heavenly Twins'? see Sir Roy Harrod, The Lif e of John Maynard 
Keynes (London; Macmillan & Co., 1963) p. 236; David Lloyd George, 
The Truth about Reparations and War Debts, (London% Wm. Heinemann Ltd., 
1932), pp. 97-8, 102-3. Keynes, w r i t i n g to Lloyd George on his (Keynes') 
resignation, said; ' I leave the twins to gloat over the devastation of 
Europe'. Lloyd George Papers, F/7/2/32. 5 June, 1919. 
4 . A United States Treasury statement dated 11 Dec., 1917 on United States loan 
policy stressed the wisdom of giving loans to the A l l i e s since t h i s enabled 
the A l l i e s to do f i g h t i n g which the U.S. would otherwise have to do. I n 
addition l i t t l e of the loans l e f t the U.S., they were mostly used to finance 
i n t e r n a l purchases. See P.R.O., T .160/7. No trace of t h i s r e a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e 
remained after the war. 
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A l l i e s however continued to regard reparations and i n t e r - A l l i e d debts 
as two sides to the same problem, and t h i s divergence of view did not 
assist the relations between the European and American A l l i e s * .One 
further d i f f i c u l t y was the terms on which the loans had been agreed. 
They were a l l i n terms of pre-war p a r i t i e s , that i s i n gold prices; 
since the currencies of a l l the A l l i e d debtor countries stood at con-
siderable discounts with the d o l l a r after the war,, the burden of the 
debt was markedly exacerbated. One of the most powerful arguments 
against those who wished the B r i t i s h authorities to return to the Gold 
Standard with a devalued pound was the extent to which t h i s would 
increase the burden of the American debt e 
Britain's position i n t h i s complex s i t u a t i o n was a central one,, 
On paper she emerged from the war a net creditor i n terms of war debts. 
While she had borrowed large sums i n the United States to finance purch-
ases there, she had also l e n t her Continental A l l i e s even larger Sums to 
pay f o r supplies i n t h i s country. At the end of the war B r i t a i n owed an 
estimated £1,000 m i l l i o n to the United States and another £200 m i l l i o n to 
Canada and other countries. France, I t a l y and Russia were Br i t a i n ' s main 
debtors, owing her a t o t a l of £1,800 m i l l i o n . However, of t h i s sum nearly 
£600 m i l l i o n had been le n t to Russia before the Communist Revolution i n 
1917. The new regime having repudiated a l l pre-Revolutionary undertakings 
1 
i t seemed un l i k e l y that t h i s sum would ever be repaid. 
B r i t i s h policy on i n t e r - A l l i e d debt seems from early days to have 
included ideas of. all-round cancellation. Sir Basil Blackett, w r i t i n g i n 
1920, stressed the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of repayment by the Continental a l l i e s of 
th e i r debts to the United States and B r i t a i n , and i t i s apparent that a 
1 0 E.V. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1914-25 (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1952), pp„317, 320-321,. 
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policy of debt reduction was advocated by the Treasury and adopted by 
1 
the Government 'from the f i r s t 1 . Lloyd George,, i n his book on repar-
ations and i n t e r - A l l i e d debts, said: 
"From the outset B r i t a i n , although she was more creditor than 
debtor, took the view that the best course with a l l these war-
, debts was to cancel them." ' 
Nor was t h i s p o licy l i k e l y to be unpopular i n the country; as early as 
Ap r i l 1918, Sir James Hope Simpson, i n evidence to the Gunliffe Committee^ 
suggested that i n the interests of France and I t a l y i t might be necessary 
f o r the United States and B r i t a i n to consider 
"whether they should not make common cause by cancelling 
t h e i r mutual indebtedness".3 
Another course of action which B r i t a i n should consider, he suggested, was 
that of persuading the United States to accept part of our claims on our 
European A l l i e s i n payment of our United States debt, at a discount 
i f necessary. Failin g t h i s he suggested the consolidation of a l l B r i t i s h 
debt to the United States i n a single irredeemable Bond issue„ 
Academic support f o r cancellation came from Keynes, w r i t i n g , i n 1919? 
his great polemic on the Peace Conference. Keynes suggested that the war 
debts were an aberration i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l finance. 
"...the system [of i n t e r n a t i o n a l indebtedness} i s f r a g i l e ; and 
i t has only survived because i t s burden on the paying countries 
has not been oppressive, because t h i s burden i s represented by 
rea l assets,..and because the sums already l e n t are not unduly 
large i n r e l a t i o n to those which i t i s s t i l l hoped to borrow."^ 
Further, he saw p o l i t i c a l as well as f i n a n c i a l dangers i f reduction i s 
not achieved. 
1. P.R.O., Cab.2A/97. C.P..584-, 6 Feb., 1920, Blackett was Controller of 
Finance at the Treasury f o r the years 1918 to 1922. 
2. Lloyd George, The Truth about Reparations .and I n t e r - A l l i e d Debts, 
pp. 97-8. 
3. P.R.O., T.185/1, evidence of Sir James Hope Simpson before the Gommitte 
on Currency and Foreign Exchange after the War, 3 June, 1918. 
•4. J.M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: Macmillan 
and Co., 1919), p. 263. 
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" I t might be an exaggeration to say that i t i s impossible f o r 
the European A l l i e s to pay the c a p i t a l and in t e r e s t due from 
them on these debts, but to make them do so would ce r t a i n l y 
be to impose a crushing burden. They may be expected, there-
fore, to make constant attempts to evade or escape payment,,. 
There i s no European country i n which repudiation may not soon 
become an important p o l i t i c a l issue. the creditor nations may 
soon f i n d t h e i r i n t e r e s t inconveniently bound up with the 
maintenance of a pa r t i c u l a r type of government or economic 
organisation i n the debtor countries." ^  
Most important of a l l , since Keynes never l o s t sight of two important 
objectives, namely that of remembering the l i n k between i n t e r - A l l i e d 
debt and reparation, and of ensuring that reparation payments are fi x e d 
w i t h i n the capacity of the conquered countries to pay, i t would i n his 
view almost certainly r e s u l t i n inequities I f some cancellation of. i n t e r -
A l l i e d debt were not achieved. I f no equitable settlement can be reached 
said Keynes, 
"the war w i l l have ended with a network of heavy t r i b u t e payable 
from one a l l y to another. The t o t a l amount of t h i s t r i b u t e i s 
even l i k e l y to exceed the amount obtainable from the enemy? and 
the war w i l l have ended with the intolerable r e s u l t of the A l l i e s 
paying indemnities to one another instead of receiving them from 
the enemy," ^  
But the attitude of the United States 'Treasury was completely opposed 
to any suggestion of all-round cancellation, i t seems p a r t l y from i n c l i n -
ation and p a r t l y , to be f a i r , because i t seemed u n l i k e l y i n the extreme 
that Congress .could ever be persuaded to sanction any such arrangement. 
Not a l l public opinion i n the United States was so completely bli n d to 
f i n a n c i a l r e a l i t y ; i n September 1919 Lord Grey talked to 'an eminent 
American' on the subject, and reported the results of the conversation 
to Lloyd George. This American confirmed the B r i t i s h opinion that Congress 
was most u n l i k e l y to agree to all-round cancellation, and i n his view i t 
would i n any case not be wise. I t would be a bad precedent, and would be 
1. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p„ 261; 
2. I b i d . . p.259. 
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a blow to international c r e d i t . He suggested that the best possible 
solution would be f o r Reparatidn payments and credits to be accepted 
by the United States and B r i t a i n i n place of equivalent debt from other 
A l l i e s . But he thought the United States Treasury would be unwilling 
1 
to agree to such a plan. Attitudes mellowed gradually during the i n t e r -
war yearsj by 1922 rumours that B r i t a i n was about to propose u n i l a t e r a l 
cancellation provoked an American newspaper, The Globe, to admiring 
2 
comment, and by the end of the period some American writers were strongly 
3 
c r i t i c a l of United States Treasury policy on t h i s point. 
The B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e to the i n t e r - A l l i e d debt question was strongly 
affected by i t s views on reparations„ Despite the anti-German mood of 
1918, and the prevalence at the election of that year of slogans l i k e 
'Hang the Kaiser' and of echoes of Lloyd George's determination to make 
Germany pay 'to the uttermost f a r t h i n g ' , opinion on the indemnity question 
was never as violent i n B r i t a i n as on the Continent. As early as January 
1918, the Economist published an e d i t o r i a l on the subject, quoting with 
approval a number of authorities advocating the necessity f o r equable 
economic treatment of Germany aft e r the war, and agreeing that an economic 
war should not follow the end of the m i l i t a r y one 0^ Lloyd George himself 
performed a fascinating balancing act, between the popular anti-German 
fever of the moment, and what seems to have been his own feelings -
certa i n l y the ideas of his chief advisers at the Treasury were moderate 
ones. He had some big guns to contend with; among the strongly a n t i -
German lobbyists were Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, and Lord 
Cunliffe, past Governor of the Bank of England. The Treasury had,, early 
i n 1918, produced a detailed estimate of German l i a b i l i t i e s and of t h e i r 
1. Lloyd George Papers, F/60/3/6. Lord Grey to Lloyd George, 29 Sep.. 1919» 
2. Lloyd George Papers,~F786/577, 
3. See, f o r example, G.M.Frasure, B r i t i s h Policy on War Debts & Repar-
ations (Philadelphia: Dorrance & .Co..., 194-0). 
4. Economist . • • *:„';. ULXXXVT, 12 Jan., 1918. 
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capacity to pays the former they estimated at j^ .OOO m i l l i o n , the l a t t e r 
on an optimistic basis at £3,000 m i l l i o n , or on a more cautious l e v e l at 
£2,000 m i l l i o n . Hughes, who was at that time a member of the War Cabinet;, 
protested that t h i s was a r i d i c u l o u s l y small amount, and he was appointed 
Chairman of an independent committee, with which Lord Cunliffe was 
associated, to determine the correct sum. This body came up with a 
figure of £24<>000 m i l l i o n , representing the f u l l cost of the war to the 
Allies.. Despite the fact that pre-war Germany had only maintained a 
balance i n her external payments by means of a substantial earning on-
i n v i s i b l e account, which would now largely disappear with the disposal, 
of her foreign investments and the impounding of her ships and colonial 
possessions, the Committee seemed to see nothing unreasonable i n t h i s 
demand. The Cabinet did not come to a decision on the matter and the 
B r i t i s h delegation took both reports with them to Paris„ 
The B r i t i s h Treasury representative i n Paris was John Maynard Keynes. 
As main author of the Treasury report on Germany's capacity to pay s he was 
one of the p r i n c i p a l B r i t i s h proponents of l i b e r a l treatment of Germany. 
But neither he nor any other Treasury representative was appointed to the 
Reparations Commission which was set up by the Peace Conference to deter-
mine Germany's capacity to pay. Despite Lloyd George's assertion that 
"Mr. Bonar Law and I regarded the conclusions of t h i s Report 
[of the Hughes Committee] as a w i l d and fantast i c chimera. 
I t was incredible that men of such position, experience and 
re s p o n s i b i l i t y should have appended t h e i r names to i t . " ' ' 
he appointed Hughes and Cunliffe, together with Lord Sumner, a Judge 
without f i n a n c i a l knowledge, to be the B r i t i s h representatives on the 
Commission. His motives f o r doing t h i s would make fascinating study. 
However, the deliberations of the Commission at the Peace Conference were 
inconclusive, and the Treaty was signed without the inclusion of any 
1. David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (London: 
Heinemann & Co.., 1938)., p.305.. 
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specific sums i n reparation. What was l a i d down were the guidelines 
on which further deliberations should take place. The dispute between 
the French and the Americans as to whether Germany was responsible f o r 
the f u l l cost of the war or f o r reparation of damage only was settled 
by a compromise; f i n a n c i a l recompense was to be f o r damage only but 
the Treaty would acknowledge the theor e t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the 
whole cost of the war (the 'War-Guilt' clause). Pensions and allow-
ances were slipped i n t o the account by Lloyd George at the suggestion 
of Smuts,' not i n order to increase the t o t a l , since at that time the 
Big Four were s t i l l thinking i n terms of a 30-yeax- time l i m i t , but to 
increase Great Britain's share vis-a-vis France and the r e s t of the 
Continental a l l i e s . Afterwards the ti m e - l i m i t was dropped, and t h i s 
-j 
i n s e r t i o n seemed harsher than was intended. 
A permanent Reparations Commission was therefore set up to deter-
mine the t o t a l to be paid under ten counts. I n addition Germany was to 
reimburse Belgium f o r a l l sums borrowed by her up to the Armistice s to 
make deliveries of reconstruction materials., ships and dyestuffs, and to 
pay £1,000 .million i n a form to be decided by the Reparations Commission 
towards the cost of the Armies of occupation. Numerous conferences were 
held on t h i s basis, at which the B r i t i s h consistently advocated a s e t t l e -
ment based on German capacity to pay, while the French equally consist-
ently demanded a much larger sum; p a r t l y i n order to 'keep Germany dowri-% 
p a r t l y to meet the twin costs of eventual repayment of the debt to the 
United States and B r i t a i n , and of restoring the devastated areas. 
Agreement was f i n a l l y reached on the basis of a fixed levy based on 
German capacity to pay and a variable levy based on future prospects <, 
at Paris i n January 1921. The Germans refused t h i s , and sanctions were 
1. This account i s taken from Harrod, The L i f e of .Jpb^MaynarcL Keynes, 
pp. 228-246. 
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applied, of which the main one concerning B r i t a i n was a levy of 50% 
( l a t e r reduced to 26%) ad valorem on German imports, under the German 
Reparation (Recovery) Act, 1921. F i n a l l y , the Reparations Commission 
arrived at. a lump sum settlement which the Germans accepted i n June 
1921„ This involved three main elements; the deposit with the Repar-
ations Commission of three classes of bonds, to the t o t a l value of 
£6,500 m i l l i o n i n gold, an annual annuity of £100 m i l l i o n also i n gold, 
and a variable annuity of 26$ of exports. The l a s t two were to be paid 
quarterly. To begin with Germany paid regularly, but i n December 1921 
she gave notice that she would not be able to make the January and 
February payments due. Negotiations on a moratorium during the spring 
of 1922 were accompanied by a sharp f a l l i n the mark. A p a r t i a l morat-
orium was offered to the Germans i n A p r i l , which they were unable to 
accept; discussions continued in t o the summer, and eventually the 
Germans applied f o r a moratorium to the end of 192<4 to enable them to 
sta b i l i s e the mark and put the economy on a proper basis before attemp-
ti n g to make further reparation payments. Pending a decision on this., 
a Belgian plan f o r acceptance by the Reparations Commission of German 
Treasury B i l l s f o r payments due from August 15th was accepted despite 
French opposition on August 31st. 
Thus the period from the Armistice to the issue of the Balfour Note 
i n 1922 was one i n which B r i t a i n and France were i n constant c o n f l i c t 
over t h e i r attitudes to Germany, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the Reparations question,, 
and they became involved i n a ci r c u l a r argument. France could not begin 
to pay in t e r e s t on her debt nor to negotiate properly on the p r i n c i p a l 
u n t i l the reparations question had been settled and she knew how much 
1. These, necessarily summary and incomplete, d e t a i l s are taken from 
a h i s t o r i c a l summary by a Treasury o f f i c i a l , S.D. Waley, i n 
February and September 1922, P.R.O., TJ72/j^76 0 
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she might expect from Germany. Neither could she agree to reduce her 
demands on Germany to what the B r i t i s h regarded as a reasonable figure 
while she owed vast sums to B r i t a i n and the U.S. B r i t a i n could not 5 
i t seemed, break the deadlock; not only had she her own debt to the 
United States to think of, but she f e l t some -obligation to f o l l o w a 
j o i n t p o l icy with the United States over her dues. 
One imaginative attempt to aid i n the reconstruction of Europe on 
the necessary scale had been made by Keynes while he was s t i l l at the 
Treasury, before the Treaty was signed, i n A p r i l 1919. This was a 
proposal f o r a loan to Germany of £1?000 m i l l i o n guaranteed by a l l the 
Al l i e s i n proportions which reflected t h e i r intei anational position a f t e r 
the war. This loan was to be applied as to f o u r - f i f t h s to reparation 
and as to the remaining o n e - f i f t h to the purchase of food and raw mat-
1 
e r i a l s . The plan was sent to Lloyd George by Chamberlain, the Chanc-
2 
e l l o r of the Exchequer, with a warm recommendation. Lloyd George also 
3 
thought i t a good scheme and sent the plan to President Wilson s who 
turned i t down, on the basis that since the A l l i e s were forcing Germany 
under the condit ions of the Treaty to give them £1s000 m i l l i o n i n gold 
or goods i n payment for the costs of the Army cf Occupation,, Since by 
t h i s action the A l l i e s were deliberately starving Germany of the necessary 
working c a p i t a l , they could hardly expect the United States to help make 
good the deficiency.^ Since the Germans were eventually declared to be 
i n default of £600 m i l l i o n of t h i s £1 s000 million;, and since Wilson 
apparently made no objection to the i n s e r t i o n of that clause in t o the 
Treaty, his refusal seems both harsh and mildly hypocritical.. 
1. P*R.0., Cab.24/5, G.241, 17 Apr., 1919. 
2. Lloyd George Papers, F/7,/2/27, 17 Apr.. 1919. He outlined the scheme 
to the War Cabinet on the same day, P.R.Oo, Cab.23/12, W0C557, 
17 Apr.. 1919. 
3. Lloyd George Papers, F/7/2/3A, 2 July, 1919. 
A. I b i d . 
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Keynes resigned from the Treasury i n 1919, following the f a i l u r e 
both of t h i s scheme and of his ideas on reparation to gain any r e a l 
success, and expressed his bitterness about the Treaty i n 'The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace'. But the forces w i t h i n the Treasury working 
for a j u s t settlement of both the post-war i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l prob-
lems did not depart with him. Sir John Bradbury, Joint Financial Secret-
ary, had departed to be B r i t i s h representative on the permanent Reparations 
Commission i n 1918, where he continued the B r i t i s h f i g h t f o r a l i b e r a l 
settlement, and his place on the f i n a n c i a l side of the Treasury was taken, 
by Sir Basil Blackett, who held" the post of Financial Controller u n t i l 
he went to India i n 1922. Blackett was i n charge of Treasury negotiations 
with the United States Treasury on our debt to America, and was soon to 
come up with a constructive plan f o r dealing with a l l our A l l i e d debt 
structure which might have had far-reaching be n e f i c i a l consequences had 
i t been adopted. 
Before looking i n t o his suggestions, we must trace the his t o r y of 
debt negotiation a f t e r the end of the war. The Continental A l l i e s were 
much involved with reparation,'as we have seen, and were unwilling t o 
agree to a permanent settlement u n t i l the reparation question had been 
settle d . The lega l position was that the obligations of the B r i t i s h 
Government to the United States Government were t h e o r e t i c a l l y payable on 
demand. This was manifestly unsatisfactory from every point of view, and 
i t seems certain that t h i s was a serious factor i n the depression of the 
st e r l i n g exchange after the war. The United States Treasury alone had 
the leg a l r i g h t to arrange f o r funding without Congressional sanction., 
and the American Government was anxious to keep the debt settlement out 
of the p o l i t i c a l arena. Early i n 1920 Mr. Rathbone of the United States 
Treasury came to London to discuss the problem, with the B r i t i s h appar-
ently under the impression that mutual postponement of interest payments 
was to be the main topic f o r discussion, while Rathbone thought he had 
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come simply to discuss funding. I t was l a t e r made -clear that any prop-
osal f o r postponement would have to be made e x p l i c i t and public. However, 
the discussions made some progress, despite the feelings of the Treasury 
1 
o f f i c i a l s about the high-handed behaviour of Rathbone.. 
Partly as a resul t of the early negotiations with Rathbone, p a r t l y 
from other pointers coming from America during 1919, Blackett became 
convinced that j o i n t action by B r i t a i n and America over t h e i r creditors 
on the Continent was ruled out by the American a t t i t u d e on any basis but-
one which treated the war debts as though they were commercial obligations. 
Early i n 1920, therefore, he decided that i f any progress .on..cancellation 
were to be made, B r i t a i n would have to go i t alone. He devised a plan 
2 
on t h i s basis, which he submitted v i a Chamberlain to the Cabinet. The 
substance of the proposal was that , as we have seen, o f f i c i a l opinion i n 
America, both i n the Treasury and i n Congress, was so vehemently opposed 
to what the B r i t i s h Treasury regarded as the most desirable -course of 
action, namely all-round cancellation, that there was l i t t l e or no l i k e -
lihood of concerted action at the time Blackett was w r i t i n g . But the 
gains to us of cancellation were l i k e l y to be so-great, Blackett said, 
that we should go ahead on our own, separate the problem of our debt to 
the United States from that of our debt from the A l l i e s , and cancel the 
l a t t e r u n i l a t e r a l l y . 
This plan of B l a c k e t t s , and the reasons he gives f o r advocating i t , 
are of considerable in t e r e s t and importance, both i n the l i g h t of subse-
quent B r i t i s h policy on the subject, and f o r the way i t indicates the 
broad l i n e s of opinion i n the Treasury and i n the Cabinet on t h i s subject. 
For these reasons, i t s study i n d e t a i l i s highly rewarding.. 
1. This account i s taken from a summary of negotiations by Sir Auckland 
Geddes, B r i t i s h Ambassador to Washington from 1920 to 1924, included 
i n B r i t i s h Empire Delegation papers presented at the Genoa Economic 
Conference i n 1922, P.R.O.. .Cab.31/1 .B.E.D.232. A p r i l 1922. 
2„ P.R.C .Cab.24/97.CP.584. 6 Feb.., 1920. 
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Blackett adduced two main reasons f o r advocating u n i l a t e r a l cancel-
l a t i o n . F i r s t l y , he said, the whole structure of our exchanges with the 
Continental countries i s affected pejoratively by the debt of the A l l i e s 
to us. Since t h e i r credit-worthiness was so low, the fact that the A l l i e s 
owed us large sums, not only f o r war expenditure, which he proposed we 
should remit, but f o r post-war expenditure too ? both at the Government 
and the private l e v e l , was a depressing effect on our int e r n a t i o n a l c r e d i t 
generally, and p a r t i c u l a r l y on the s t e r l i n g - d o l l a r exchange. I n view of 
the f a c t that the American debt was fixed i n terms of gold, any improvement 
i n the s t e r l i n g - d o l l a r . exchange would-pari passu li g h t e n _ t h e American debt-
burden. 
Secondly, and following on from t h i s , with an improved credit stand-
ing the A l l i e s would more easily be able to finance purchases of our 
exports, which they desperately needed i n order to proceed with the 
reconstruction of Europe. I n addition, though t h i s i s made p l a i n by 
implication rather than e x p l i c i t l y , such a plan would help to improve 
the position of Germany too, since some remission of reparation demands 
might be expected i f France and the other Continental A l l i e s no longer 
had to think i n terms of repaying t h e i r debt to us. Not only was t h i s 
important from a moral standpoint, but from a commercial standpoint too; 
before the war Germany had been our second largest supplier and also our 
1 
second greatest customer. 
To j u s t i f y his advocacy of u n i l a t e r a l , rather than concerted, 
cancellation, Blackett began by setting out the o r i g i n a l aims of B r i t i s h 
policy on i n t e r - A l l i e d debt: 
.1. A.W. Kirkaldy (ed), B r i t i s h Finance 19U--1921 (London; Pitman, 1921), 
pp.370-373. 
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"From the f i r s t the general policy of the E r i t i s h Government i n 
the matter of I n t e r - A l l i e d debt has been to move as f a r and as 
fa s t i n the d i r e c t i o n of "Deflation of the world's balance sheet" 
as we could persuade the United States Treasury to go with us. 
Our idea has always been that ultimate repayment by the contin-
ental governments of t h e i r debts to the United Kingdom and the 
United States was i n f a c t out of the question, that the existence 
of t h i s mass of external indebtedness meanwhile lay l i k e a dead 
weight upon the credit of continental Europe and made reconstr-
uction even slower and more painful than i t needed to be, and 
that the statesmanlike thing to be done was f o r the United 
Kingdom and the United States to make a "beau geste" by of f e r i n g 
to wipe out the whole of such indebtedness with a stroke of the 
pen.11 1 
Sir Basil's previous dealings with the United States Treasury had 
not led him to expect that his ideas would be received with any enthus-
iasm. 
"...hitherto our e f f o r t s to co-operate with the United States 
Treasury have almost invariably meant that we have had to abandon 
without even putting on formal record p o l i c i e s which we have 
favoured whether i n great matters or i n small, and accept the 
views of the United States Treasury. Not only so y but the policies 
favoured by us have never reached beyond the in d i v i d u a l o f f i c e r s 
of the United States Treasury with whom they have been discussed,, 
and our att i t u d e i s almost invariably represented i n the United 
States of America, because the United States Treasury's sole 
preoccupation i s usually to persuade an unwilling congress to 
take a small step forward i n the d i r e c t i o n desired by the United. 
States Treasury, and i t frequently does the persuading by putting 
forward arguments which are from our point of view i r r e l e v a n t and 
. unfair," 2 
When Blackett's plan was proposed informally to the United States Treasury 
his fears were confirmed. I t was made quite p l a i n that such j o i n t action 
was at that time out of the question. 
"The United States Treasury has from the f i r s t been h o r r i f i e d with 
even the mention of such a plan...... [and] seems incapable of apprec-
i a t i n g the position and Congress as usual i s e n t i r e l y ignorant of 
and untouched by the r e a l i t i e s of the ease."^ 
1. P.R.U. ,Cab„24/97,CP.584.PP.,1-2. The term "beau geste" was also used 
by Lord Derby, B r i t i s h Ambassador to Paris 1918-20, i n a l e t t e r to 
Curzon on the subject, saying that he s t i l l adheres to "the proposal 
I made to the Prime Minister f o r the reduction of France's debt to 
us as a beau geste which would do much to smooth away our present 
d i f f i c u l t i e s " . Lloyd George Papers, F/53/1/40. 9 June, 1920. Anti-
B r i t i s h feeling was at i t s height i n France at t h i s time. 
2. P.R,0.,Cab.24-/97, CP. 584, p.1. 
3» Ibid... p.2„ 
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Subsequent negotiations with the United States had thus to be confined 
to questions of inte r e s t postponement and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of coiwerting 
short-term obligations i n t o long-term debts. But while the United States 
Treasury expressed continued anxiety f o r co-operationj the i n t e n t i o n seems 
not to have been translated i n t o action. 
"...the United States Treasury abuses i t s position as our creditor 
and i t s i n a b i l i t y or unwillingness to t e l l Congress the t r u t h f o r 
the purpose of making us accept whatever the United States Treasury 
wants, and often goes-further and demands that we s h a l l put forward 
i t s views as i f they were being pressed on i t by us."^ 
On the specific question with which Blackett was at that time 
concerned,-progress ;was ho better. 
"In order that we may secure postponement of a l l in t e r e s t on i n t e r -
a l l i e d debts including i n t e r e s t on our debt to the United States of 
America, the United States Treasury demands that we should o f f i c -
i a l l y appear as authors of t h i s policy (which seems to us only a 
p i s - a l l e r ) and should appear i n the somewhat undignified a t t i t u d e 
of suppliants to the United States Treasury f o r r e l i e f . " 
I n view of the att i t u d e and behaviour of the United States Treasury, 
Blackett suggested that the time had now come to reconsider the att i t u d e 
of one-sided co-operation which the. B r i t i s h Treasury o f f i c i a l s had been 
forced to adopt» Since i t was apparently beyond the vi s i o n of the 
United States Treasury to see what a beneficial e f f e c t such a magnan-
imous gesture as an' of f e r of all-round debt cancellation would have; 
and since the United States Treasury was f a r too a f r a i d of Congress even 
to suggest t h i s course of action anyway, such a j o i n t o f f e r was out af" 
the.._.que'stipric.- But,("independent action' by'Britain was not-*"- Blackett , 
went on to suggest a course of action which would I n his view have. . 
considerable .beneficial results both f a r B r i t a i n and f o r Europe„ 
1. E.R.Q..Cab.24/97,C.R.58&4P..3. As i n the o r i g i n a l ; possibly the 
f i r s t 'and5 should have been 'by1 or 'in'„ 
2. P.R.O., Cap 02^97.. G584..p.3. 
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" o . o i t i s quite possible f o r us to say, without reference to any 
question of the debt of the Government of the United Kingdom to 
the Government of the United States of 'America, that we are 
prepared f o r our part, without any conditions whatever, to wipe 
out the debts owed to us by the Governments of our European 
allies.ooWe should base our proposal on the necessity of doing 
something r e a l l y useful towards setting Europe on i t s f e e t , and 
on the disadvantages which we see i n remaining as a Government 
the creditor of other Governments." ^  
The paper noted two main considerations to be borne i n mind i f t h i s 
policy were adopted, apart from the willingness of France and I t a l y to 
2 
accept a g i f t of t h i s magnitude. F i r s t l y there was the problem of the 
st e r l i n g exchange; t h i s was a l l i e d to the second d i f f i c u l t y , the 
p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t involved_in B r i t a i n taking a step i n a d i r e c t i o n - i n 
which the United States might not wish to follow. Blackett, recognising 
that the effect on the s t e r l i n g exchange would be markedly affeeted by 
the course of action taken by the Americans as a resul t of the B r i t i s h 
carrying out the new policy, summed up the possible courses as follows» 
F i r s t l y , the United States might simply do nothing. Secondly, she might 
cancel a l l A l l i e d debts due to her including those of B r i t a i n . Thirdly,, 
America might wipe out a l l her debts except those of Britain;, saying 
that i n doing so she was doing no less' than the B r i t i s h . The effect of 
the second course upon the s t e r l i n g exchange was not discussed, but i t 
i s probably legitimate to assume that t h i s was not done because the 
benefits which would accrue to the exchange were so obvious as not t o 
need mention or expansion. Blackett found i t d i f f i c u l t to forecast what 
the results of either of the other courses of action would be f o r the 
exchange. He suggested that since there would be no increase i n the 
1. P.R.O. .Cab.24./97.C.P.58A.p.A. There was a precedent f o r t h i s : i t 
i s a recurrent theme i n the Treasury documents on t h i s subject that 
a f t e r the Napoleonic Wars we v o l u n t a r i l y forgave 90% of our A l l i e s 2 
debt to us. There was of course then no foreign, debt owed by 
B r i t a i n to complicate the issue, 
2. Blackett noted that Russia should be excepted f o r the time being. 
Belgium was also a special case since her debt was to be convei-ted 
i n t o German bonds. Similar treatment to that accorded to France 
and I t a l y should be offered to the Dominions,P.R„0.,Qa^2A/22 > 
C.P.584.,p.5.-
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amount of currencies currently seeking a market i n New York, only a small 
depression of s t e r l i n g i n New York might be expected, and, i n the event 
of America following the t h i r d course, there should be a reduction i n the 
discount on francs and l i r e so as to bring i t f a i r l y close to that on 
s t e r l i n g . Blackett thought that i n any case, 
"the market f o r our exports i n France and I t a l y would be improved, 
and we should be more l i k e l y to secure payment f o r those exports 
i n case „ „„"'' 
Obviously the main disadvantage of a scheme of all-round cancellation 
which did not include the abrogation of the B r i t i s h debt to the United 
States was that while"Britain "could no longer claim any ca p i t a l sums from 
the Continent, such sums would s t i l l be due from her to the United States. 
However, Blackett believed that given reasonable time f o r payment, our 
debt to the United States could be honoured without too great d i f f i c u l t y , 
and i n c i d e n t a l l y might bring important compensations i n the opening of 
the markets of America to our imports. 
I t i s clear that while the economic aspects of the policy of cancel-
l a t i o n of the A l l i e s 1 debts to us were regarded as v i t a l by Blackett, 
nevertheless he was also well aware of the in t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l poss-
i b i l i t i e s o 
"...we should surely have earned the gratitude of the world, by 
recognising now and at once the facts of the s i t u a t i o n and restoring 
r e a l i t y t o the discussions of the economics of today, and by giving 
new hope to Continental Europe by clearing away, so f a r as we are 
able, the useless obstruction of a vast mass of paper indebtedness 
between Governments."^ 
Blackett !s memorandum, which subsequently led to considerable disc-
ussions i n the Cabinet,- i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g , coming as i t did 
from the Controller of Finance at the Treasury, and containing an imagin-
ative plan f o r the p a r t i a l solution of one of the most intractable of 
1. P.R.0..Cab»2^/97.C.P.58A.P«6. 
2. I b i d . 
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post-war problems „• I t i s also indicative of two noteworthy points abotat 
current o f f i c i a l thinking on inter-Governmental debt i n the 1920s„ 
F i r s t l y , the B r i t i s h attitude to such debt was more l i b e r a l than i s often 
supposed; and secondly, the attitudes of the o f f i c i a l s coneex-ned with 
the problem on either side of the Atlantic were completely d i f f e r e n t ? 
and i n fundamental opposition. I t i s clear that the Americans regarded, 
the debts incurred by the A l l i e s as a purely f i n a n c i a l problem; indeed, 
they saw the debts as commercial debts. I n addition, there was appar-
ently no conception i n o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s of the unr e a l i t y of the sums 
involved, nor of the benefits which would accrue t o world; trade i n 
general, and to that of the United States, i f the deflationary influence 
i n the debtor countries of these debts were removed. I t may be said that 
economic thought on these matters was not s u f f i c i e n t l y advanced, at the 
time f o r i t to be reasonable to expect the American o f f i c i a l s to be aware 
of these considerations„ But the fa c t remains, as i s clear l y demonstrated 
i n Blackett's paper, that i n B r i t a i n some at least i n o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s 
were aware of, even i f they did not make e x p l i c i t s propositions which 
have since come to be seen as almost self-evident„ That is? that the 
debts of nations and of t h e i r governments are n o t ? and eannct be consid-
ered to be, on a par with commercial int e r n a t i o n a l debts; and that debts 
incurred by governments i n times of general warfare are of a d i f f e r e n t kind 
from those incurred by governments i n peacetime» 
Blackett's memorandum was submitted through Sir Warren Fisher,,, the 
Permanent Secretary, to whom a l l three Controllers were o f f i c i a l l y respon-
si b l e , to the Chancellor, Fisher's attitudes were apparently i n agreement 
with Blackett's; the l a t t e r r s memorandum contains the sentence, 
"The following i s an attempt to put on record the views which 
you and I discussed together t h i s morning,,11 ^  
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Sir Austen Chamberlain,, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the 
time, took a r e l a t i v e l y uncommitted stand. He submitted the memorandum 
to the Cabinet with a covering note which expressed the issues concisely 
without venturing a strong opinion on them: 
"The Cabinet agreed that we should remit debts due to us by A l l i e s 
i f the United States would do the same to i t s debtors including 
ourselves. The United States Treasury i s vehemently opposed to 
t h i s proposal. Should we act without them? 
I f our A l l i e s could pay us and i f the United States did not 
follow our example, we should be the losers. But w i l l our A l l i e s 
ever be able to pay us and would America permanently refuse to 
follow our example i f we had acted spontaneously?1''' 
Amplification-of the- Chancellor's views' on the whole problem of Britain's 
2 
f i n a n c i a l position i n the world i s obtained from a dispatch sent by him 
to a B r i t i s h representative i n Washington j u s t a f t e r he had circulated 
Blackett's memorandum to the Cabinet, early i n February 1920„ This 
confidential dispatch was i n response to an i n d i r e c t request from a member 
of the United States Treasury s t a f f f o r a summary of the Chancellor's views' 
on the in t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n . 
The substance of the dispatch i s that i f Br i t a i n ' s current position 
were viewed i n i s o l a t i o n from that of the rest of the world, i t would appeal1 
f a i r l y comfortable; but such a view would be u n r e a l i s t i c . I n order to s e l l 
enough B r i t i s h exports i n 1920 to secure a surplus i n the balance of paymentsf 
i t would be necessary to advance considerable credits to Europe. Since the 
Government had set i t s face against fu r t h e r Governmental credits unless there 
were exceptional circumstances, these must be private credits. But Britain's 
own credit position was f a i r l y t i g h t , and i t would therefore be necessary f o r 
B r i t a i n i n her turn to borrow commercially i n the United States. Therefore,- the 
current banking c r i s i s i n the United States would be very harmful not only to Ame 
1. P.R.O., Cab.2^/97, C.P.584, introductory note. 
2o I b i d . . CP.597, 9'Feb., 1920. 
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but also to the rest of the world. Another problem was the lack of ' 
credit-worthy Continental borrowers. 
Turning to the problem of our relations with the United States, 
the Chancellor f e l t that the main d i f f i c u l t y 1 i n connection with the 
B r i t i s h debt to the United States was that, with the continued f a l l 
of s t e r l i n g vis-a-vis the d o l l a r , the debt was becoming more- costly 
a l l the time. 
"In my view t h i s f a l l i s almost e n t i r e l y due to the credits, 
public and private, which we have been forced to give to Contin-
ental Europe, just as our debt to the United States i s almost 
wholly due to loans we made t o A l l i e s during the War, so that 
d o l l a r - s t e r l i n g exchange i s not r e a l l y a measure.of Anglo-
American conditions but of Europe-American conditions. Thus 
any improvement i n the credit of continental countries would 
pro tanto relieve the s t r a i n on us."^ 
The Chancellor went on to stress that i t was because of the combined 
dangers of insolvency i n Europe, and the lack of credit provision by 
the United States because of the banking c r i s i s , that he would welcome 
the all-round cancellation of i n t e r - A l l i e d debts. 
The telegram which had called f o r t h t h i s memorandum, together with 
the paper i t s e l f , were circulated to the Cabinet early i n A p r i l 1920. 
At the same time a preliminary discussion of the Blackett plan took place, 
with inconclusive results; the Cabinet noted that the plan had been 
circulated f o r information only, and that the Chancellor was not committed 
3 
to A l l i e d debt cancellation irrespective of American action. 
The memorandum^ which Chamberlain had despatched to the United States 
Treasury received an uncompromising reply. Despite the fact that the 
paper did not contain a formal proposal on A l l i e d debt cancellation, and 
was merely an expression of views submitted at the i n s t i g a t i o n of the 
P.R.0.,Cab.24/97.C.P.597. p.4. 1 
Tbi|„,:c.P.5970 
3 
4. 
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United States Treasury, the Secretary of that Department f e l t i t 
necessary to set out once again his Governments views on the subject 
and to read Chamberlain a barely disguised lecture on the subject of 
people who t r i e d to shirk t h e i r debts. 
" I f e e l certain that neither American people nor our Congress, 
whose action on such a question all-round cancellation would be 
required, i s prepared to look with favour upon such a proposal. 
Apparently there are those who have been labouring f o r 
some time under the delusion that the inevitable consequences 
of War can be avoided....I recognise that a general cancellation 
of such debts would be of advantage to Great B r i t a i n and that i t 
would probably not involve any losses on her part.. .Such a plan, 
does not involve mutual s a c r i f i c e on part of nations concerned. 
I t simply involves a contributionmainly by the. United-States. 
Chamberlain was by t h i s time becoming increasingly impatient with the 
2 
American a t t i t u d e , and responded i n d i g n i f i e d tones to t h i s peroration: 
" I f u l l y , appreciate a t t i t u d e of United States to any proposal 
f o r mutual cancellation of International War indebtedness. I 
had no int e n t i o n of renewing t h i s proposal to which I referred 
only i n order to respond f u l l y to Leffingwell's request f o r my 
appreciation of general s i t u a t i o n of Europe as wel l as of t h i s 
country."3 
Public opinion i n t h i s country was also moving towards the idea of 
separating our debt to the Americans from that owed to us ? although s t i l l 
r etaining the idea of working i n concert with the Americans over our 
Continental A l l i e s . I n January 1920 a leading a r t i c l e i n the Economist 
advocated the wiping out of Continental debts t o the U.S. and B r i t a i n , 
and the funding of our debt to the U.S. over f i f t y years, with an i n t e r e s t -
free-period to extend over the next few years. ' Between 1920 and the 
summer of 1922, when the Balfour Note appeared, opinion had moved furt h e r 
i n this d i r e c t i o n , and i t seems l i k e l y that by then, at any r a t e , the 
Blackett plan would have had wide popular acceptance as a r e a l i s t i c and 
statesmanlike proposal. 
1. P.R.O..Cab.2^/100.C.P.8^2. Secretary of United States Treasury to 
Chamberlain, 5 Mar., 1920. 
2. See below, >p, '23\ * 
3. P.R.O..Cab.24/100.C.P.842. Chamberlain to Secretary of United States 
Treasury, 11 Mar., 1920. 
4. Economist. Vol.XC, 10 Jan., 1920. 
5. See below, pp. 241-2, 262-3.-. 
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But opinion i n the Cabinet was, as might have been expected, strongly 
divided over the merits of the plan, both at t h i s time and in. 1922. The 
1 
paper had been circulated to the Cabinet i n February 1920, and evoked a 
number of papers i n response from other members of the Cabinet. 
As has been said, Cabinet opinion was sharply divided. The Foreign 
Office was strongly i n favour of the proposal,, Lord Curzon's memorandum 
added foreign policy arguments to the economic ones advanced by the 
Treasury. 
" I t i s certain that a state of things under which our a l l i e s , who 
are impoverished while we remain r e l a t i v e l y r i c h , have to discharge 
heavy obligations to us as the r e s u l t of a" victorious war-, must 
promote bad. feeling. I t must be remembered tha t , as long as these 
debts- remain, Germany i s not much worse o f f , i f at a l l , than France 
and I t a l y . True, she has to make reparation, but otherwise she has 
l i t t l e or no external debt. And there i s more. ...in practice, the 
exaction of our debts from our a l l i e s w i l l mean that we.„„shall be 
the sole recipients of any benefits from German reparation payments„.. 
i t i s hard to see how, i f we i n s i s t on our debts, we can f a i l to lose 
our old position i n the European system, which depended upon our 
being f e l t to be neither oppressive nor unjust."*' 
He f e l t t h a t , were we to renounce our debts, we should clear the atmos-
phere at once, and regain the moral leadership of Bar-ope at a time when 
i t was v i t a l f o r Europe that we should do so, since only B r i t a i n had 
the economic strength to take the leadership i n the facing of the problem 
of reconstructing Europe. 
Not only were there considerable advantages to be gained by our 
abrogating our a l l i e s ' debts; considerable dangers would attend our 
course i f we did not do so. 
"...the prevalent conviction that we have always :done w e l l 1 out 
of wars w i l l . . . c r y s t a l l i s e i n t o forms of extreme bitterness. No 
continental Government under present conditions i s l i k e l y to be 
strong enough to r e s i s t the temptation to increase the bitterness 
and to use i t f o r i t s own ends."2 
1. P.R.O..Cab.24/97.CP. 584. 
. 2. .P.R.O. .Cab.24/103.CP. 1093. 17 Apr., 1920, p.2. 
3° IbM»j pp.2-3. 
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Curzon recognised that the American reaction to such a change i n B r i t i s h 
policy might at f i r s t be one which would resu l t i n a worsening of Anglo-
American r e l a t i o n s . 
"The f i r s t impulse i n America would almost cer t a i n l y be to regard 
i t as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 'slim' move, designed to force the 
hand of the United States." 1 
But Curzon thought that t h i s would only be a passing mood. 
"For the moment the American conscience as regards Europe seems 
dead, but conscience does not die i n so sentimental and i d e a l -
i s t i c a people; i t i s only numb; and, i f the B r i t i s h action 
were prevented on the l o f t i e s t e t h i c a l grounds, a revulsion of 
feeling would quickly follow, which would not merely affeet 
Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s , but would profoundly affeet the whole 
American atti t u d e towards Europe. The r e s u l t might well be^ _ 
similar action on the American side before a year was outJ'^ 
Thus, f o r similar reasons, although from a d i f f e r e n t stance and i n rather 
more extravagant language, Lord Curzon concurred i n the Treasury view. 
He was supported by Sir Laming Worthington Evans, who added the suggestion 
that instead of the policy coming as the i n i t i a t i v e of the B r i t i s h Govern-
ment, acceptance of the policy by other countries might be considerably 
eased i f a less dir e c t method were used„ An International Financial 
Conference under the League of Nations was soon to take place. Sir Laming 
suggested that i t might be arranged f o r the conference to recommend that 
the eancella/tion of i n t e r - A l l i e d indebtedness was necessary f o r the 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Europe. B r i t a i n could then accept t h i s recommendation. 
While t h i s would mean that B r i t a i n l o s t some of the appearance of taking 
the i n i t i a t i v e , the li k e l i h o o d of the United States taking offence would 
3 
be lessenedo" 
The p r i n c i p a l opposition to the Blackett plan came from the Board of 
Trade and from the Secretary of State f o r War. The President of the 
Board of Trade issued two memoranda. The f i r s t , i n February, was w r i t t e n 
1. 
2. 
3. 
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by Sir Auckland Geddes; the second, after Sir Auckland's appointment 
as Ambassador i n Washington, was by Sir Robert Horne. Geddes' objection 
was based p a r t l y on the d i f f i c u l t y of the American a t t i t u d e ; he thought 
i t l i k e l y that the policy would seem i n America to be an attempt to force 
America's hand, and that she might well remit the A l l i e s ' debts and not 
ours. This would put France p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a very advantageous position^ 
and i t might be tha t , by 1930, France would be prospering, as a r e s u l t , 
to a greater extent than B r i t a i n . Geddes was also more optimistic about 
the chances of the continental A l l i e s getting some benefit from repar-
ations, than were the Treasury or the Foreign Office. Sir Robert-Horne, -
Geddes' successor, went further with the suggestion that France would as 
a resul t of all-round debt cancellation be considerably better o f f than 
B r i t a i n i n the end. He adduced figures which purported to show that i f 
one took levels of war-time taxation i n t o account, the contribution of 
the B r i t i s h taxpayer would per capita be considerably greater than that 
2 
of the French i f her debts were remitted. 
/ The Secretary of State f o r War at that time was Sir Winston Churchill. 
He was strenuously opposed to the new proposal, and he too circulated two 
3 
memoranda. He f e l t that the correct policy would be to say to the United 
States that we were w i l l i n g to remit our debts from our a l l i e s i f she 
would do the same f o r us. He expressed his comments i n ""What one has 
come to regard as t y p i c a l l y Churchillian language: 
" I t would, I am sure, c a l l f o r t h a violent outbreak of anger i n 
t h i s country i f i t were known that while we are taxing ourselves 
more than double as much as the French, we are nevertheless f o r -
giving them t h e i r debt, and at the same time allowing the United 
States, which has already pillaged us of twelve hundred m i l l i o n s 
of our sec u r i t i e s , to continue to exact from us payment to the 
uttermost farthing of a debt contracted f o r a common cause. 
1. P.R.Q..Cab.2£/98.C.P.621. 12 Feb., 1920. 
2. P.R.0..Cabo24/l05.C.P.1202. 1 May, 1920. 
3. P.R.O. .Cab.2A/l0A.C.P.1t56.. 23 Apr.,1920; Cab.2A/l06,C.P.13T6. 
Uo P.R.0.,Cab.2A/l0A.C.P.1156. 
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I n his second memorandum Churchill adduced a hitherto unmentioned 
argument. He stressed that an important element i n B r i t i s h policy on the 
matter was the connection with reparations, and that we had always been 
concerned to exact a just and reasonable settlement. He regarded the 
offer of debt remission ag a bargaining counter which we should use to 
persuade France and I t a l y to agree to a reasonable settlement with. Germany; 
to o f f e r t h i s remission u n i l a t e r a l l y would be to throw away the chance to 
influence the French i n t h i s and to produce a viable reparations 
1 
settlement. 
- - " 2 Blaekett-' s- second memorandum, circulated i n May 1920, was concerned 
with r e t a i l i n g the course of negotiations with the United States over 
the Anglo-American debt, and with setting out the actual monetary trans-
fers which would be involved i f B r i t a i n simply waived the negotiations 
and paid up. That t h i s course could be seriously contemplated, i n view 
of the drain of exchange and the s t r a i n on our f i n a n c i a l resources f o r 
some time afterwards, was due largely, i t seems, to the importunities 
of the United States Treasury. Blackett quoted an extract from the d r a f t 
agreement drawn up by Rathbone, the Assistant Secretary of the United 
States Treasury: 
"„..the Secretary of the Treasury has desired to aid i n the s t a b i l -
i s a t i o n and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the f i n a n c i a l and economic conditions 
of Europe. His willingness to accord l i b e r a l terms...to the Govern-
ments whose demand obligations are held by the United States i s 
conditioned on reparation matters under t r e a t i e s with enemy and ex-
enemy countries, and other questions involving the f i n a n c i a l and 
economic s t a b i l i t y of the world being arranged so that i n the judge-
ment of the Secretary of the Treasury the aforesaid purposes may be 
realised...preferential t a r i f f s and discriminating concessions must 
be avoided, ^andj ...each Government should r e f r a i n from granting to 
other Governments, or from asking or accepting from other Govern-
ments, any such t a r i f f s or concessions. Accordingly, no exchange of 
obligations as contemplated w i l l be actually made and concluded 
unless and u n t i l determined by the Secretary of the Treasury."-^ 
1. P.R.O..Cab.2A/l06tC.P.13l6. 
2. P.R.O. ,CabT2.4/l05.C.P.1259. 11 May, 1920. 
3. I b i d . , pp.2-3. 
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Blackett went on to say that i n addition the Americans were most anxious 
that B r i t a i n and America should t r e a t t h e i r Continental debtors a l i k e 0 
"...hitherto i t has meant simply that the B r i t i s h Government has 
subordinated i t s views of how to deal with the problem t o those 
of the United States Treasury - or rather to those which the 
United States Treasury feels strong enough to defend before- the 
United States Congress."'' 
In view of the high-handed a t t i t u d e of the Americans, and the f a c t that 
up to that point 'co-operation' with the United States had been f o r the 
Treasury o f f i c i a l s from t h i s country a matter of subordinating B r i t a i n ' s 
views" and interests to those of the United States, Blackett believed that 
the time had come f o r B r i t a i n to 'go i t alone'. - __ 
" I f the B r i t i s h Government i s prepared t o give up the attempt to 
co-operate i n t h i s matter with the United States Government, and 
to inform the l a t t e r that i t i s at l i b e r t y to make what terms i t 
thinks f i t with France, I t a l y , &c., and that the B r i t i s h Govern-
ment proposes to deal with the debts owed to i t by those countries 
on i t s own l i n e s , indicating that those l i n e s w i l l be more l i b e r a l 
than the United States proposes, i t w i l l then be possible to sep-
arate t h i s problem of the A l l i e d debts from the p a r t i c u l a r problem 
of B r i t a i n ' s debt to the United States Government."2 
Moreover, i n Blackett's view, i t was not simply that positive gains would 
resu l t from a change of policy by the B r i t i s h . I n his view the advantages 
of continuing the current negotiations with the United States on funding 
and deferment of interest were so comparatively negligible as to be not 
worth the apparently inevitable humiliations involved i n obtaining any 
concessions from the Americans. 
" I t i s submitted that the inconveniences of attempting to reach a 
j o i n t p o l icy with the United States Government regarding the A l l i e d 
Governments' debts are so great as to j u s t i f y the B r i t i s h Govern-
ment i n taking i t s own course, and that, as the advantages offered 
by the United States Treasury i n regard to postponement of in t e r e s t 
on the B r i t i s h Government's debt are negligible under the terms now 
suggested, i t i s not worth while to negotiate further as regards 
such postponements..."3 
1. P.R.O.,Cab.24/105.C.P.1259. p 03. 
2. I b i d . . p.3. 
3. Ibid.„ p.3» 
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The remainder of the memo i s concerned with the deta i l s of the sums 
which would be due i n the immediate future were B r i t a i n to suspend 
negotiations with the United States f o r t h w i t h . He assessed the sums 
thereafter, and regarded the payment of such sums as a d i f f i c u l t but 
not impossible task f o r Britain,, 
This paper of Blackett's was circulated to the members of the 
Cabinet by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, accompanied by a short memor-
i 
andum by the Chancellor himself, dated May 12th 1920. From taking a 
. neutral stance i n his accompanying memo, to Blaekett's e a r l i e r paper, 
Chamberlain had apparently become by then convinced that the course 
which Blackett suggested was the r i g h t one, and he said so i n no uncert-
ain terms. 
" I have changed my mind on t h i s question i n consequence mainly 
of the intolerable pretensions of the United States Government. 
I have t o l d Mr. Rathbone p r i v a t e l y , and as one in d i v i d u a l 
speaking to another, that I would sooner pay i f I could, and 
default i f I could not, than s e l l my country i n t o bondage by 
signing any document containing language l i k e that quoted from 
his d r a f t by Mr. Blackett. 
I am now i n favours 
•1. Of releasing our A l l i e s from t h e i r debts to us aft e r 
setting o f f anything due us by them. 
2. Of s i m i l a r l y releasing the Dominions i f they desire i t . . . 
3. Of informing the United States Government of our 
intenti o n i n t h i s respect, and at the same time of 
our i n t e n t i o n to provide back i n t e r e s t , i n t e r e s t and 
sinking fund on our debt t o them on the lines suggested 
by the Controller. 
Immediately pr i o r to the Cabinet discussion of the subject, there 
had taken place an i n t e r - A l l i e d conference at Hythe on the subject 
p r i n c i p a l l y of reparations, but i t had been agreed that the matter of 
i n t e r - A l l i e d debt was closely connected with t h i s and should be urgently 
considered. France and B r i t a i n had issued a short j o i n t statement, which 
due as about $400m. f o r each of the next two years and ^ 200m. annually 
1 
12 May, 1920. 
P.R.0..Cab.24/l05.C.P.1259.Po1 
. ,C.P. 1259,p.3., Covering l e t t e r by Chancellor, 
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among other things expressed the d e s i r a b i l i t y of j o i n t Anglo-French 
action over i n t e r - A l l i e d indebtedness;, and over the ! connected problem 
of reparationso 
"The two Governments are further of the opinion t h a t . . . i t i s 
important to arrive at a settlement which w i l l embrace the 
whole body of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i a b i l i t i e s which have been 
l e f t us as a legacy of the War, and which w i l l at the same 
time ensure a p a r a l l e l l i q u i d a t i o n of the I n t e r - A l l i e d War 
Debts and of the Reparation Debts of the Central Empire J'^ 
A report on the Conversations at Hythe was given to the Cabinet at a 
2 
meeting on. the 19th of May, at which Lloyd George was not present. 
Arising out of the discussion on these conclusions, a discussion of the 
in t e r - A l i i e e l debt problem took place, apparently at the i n s t i g a t i o n of 
3 
Winston Churchill. The attention of the Cabinet was drawn to the import-
ance of avoiding any f i n a l settlement of our debt to the United States 
independently of the settlement of our loans to France and I t a l y , and 
the payment of reparation by Germany. The view was that any settlement 
with the Continental A l l i e s along; the lines of cancellation should be 
contingent upon the Americans off e r i n g us a similar release. As a 
r e s u l t of t h i s statement, the Chancellor of the Exchequer f e l t i t 
necessary to t e l l the Cabinet that the Prime Minister had been f u l l y 
acquainted with the B r i t i s h Treasury's views- as outlined i n Blackett's 
second paper,^ and that he did not approve of the adoption of a policy 
of u n i l a t e r a l cancellation at the present time.- Since there was no other 
course open to us, the Chancellor was proceeding with the negotiations 
fo r meeting our demand obligations with America by giving the Americans 
int e r e s t bearing Bonds, payable at f i x e d dates. This would not prevent 
the United States from dealing more generously l a t e r on i f circumstances 
became more propitious, 
1. P.R.O..Cab.24/105.CP.1297.17 May, 1920. p.3. 
2. P.R.Q.<Cab".23/2l7 Cabinet meeting 29(20), 19 May, 1920. 
3. The Cabinet conclusions contain only a summary of the discussion, 
with no names mentioned. The det a i l s given here are taken from 
Lloyd George Papers.F/24/2/36.Hankey to Lloyd George, 19 May 1'920j 
see below, pp.'233-4• 
4. P.R.Q.„Cab .24/105. CP. 1259. 
The summary of the Cabinet discussion i s b r i e f , and i t ends by 
saying, 
"The Cabinet were impressed with the importance of the issues; 
raised by the discussion, which had arisen without notice. . . . " I 
and notes the conclusions of the Cabinet, which were that pending f u r t h e r 
discussion, which should take place as soon as possible, the Chancellor 
should suspend further negotiations with the United States Treasury. 
Lloyd George was out of London at the time, and i n accordance with 
custom, Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, sent him a copy 
of the Cabinet minutes, accompanied by a letter, .giving--•some -amplific-"" 
2 
ation of the discussion. Hankey said that the question of i n t e r -
A l l i e d debt was raised by Winston Churchill, without notice, following 
the discussions of the Conversations at Hythe. Hankey described 
Churchill as apprehensive of any mention of French debt remission at 
t h i s stage. He suggested that we should t e l l France that we should 
l i k e to see some debt of Germany remitted by her; that i n return we are 
prepared to remit some French debt, provided we can obtain similar t r e a t -
ment of our American debt from the United States. 
"His idea i s to mobilise the whole sequence of debts i n t h i s 
order, so as to put America i n an invidious position before 
the world i f she refuses to take a part."3 
This despite the f a c t that i t was very clear from Blackett and Chamberlain' 
experiences with the United States that i t was most u n l i k e l y that the 
United States could be 'shamed' int o cancellation. As we have seen 
Chamberlain was then obliged to explain the position with regard to the 
discussions between the two Treasuries. Hankey went on: 
"There was a very general feeling i n the Cabinet that any arrang-
ement of t h i s kind j i . e . funding! might prejudice the general 
question of I n t e r - A l l i e d indebtedness.'"^ 
1. P.R.O..Cab.23/21.Cabinet meeting 29(20), 19 May 1919. 
2. Lloyd George Papers, F/24/2/36. Hankey to Lloyd George, 19 May 1920. 
3. I b i d . 
A. I b i d . 
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He added that a further Cabinet meeting on the subject had been requested, 
1 
and that there was a general wish f o r Lloyd George to preside. 
2 
The requested Cabinet meeting took place on May 21st, and those 
present had before them a l l the papers to which reference has been made. 
The matter was introduced by the Chancellor, who made a lengthy statement, 
which consisted of a summary of the proceedings with the Americans to 
date, and of his views and those of his s t a f f as expressed i n the memor-
3 
anda, which have already been discussed at some length. Thereafter 
discussion centred on two main points. The f i r s t was that since B r i t a i n 
had j u s t issued a j o i n t statement with France stressing the importance- --
of j o i n t action and of taking the problem of i n t e r - A l l i e d debt i n conj-
unction with that of reparations, i t would hardly be reasonable or 
consistent of B r i t a i n to proceed at once to independent action on i n t e r -
A l l i e d debt. Not only was j o i n t action with France and I t a l y over t h e i r 
debts to one another advisable; much was to be gained by a j o i n t approach 
on the part of the three countries to the American problem. 
Secondly, the current p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n America was abnormally 
confused; Presidential elections were imminent, and the moment was thus 
highly unpropitious f o r an approach of t h i s kind to the United States. 
The summary of t h i s discussion i s contained i n single page of foolscap 
i n the Cabinet records - surely rather a cursory treatment of such an 
important problem - and the substance of the, discussion may be summed up 
by the f i n a l sentence: -<£ 7*-
"Everything was to be gained by postponing a decision.."^ 
1. Lloyd George Papers.F/24/2/36. Hankey to Lloyd George, 19 May 1920. 
2. P.R.O.„Cab.23/21.Cabinet meeting 30(20), 21 May, 1920. 
3. I b i d . 
4. I b i d . 
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The conclusions of the Cabinet are recorded as being th a t , i n future, 
negotiations on i n t e r - A l l i e d debt should take place at Government, 
rather than Treasury, l e v e l , i n view of the "questions of high policy" 
raised; that the Prime Minister should write to President Wilson on 
the subject; and that the Chancellor should n o t i f y Rathbone of the 
1 
Cabinet's decision. 
Since the practice of Cabinet meetings at t h i s time was f o r the 
discussion to be summarised by the Secretary without names being given;, 
i t i s not possible to determine from the Minutes who was p r i n c i p a l l y 
responsible f o r the Blackett plan's .rejection. However, i t - i s - e l e a r -
2 
from the minutes of the previous' meeting on the subject, and from 
3 
Hankey's l e t t e r to Lloyd George, that at any rate Churchill and Lloyd 
George himself were against the plan. The policy of j o i n t action with 
France, one main stumbling block, had been agreed at Hythe during disc-
ussion between the Prime Ministers- of the two countries J* The decision 
that discussions should subsequently take place at Government l e v e l , 
although recommended at the e a r l i e r discussion at which Lloyd George was 
not present, was apparently very much his own policy as we l l ; Chamberlain 
l e t t e r to Rathbone t e l l i n g him of the change of negotiation machinery 
contains a pointer to t h i s : 
"Discussions on the subject took place at an e a r l i e r stage 
between President Wilson and the Prime Minister and the -
Prime Minister proposes now to resume these discussions..." 
I n addition, the l e t t e r which Lloyd George eventually sent to 
Wilson as a res u l t of the Cabinet meeting,^ makes i t clear that he was 
1 . P.R.O., Cab.23/21. Cabinet meeting 30(20), 21 May, 1920„ 
2 . I b i d . , Cabinet meeting 29(20), 19 May, 1920. 
3» Lloyd George Papers, F/24/2/36. 
A. P.R.O., C_a,b.24/1061_C,P. 13.82, 2 June, 1920. 
5. I b i d . , my underlining. 
6. P.R.O., Cab.24/114, CP.2037. 5 Aug., 1920. 
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convinced that a one-sided remission of A l l i e d debt by B r i t a i n would 
be a disaster p o l i t i c a l l y : 
" . . . B r i t i s h public opinion would never support a one-sided 
arrangement at i t s sole expense, and...if such a one-sided 
arrangement were made i t could not f a i l to estrange and 
eventually embitter the relations between the American and 
the B r i t i s h people with calamitous results to the future 
of the world." 1 
Thus i t seems clear that, while he had some support i n the Cabinet, 
the decision not to implement the plan f o r u n i l a t e r a l cancellation was 
fundamentally Lloyd George's own. A l l the concrete evidence we have 
suggests t h i s . F i n a l l y , although the Cabinet Minutes do not provide 
_2 - - - -
dir e c t confirmation of t h i s at the main discussion, the evidence of 
the e a r l i e r meeting, coupled with the content and brevity of the second 
discussion, seem conclusive. For the discussion on May 2Tst was not 
only extremely b r i e f . Despite the f a c t that i n t h e i r w r i t t e n memoranda 
the holders of two of the highest offices i n the State,- and those most 
nearly concerned i n the question, namely the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and the Secretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s , were f i r m l y and whole-
heartedly i n favour of the plan, the minutes of the discussion do not 
record a single word said i n favour of the plan. No influence other 
than Lloyd George's could have been responsible f o r t h a t . So the i n i t -
i a t i v e was l o s t ; a plan which could have resulted i n an immediate 
lightening i n the economic clouds over B r i t a i n and the Continent was 
rejected, apparently on the grounds of p o l i t i c a l expediency and from 
fear of public opinion. 
Following the Cabinet decision on May 2 1 s t 1 9 2 0 , Lloyd George even-
t u a l l y wrote to President Wilson i n August of that year. The delay was 
due p a r t l y to the pressure of business, and p a r t l y to the f a c t that 
1 . P.R.O., Cab .2A/lU. C.P.2037, p.2. 
2 . P.R.O., Cab..23/21. Cabinet meeting 3 0 ( 2 0 ) , 21 May, 1920 . 
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Lloyd George wished to delay w r i t i n g u n t i l a f t e r the Conference at Spa, 
at which the European l i l i e s decided what proportions the German Repar-
1 
ation should be divided among them. The l e t t e r was i n f a c t w r i t t e n and 
2 
rewritten i n d r a f t several times during July and early August. The 
passage on i n t e r - A l l i e d debts was embodied i n a l e t t e r on more general 
matterso The substance of the passage was that d i f f i c u l t y had arisen 
over the reparations problem, since the French would only be w i l l i n g to 
accept l i m i t a t i o n s on Reparation payments based on German capacity to 
pay i f her A l l i e s were to t r e a t her debts i n the same way. But B r i t a i n 
could not remit A l l i e d debt "unless some of the United States debt were 
remitted by her; as we have already seen, i n Lloyd George's view the 
3 
B r i t i s h taxpayer would not stand f o r a one-sided arrangement. Lloyd 
George i s at pains to make i t clear to Wilson that the breaking o f f of 
inter-Treasury negotiations was not due to an unwillingness on the part 
of B r i t a i n to pay. but to a be l i e f that a general settlement would have 
much more l a s t i n g value than a piecemeal one.^ 
' The l e t t e r was eventually despatched on August 5th 1920j, but 
President Wilson did not reply u n t i l November, presumably because of 
5 
i l l - h e a l t h . Meanwhile, the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Washington was growing 
anxious about the p o s s i b i l i t y that the new Administration which wou3.d 
take power i n January 192T would be more host i l e to B r i t a i n than the 
present one. He sent a telegram to the B r i t i s h Government to t h i s e f f e c t , 
7 
which was discussed by the Cabinet i n November 1 9 2 0 , but Cabinet opinion 
was not wholly i n agreement with his view. I t was eventually decided to 
1. P.R.,0.., Cab.3l/l,B.E.D.232?p.5, memo, by Sir Auckland Geddes. 
2 . Lloyd George Papers, F / 6 0 / 1/28 o 
3. See above, p.2255« 
U. P.R.Q., C a b . 3 . B.E.D.232, p.8., memo, by Sir Auckland Geddesy 
Annex A. 
5o P.R.O., Cab.23/23. Cabinet meeting 59(20), 3 Nov., 1920. 
6. P.R.Q.,. Cab^m^, CP.2039, 23 Oct., 1920. 
7. P.R.O., "CakaS^^ Cabinet meeting 59(20), 3 Nov., 1920. - 237 -
do nothing f o r the time being, and to hope that the new Administration 
would i n f a c t be more kindly i n c l i n e d . Further discussion took place 
i n December, by which time a reply from President Wilson had been 
received.^ The terms of t h i s reply were uncompromising. The le g a l 
position of the United States Government, he pointed out, was that the 
only thing i t could authorise the United States Treasury to do was to 
arrange f o r funding and f o r deferment of in t e r e s t payments as part of 
a funding agreement. I t had no Congressional sanction f o r remission 
of debt i n whole or i n part, and i t was most u n l i k e l y that Congress 
would grant such sanction. Wilson suggested that unless funding took 
place soon, a "misunderstanding" would r e s u l t . He also repeated the 
dogma that the United States could not recognize any connection between 
2 
reparation and i n t e r - A l l i e d debt. 
Geddes again telegraphed the Government on the subject i n December, 
along much the same l i n e s , although he included mention of the opinion 
of Colonel House, Wilson's personal representative at the Armistice 
discussions, that America would eventually be driven to cancel B r i t i s h 
debt by economic necessity. But Geddes thought House was wrong, and 
once again suggested further negotiations. He thought that i f these 
were not forthcoming the United States Government would eventually demand 
the r i g h t to s e l l our obligations on the market, and any hope of remission 
would then be gone for ever. This telegram was circulated to the Cabinet 
by the Chancellor, with an accompanying note to the effect that he would 
l i k e the Cabinet to look again at Blackett's plan: 
" I plead again and most earnestly f o r a beau geste, and that 
without delay."3 
1. Lloyd George Papers, F/6o/l/31, 3 Nov., 1920. Wilson's l e t t e r 
does not appear to have been circulated to the Cabinet. 
2. I b i d . 
3 . P.R.O., Cab.24/116. C.P.22UA, 3 Dec., 1920. - ... 
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These documents were discussed by the Cabinet i n l a t e December, 
and i t was decided that Lord Chalmers should be asked to go to Washington 
to conduct negotiations. Lord Chalmers' v i s i t was? however, postponed. 
Meanwhile, the Republicans under Harding came int o power i n the United 
2 
States, determined to 'solve' the problem of i n t e r - A l l i e d debt. The 
powers of the United States Treasury to deal with the problem were 
severely l i m i t e d , and the new Government brought i n a B i l l to extend 
those powers. This B i l l was introduced in t o Congress i n June 1921, 
and received Presidential assent i n February 1922. During t h i s time 
negotiations were naturally l a r g e l y i n abeyance. But the Commission 
which the United States Funding Act provided f o r was set up i n the 
spring of 1922, and t h i s f a c t , added to the f a c t that the agreement 
made i n 1919 f o r the postponement of interest on United States debt f o r 
three years was due to expire i n October 1922, made i t imperative that 
3 
a B r i t i s h decision on the American debt be taken. 
As a preliminary, the B r i t i s h Treasury expressed the opinion that 
America should be asked what basis she wished to discuss the problem,, 
whether the B r i t i s h debt were to be the sole topic of discussion or 
whether a j o i n t attitude to a l l the other A l l i e d debtors would also be 
under discussion. The Treasury also suggested that a special mission 
with wide powers should be sent to Washington to negotiate with the 
Commission.^ As a resul t of a l l t h i s a c t i v i t y the subject of i n t e r - A l l i e d 
debt again came up f o r discussion i n d e t a i l i n the Cabinet i n the summer 
of 1922. 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/23. Cabinet meeting 72(20), 17 Dec., 1920. 
2. Frasure, B r i t i s h Policy on War-Debts and Reparations, p.21. 
3. P.R.O.Cab.31/1, B.E.D.232. p.6. memo, by Sir Auckland Geddes. 
U. I b i d . . p.7. 
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But before going into t h i s i n some d e t a i l i t i s worth noting that 
although American public opinion had i f anything hardened since the l a s t 
serious moves took place i n 1 9 2 0 , B r i t i s h public opinion was becoming 
much more in s i s t e n t on the need f o r mutual cancellation of debt and f o r 
the f i x i n g of Germany's obligations with i n her capacity to pay. I n 
November 1921 the Westminster Bank Review carried an a r t i c l e on resolu-
t i o n by the B r i t i s h National Committee of the International Chamber of 
Commerce. This resolution urged on the Government the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 
negotiations on i n t e r - A l l i e d debt, 
" i n order to obtain the benefits which...would accrue i f the debts 
of the A l l i e d Nations to Great B r i t a i n , incurred as a consequence ^ 
of the War, were either reduced or cancelled on terms to be agreed." 
The leader w r i t e r approved of t h i s resolution saying that 
" i t |the resolution} gives authority to the great mass of public 
opinion that i s slowly coming round to t h i s view." 
But the Review did not f e e l that the American debt i s i n the same category, 
since B r i t a i n has not been devastated by the war i n the same way as the 
3 
Continent, though B r i t a i n must be given time to pay. 
Nor was i t s t i l l true that the majority of the B r i t i s h public, as 
had been the case immediately af t e r the war, thought that Germany could 
or should be made to pay to the uttermost far-thing. Opinion i n the City, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , tended to be that German economic recovery was essential 
to B r i t a i n . ^ 
Thus opinion on reparations and i n t e r - A l l i e d debts tended to vary 
from, on one side, those who s t i l l thought i n terms of heavy German 
reparation payments, through those who f e l t that whether B r i t a i n received 
anything from the Germans or not, our debt to the United States was a 
1 . Westminster Bank Review, 
leading a r t i c l e . 
2 . I b i d . 3 . 
U. See, f o r example, the Report of 
Westminster Bank Review. No.103, 
No.101, Nov., 1 9 2 1 , 
I b i d . 
the Chairman of Westminster Bank, 
Feb., J 9 2 2 ^ _ 
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sacred t r u s t which we could not i n any circumstances abrogate, to those 
who f e l t that the reparations payments were hindering the recovery of 
Germany and therefore of Europe, and those who f e l t that since the loans 
had been incurred i n the process of prosecuting a long war f o r the sur-
v i v a l of a l l the countries involved, whether they entered the f i e l d of 
actual b a t t l e early or l a t e , the debts were of a special kind and might 
with honour be repudiated. One advocate of the l a t t e r view, w r i t i n g i n 
the Economic Journal, suggested that war debts were i n essence inequitable, 
since those who had made vast contributions of men to the common cause 
now owed huge sums to those who had only contributed material goods. 
The l o g i c a l answer, the w r i t e r says, i s cancellation a l l round, u n i l a t -
1 
e r a l l y i f necessary. 
Few people i n t h i s country concurred i n t h i s view. The majority of 
the banking and economic journals took the view that at any rate our debt 
2 
to the United States was i n v i o l a t e and must remain so. Some, l i k e the 
Economist, concentrated on the necessity f o r r e l i e v i n g both Continental 
and European trade from the constricting problems of international &Sfbt 
and reparations. To t h i s end, the Economist strongly c r i t i c i s e d the 
deterrent which reparations were to German recovery, not believing that 
a l l the European nations could become prosperous again without allowing 
Germany a share i n such recovery, nor that the other continental countries 
could once again prosper while Germany remained devastated and divided. 
The Economist also tended to support any measure which might relieve the 
similar burden on world trade i n general by easing both the burden of 
i n t e r - A l l i e d debt and the currency troubles and i n f l a t i o n i n Central 
Europe. Thus i n the same ed i t i o n i n A p r i l 1922 t h i s magazine was promoting 
1 . R. Trouton, "The Cancellation of I n t e r - A l l i e d Debts", Economic 
Journal, XXXI ( 1 9 2 1 ) . 
2 . See above, pp. 239-24.0 . 
both a scheme by Sir Robert Home, by now Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and a similar one by Goodenough, one of the Bank chairmen, f o r the 
transfer of both reparations and i n t e r - A l l i e d debts to bonds to be 
issued to private individuals with Government guarantees, and one by 
Keynes i n the Commercial Supplement to the Manchester Guardian., This 
l a t t e r proposed that any currency which was at a l e v e l more than 10/6 
below the pre-war p a r i t y should be stabilised at an agreed lower l e v e l . 
The Economist thought t h i s a sensible proposal, but with l i t t l e l i k e l i -
i 
hood of success u n t i l p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y returned to Europe. 
Keynes had other observations to make on the int e r n a t i o n a l debt 
problem. We have already noted his remarks on the economic madness i n v o l -
2 
ved i n retaining the structure of deadweight debt„ I n his second book on 
the Peace Treaty, which came out i n 1922, he had some wry and highly 
illuminating observations to make on the American attitude to European 
debt problems. 
"The average American, I fancy, would l i k e to see the European 
nations approaching him with a pathetic l i g h t i n t h e i r eyes and 
cash i n t h e i r hands, saying, 'America, we owe to you our' l i b e r t y 
and our l i f e ; here we bring you what we can i n g r a t e f u l thanks, 
money not wrung by grievous taxation from the widow and the 
orphan, but saved, the best f r u i t s of v i c t o r y , out of the abol-
i t i o n of armaments, m i l i t a r i s m , Empire and i n t e r n a l s t r i f e , made 
possible by the help you f r e e l y gave us.'"-' 
Presented thus with repayment by a g r a t e f u l a l l y , Keynes goes on, 
"And then the average American would reply; ' I honour you f o r 
your integrity.- I t i s what I expected. But I did not enter 
the War for- p r o f i t or to invest my money w e l l . I have had my 
reward i n the words you have j u s t uttered. The loans are fo r g -
iven. Return to your homes and use the resources I release to 
u p l i f t the poor and unfortunate.' And i t would be an essential 
part of the l i t t l e scene that his reply would come as a complete 
and overwhelming surprise."4 
1. Economist. XCIV, 15 Apr., 1922. 
2. See above, pp. 208-9. 
3. J.M. Keynes, A Revision of the Treaty (London:Macmi.llan & Co.„ 
1922), p.183. 
Am I b i d . 
The idea that the American a t t i t u d e to Europe was a combination of a 
desire not to be put upon by the w i l y nations of the Old World, and of 
a psychological need to f e e l superior to them, i s an interesting one,, 
which finds echoes i n the paper which Sir Edward Grigg wrote to Lloyd 
1 
George urging him to reconsider his decision t o issue the Balfour Note. 
But the American a t t i t u d e was met with l i t t l e sympathy or under-
standing on t h i s side of the A t l a n t i c ; perhaps hardly surprising i n the 
circumstances. This was, a f t e r a l l , America's f i r s t r e a l s a l l y i n t o 
world p o l i t i c s ; and she had throughout behaved i n an extremely high-
handed fashion, obviously regarding herself as the saviour of European 
c i v i l i s a t i o n . This attitude could hardly be expected to recommend 
i t s e l f to the European A l l i e s , least of a l l Great B r i t a i n . 
Be that as i t may, against a background of confusion i n pol i c i e s 
and opinion a l i k e , the next important period i n the reparations and 
i n t e r - A l l i e d debt s i t u a t i o n began to unfold. Reparations were discussed 
at length i n Cabinet during May 1922, i n view of the imminent default of 
Germany on her obligations, and the necessity of helping to arrange a 
moratorium so that Germany would not formally be declared i n default, 
with the consequence of inevitable m i l i t a r y action by France. I t i s 
interesting t o note that the Cabinet was becoming aware of the inconsist-
encies i n the a l l i e d , and p a r t i c u l a r l y French attitude to the Germans. 
Lord Balfour i s quoted i n the summary of the discussion as saying: 
"...Germany ought to be pulled up, but on the snaffle and not 
the curb. The misfortune was that we had an A l l y who at one 
and the same time wanted Germany r i c h enough to pay indemnities, 
and also a Germany that was ruined."^ 
The immediate solution to the German problem, and that suggested by Sir 
John Bradbury, the B r i t i s h representative on the Committee of Experts 
1. See below, pp. 254.-6.. 
2 . P.R.O., Cjibj23_Z20, minutes of Cabinet meeting 29(22)J_23_May_>_1922( 
who had the settlement of the reparations problems and the supervision 
of that settlement i n t h e i r charge, was f o r a large loan to be arranged. 
But with or without a loan France was un l i k e l y to receive enough from 
Germany to pay her own annual a l l i e d debt charge, and the problem of 
i n t e r - A l l i e d indebtedness would once again be raised. At t h i s point, 
the Prime Minister said that he was i n favour of endeavouring to relieve 
the s i t u a t i o n by col l e c t i n g debt on a "quid pro quo" basis. He did not 
see how, with a considerable national debt and a large number of unem-
ployed i t was possible to forgive France and the other A l l i e s t h e i r 
debts while at the same time continuing t o acknowledge the American 
debt i n f u l l . He then went on to say that he was 
" . . . a l l f o r the 'Blackett plan 1 ( i . e . to say to our debtors we 
w i l l only collect from you the same proportion of your debts 
to us as the United States collects from us)." 
I n view of the actual substance of the Blackett plan, as set out i n 
2 
d e t a i l above, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how Lloyd George could have placed 
such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on Blackett's plan f o r a cancellation of our 
European credits regardless, i f necessary, of what the United States 
was prepared to remit of our debt to her. The lapse of two years 
between Lloyd George's statement and the o r i g i n a l mooting of the plan 
i s hardly s u f f i c i e n t explanation; that Blackett's 1920 Plan was indeed 
the one the Prime Minister meant i s obvious from a Treasury memorandum 
3 
drawn up during 1922. This was addressed to Sir Otto Niemeyer, who 
was soon to succeed Sir Basil Blackett as Controller of Financej 
Blackett was at t h i s time busy with reparations problems and spending 
much of his time i n Europe. The memorandum was apparently drawn up to 
assist Niemeyer i n giving advice to the Chancellor on current i n t e r -
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/30. minutes of Cabinet meeting 2 9(22), 23 May, 1922. 
2. See above, pp.217-221. 
3. P.R.O., T.172/1288. ___ 
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A l l i e d debt policy, and sets out i n d e t a i l Blackett's 1920 Plan, 
c a l l i n g i t a 'Beau Geste 1, the nickname i t had apparently acquired, i n 
view of i t s u n i l a t e r a l generosity. The 'Beau Geste' Plan i s so d i f f -
erent, both i n d e t a i l and i n summary, from the 'do-as-you-are-done-by' 
policy which Lloyd George appears to think the Blackett Plan consists 
i n , that such confusion seems inexplicable. 
No decisions on the A l l i e d debt problem were arrived at at that 
meeting of the Cabinet, as i t had been prima r i l y concerned with the 
immediate and pressing problems of reparations. But the subject was 
given detailed consideration by the following meeting, and i t was t h i s 
meeting which e f f e c t i v e l y commissioned the drawing up of the Balfour 
Note. The basis f o r discussion on t h i s occasion was a memorandum c i r c -
ulated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Robert Home.1 Home, 
i t w i l l be remembered, was i n 1920, when the Blackett Plan was f i r s t 
discussed by the Cabinet, President of the Board of Trade, and an 
opponent of the plan. 
The memorandum began by setting out the events of early 1922 on 
the matter. These were that the United States Congress had passed an 
Act setting up a World War Foreign Debt Committee, the Act being signed 
by the President on February 9th 1 9 2 2 , and the Secretary of the United 
States Treasury being Chairman} and that t h i s Committee had passed at 
i t s f i r s t meeting a resolution i n v i t i n g a l l countries owing war debts 
to the United States should submit proposals f o r funding. This prop-
osal reached t h i s country formally i n A p r i l 1 9 2 2 , together with a semi-
o f f i c i a l suggestion that a delegation be sent from London to discuss 
funding with the Commission. Further, i t was announced i n the House of 
Commons during the Budget speech that B r i t a i n would begin paying i n t e r e s t 
on the debt to the United States Government i n October 1 9 2 2 . 
1 . P.R.O.. Cab.24/137. C.P.4020. 8 June 1 -922 .— 
2 . I b i d . , p . 1 . 
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The memorandum went on to mention the reaction of Sir Auckland 
Geddes, B r i t i s h Ambassador i n Washington, to the news of the American 
request f o r B r i t a i n to despatch a funding mission. Sir Auckland 
1 
stressed the importance of sending such a mission without delay. 
He took the view that 
"the United States Government intends that t h e i r note should 
be looked upon as an o f f i c i a l proposal f o r the commencement 
of negotiations f o r 1 s e t t l i n g or funding 1 and that the United 
States Government has no int e n t i o n whatever of making any new 
or wider proposal with regard to a discussion of reparations 
or debts, at any rate before we have discussed the question 
of the B r i t i s h debt with the Gommission..."^ 
Sir Auckland emphasised that the Commission was s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d by law 
i n the negotiations i t may carry out, a point which Home himself 
confirmed l a t e r i n the memorandum, and continues: 
" . . . i t would be f u t i l e f o r me to t r y to get them the Commission 
to agree to negotiations being commenced on any other matter save 
that of refunding. Should any circumstances exist which would 
absolutely preclude us from agreeing to any solution which the 
Commissions mandate would allow i t to o f f e r . . . I consider that i t 
would be far better f u l l y to inform the United States Government 
of the fa c t when answering t h e i r note, rather than to despatch a 
delegation whose prospects of success would ab i n i t i o be non-
existent. "^ 
Home agreed with Sir Auckland about the nature of the delegation, i f one 
were sent out to the United States: 
" . . . i f a delegation were sent out i t would have to confine i t s 
o f f i c i a l action to discussing with the Commission (not the United 
States Government), the pa r t i c u l a r problem of exchanging the 
existing demand obligations by which the B r i t i s h debt i s repres-
ented i n t o bonds or other obligations maturing on or before 
June 15th, 194-7.. .which would have to be i n form at any rate 
marketable securities. "4 
The implications of the transfer of the B r i t i s h Government debt into 
p r i v a t e l y marketable debt were obvious and ominous. 
1. See also above, pp. 237-238_ 
2 . P.R.O., Cab.24/137. CP.4-020, p.1. 
3 . I b i d . , p.2. 
4. I b i d . 
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"Once the terms of the funding had been set t l e d and the bonds 
issued, i t would be p r a c t i c a l l y certain that every dollar- of 
the B r i t i s h debt to the United States Government would be 
exacted, with i n t e r e s t , without reference to what Germany may 
pay by way of reparation or to what terms may be given by the 
United States Government to France and her other debtors or by 
the B r i t i s h Government to the A l l i e d debtors."' 
Home went on to summarise the arguments f o r and against funding. The 
strongest argument against sending a funding delegation to the United 
States at that time was that i f B r i t a i n came to a funding agreement 
with the United States u n i l a t e r a l l y and before the settlement of any-
other i n t e r - A l l i e d debt problem, 
"...we are giving up our strongest weapon f o r forcing the 
United States of America to take part i n a round-table 
discussion of i n t e r - A l l i e d indebtedness arising out of the 
War, unless we proceed, pari passu with our negotiations 
f o r funding our debt to the United States of America, to 
demand that our A l l i e d debtors, especially France and I ^ a l y , 
s h a l l take ijnmediate steps to fund t h e i r debt to ourselves 
and at least begin paying in t e r e s t i n cash."^ 
Horne regarded the s i t u a t i o n with regard to extracting cash payments of 
any kind from our A l l i e s as hopeless at that time. He thought i t would 
be necessary to wait at least two years before expecting any payments 
at a l l , and that i n any event B r i t a i n would have to make considerable 
concessions over these debts. 
" I f , therefore, we proceed now to fund our debt to the United 
States of America, we must do so without reference to the rest 
of the inter-Governmental debt problem. We must make up our 
minds that our debt to the United States Government i s going to 
be paid i n f u l l , and that f o r the present, at any rate, we can 
count on no counter-balancing receipts from our German or A l l i e d 
debtors...By agreeing to fund our debt to the United States 
Government we accept the certainty that we must make these con-
cessions to our A l l i e s without ourselves getting any benefit of 
the concessions which ult i m a t e l y the United States w i l l , have to 
make to Europe."3 
Despite t h i s formidable argument against sending a funding mission 
to the United States at that time, Horne nevertheless believed that t h i s 
1. P.R.O., Cab.24/137. C.P.4020, p.2. 
2. I b i d . , pp. 2-3. 
3. I b i d . , p.3. : 
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should be done,, and t h i s was the course of action which he recommended 
to the Cabinet. He gave a number of reasons* F i r s t l y , the agreement 
"expressed on the face of the demand obligations by which 
the debt i s at present represented requires us t o convert 
these obligations i n t o long-term bonds ' i f requested by 
the Secretary of the Treasury of the Unites States of 
America.1 "1 
Further, Home believed that i t would not be remotely p o l i t i c a l l y 
possible f o r the United States w i t h i n the next two or three years t o 
remit, cancel or exchange f o r French or German obligations any part 
of the B r i t i s h debt to America. Neither did Horne believe that B r i t a i n 
has anything to lose by s t a b i l i s i n g at once, i f i t be accepted that. 
B r i t a i n would have at some point to pay the American debt i n f u l l . 
On the contrary, 
"by funding now we w i l l be hastening the date at which i t 
w i l l be possible to s t a b i l i s e s t e r l i n g f i n a l l y at par." 
Once again, the importance of the B r i t i s h commitment t o return t o the 
Gold Standard at the pre-war p a r i t y at the earliest, opportunity i s obvious 
t o B r i t i s h policy i n other, connected matters. 
Home also f e l t that t o refuse the United States demand f o r funding 
could have unpleasant consequences, since to turn Congress against 
B r i t a i n when i t was about to discuss the T a r i f f and Shipping Subsidy 
B i l l s would be most unwise,: f o r unfavourable B i l l s could permanently 
damage Britain's trading position with the United States,, and aff e c t i n 
the process her a b i l i t y to repay the American debt at any time. Further-
more, a settlement of the Anglo-American debt problem would leave B r i t a i n 
more free to follow her own po l i c i e s over European reconstruction and 
German reparations; and i n addition, 
1. P.R.Q., Cab.24/137. CP.4020, p.3. 
2 . I b i d . 
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"...once our debt to the United States Government i s funded 
there is-much more chance that sentiment i n the United States 
w i l l move i n favour of cancellation or w r i t i n g down of the 
debts ©f France and the other A l l i e s , and the United States 
Administration may at l a s t f i n d i t s e l f able to co-operate 
e f f e c t i v e l y i n European affairs'."'' 
Home was no optimist about the l i k e l i h o o d of American i n i t i a t i v e i n 
Europe serving any useful purpose unless the B r i t i s h agreed to act f i r s t 
over funding: 
" I f the restoration of order i n Europe and the settlement 
of the problem of reparation has t o wait f o r American 
i n i t i a t i v e , there i s l i t t l e hope f o r Europe or f o r our 
unemployed."2 
He also said that an element i n f i n a n c i a l c i r c l e s feels strongly t h a t _ 
our cre d i t would lose more than our finance would gain by an cancel-
l a t i o n of our debt to the United States. But he finishes his memorandum, 
much of which seems sound and well-reasoned, with words which emphasise 
i n a most inte r e s t i n g way the difference between ways of thought i n 
Horne's e f f e c t i v e l y pre-Keynsian economic environment and those current 
i n our own: 
" . . . t h i s country's prosperity depends on i t s being able to f i n d 
markets f o r the surplus products which i t s people must be employed 
i n making...we must be able not only to f i n d markets f o r an amount 
of our goods and services s u f f i c i e n t to pay f o r the food and raw 
materials and luxuries which we wish to obtain from abroad, but 
also to f i n d means of placing abroad surplus capital i n order to 
enable our customers to absorb more of the goods and services 
which we produce.. From t h i s standpoint i t makes l i t t l e difference 
whether we- lend the c a p i t a l abroad or use i t to pay the i n t e r e s t 
a,nd p r i n c i p a l of our external debt. The difference arises mainly 
i n the degree of comfort and luxury of some of our own people, who 
get i n t e r e s t on t h e i r foreign investments i n the one case, and i n 
the other case pay additional taxation to enable the State to pay 
the foreign creditor."-^ 
There are a number of notable points i n t h i s statement, which i s why i t 
has been quoted at length; not least of which must be the reductio ad 
absurdem of suggesting that the sole difference to t h i s country of either 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
I b i d . 
I b i d . , p.4« 
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investing capital abroad or using surplus on revenue to service and 
pay o f f external debt would be that a few surtax payers would either 
be making more i n dividends or paying more i n taxation;, and that even 
t h i s would only affect the individuals concerned! 
Be that as i t may, the f i n a l paragraph of Home's memorandum re com-
mended that the Cabinet agree to the despatch of a funding mission as 
soon as possible to Washington, and t h i s memorandum was the primary 
focus f o r the discussion which took place i n Cabinet cn June 16th 1922. 
I t i s only occasionally that Cabinet minutes give names to opinions; 
the usual practice i s f o r the d i f f e r e n t strands of opinion and the general 
tone of the discussion to be outlined without individuals being mentioned, 
and t h i s was the case on t h i s occasion, so there i s no means of a t t r i b -
uting opinions to pa r t i c u l a r ministers. The f i r s t half of the Cabinet's 
recorded discussion consists i n what appears to be a summary of the 
Chancellor's own paper, so much i n accord with i t s sentiments are they. 
But the Chancellor's views about the necessity of sending a funding 
mission to the United States, while concurred with by most members of the 
Cabinet, were only accepted with an important r i d e r by one member, who 
urged; 
"...that while, no doubt, the B r i t i s h Government had agreed to 
the funding of the debt and to the payment to the United States 
Government or i t s assigns, i t was s t i l l open to the B r i t i s h 
Government to negotiate with a view to preventing i f possible, 
the funded debt being placed on the open market."^ 
The view that B r i t a i n could not without considerable dishonour and loss 
of prestige refuse to pay had considerable support: 
" . . . i t was inconceivable that Great B r i t a i n would ever place herself 
i n the humiliating position of being i n fact a defaulter to America. " 
On the other hand, i t was urged: 
1. 
3. 
I b i d . 
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"...that Great B r i t a i n should take up the position that i n no 
circumstances ought she to be given a less favourable treatment 
than that accorded by the United States Government to her other 
European debtors...Europe should present to America a United 
front...the l a t t e r should not be allowed to s e t t l e with her 
debtors i n d i v i d u a l l y . Even i f the United States would not 
relax her demands upon Great B r i t a i n , she might possibly be 
persuaded, as the result of a general settlement, to give more 
lenient treatment to her other debtors,"'' 
The suggestion was then made that as a re s u l t of the United States demand 
the most p r a c t i c a l course would be to d r a f t a despatch to the various 
European a l l i e s setting out the nature of the demand made by the United 
States, and indicating that while B r i t a i n thought the American policy 
mistaken, B r i t a i n would nevertheless be obliged i n consequence to exact 
some payment from the A l l i e s i n respect of t h e i r debts to B r i t a i n . The 
importance of such a communique being c a r e f u l l y worded was stressed. In 
addition, i t was suggested that a despatch to the United States also be 
drafted, saying that B r i t a i n would need to carry out certain consultat-
ions with her A l l i e s before responding to the American demand f o r B r i t i s h 
funding of her debt to the United Stated. 
In support of such a policy, i t was stressed that; 
"...public opinion i n Great B r i t a i n would severely c r i t i c i s e 
any proposals which would have the effect of compelling the 
B r i t i s h taxpayer to s a t i s f y the American debt while at the 
same time obtaining very l i t t l e , i f any, sat i s f a c t i o n out of 
the European debtors."2 
Further discussion, no details of which are given, followed,, and was 
concluded by a suggestion that: 
"...public opinion i n the United States of America had had l i t t l e 
or no opportunity of learning the strength of the B r i t i s h case 
and that i t was most important that the United States should 
realise that by i n s i s t i n g on the payment of the debt she would 
be making herself i n effe c t the tax-gatherer and rent-collector 
of the c i v i l i s e d world. 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/30, Cabinet meeting 29(22), 23 May, 1922. 
2. I b i d . 
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Eventually, the Cabinet agreed to the drawing up of two despatches;, one 
to the European A l l i e s , and one to the United States, along the l i n e s 
suggested i n the discussion. The communication to the A l l i e s was to 
refer to 
"...the demand made upon the B r i t i s h Government by the United 
States Government, recognising the obligation of the B r i t i s h 
Government i n the matter, and stating i n f u l l the reasons which 
made i t necessary f o r Great B r i t a i n to take similar measures 
against her European debtors...and should emphasise the necessity 
fo r similar treatment being accorded by the United States to a l l 
her European debtors."1 
The despatch to the United States was to acknowledge Great Bri t a i n ' s 
obligations to her Government and to inform that Government 
"...that Great B r i t a i n was not i n a position to make proposals 
for the funding of her debt u n t i l certain conversations with her 
All i e s on the kindred question of her European debts had been 
completed. 
Further Cabinet discussion took place on the Note during June and 
3 
July, and centred on two main questions: f i r s t l y , whether or not a 
mission should be sent to Washington i n the near future charged with 
funding the B r i t i s h debt to the United States, and secondly on the terms 
of the despatch to be sent to the A l l i e d debtors. The decision to under-
take a funding mission was taken and announced to the public during July,' 
but discussion on the A l l i e d despatch was reopened by the Prime Minister 
i n July following the catastrophic f a l l i n the mark„~ Following t h i s , 
the question was given a f u l l hearing at a Cabinet meeting on July 2 5 t h , 
and contrary to normal practice the Secretary was allowed to make a 
detailed record of the discussion. I t i s therefore possible to give 
names to opinions on thi s occasion at least. 
1 . PoRoO., Caba23/30. Cabinet meeting 29 ( 2 2 ) , 23 May, 1922. 
2 . I b i d . 
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I n 1920 the p r i n c i p a l proponents of the 'hard l i n e 1 with regard to 
our Continental A l l i e s had been Lloyd George and Churchill. The discussion 
i n 1922 showed the same pattern; neither seems to have changed t h e i r views 
1 
at a l l . The supporters of more generous terms had i n 1920 been Austen 
Chamberlain, backed by the Treasury, and Curzon at the Foreign Office. 
I n 1922 Curzon was away i l l , leaving Lord Balfour i n temporary charge 
at the Foreign Office. Balfour was largely i n favour of the policy of 
Lloyd George. Austen Chamberlain, by t h i s time Lord Privy Seal, s t i l l 
strenuously opposed anything but u n i l a t e r a l cancellation by a 'beau geste'. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer was i n favour of a funding mission, but 
was very wary of the attempts being made by Lloyd George i n pa r t i c u l a r to 
'shame' America i n t o behaving more l i b e r a l l y . Thus once again the Ministers 
who were to some extent influenced by the Treasury took a more l i b e r a l , and 
2 
at once more r e a l i s t i c l i n e than the rest of the Cabinet. 
3 
During the e a r l i e r discussions i n May and June Home, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, had deprecated any suggestion that America should be 
held up to obloquy i n the despatch which i t was proposed to send to our 
debtors, and he was not happy wi t h the f i r s t d r a f t which Balfour presented 
to the Cabinet. Backed by Sir Auckland Geddes, Ambassador to Washington, 
who was present at and made a considerable contribution to the second 
meeting at which the d r a f t was discussed, the Cabinet decided to allow 
these two to assist Balfour i n v e t t i n g the document f o r any phrases that 
1 . I n addition to his natural i n c l i n a t i o n s , Churchill's support of Lloyd 
George at t h i s time probably owes something to the pact between himself, 
Lord Birkenhead and Lloyd George. See Lord Beaverbrook, The Decline and 
F a l l of Lloyd George (London: Collins, 1963), p. 101-2. 
2. P.R.O., Cab.23/30. Cabinet meeting 36(22), 30 June, 1 9 2 2 . 
3. See above, pp. 244-250. 
4 . P.R.O., Cab.23/30. Cabinet meetings 36(22), 30 June, 1 9 2 2 , 
38(22), 7 July, 1 9 2 2 . 
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might be taken amiss by American opinion. As a r e s u l t , one important 
change was made, i n the penultimate sentence of the Note. This had 
e a r l i e r read: 
"They [the B r i t i s h Government] content themselves with saying 
that, so deeply are they convinced of the economic i n j u r y 
i n f l i c t e d on the world by the existing state of things that, 
i f any general plan were proposed by which the question could 
be dealt with as a whole, Great B r i t a i n would be prepared for 
her part to abandon any claim to repayment of the loans she has 
made, and a l l her rights i n German reparation, provided similar-
treatment was meted out to her."^ 
The c r u c i a l phrase was, of course, contained i n the l a s t eight words of 
the passage quoted. The moral blackmail on the United States would have 
been much resented by her, as indeed the implication of i t alone was to 
3 
be, to a l e s s e r extent. Geddes and Home i n s i s t e d that t h i s be changed, 
so as to imply that a general settlement involving cancellation might be 
possible even i f the Americans were not prepared to co-operate. The 
sentence as f i n a l l y drafted read: 
"They content themselves with saying that, so deeply are they 
convinced of the economic i n j u r y i n f l i c t e d on the world by the 
existing state of things that, Great B r i t a i n for her part 
(subject to the j u s t claims of other parts of the Empire) 
would be prepared to abandon a l l her rights to German repar • 
ation and a l l her claims to repayment by her A l l i e s , provided 
that some general plan were proposed by which t h i s great 
question could be dealt with s a t i s f a c t o r i l y as a whole."4-
I n addition to the discussion i n the Cabinet 3 and the opposition of 
Chamberlain and Horne to h i s policy, Lloyd George had other dissenters 
to contend with. His own private secretary, S i r Edward Grigg, was firmly 
i n favour of B r i t a i n being an 'honest debtor' v i s - a v i s the Americans, 
and a magnanimous v i c t o r and a l l y to the Continental countries, along the 
li n e s of Blackett's 'beau geste'. He wrote a l e t t e r to the Prime Minister 
on the subject on July 7th, supporting Blackett and suggesting that C i t y 
opinion e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y concurred with his ideas. 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/30, Cabinet meeting 38/22, 7 July, 1922. 
2. I b i d . , Appendix I I I . 
3. See below, p. 262. . 
7^ P.R.O.. Cab.24/138. C.P.4112. 17 Feb., 1922, p.4. 
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The substance of Grigg's thesis was that the Americans regard us as 
both a superior and a clever people: the former i s one reason why they 
lent us so much i n the f i r s t place, rather than doing more lending 
1 
dir e c t to the A l l i e s ; the l a t t e r i s responsible f o r the f a c t that they 
did not t r u s t us diplomatically to be plain-speaking, and would not 
believe our pleas of poverty. He suggested that a l l mention of the 
United States should be removed from the Balfour Note, and we should 
send a copy to the United States accompanied by a l e t t e r o f f e r i n g to 
send a funding mission at once. Grigg regarded any suggestion of 
default with horror: 
"...not to fund and pay i t [the U.S. debtj would be a blow to 
B r i t i s h c r e d i t and a slur on B r i t i s h character almost as 
intolerable as i f we had shirked the War i n 1914. 
He talked i n terms of 'demeaning ourselves by saying our c r e d i t i s 
dependent on the European bankrupts'. He believed that what he c a l l s 
'manoeuvring' - the policy advocated by Churchill and L l j y d George <- i s 
not worth i t either from a moral or a f i n a n c i a l standpoint. 
"Blackett t e l l s me that the whole City would rather pay every 
penny of our debt than face the loss of credit of t r y i n g to 
manoeuvre ourselves out of i t . " ^ 
On the subject of the A l l i e d debts, he said: 
"Everyone knows we do not mean to c o l l e c t them...we can f a i r l y 
therefore use them to set an example and give a lead. That i s 
the only kind of appeal to which the U.S.A. w i l l respond...this 
i s a question i n which the City of London, that fortress of 
reaction, actually desires and demands the l i b e r a l course!"^ 
1. B r i t a i n had always asserted that the only reason we needed to borrow 
i n the United States was because the A l l i e s borrowed so much from us. 
I n a sense t h i s i s true, since B r i t a i n was a net creditor on War 
account; but the A l l i e s borrowed from us to purchase supplies here, 
i n s t e r l i n g , while we borrowed dollars from the United States t o 
purchase supplies there, so a further problem might have resulted 
even i f the A l l i e s had been more solvent. 
2 . Lloyd George Papers,F/86/2/4., 7 July, 1922. This correspondence, 
together with the e d i t o r i a l s of the time, seem to dispose of the 
suggestion that City anger at the Balfour note was due to the f a c t 
that the bankers expected s t i l l to wring large sums from Europe. 
See W.N.Medlicott, B r i t i s j i ^ b r e i g n Policy m r ^ - 4 f e r^ai - 1 . 1^8 ^ ^ ^ - t 9 6 3 ~ ' 
, (2nd--ed^^—Loridtm^~Me"^^ 45- '49. 
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Grigg was so sure of the importance of his views that he took the unusual 
step, after informing his chief that he was doing so, of sending a copy 
of his memorandum to Lord Balfour, with a covering note, i n which he 
emphasised t h a t , by manoeuvring, 
"we present ourselves to Europe and to the U.S.A. as an insincere 
and dishonest middleman, at a moment when a great example i s the 
only chance of saving collapse - not to say the only course 
worthy of a great nation."1 
He went on to repeat that i n r e a l i t y we did not intend t o col l e c t the 
debts of the A l l i e s , and we did mean to pay the United States. 
"We are therefore abandoning the great and generous l i n e , not to 
avoid any re a l loss or danger, but simply i n order to manoeuvre."'' 
As might be expected, Sir Basil Blackett was a strong c r i t i c of the 
policy outlined i n the Balfour Note. He was apparently not available at 
the Treasury i n May to assist i n the b r i e f i n g of the Chancellor - the 
2 
relevant memoranda were submitted through Niemeyer, who was to succeed 
Blackett as Controller l a t e r i n the year ~ but i n July Blackett wrote 
3 
d i r e c t to Lloyd George on the subject. He also, as we have seens made 
his views p l a i n to Lloyd George's private secretary. 
Blackett ss memorandum i s a sound and reasoned c r i t i q u e of the Balfour 
Note, as d i f f e r e n t from Grigg !s impassioned pleading as i t would be poss-
i b l e to imagine, and yet by no means lacking i n warmth and s i n c e r i t y . He 
appealed to Lloyd George to reconsider the Cabinet decision which led to 
the f i r s t d r a f t of the Note. He regarded the policy as fundamentally 
insincere, since i t could not be carried out, and suggested that there 
were two choices, and two only, facing the Government. Either B r i t a i n 
could agree to fund and pay the United States debt, leaving her a free 
hand to deal with Europe; or she could say that she cannot deal with the 
1. Lloyd George Papers, F/86/2./5. 8 July, 1922. 
2. P.R.O., T.I72/1288. 
3 . Lloyd George Papers, F/86/2./8. 12 July, 1922. 
United States debt separately from the whole i n t e r - A l l i e d debt structure. 
The policy set out i n the Balfour Note was a t h i r d l i n e , and an impossible 
one. The Note said, we w i l l only attempt to c o l l e c t from our A l l i e s what 
we need i n order to pay the Americans what they demand from us. But, 
Blackett asserted, we cannot c o l l e c t from the A l l i e s what we owe America. 
Even assuming a favourable funding of the United States debt, we could 
not have expected better terms than to pay £850 m i l l i o n at Uk% over 25 
1 
years. This meant an annual payment of £57 m i l l i o n . Even i f the United 
States were content to receive payments over f i f t y years, t h i s would s t i l l 
involve an annual payment of £43 m i l l i o n . 
Thus even on the most favourable assumptions, B r i t a i n was committed 
by the Note to demanding £4-3 m i l l i o n each year from the Continent. France 
was already committed to demanding £1 ,500 m i l l i o n from the Germans for 
herself, to cover sums already l a i d out i n costs of occupation and of 
repairing the devastated areas; without the receipt of t h i s sum the 
French budget could never be balanced. Thus Germany would i n any case 
be l i a b l e for t h i s £ 1 , 5 0 0 m i l l i o n . In addition, the A l l i e s would say 
that they could not pay anything to B r i t a i n unless they f i r s t receive 
reparation from Germany of the same amount. Thus the Germans would be 
l i a b l e for the French £1,500 million, and for the £850 m i l l i o n B r i t a i n 
was demanding. Making a moderate allowance for other claims t h i s gave 
a t o t a l of about £2,750 m i l l i o n . This does not include any provision 
for Continental debt to the United States. But t h i s figure alone would 
require annual payments by Germany of £184 m i l l i o n over 25 years, or 
£139 m i l l i o n over 50 years. 
1. The settlement eventually reached involved us i n an annual payment 
of £33 m i l l i o n for the f i r s t ten years and £38 m i l l i o n thereafter. 
But t h i s simply involves reducing B l a c k e t t 1 s estimates of the 
Germans1 consequent l i a b i l i t y by £10 m i l l i o n p.a„, not a consid-
erable sum i n the context. See S i r Albert Feavearyear, The Pound 
Sterling (2nd edn; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 6 3 ) , p, ~*57. 
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Blackett went on to point out that even the present Schedule of Payments 
did not demand a sum as large as £184 million i n the years before German 
exports revive; and the smaller sum was only a l i t t l e smaller than the 
sum due i n the current year, which was proving quite beyond German 
capacityo Since, he said, we are committed to persuading the French to 
accept a big reduction i n reparations payments i n the i n t e r e s t s of 
European c i v i l i s a t i o n , could we r e a l l y pretend to expect Europe to pay 
over the equivalent of our debts to the United States? But t h i s question 
of the f i n a n c i a l f e a s i b i l i t y of the Balfour Note i n the absence of 
American concessions, had not r e a l l y been discussed by Cabinet,,— .It was-
becoming clearer that the Note, was r e a l l y a version of the 'Big Stick's 
to be used to belabour American meanness on the one hand, and French 
selfishness over reparations on the other. Blackett regarded t h i s attitude 
as wholely mistaken and l i k e l y to have harmful e f f e c t s . 
"A sincere policy of funding our debt to the U.S.A. preparatory 
to a settlement with Europe designed to rescue Europe from Chaos 
might well bring the U.S.A. i n to our help. An insincere policy 
W i l l have the reverse e f f e c t . And i f we r e a l l y mean to t r y and 
save Europe and are merely venting our preliminary grumble before 
doing so, i s i t worth while to begin by p i l l o r y i n g American 
selfishness?"'' 
Thus when the Cabinet discussed the matter again at length at the 
end of July, Lloyd George had before him not only the advice of his 
Cabinet, but also that of some i n f l u e n t i a l outsiders. I n addition, as 
we have noted, there was the influence of the f a l l i n the German mark, 
which had become serious; from 771 to the pound on January 1st 1922 i t 
had f a l l e n to 1188 by June 1st, 1750 by July 1st, and during July and 
August experienced another catastrophic f a l l to 5725 on September 1st. 
°2 
By the end of the year i t had f a l l e n to 3400^ Thus the problem of 
European reconstruction had reached a c r i t i c a l stage. But i t i s apparent 
1 ap 
P.R.O., Cab.24/140. C.P.4348, 5 Dec, 1922 , p.2. 
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from the Cabinet's deliberations that the combined effect of a l l these 
influences had had no e f f e c t at a l l on Lloyd George. 
Lord Balfour began the discussion by saying that there had o r i g -
i n a l l y been unanimous approval of the policy of the Balfour Note, but 
subsequently there had been some doubts, p a r t l y about the wisdom of t h i s 
method of treating America, and p a r t l y because of the current position 
2 
of the mark. Home objected to t h i s , saying that he had always been i n 
favour of t r e a t i n g American demands on a basis of equality, and not 
pleading poverty; but he had been alone i n his opinion, Chamberlain 
being absent on that occasion, and since the policy had been accepted 
by the Cabinet he had confined further c r i t i c i s m to the exact form of the 
d r a f t dispatch. Horne went on to say that he regarded Lloyd George's 
avowed determination to 'rebuke' America as a profound mistake, and 
3 
l i k e l y to have serious effects on public opinion there. 
Horne then went on to say that he f e l t that the f a l l i n the mark 
profoundly affected the s i t u a t i o n . I t made i t s t i l l more imperative 
that we should persuade the French to scale down the reparation demands; 
but the French would r e t o r t that they cannot l e t Germany o f f i f they are 
expected to pay B r i t a i n and America. 
"In e f f e c t Germany would become the sole debtor, and hor position 
would be made much worse. The Mark would f a l l s t i l l f u r t h e r , and 
we should see Germany t r a v e l l i n g i n the track of Austria. "4-
Lloyd George's reply to t h i s was that i f that happened, America would be 
primarily responsible. But Horne stressed that i n his view the American 
bankers cared l i t t l e f o r Europe, and the policy embodied i n the despatch 
5 
would make the s i t u a t i o n i n f i n i t e l y worse. 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/30. Cabinet meeting 4 2 ( 2 2 ) , 25 July, 1922. 
2. I b i d . 3. I b i d . 
4 . I b i d . 5 . I b i d . 
At t h i s point Churchill saw f i t to remind the Cabinet that the 
policy i t s e l f had already been discussed twice and approved by an over-
whelming majority. The f i r s t part of the policy, that of informing 
Washington that we intended to send a funding mission i n September, 
had already been carried out. He thought i t hardly s a t i s f a c t o r y that 
the despatch, which constituted the second part, and an i n t e g r a l one-, 
of the same policy, had been withheld. He did not agree that the 
despatch would have any harmful ef f e c t , other than causing a l i t t l e 
i r r i t a t i o n to the Americans at f i r s t . He urged the Cabinet not to go 
back on the policy: 
" I t would be a cruel wrong to the B r i t i s h people to force them 
to give up a l l that was owing to them while at the same time 
compelling them to pay every farthing they owed."'' 
On t h i s occasion Chamberlain, by now Privy Seal, was present; and 
he backed Home to the h i l t . He said that he f u l l y agreed with h i s 
colleagues i n t h e i r d i s l i k e of the American attitude. I t was s e l f i s h , 
even insolent. But i t would not change overnight. 
"We had invited the United States to j o i n i n a general treatment 
of the problem. They had refused, and had declared that i t was 
not t h e i r policy to do so; i t was the duty of borrowers to pay..."' 
Having made t h i s suggestion and had i t rejected, Chamberlain regarded i t 
as undignified and incompatible with our position as a world power 
"...to ask again, and as a favour, what had been refused to us 
when advanced i n the i n t e r e s t s of world peace. 
In addition, Chamberlain was a f r a i d that, unless the idea of remission 
came at the Americans' own i n s t i g a t i o n , l i f e would not be worth l i v i n g , 
since i t would be possible 
"...for Americans on every suitable occasion i n future to boast 
that they had l e t us off."4 
.1. P.R.O., Cab.23/30. Cabinet meeting 42(22), 25 July 1922. 
2. I b i d . 3. I b i d . 
4-.. I b i d . 
He thought that the subsequent loss of credit would be disastrous. He 
also thought that the despatch would have a serious effe c t on public 
opinion i n the United States, and i n Europe. Far from being g r a t e f u l 
at being l e t o f f part of t h e i r debt, he thought that the a t t i t u d e of 
the European A l l i e s would be similar to ours to the United States, but 
with added bitterness. He agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
that publication of the despatch would add to the disasters of Europe. 
"We would be regarded as gibbeting the United States before the 
world. They might deserve t h a t , but i t was a mad policy to 
pursue; i t would destroy our good relations with the United 
States, and would increase the d i s l i k e (already considerable) 
f e l t f o r England i n France and Italy."'' 
Lloyd George, however, while conceding that i t was sensible to 
discuss the policy of the Note i t s e l f again i n the l i g h t of the currency 
c r i s i s i n Germany, stated that his view had not altered at a l l . He f e l t 
i t should be made clear the extent to which we were being generous to 
Europe, and that we should stand up to America and state the s i t u a t i o n 
exactly as we saw i t . Nothing was to be gained by cringing. Nor was 
i t f a i r to allow the B r i t i s h people to undergo penal levels of taxation 
while the European Al l i e s got o f f scot-free; he was not convinced that 
we should not get something from France. 
"...our policy should be put forward as an attempt to wipe out 
inte r n a t i o n a l indebtedness i n order to give the world a fresh 
s t a r t . The Americans were ignorant of some of the great facts 
of the War. They had no idea of the magnitude of the war e f f o r t 
of the Allies...The publication of t h i s document, and the controv-
ersy to which i t would give r i s e , would have important educational 
results on American opinion."^ 
Unfortunately, Lloyd George and Churchill, with t h e i r arguments about 
equity, were missing the point. Everyone agreed that the behaviour of 
America was s e l f i s h , and that the French were making a very bad job of 
acting the poverty-stricken indigent. That was not i n dispute. But 
1 . P.R.O., Cab.23/30. Cabinet meeting - 4 2 ( 2 2 ) , 25 Juljr, 1 9 2 2 . 
2 . I b i d . ______ — 
B r i t a i n had done a l l she could to influence these nations to her way cf 
thinking, without success. The only hope was f o r B r i t a i n to espouse a 
policy which did not depend on the other A l l i e s f o r success. Be that 
as i t may, the Cabinet was influenced by Lloyd George and Churchill, 
not by Home and Chamberlain, and the d r a f t despatch was approved, 
subject to certain minor amendments aimed at toning down the references 
to the United States and at stressing the amount which B r i t a i n was i n 
fa c t r e m i t t i n g . However, Sir Robert Home and Austen Chamberlain asked 
1 
that t h e i r disapproval be formally recorded. 
The despatch was published on the 1st of August, and reactions from 
B r i t i s h and foreign sources were quickly forthcoming. On the whole the 
Note was universally i l l - r e c e i v e d , although European reaction was some-
2 
what modified l a t e r . The French continued to i n s i s t that the claims of 
the Devastated areas ought to come before there was any question of 
repaying A l l i e d debt incurred f o r the common cause. The I t a l i a n s cont-
inued to press f o r all-round cancellation with or without the United 
States. There i s some evidence that American attitudes towards the 
B r i t i s h hardened following the Note, and one correspondent reported that 
while i t was becoming clear to the Americans that the debt of the Contin-
ental A l l i e s was a w r i t e - o f f , that of B r i t a i n was not so regarded, and i t 
was important f o r the B r i t i s h Government to realise t h i s . 
1. P.R.O., Cab.23/30. Cabinet meeting 4-2(22), 25 July, 1922. The despatch 
was published i n t h i s country as Cmd.1737 (London:H.M.S,0..1922). 
2. P.R.O., T.160/1U/A399/1. 
3. Times, 3 Aug.,1922. Lloyd George had had an early 
i n d i c a t i o n of the acclaim which u n i l a t e r a l cancellation might have 
brought him. Apparently a report that B r i t a i n was proposing to remit 
some A l l i e d debt i n r e t u r n f o r a reduction i n reparation demands 
reached America early i n July 1922, and was hailed enthusiastically 
by the American press. The Globe said: "with one magnificent stroke 
Great B r i t a i n has cut through the web of hatred, selfishness which 
i s keeping Europe prostrate". Lloyd George Papers, F/86/5/7. 
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I n B r i t a i n , c r i t i c i s m centred on the implication that America was being 
p i l l o r i e d . The Economist thought that the Note would have an unfavourable effe c t 
i n America, since i t placed at her door the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r all-round cancel-
l a t i o n . I t would have been better to cancel the A l l i e d debt anyway, and hope f o r 
1 
American clemency; the main thing was to get the tangle unravelled. The leader 
w r i t e r thought that Lloyd George had missed an opportunity by tying everything to 
the United States debt, and that the Balfour Note was worse than useless i n Lloyd 
2 
George's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
I t i s in t e r e s t i n g to note that, while on the whole public opinion on repar-
ations and i n t e r - A l l i e d debt seems to have mellowed between 1 9 2 0 , when the Blackett 
plan was f i r s t discussed, and 1 9 2 2 , when the Balfour Note was despatched, the 
attitude of Cabinet members had on the whole hardened. Blackett's plan was barely 
mentioned during the 1922 discussions; the Cabinet was unanimous except f o r Home, 
and, when he was present, Sir Austen Chamberlain. I t i s possible that had Curzon's 
i l l n e s s not removed him from the fr a y , i n favour of Balfour, who applauded the 
Note which bears his name, the more l i b e r a l policy might at least have had a few 
more adherents. But i t seems that the Cabinet was becoming increasingly impatient 
with the intransigence of i t s European A l l i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the French. The Cabinet's 
approach i n 1920 had at least p a r t l y been distinguished by an eagerness to assist-
i n European reconstruction f o r i t s own sake. By 1 9 2 2 , the mood had become one of 
disgruntled resignation to the importunities of the Continental A l l i e s . For 
Blackett himself i t must have been a considerable irony that one of his l a s t acts 
as Controller of Finance, before leaving f o r India i n October 1 9 2 2 , was to draw up 
a detailed memorandum to show the way i n which the Balfour Note was to be 
implemented. 
1 . Economist XCV, 5 Aug., 1 9 2 3 . 
2 . I b i d . , 12 Aug., 1 9 2 2 . 
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As a counterpart t o the B a l f o u r Note, the Cabinet also agreed t o send a 
funding mission t o America, headed by the Chancellor, Horne. The f a l l o f the 
C o a l i t i o n i n October, 1922, and the imminence of a General E l e c t i o n changed the 
s i t u a t i o n , however, and i n the event i t was Baldwin, Chancellor i n the new 
1 
Conservative a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , who went to Washington. He was accompanied by h i s 
p r i v a t e secretary from the Treasury, Grigg, and by another Treasury o f f i c i a l , 
Ernest Rowe-Dutton, as w e l l as by the Governor of the Bank, Montagu Norman. 
I t i s notable t h a t the Treasury o f f i c i a l s who accompanied the p a r t y were of 
j u n i o r s t a t u s ; the mission was to be conducted a t M i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l , w i t h the 
r o l e of the o f f i c i a l s being confined to the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t e c h n i c a l d e t a i l s 
when requested. I n e f f e c t , the Departmental Treasury had no policy-making r o l e 
t o play at t h i s stage. 
Under the terms of the Funding Act, the American Debt Commission was author-
i s e d t o n e g o t i a t e funding a t 4-?$ i n t e r e s t . Opinion i n the Cabinet h e l d t h a t t h i s 
was an i n o r d i n a t e l y high r a t e f o r a long-term loan of complete s e c u r i t y , and indeed 
Bonar Law, the new Prime M i n i s t e r , was encouraged by Harvey, the American Ambassador 
i n London, t o b e l i e v e t h a t the Commission might be prepared t o d i s r e g a r d i t s 
i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the extent of n e g o t i a t i n g a settlement on a 2js% basis. Accordingly, 
Bonar Law i n s t r u c t e d Baldwin v e r b a l l y t o s e t t l e as he thought f i t , provided the 
2 
annual payment d i d not exceed £25 m i l l i o n . 
The mission f o r m a l l y consisted of Baldwin, Norman and Geddes, the B r i t i s h 
Ambassador i n Washington. At the e a r l y meetings w i t h the Commission, the atmosphere 
was r e l a t i v e l y favourable, and Geddes t o l d Baldwin t h a t he thought the Commission 
might be prepared t o agree t o an annuity of about £30 m i l l i o n . Baldwin telegraphed 
1. P.R.O., T.172/1288. 
2. J. Barnes and K. Middlemass, Baldwin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 
p. 136. 
Bonar Law f o r a u t h o r i t y t o agree t o such a proposal, since i t was £5 m i l l i o n 
mere than Bonar Law had o r i g i n a l l y suggested. Eonar Law agreed, on c o n d i t i o n 
} 2 t h a t the p e r i o d of payment was not more than f i f t y years. 
I n f o r m a l discussions and meetings continued f o r several days, u n t i l on the 
12th of January the Commission announced t h a t i t had a d e f i n i t e o f f e r t o make. 
This i n v o l v e d an i n t e r e s t r a t e of 3g#, together w i t h a m o r t i z a t i o n of the p r i n c i p a l 
over 61 years, making an annual payment of $181 m i l l i o n f o r 61 years. Baldwin 
t o l d the Commission t h a t he had been given a u t h o r i s a t i o n t o agree t o a maximum 
annual payment of $14-0 m i l l i o n , and t h a t i f the Commission could not make a 
3 
b e t t e r o f f e r he would have t o consult f u r t h e r w i t h London. 
Bonar Law's r e p l y , when Baldwin t o l d him of the Commission's o f f e r , was 
u n y i e l d i n g . He f e l t t h a t the terms were q u i t e unreasonable, both as between 
two f r i e n d l y n a t i o n s , and as between debtor and c r e d i t o r , and t h a t the proposal, 
was more harsh than a commercial f i r m would have employed w i t h a customer. He 
concluded, 
" I f a settlement i s not obtainable on terms which seem t o us 
reasonable, you have no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o ask f o r f u r t h e r time 
f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n and r e t u r n . "4-
Baldwin was most u n w i l l i n g t o leave matters i n t h i s s t a t e , because he believed 
i t would be di s a s t r o u s i f n e g o t i a t i o n s were broken o f f a t t h a t p o i n t . He had. 
f u r t h e r discussions w i t h Geddes and Norman, from which i t emerged t h a t Geddes 
believed the Commission might go as f a r as a 3% basis w i t h 66 years a m o r t i z a t i o n . 
Baldwin thought t h a t he should be authorised t o proceed on t h a t b a s i s , and t h a t 
even i f the Commission refused t o accept t h i s proposal i t was one which would seem 
f a i r t o most Americans, and would enable the mission t o withdraw honourably and 
wit h o u t danger of damaging r e l a t i o n s between B r i t a i n and the United States. He 
5 
a c c o r d i n g l y telegraphed Baldwin t o ask f o r h i s agreement t o t h i s p lan. 
1. P.R.O., T.16O/365/557/1. Baldwin t o Bonar Law, 8 Jan., 1923 . 
2 . I b i d . , Bonar Law t o Baldwin, 9 Jan., 1923 . 
3. I b i d . , Baldwin t o Bonar Law, 12 Jan . - , - 1923 -»— 
I b i d . , Bonar Law t o Baldwin, 13 Jan., 1923 . 
5 . I b i d . . Baldwin t o Bonar Law, 13 Jan., 1 9 2 3 . 
2 6 5 . 
Bonar Law was unable to c a l l a Cabinet i n time to reply to Baldwin's request 
before the next meeting with the Commission. He d i d , however, agree to put the 
proposal to the Cabinet i f i n addition the arrears of in t e r e s t were remitted. 
But he was reluctant to go even t h i s f a r : 
" . . . I believe we both think the proposal i s most ungenerous, we 
might easily pay too big a price f o r a momentary increase i n 
goodwill between the countries...There would also be the strongest 
possible objection to making such a proposal unless i t were certain 
to be accepted as i t would be almost impossible to attempt to improve 
i t i n the f u t u r e . For t h i s reason i f you are not to sueceed would i t 
not be better to end (the) discussion on t h e i r proposal rather than 
commit ourselves to (a) plan."'' 
On receiving t h i s telegram, Baldwin had a private conversation with Mellon, 
the Secretary to the American Treasury, and on his advice made a formal proposal 
to the Commission on the basis of Bonar Law's authorisation. The Commission, 
however, would reduce the rate of interest from 3g$ to 3$ for the f i r s t ten years 
only, and the only other concession they made was to o f f e r to recalculate the back 
inte r e s t at Lffi instead of 5%, whereas Bonar Law had proposed that i t should be 
remitted altogether. Baldwin, however, agreed with his colleagues that these were 
the best terms which they could hope f o r , and recommended t h e i r acceptance to 
2 
Bonar Law. 
Bonar Law's reply, which had the support of the small group of the Cabinet 
which was a l l that could be called i n the time available, was wholeheartedly 
against acceptance. He t o l d Baldwin that the Cabinet had decided to i n s t r u c t him: 
"...to inform the American Government that the terms which they put 
forward go f a r beyond anything contemplated by you when you l e f t 
England, and that you are not empowered to accept them, but that you 
must return at once to discuss the matter with His Majesty's Government 
i n person."3 
I n a private telegram sent the same day, Bonar Law urged Baldwin not to defer too 
much to the Americans: 
"Is i t not possible that you are too much under the influence of 
Washington which i s not even the New York atmosphere? What would 
you have thought of such proposals before you l e f t ? " 4 
1 . P . R . O . , T . I 6 0 / 3 6 5 / 5 5 7 / 1. Bonar Law to B a l d w i n , 13 Ji*U, T9g3 . 
"2^  I b i d . , Baldwin to Bonar Law, 15 Jan., 1923. 
3 . I b i d . . Bonar Law to Baldwin, 16 Jan., 1923. 
4 . Barnes and Middlemass, Baldwin, p. 14.2. 
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I t was impossible f o r Baldwin to ignore such e x p l i c i t i n s t r u c t i o n s , and 
he conveyed them to the Commission. I t was decided that Baldwin should state 
formally at the next meeting of the Commission that he wished discussions to 
be adjourned while he returned home for discussions with the Cabinet. The 
mission l e f t f o r home on the 20th of January. When the boat docked at 
Southampton, Baldwin was assailed by jou r n a l i s t s with a multitude of questions, 
and, whether through inexperience or naivety, was more frank than was advisable, 
both about the stage negotiations had reached and about the vagaries of American 
opinion. This, together with the f a c t that the terms f i n a l l y offered by the 
Commission had been made public i n America, served to harden the s i t u a t i o n and 
1 
to put the B r i t i s h Government i n a rather d i f f i c u l t position. 
On his return, Baldwin had a private interview with Bonar Law attended only 
by Harvey, the American ambassador; apparently Baldwin made no attempt to defend 
himself or his actions, and was s i l e n t v i r t u a l l y throughout. The formal discussion 
with the Cabinet came a l i t t l e l a t e r . No o f f i c i a l record was kept of t h i s 
2 
meeting; the Cabinet minutes merely record the f a c t that discussion took place. 
But Viscount Davidson, then J.C.T. Davidson, Bonar Law's private secretary, has 
3 
given an account of the proceedings. 
The majority of the Cabinet f e l t that the settlement was the best that was 
l i k e l y to be obtained, and supported Baldwin i n his wish to accept the proposals, 
Bonar Law found himself almost alone i n his opposition,, but made i t clear that he 
would resign i f his colleagues insiste d on the settlement. Eventually the 
discussion was adjourned u n t i l the following day. 
The next morning, the whole Cabinet with the exception of Bonar Law met i n 
Lord Cave's room at the House of Lords; the Ministers were almost unanimous that 
default on the debt would now be even more serious than Bonar Law's resignation, 
1„ Barnes and Middlemass, Baldwin. pp. 14.3-4-. 
2. P.R.O., Cab. 23/45. Minutes of Cabinet meeting (4 )23. 
3 . Barnes and Middlemass, op. c i t . . p—J44-* — 
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and since default was the only r e a l alternative to accepting Baldwin's settlement, 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s which would follow Bonar Law's resignation would have to be faced. 
A small group was deputed to go and see Bonar Law and t e l l him of the feeling of 
his colleagues, and to t r y to persuade him not to resign, Bonar Law relented, 
p a r t l y on the recommendation of McKenna, who had o r i g i n a l l y advised against 
accepting the settlement, and then changed his mind on the grounds that City 
i 
opinion was strongly i n favour. Bonar Law, however, took the unprecedented 
step of b i t t e r l y attacking the policy of his own government i n an anonymous 
n 2 
l e t t e r to the Times. 
I n the event, i t has been estimated that B r i t a i n was the only A l l i e d country 
to pay out more than she received on account of war debt. The funding mission of 
1923 committed B r i t a i n to paying £33 m i l l i o n annually f o r the f i r s t ten years and 
3 
£38 m i l l i o n annually f o r the next f i f t y - o n e years. When Britain's debtors f i n a l l y 
settled up t h e i r payments gave r i s e to an annual flow of £42 m i l l i o n , so that when 
these payments were at t h e i r height B r i t a i n had a small surplus on t h i s account. 
But since B r i t a i n started paying f i r s t , overall she paid out approximately 
£134 m i l l i o n more than she received, whereas France benefitted on balance by about 
£163 m i l l i o n . ^ 
As for the Americans themselves, t h e i r heavy investments i n Germany i n the 
nineteen-twenties permitted the flow of reparation payments, and default was 
postponed u n t i l indemnity payments were f i n a l l y repudiated by H i t l e r i n 1933» 
Throughout the period 192-4-32 Germany was receiving large sums of long-term 
c a p i t a l , and u n t i l 1929, except f o r 1926, she was a net receiver of short—term 
c a p i t a l as w e l l . The inflow reached a peak i n 192? and 1928, when receipts of 
about $1 ,000 m i l l i o n of short- and long-term c a p i t a l were recorded.'' The United 
1„ Barnes and Middlemass, Baldwin, p. 147. 
2. A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-194-5 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 6 5 ) , 
p. 203 . 
3 . Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling , p. 35V. y?_ • 
4 . A. Youngson, The B r i t i s h Economy 1920-57 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1 9 6 0 ) , p. 5 2 . ~ 
5 . International Capital Movements during the Inter-War Period (New York: 
United Nations, 1 9 4 9 ) , p. 1 9 . 2 6 8 . 
States was a net lender almost throughout the 'twenties: i n a l l the years 1924-8 
her outflow of long-term capital exceeded #500 m i l l i o n and i n 1928 the t o t a l 
1 
capital outflow was over #1,100 m i l l i o n . This despite the fact that during 
t h i s period B r i t a i n and the Continental A l l i e s repaid a t o t a l of about £450 
2 
m i l l i o n loaned to them by the United States. B r i t a i n also consistently l o s t 
c a pital during t h i s period; there was a net outflow i n every year from 1924-30 
except f o r 1926, the amounts varying from #574 m i l l i o n i n the highest year, 
1929, to #112 m i l l i o n i n the lowest, 1930. France also experienced a net 
outflow i n every year from 1924 -28 . 
Thus throughout the nineteen-twenties, although there were some receipts 
from the A l l i e s , on balance B r i t a i n paid out more than she gained, and i n any 
case there was a considerable outflow of c a p i t a l on other accounts as w e l l . 
This was only possible because by 1924 she had brought her current account back 
in t o the healthy surplus which i t sustained i n every year up to 1931 , except, 
once again, f o r 1926, the year of the General Strike. But i t i s arguable that 
the policy of all-round u n i l a t e r a l cancellation advocated by the Treasury and 
the Chancellors of the Exchequer would probably have cost B r i t a i n no more i n 
money terms, and would certainly have contributed much to the restoration of 
Europe. I t i s c e r t a i n l y feasible to maintain that the f a c t of being forced to 
make large reparation payments, which were only i n f a c t possible because of 
American loans, had a disastrous e f f e c t on the reputation and coherence of 
the embryonic democratic government I n Germany. 
1. International Capital Movements during the Inter-War Period, p. 1 8 . 
2 . A. Youngson, The B r i t i s h Economy 1920 -57 . p. 52 . 
3- International Capital Movements, p. 1 9 . 
4. I b i d . 
5 . I b i d . 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DEBT REDEMPTION AND INTEREST RATE POLICY 
1920-5 
Treasury Monetary Policy after the War 
One of the most notable changes brought about by the war I n the 
f i n a n c i a l and economic f i e l d s was the enormous increase i n Government 
influence on monetary policy,, Before the war governments r e a l l y had no 
1 
need of a monetary policy as such; changes i n Bank Rate were a matter 
f o r the Bank alone, and the volume of central government debt was very 
2 3 small. The f l o a t i n g debt i n p a r t i c u l a r was of i n s i g n i f i c a n t size. 
The course of the war wrought a complete change i n t h i s picture,, Not 
only did the size of the National Debt increase to ten times i t s pre-
war f i g u r e , and the f l o a t i n g debt r i s e from £1~5 m i l l i o n i n Treasury B i l l s 
at the outbreak of the war to £1,095 m i l l i o n i n Treasury B i l l s and £455 
m i l l i o n i n Ways and Means advances by December 31st, 1918.^" I n addition, 
the methods by which the National Debt was managed operated to make 
Bank Rate i n e f f e c t i v e , since int e r e s t levels tended to relate rather to 
the Treasury B i l l rate while these were being issued on tap; t h i s prac-
t i c e continued i n f u l l u n t i l A p r i l 1921, f o r 12-month B i l l s u n t i l August 
1921, and i n a minor way which made i t much less important f o r rate struc--
5 
ture throughout the xnter-war periods Thus the Government became the 
largest single borrower i n the market and the effective arbiter of money 
rates i n the post-war period. 
Government operations i n the market tended to be governed; p r i n c i p -
a l l y by the idea that t h i s all-importance of government policy i n t h i s 
f i e l d was a temporary phenomenon, and that the sooner conditions returned 
to normal the better„ I n t h i s f i e l d as i n the other areas of economic 
l i f e , Government and Treasury policy was devoted to a 'return to normalcy'„ 
1. U. Hicks, The Finance of B r i t i s h Government 1920-1938 (London:0.U.P.. 
1938), p.310. 
2. Total debt outstanding on 31 Mare, 1914- was £649,800,000. E.V.Morgan, 
Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1914-25(London:Macmillan & Co., 
1952),p.l07. 
3. £13 m i l l i o n on 31 Mar0, 1914. I b i d . . p.107. 
4 . EocteQir i-flt-lLonfo^^ 
5. Morgan, op.cit.. p . 146 „ 
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I t was of course realised f i r s t l y that repayment on a r e a l l y large 
scale of the t o t a l war debt was not a practicable p o s s i b i l i t y i n the 
very near future, and that Government stocks would continue to form a 
large part of any investor's p o r t f o l i o f o r some time to come, and 
secondly that any attempt at rapid repayment would have disastrous 
consequences and might lead to a f i n a n c i a l panic. But the main aims of 
debt p o l i c y i n the period 1920-5, of funding or repaying the f l o a t i n g 
debt, and of converting the large quantities of short-dated stock in t o 
longer-term securities, not only s a t i s f i e d the Treasury's desire to ease 
i t s own burden of debt management,, but also conformed to another- purpose 
which the central monetary authorities f e l t strongly about; that i s , the 
bringing about of d e f l a t i o n of the currency and of cr e d i t . The two were 
of course inter-dependent; repayment of the f l o a t i n g debt would per se 
reduce the credit base and thus the volume of credit; and t h i s was 
recognised by the Treasury o f f i c i a l s . As we have seen, they were alive 
to the dangers of too hasty a d e f l a t i o n , although they varied i n the 
1 
importance they gave to t h i s problem. But t h e i r desire f o r d e f l a t i o n 
as a good thing i n i t s e l f reinforced t h e i r natural wish to r i d themselves 
of the cumbersome weight of f l o a t i n g debt. 
One of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n discussing post-war d e f l a t i o n i s that 
the terms i n f l a t i o n and d e f l a t i o n are often used i n varying ways not only 
among the bankers but i n the Treasury f i l e s . The most frequent confusion 
i s between the symptoms and the causes of i n f l a t i o n . On the one hand, 
there i s an instance of Blackett condemning any attempt to increase 
purchasing power (towards the end of 1921) because i t would lead to 
i n f l a t i o n , by which he says he means r i s i n g prices. This despite the 
fact that the numbers of unemployed at t h i s time make i t clear that any 
ri s e i n prices would be due to a temporary lag of production behind the 
1 . See above, pp. 4 7 , ' . 4 9 - 5 0 , 58„ 
- 272 -
increased demand, rather than a genuinely i n f l a t i o n a r y movement caused 
by too much purchasing power chasing too few goods i n a s i t u a t i o n where 
supply could not rea d i l y be increased. On the other hand, i n another 
memorandum evidence of the small decline i n the t o t a l of currency notes 
and Bank deposits i s adduced to show that there has been l i t t l e or no 
2 
def l a t i o n . I n the f i r s t instance the Treasury i s concerned with what 
i s r e a l l y evidence of i n f l a t i o n , not i n f l a t i o n i t s e l f . I n the second, 
i t i s concerned with an element i n the causation of i n f l a t i o n , namely 
the quantity of purchasing power0 I t i s clear that without a d e f i n i t i o n 
of i n f l a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s of exposition w i l l arise, j u s t as they did f o r 
the o f f i c i a l s concerned. The d e f i n i t i o n used by the Economist i n t h i s 
period seems to be as useful as any; that i n f l a t i o n occurs when demand 
for goods and services, expressed i n the tendering of purchasing power, 
exceeds supply, and d e f l a t i o n occurs i n the reverse 
3 
sit u a t i o n . Increases i n purchasing power or i n i t s v e l o c i t y of c i r c u l -
a t ion, or decreases i n the quantity of goods available;, are a necessary 
concomitant of the process, of i n f l a t i o n , and r i s i n g prices are evidence 
that i t i s occurring. 
The chief means by which d e f l a t i o n was to be accomplished were by 
reducing government expenditure to less than the revenue i n order to 
achieve a budget surplus, to be used f o r debt redemption; and by high-
int e r e s t rates, that i s by increasing the price of money. Deflation* 
bringing with i t a f a l l i n prices, was an essential plank i n another 
government f i n a n c i a l pre-occupation i n the post-war period, the return 
to the Gold Standard; and one of the means by which d e f l a t i o n was to be 
1. P.R.O.., T. 172/1208. memo, by Blackett, dated 8 June, 1921. 
2. Ibid.,, memo, by Niemeyer on f i n a n c i a l p o licy i n response to a 
question by the Colonial Secretary, 5 Oct., 1921. 
3. Economist. Vol.LXXXVI, 12 Jan., 1918. 
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achieved, dear money, was also an essential instrument i n the policy of 
effecting the appreciation of the s t e r l i n g exchange. Unfortunately the 
process of d e f l a t i o n increased the re a l burden of servicing the debt, 
and had the effect of throwing the burden of adjustment of prices onto 
those sections of the community who were, on the whole, least able to l~ 
L 
i 
bear i t , that i s the wage and salary earners. For those whose income 
was fi x e d i n money terms saw t h e i r income appreciate considerably during 
As 
the post-war period. I n addition, i t seems probable that t h i s d e f l a t i o n 
acted to depress industry i n two main ways: f i r s t l y , a long period of 
f a l l i n g prices did-not encourage"industrial optimism about the future 
course of demand and of p r o f i t s ; secondly, the fa c t that one important 
element i n d e f l a t i o n involved a perpetuation and indeed an increase i n 
the r e l a t i v e burden of debt service, which i n tu r n meant a transfer of 
purchasing power from the poorer, consuming members of the community to 
the wealthier, investing members, implied that t h i s lack of optimism 
about effective consumer demand would be j u s t i f i e d . 
Thus the main aims of Treasury monetary policy i n the immediately 
post-war period were the reduction of debt, p a r t i c u l a r l y the f l o a t i n g 
debt, and the funding of t h i s f l o a t i n g debt and of the large amounts of 
short-dated securities outstanding at the end of the war, together with 
an adjustment of the price - l e v e l to bring i t i n t o l i n e with the countries 
which remained on the Gold Standard, notably the United States. The 
deflationary effects of the f i r s t part of t h i s policy, together with the 
high in t e r e s t rates which were necessary f o r i t to be achieved, were the 
main factors i n the p a r t i a l success of the second part of t h i s policy. 
The t h i r d aim, to relieve the burden of debt service wherever possible 
by favourable conversions, took second place to the f i r s t two aimsj and 
indeed the policy of d e f l a t i o n was p a r t l y i n d i r e c t c o n f l i c t with t h i s aim, 
since d e f l a t i o n , depression and unemployment tended to depress the revenue 
at the same time as f a l l s i n the price l e v e l increased the r e a l burden of 
debt service. nrj. 
The- Influence of the Gunliffe Committee 
The origins of the Treasury's monetary policy are to be found i n 
the recommendations of the Cunliffe Committee,, but these were reinforced 
not only by Treasury o f f i c i a l s ' own opinions and experience ? but by v i r t -
u a l l y a l l those, both i n Parliament and outside ? who commented on the 
question,, Stanley Baldwin, speaking i n the House of Gammons i n July 1919? 
t o l d Members that the Government was aware of the importance of cheeking 
currency and cre d i t expansion, and that no further investigations i n t o 
the subject (the setting up of a Select Committee of the. House had been 
suggested) were necessary, 
"The principles on which the matter must be dealt with are, I 
think, generally understood and agreed, and the questions' f o r 
decision are how and when and to what extent the necessary 
measures should be applied, regard being had to the conditions' 
of c r e d i t , trade and industry, from time to time."'' 
Endorsement of government deflationary policy was common i n the speeches 
of Members of Parliament on the need f o r economy and f o r reductions i n 
government expenditure, which are so notable a feature of Parliamentary 
and public debate immediately af t e r the war. The representatives of 
commercial interests were of course anxious that business credit should 
not be r e s t r i c t e d i f possible, but a l l were united i n condemning govern-
ment waste and fu r t h e r expansion of the f l o a t i n g debt. Outside 
Parliament the story was much the same. A leading a r t i c l e i n the Economist 
w r i t t e n i n November T919 aft e r an announcement that the Budget f o r 1919-20 
was not being balanced and that further- borrowing would be necessary, was 
highly c r i t i c a l of government inaction over i n f l a t i o n : 
1. H. of C. Debates. 1919. Vol. CX7III, ccI.18U, 28 July, 1919. 
2 7 5 , 
"What i s wanted i s r e a l control over the money market,, and a 
restoration of the system under which a l i m i t could be placed on 
the expansion of c r e d i t . When we had a gold standard, and a 
r e a l l y convertible currency, that l i m i t was imposed by the gold 
stock. Now our credi t system i s based upon the i n a b i l i t y of the 
Government to pay i t s way, and on the enormous power which the 
huge mass of f l o a t i n g debt gives to the banks to c a l l f o r fresh 
le g a l tender currency, by demanding repayment of maturing 
Treasury B i l l s . The Chancellor of the Exchequer has t o l d the 
House that he intends to finance his d e f i c i t by increasing the 
f l o a t i n g debt. As long as he i s allowed t o continue t h i s wastrel !s 
course, rises i n Bank Rate can do l i t t l e good, and w i l l c e r t a i n l y 
do harm."'' 
To begin with, the Government was wary of proceeding too f a s t , and i n 
particular was unwilling to pay much attention to the problem of d e f l a t i o n 
during the period of dislocation immediately following the Armistice. 
Chamberlain, i n his speech on the Budget i n 1919, said: 
"Lord Cunliffe's Committee, which examined the problem very 
completely and came to conclusions which, i f they err, do 
not err on the side of heterodoxy, c l e a r l y recognised that a 
policy of drastic currency r e s t r i c t i o n i s impracticable u n t i l 
the conclusion of the period of demobilisation and the 
cessation of war borrowing."^ 
Treasury o f f i c i a l s , too, were aware of the dangers inherent i n too speedy 
a d e f l a t i o n . An unsigned memorandum, w r i t t e n as lat e as November 1919? 
demonstrates t h i s point: 
"The governing factor j j l n i n f l a t i o n ] i s the creation of cr e d i t ; 
once the credit i s there, i t can be turned in t o legal tender 
on demand, and the banks must be supplied with the money they 
need. I f t h e i r requirements are to be reduced, the very 
delicate operation of a contraction of credi t must be entered 
upon. To eff e c t t h i s too suddenly might be disastrous. A 
collapse of values, bringing widespread bankruptcy and exten-
sive unemployment, would be too heavy a price to pay."3 
In. the same memorandum i t i s noted that a f a l l i n prices can be effected 
as well by Increasing production as by c u r t a i l i n g purchasing power, and 
i n t h i s connection the experience of the United States after the C i v i l 
1. Economist. Vol.LXXXIX, 8 Nov., 1919. 
2. P.R.O., TJ71/156. 
3 . P.R.O., T.171/171. dated 26 Nov., 1919. The reference i n the l a s t 
sentences i s to the Gold Standard; d e f l a t i o n and a f a l l i n prices 
were essential to i t s restoration. 
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War i s c i t e d , when America achieved an improvement i n the d o l l a r 
exchange from a 30% discount to par without r e s t r i c t i n g currency but 
1 
by stimulating increased production. 
Changes i n Attitude during the Post-War Boom 
But the events of early 1920, when i t had become apparent that the 
post-war boom was reaching fever-pitch, altered the situation,, By March 
1920 the Treasury's anxiety over the i n f l a t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n was consid-
erable, and Chamberlain was appealing f o r , and apparently ge t t i n g , the 
2 
help of the bankers i n c o n t r o l l i n g -the situation,, - — - - -
"That brings me to the f a c t that I require -co-operation i n 
every quarter i n order to maintain the policy on which the 
Government have set t h e i r hearts, of f i r s t stopping^further 
i n f l a t i o n and then beginning gradually to deflate,"- 3 
The desire f o r d e f l a t i o n i n order to reduce the price l e v e l was r e i n -
forced as f a r as i t s implications f o r debt management were concerned 
by the d i f f i c u l t i e s which the Treasury experienced i n placing i t s B i l l s 
during the middle of 1920, The Treasury B i l l rate was raised to 6g# i n 
A p r i l 1920, yet despite t h i s penal rate there was s t i l l considerable 
d i f f i c u l t y i n placing a l l the B i l l s and Ways and Means advances remained 
alarmingly high,^ From t h i s point on the tone of Treasury comments on 
the s i t u a t i o n became much more strongly deflationary, and even though 
some of the o f f i c i a l s ' utterances s t i l l indicate wariness -over encour-. 
5 
aging too drastic a d e f l a t i o n , on the whole the d i f f i c u l t i e s over the 
f l o a t i n g debt weigh the most heavily on t h e i r minds„ Their attitudes 
played a part i n influencing the B r i t i s h policy on monetary problems as 
1, P.R..0., T, 171/171 . 
2 0 S. .Harris, Monetary Problems of the B r i t i s h Empire (New Yorks 
Macmillan &~Co., 1931), pp. 179 -1807 
3> H ^ g O ^ J D e b a J t e s ^ l ^ , Vol.126, col.2075. 
4, Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financlal_Policy 1914-1925 , p„ 14-6. 
5. See, f o r example, Blackett's evidence to the Committee on War 
Wealth, H. o£J^J>aeer£auJ22&. No.. 102 (LondonsH.M.S.O. ,1920) 5 
Q.I 54-6. 
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outlined at the Brussels Conference i n October 1920, and the Recommend-
ations of that Conference were orthodox i n the extreme. Floating debt 
must be funded, i n f l a t i o n arrested, a gold standard restored wherever 
possible, and most important, Governments must never forget that a 
country which has a Budget d e f i c i t i s 
"treading the slippery path which leads to general ruin.-"^ 
The Conference also urged care with policies of d e f l a t i o n . By t h i s time 
the B r i t i s h Government was beginning to f e e l that t h i s was an important 
point. I n December 1920, Chamberlain,, answering a question i n the" House 
on i n f l a t i o n , said: 
"My policy, therefore, i n that respect, i s to avoid renewed 
i n f l a t i o n and, i f i t be i n any way possible, gradually, very 
gradually, to deflate as opportunity o f f e r s , and as the conditions 
of the time permit with safety; and as regards debt reduction, 
my policy has been that when we could redeem debt, we should redeem 
a l l the debt that we could, j u s t because I saw that the good times 
would not always l a s t and that , we must t r y and li g h t e n the load 
before the bad times came upon us."^ 
The onset -of the depression i n the l a t t e r part of 1920 also toned 
down, as was to be expected, the general clamour f o r d e f l a t i o n , although 
on the whole f a l l s i n prices and the Government's attempts to reduce the 
debt were s t i l l welcomed by public opinion i n general. There we're, 
however, some dissident voices. As early as March 1920 an a r t i c l e was 
published i n the Nation objecting to a policy of d e f l a t i o n brought about 
by the contraction of cred i t on the grounds f i r s t l y that f a l l s i n the 
price l e v e l would increase the r e a l value of the National Debt and of the 
inte r e s t on i t , and secondly that a reduction i n economic a c t i v i t y would 
lead to a f a l l i n revenue, which would make the burden of debt service 
3 
and repayment s t i l l more onerous. Reginald McKenna, addressing the 
General Meeting of the Midland Bank, of which he was chairman., i n 
1. P.R.O., Cab.24/112. C.P.1967, p.6. 
2 . H, of C. Debates 1920. Vol . 1 3 5 , col.2495 . 
3 . Nation (" .itov v r.XXV, 17 Mar.., 1920. 
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January 1921, c r i t i c i s e d the Treasury policy of d e f l a t i o n through dear 
money on the grounds that the preceding i n f l a t i o n was neither temporary 
nor due to rash behaviour by the financiers, but a permanent feature of 
the economy resulting from the war. To t r e a t as a temporary i n f l a t i o n 
one which was i n fact evidence of fundamental changes was inappropriate 
and harmful. The force of McKenna's c r i t i c i s m i s somewhat mitigated. 
by the f a c t that at the time he spoke there was s t i l l some idea that i t 
might be possible to aim at regaining, not only the same r e l a t i v e price 
l e v e l as we had had pre-war, that i s to restore the s t e r l i n g / d o l l a r 
exchange" to par, but the absolute price l e v e l of 1914-? which would have 
meant a much more severe d e f l a t i o n than i n f a c t occurred. But the 
principles behind his comments were on the whole sound. 
However, i n the early 1920s such voices were lone and f a i n t ; even 
Keynes, soon to be such a powerful opponent of d e f l a t i o n i n inappropriate 
circumstances, was more concerned at t h i s time with the problems cf 
2 
i n f l a t i o n abroad. Treasury opinion continued to favour maintenance 
of the policy of debt redemption and d e f l a t i o n , even when the i n d u s t r i a l 
s i t u a t i o n became serious. This i s demonstrated by a series of memoranda 
writ t e n i n response to requests from the Chancellor as to the effects cf 
deliberately inducing a mild i n f l a t i o n i n order to reduce unemployment 
and increase production. This followed Lloyd George's -conferences -on 
3 
the subject at Gairloch i n the summer and early autumn of 1921. One 
of the suggestions had been that the Government should undertake some 
borrowing i n order to finance r e l i e f works. This suggestion was met 
by Niemeyer, at his most uncompromising, with strenuous objections, the 
1. Midland Bank Review (London:1921), Feb., 1921. 
2. Sir Roy Harrod, L i f e of John Maynard Keynes. (London; Macmillan & 
Co., 1951), p.3U. 
3. T. Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol..I. 1916-1925. ed. K„ Middlemass 
(London: O.U.P., 1969), pp.169-174. 
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chief of which was that the volume of debt which would mature i n the 
near future was so great that considerable d i f f i c u l t y would be experienced 
i n dealing with i t , without making matters worse by t r y i n g to i n i t i a t e 
1 
new borrowing. His opinion was reinforced by Blackett, i n another paper 
w r i t t e n attacking a proposal to pump an additional £200 m i l l i o n of currency 
notes i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n . This would of course have been an extremely clumsy 
way of t r y i n g to r e f l a t e , but Blackett's cr i t i c i s m s were equally applicable 
to any more sophisticated methods which might have been suggested. 
Blackett f e l t that such an increase i n purchasing power would only r e s u l t 
i n a r i s e i n production after the elapse of quite a considerable period 
of time. I n the i n t e r v a l , he said, prices would r i s e , and imports would 
increase while exports would f a l l . This would lead to a depreciation of 
the exchange which would tend to counteract t h i s movement, but the re s u l t i n g 
increases i n the prices of raw materials and of food would lead to wage 
demands which would set o f f a further price r i s e . Furthermore, Blackett 
suggested that the most d i f f i c u l t period of adjustment was nearly over, 
and that Government should 'stick to i t s guns 1, as trade r e v i v a l was ju s t 
2 
round the corner. 
Effects of Treasury Policy 
I t has been suggested by some that Treasury policy was not respons-
3 
i b l e f o r any but a small part of the post-war d e f l a t i o n , and more 
recently that they did not understand the extent to which a deflationary 
policy was inappropriate at a time of severe depression.^ I n view of the 
strongly deflationary tendencies inherent i n Br i t a i n ' s overseas trade 
1. P.R.O., T.172/1208. memo, by Niemeyer on additional government 
borrowing, 10 Oct., 1921. 
2. I b i d . , memo, by Blackett on currency expansion, 8 June, 1921. 
3. Harris, Monetary Problems of the B r i t i s h Empire, pp.175-176. 
4. Hicks, The Finance of B r i t i s h Government 1920-1936. pp.34-1-34-2. 
See also Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1-914-1925* 
pp.142-144. 
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position a f t e r the war i t seems impossible to doubt that considerable 
d i f f i c u l t y would have been experienced i n any case. But there seems l i t t l e 
doubt that the almost uncontrolled release -of i n t e r n a l purchasing power 
i n 1919 and the early part of 1920, followed by the strong measures taken 
by the authorities i n the early part of 1920, helped to make the depression 
more severe than i t might have been, and i t c e r t a i n l y seems clear that 
Treasury policy on the desirable course of price changes, and the continued 
stress on debt repayment, during the early 1920s, played a major part i n 
prolonging the slump. The p o s s i b i l i t y that the o f f i c i a l s did not know 
that they we're pursuing a deflationary policy seems to be conclusively 
disproved by the evidence of the Treasury f i l e s . Hicks f c r i t i c i s m , that 
the Treasury continued to pursue a deflationary policy long after such 
action ceased to be appropriate, i s i n a sense j u s t i f i e d . But there i s 
one important point which should be remembered. The continuation of 
deflationary policies a f t e r the end of 1920 might well be judged quite 
wrong i n the sense that contra-cyclical policy would have dictated the 
opposite courseo But i t i s clear that to have pursued a -contra-cyclical 
policy at t h i s stage would have had the ef f e c t of retarding, perhaps prev-
enting altogether, the fundamental alterations i n the price l e v e l required 
fo r s t e r l i n g to regain i t s pre-war p a r i t y with the d o l l a r . I t i s indeed 
quite clear from the Treasury f i l e s that the o f f i c i a l s were well aware 
that t h e i r policy would f o r the time being continue to make matters worse. 
But the eventual gain to the economy of regaining the Gold Standard would 
be worth the e f f o r t . 
Evidence f o r t h i s view i s to be found i n a f i l e from which some 
comments have already been quoted. I t contains memoranda wr i t t e n during 
the autumn of 1921 when the unemployment s i t u a t i o n was giving r i s e to 
considerable concern, and various unorthodox methods of dealing with the 
sit u a t i o n were being proposed. The paper i n question sets out the origins 
_ ;2g-] „. 
of the current deflationary policy, i d e n t i f y i n g the main sources as the 
Reports of the Cunliffe Committee and of the Financial F a c i l i t i e s 
Committee, endorsed by the decisions of the Financial Conference at 
Brussels. This policy has as i t s central plank the aim of pursuing a 
slow d e f l a t i o n i n order to restore the Gold Standard. Deflation is' 
necessary to induce a f a l l i n prices; t h i s i n turn w i l l stimulate our 
exports and lead to an appreciation of the exchange. Any attempt to 
i n t e r f e r e with t h i s process w i l l lead to a return of i n f l a t i o n , , and w i l l 
retard the process of wage adjustments which is-an essential ingredient 
of a f a l l i n g price l e v e l . I t i s because t h i s f a l l i n wages and prices 
has not gone s u f f i c i e n t l y f a r that unemployment exists. 
"Experience has shown that the earnings of B r i t i s h industry are 
not s u f f i c i e n t to pay the present scale of wages a l l round. 
Consequently i f present wages are maintained a certain f r a c t i o n 
of the population must go without wages." 
In t h e i r attitude on t h i s question the Treasury o f f i c i a l s were at 
one with the o f f i c i a l position of the Bank of England, as represented by 
the Governor, Montagu Norman.. We have already seen how. t o t a l l y incapable 
he was of allowing decisions on finance and Gold Standard policy to be 
2 
affected by considerations such as the volume of unemployment. I n so 
f a r as he regarded the domestic economy as being w i t h i n his concern at 
a l l , he f e l t that the best thing f o r the economy would be f o r B r i t a i n to 
return to the Gold Standard. Prosperity would then return to the export 
industries, and the problem of unemployment would solve i t s e l f . During 
the autumn of 1921 Hilton Young, then Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 
was occupied, on Lloyd George's behalf, with sounding out opinion on the 
3 
unemployment s i t u a t i o n and on economic problems i n general.' One of those 
1. P.R.0...T. 172/1208. memo, by Niemeyer on f i n a n c i a l policy i n response 
to request f o r information from the Colonial Secretary, 5 Oct.,1921. 
2. See above, p. 10S-^. 
3. H i l t o n Young was at t h i s time acting as go-between from o f f i c i a l 
c i r c l e s i n London to Lloyd George i n Gairloch. See above, p.27#. 
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he consulted was Montagu Norman0 The r e c o r d of Young's conversation 
w i t h him i s preserved i n the Treasury f i l e s , and i t i s an i l l u m i n a t i n g 
document. Young asked Norman f o r h i s views as t o the causes of unem-
ployment; Norman r e p l i e d t h a t they were the r e f u s a l of production costs 
t o f a l l , r e s u l t i n g i n a cheapening of exports? and the i n a b i l i t y of 
Continental c o u n t r i e s t o buy because of r e p a r a t i o n s . I f countries could 
get goods from Germany f o r next t o nothing they would not pay i n f l a t e d 
p r i c e s f o r our exports. Young asked why i t would not be a good t h i n g 
f o r B r i t a i n t o g a i n advantages f o r her exports i n the same way as Germany, 
t h a t " i s by a l l o w i n g the exchanges t o depreciate. Norman r e p l i e d : 
"Why should you, by depressing the standard of l i v i n g , d i m i n i s h 
the economic e f f i c i e n c y and w e l l - b e i n g of a whole people, i n 
order t o b e n e f i t a small unemployed p r o p o r t i o n ? 1 " 
.Since the f a l l i n production costs which Norman said was e s s e n t i a l 
could i n h i s view only be brought about through f a l l s i n wages, there would 
be 'temporary' hardship not o n l y f o r the unemployed, but also f o r other 
wage and salary-earners' i n the p e r i o d i n which p r i c e s were a d j u s t i n g t o 
the new lower wage l e v e l s , so h i s assessment i s not e n t i r e l y accurate. A 
p o l i c y which meant 'temporary' unemployment f o r some, and reduced wages f o r 
m i l l i o n s of o t h e r s , i n order t o achieve an adjustment i n r e l a t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
p r i c e - l e v e l s , d i d not go u n c r i t i c i s e d e n t i r e l y . Even the Economist, a staunch 
upholder of the f i n a n c i a l orthodoxies most of the time,, wrote i n 1919: 
" I f i t i s a question of the gold standard, or of the standard of 
l i f e of those who do the hardest, d r e a r i e s t and d i r t i e s t work f o r 
us - w i t h o u t which we could none of us l i v e ~ the gold standard 
would have t o go, unless by l o s i n g i t we s t r u c k a blow at our 
commercial p o s i t i o n which would, i n the end, make t h e i r l o t worse 
than before. Nobody favours the gold standard as an end i n i t s e l f . 
1. P.R.O., T.172/1208. record of H i l t o n Young's conversation w i t h 
Montagu Norman, appended t o a l e t t e r t o the Prime M i n i s t e r a t 
G a i r l o c h , dated 27 Sep., 1921. 
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I t i s a piece o f machinery by which some of us believe the 
n a t i o n a l wealth i s increased. I f we are r i g h t , then i t s 
r e s t o r a t i o n w i l l increase the fund out o f which wage- -earners 
can be p a i d b e t t e r wages than they have earned i n the past* 
But i f i t s r e s t o r a t i o n means...that the wage-earners have t o 
go back t o something l i k e the pre-war standards i n s p i t e o f 
a l l t h a t we have l e a r n t about our powers' of production: d u r i n g 
the warj then i t would seem t h a t the g o l d standard must be a ' 
clog upon i n d u s t r y , and t h a t the many advocates o f i t s 
a b o l i t i o n are r i g h t . " 1 
But t h e r e was l i t t l e sympathy i n the Treasury, and none a t the Bank, f o r 
even t h i s s o r t of m i l d scepticism about the m y s t i c a l q u a l i t i e s o f the 
Gold Standard,, S t i l l l e s s a t t e n t i o n was paid t o the more determined c r i t i c , 
Reginald McKenna, who r e g u l a r l y expressed h i s doubts about the_ Go-Id Standard-
i n h i s speeches, and who as chairman of the Midland Bank must have been a 
p a r t y t o , i f not the author o f , the numerous l e a d i n g a r t i c l e s i n i t s 
monthly review on the s u b j e c t . There i s an i n t e r e s t i n g example i n the 
issue of November ? 9 2 3 ; 
"Apparently any s a c r i f i c e , , i n the way of trade depression and 
s o c i a l d i s o r g a n i s a t i o n , i s not too b i g a p r i c e t o pay f o r the 
t a k i n g of a s i n g l e step i n the d i r e c t i o n of p a r i t y w i t h the 
d o l l a r . I f some magic power were attached t o the r a t i o $4<>86 
t o the pound there might be good ground f o r h o l d i n g such a viewy 
but under present c o n d i t i o n s any r a t i o , so long as i t i s moder-
a t e l y s t a b l e , i s of equal p r a c t i c a l u t i l i t y . ' ' ^ 
Be t h a t as i t may, d e f l a t i o n as an instrument i n preparing the eeonomy 
f o r the r e t u r n t o the Gold Standard at the pre-war p a r i t y , and brought 
about by a combination of h i g h i n t e r e s t r a t e s , and c r e d i t r e s t r i c t i o n 
through the c o n t r a c t i o n of the cash base and o f l i q u i d i t y , i s the h a l l -
mark of Treasury p o l i c y i n the T 9 2 0 s . To the means by which t h i s d e f l -
a t i o n was accomplished we must now turn,, 
1 . Economist. Vol.LXXXVIII, 26 Apr., 1 9 1 9 . 
2. Midland Bank Review. November-December, 1 9 2 3 , 
Government Borrowing During and Immediately A f t e r the War 
There seems l i t t l e room f o r argument i n two assertions which can 
be made about Government finance during the war; t h a t they made c o n d i t i o n s 
a f t e r the war worse than they need have been, both by r a i s i n g l e s s of the 
cost of the war than they c o u l d or should have done by t a x a t i o n , and t h a t 
some of the methods by which borrowing was undertaken l e f t a good deal t o 
be desired i n the context of t h e i r time of issue and of t h e i r post-war 
management<, O v e r - a l l the Government financed l e s s than a t h i r d of the 
cost of the war out of revenue, and the r e s t had t o be found through 
borrowingo This had two main r e s u l t s ; one was t h a t the amount of bor-
rowing t h a t went on was needlessly l a r g e , and the other was t h a t the 
p r a c t i c e of l e a v i n g l a r g e amounts of purchasing power i n the hands of the 
p u b l i c when produc t i o n of consumer goods was sharply cut i n order t o 
devote the maximum resources t o the production of war m a t e r i a l s l e d t o 
a considerable amount of i n f l a t i o n . Indeed, i n a s i t u a t i o n where the 
c u r r e n t account d e f i c i t on i n t e r n a l expenditure rose t o one t h i r d of the 
n a t i o n a l income i n 1 9 1 5 - 1 6 and t o i n 1 9 1 7 - 1 8 i t could h a r d l y be 
otherwise 
The acceptance as i n e v i t a b l e of huge c u r r e n t account d e f i c i t s came 
q u i t e e a r l y i n the war, and was enshrined i n an i n t e r e s t i n g piece of dogma 
by McKenna i n h i s Budget speech i n A p r i l 1 9 1 6 . He based h i s Budget on the 
' p r i n c i p l e ' t h a t the revenue should be expected t o cover the cost of pre-
1 9 1 U expenditure plus the service of c u r r e n t debt and t h a t t o be i n c u r r e d 
2 
i n the coming year. So t h a t a great burden of debt service and repayment 
was i n c u r r e d , a good deal of i t heedlessly and even h a r m f u l l y . Nor i s 
t h i s the v e r d i c t of h i n d s i g h t ; there was considerable c r i t i c i s m a t the 
1 o Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1 9 1 / ^ - 1 9 2 5 -
' P o 1 C 5 o ' . . " . 
2 „ I b i d , , p.92 . 
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time of the extent to which the Government was mortgaging the future,, 
For instance, McKenna received a deputation of leading bankers, traders 
and manufacturers at the Treasury i n 1915 who urged d r a s t i c increases 
1 
i n taxation. Several of the City journals urged t h i s c o u r s e n o t a b l y 
the Economist, which urged t h i s course vigorously almost throughout the 
war, both i n order to r a i s e more revenue, and to check inflation,, This 
c r i t i c i s m did not end with the war; as l a t e as the Budget of 1920 t h i s 
paper was c r i t i c i s i n g the Government for not increasing taxation suff-
i c i e n t l y . ^ - -
Be that as i t may, the problem which confronted the Treasury at 
the close of h o s t i l i t i e s was a serious one. The t o t a l National Debt had 
r i s e n from £649<>8 m i l l i o n on March 31st 1914- to a t o t a l for the i n t e r n a l 
debt alone of £6142C1 m i l l i o n f i v e years- l a t e r . The value of Treasury 
B i l l s had r i s e n from £13 m i l l i o n to £957 m i l l i o n , and temporary advances 
3 
on Ways and Means from zero to £ 4 5 5 m i l l i o n , i n the same period. The-
f i r s t serious e f f o r t to reduce the large volume of floating debt, which 
was accompanied by the repayment of the banks' Special Deposits, followed 
the Funding Loan and Victory Bonds issue of June/July 1919. During the 
succeeding months considerable reductions were effected i n the flo a t i n g 
debt. This proved to be l a r g e l y temporary, p a r t l y owing to the boom 
conditions i n the market i n the spring of 1920, and Treasury B i l l borrow-
ings remained at a high l e v e l u n t i l the summer of 1'92T.-^ I n addition to 
the large volume of flo a t i n g debt, the war-time policy of issuing whatever 
sort of s e c u r i t i e s seemed to be most l i k e l y to a t t r a c t investors,, without 
much planning of maturity dates and so on, had resulted i n a large volume 
1„ Midland Bank Review. June T920, verbatim report of a speeeh by 
McKenna at the Annual Dinner of the National Union of Manufacturers. 
2 o Economist. Vol.XC, 2 4 Apr., 1 9 2 0 . 
3. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l Policy T914-1925, p. 139. 
See also below?. Appendix, Table % Q 
4 o Morgan, op»cit., p „ 1 4 7 j see below, Appendix, Table 
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of s h o r t - and medium-term debt which was t o exercise the minds of the 
Treasury o f f i c i a l s considerably d u r i n g our p e r i o d . I n March 1919, the 
t o t a l of debt w i t h a redemption date of not longer than, nine years but 
not l e s s than one was £1887.3 m i l l i o n . . By T925 i t had been reduced t o 
£1329.2 m i l l i o n , and the f l o a t i n g debt was l e s s than h a l f i t s March 1919 
f i g u r e ; w h i l e the f i g u r e f o r debt w i t h m a t u r i t y dates exceeding 20 years 
1 
had r i s e n by over £1,000 m i l l i o n . 
These operations d i d n o t , even when the small budget surpluses 
which were applied t o a c t u a l redemption are- taken i n t o account, lead t o 
a r e d u c t i o n i n the nominal value of the debt; there was i n f a c t a small 
increase, from £614-2.0 m i l l i o n i n March 1919 t o £6524..8 m i l l i o n i n March 
2 
1925. The burden of debt service also rose,- from £34-8.2 m i l l i o n i n 
1919-20 t o £393.6 i n 1924 - 5 . 3 Since G.N.P. was f a l l i n g a t the ti m e , 
from £ 5 , 8 6 0 m i l l i o n i n 1919 t o l e s s than £4-, 500 m i l l i o n i n every year 
from 1922 t o 1925, the i n t e r e s t on the N a t i o n a l Debt represented an increas 
i n g l y l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of both government expenditure and of G.N.P. duri n g 
the p e r i o d 1919-1925.^ 
Thus the forms of Government borrowing underwent a s u b s t a n t i a l 
change during the years a f t e r the war; there was a much reduced r e l i a n c e 
on f l o a t i n g debt than had been the case during the war, small Budget 
surpluses were encouraged and were used t o repay some debt, and the s t r u c -
t u r e of the remainder of the N a t i o n a l Debt was s h i f t e d d e c i s i v e l y towards 
the longer end of the m a t u r i t y spectrum. As has been s a i d , t h i s i n v o l v e d 
a process of d e f l a t i o n a t a time when such a p o l i c y was i n a p p r o p r i a t e as 
f a r as domestic considerations i n terms of the immediate f u t u r e were 
concerned. 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1914--1925, p. 107; 
see below, Appendix, Table .'J,, 
2. Morgan, o p . c i t . . p„107. 3. I b M . , p.101. 
4-o A. Peacock and J. Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure i n the 
United Kingdom (2nd edn; London: George A l l e n and Unwin, 1967), 
pp. 153, 184-. 
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Debt Redemption and Funding. 1920-25 
The two methods of l i g h t e n i n g the burden of f l o a t i n g - and. short—term 
debt, funding and repayment, were both used d u r i n g t h i s period„ For each 
of the f i n a n c i a l years from 1919-20 t o T924-5 t h e r e was a small s u r p l u s , 
t o be devoted t o debt redemption. This v a r i e d from about £109 m i l l i o n 
i n 1919-20 through a maximum of £276 m i l l i o n i n the f o l l o w i n g year, t o 
1 
approximately £71 m i l l i o n i n 1 9 2 4 - 5 . At the same t i m s j a steady prog-
ramme of funding was maintained„ As has been noted, the f i r s t l a r g e 
r e d u c t i o n i n the f l o a t i n g debt was made i n the autumn, of 1919 , f o l l o w i n g ^ 
the Funding Loan and V i c t o r y Bond issue. The t o t a l of f l o a t i n g debt. 
Treasury B i l l s and Ways and Means together, f e l l from a peak of £ 1 P 5 3 1 
m i l l i o n i n June t o £1,187 i n August, when i t s t a r t e d t o r i s e a g a i n ? 
reaching £1,4-11 m i l l i o n i n January 1 9 2 0 o The t o t a l remained around t h e 
£1 ,300 m i l l i o n mark f o r most of the time u n t i l the middle of T921 s when 
i t reached another peak of £ 1 , 3 6 0 i n June. From t h i s time on the t o t a l 
f e l l s t e a d i l y u n t i l the spring of 1923 when i t was £'783 m i l l i o n i n May, 
and t h e r e a f t e r v a r i e d between £750 and £850 m i l l i o n approximately f o r the 
2 
r e s t of our p e r i o d . 
W i t h i n t h i s p a t t e r n of change i n the t o t a l , - there was considerable 
v a r i a t i o n , i n the i n d i v i d u a l components. Sales of Treasury B i l l s were 
much a f f e c t e d i n the summer of 1919 by preparations f o r the Funding Loans., 
and t h e i r value f e l l from £1,019 m i l l i o n i n May t o £-671 m i l l i o n i n J u l y . 
Then B i l l s began t o r i s e f a s t , indeed at a f a s t e r r a t e than the t o t a l of f l o a t i n g de t, because a strenuous e f f o r t was b ing made t o r^tpay he 
Bank Ways and Means advances. These f e l l from a peak of £5T3 .8 m i l l i o n 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1914-1925,, p . T 0 4 . 
These are Morgan's adjusted f i g u r e s , which are based on the dates 
when expenditure and revenue a c t u a l l y was spent or received, not 
when i t was taken i n t o account. 
I b i d . , p.147. 
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i n J u l y , j u s t before the b i g Loan issue, t o £8.9 m i l l i o n i n March 1920. 
At t h i s p o i n t they began t o r i s e again; the Treasury was having consid-
erable d i f f i c u l t y i n p l a c i n g B i l l s because of the boom co n d i t i o n s i n the 
market, and although the B i l l r a t e was r a i s e d t o 6 ^ i n A p r i l the Ways 
and Means f i g u r e s o nly twice went below £4-0 m i l l i o n f o r the r e s t of the 
year. B i l l s , - on the other hand, having r i s e n f a s t t o over £1 S200 m i l l i o n 
i n January 1920, d i d not again r i s e above £1,100 m i l l i o n u n t i l December 
1 
of t h a t year. I t has indeed been estimated t h a t the holdings o f the 
Banks and the money market f e l l by about £100 m i l l i o n i n the s p r i n g of 
2 
1920. As Morgan says, 
" I t i s small wonder t h a t Treasury o f f i c i a l s d i d not want t o 
l i v e through t h i s experience again and were extremely anxious 
t o see the f l o a t i n g debt reduced."3 
Just how anxious they were i s demonstrated by the o f f i c i a l memoranda, 
and by the evidence of B l a c k e t t before the Select Committee on the Increase 
i n Wealth (War). This Committee had been set up by the House of Commons 
t o consider the d e s i r a b i l i t y and f e a s i b i l i t y of a c a p i t a l l e v y on war 
f o r t u n e s , the proceeds of which would be used t o repay p a r t or a l l o f 
the f l o a t i n g debt. Feeling was running h i g h a t t h i s time t h a t a good many 
people who had stayed comfortably a t home had made a good deal of money 
<yv\ 
out of the war, and p u b l i c o p i n i o n was strong i n the e v i l s of the ' p r o f i t e e r s ' 
One i s reminded of Baldwin's comment on the Parliament elected a t the 1918 
e l e c t i o n t h a t i t contained a l o t of 'hardfaced men who looked as though 
they had done w e l l out of the war', and Austen Chamberlain's d e s c r i p t i o n 
of these members as 'a s e l f i s h , swollen lot !„^ However, t h i s same House 
set up a Committee t o consider the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a c a p i t a l l e v y i n the 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y T914-1925.PP.T46--7. 
The r i s e i n the B i l l r a t e was apparently a t the d i r e c t i n s t i g a t i o n 
of the Bank of England: H. Clay, Lord Norman (London; Macmillan 
& Co., 1957), pp.127-128. 
2. Morgan, o g ^ c i t . , p . 1 4 6 . 3 . I b i d . 
4 . Quoted'by A. J.P.Taylor, E n g l i s h H i s t o r y 1914-1945 (OxfordsClarendpn 
1965), p.129. Fress, 
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autumn of 1919, and i t s recommendations were discussed by the Cabinet i n 
1 
June 1920. Chamberlain was on the whole opposed t o the idea on p r a c t i c a l 
grounds. The Committee had suggested a l e v y of £500 m i l l i o n , of which 
£350 m i l l i o n would be y i e l d e d i n the f i r s t two years: of i t s o p e r a t i o n 
and £150 m i l l i o n i n the f o l l o w i n g t e n ye a r s . 4 This would be accompanied 
by a r e d u c t i o n i n the Excess P r o f i t s Duty t o j+0%„ The Chancellor f e l t 
t h a t t o c o l l e c t so l a r g e a sum would be h i g h l y d i s l o c a t o r y and would 
produce a f i n a n c i a l panic, because the great m a j o r i t y of f i n a n c i e r s " and 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were against the scheme. _ Those__ members - of-the-Cabinet-who 
favoured the scheme countered w i t h a number of arguments: t h e i r o b j e c t 
i n proposing the l e v y was t o equalise the s a c r i f i c e undergone f o r the 
sake of winning the war, and t o reduce the burden of the debt, p a r t i c -
u l a r l y the f l o a t i n g debt, at a time when the value of the debt was comp-
arable t o t h a t a t the time i t had been borrowed. I n a d d i t i o n i t was urged 
t h a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o r e j e c t a recommendation of a House of Commons 
Committee on the su b j e c t . But the m a j o r i t y of the Cabinet f e l t t h a t i n the 
only form i n which i t would be f e a s i b l e the l e v y would be extremely u n f a i r , 
since i t would penalise only those who had saved considerable sums out of 
t h e i r war f o r t u n e s , not those who had earned them and spent them. Because 
of the discouragement t o e n t e r p r i s e , the i n j u s t i c e , and the d i s l o c a t i o n 
2 
which would be caused, the Cabinet r e j e c t e d the proposal. 
They also r e j e c t e d a proposal by the Governor of the Bank of England, 
f o r a fo r c e d long-term loan i n s t e a d of a l e v y ; t h i s would have r a i s e d 
£750 m i l l i o n , of which £250 m i l l i o n would have been taken i n e x i s t i n g 
3 
Government s e c u r i t i e s valued a t cu r r e n t p r i c e s . This proposal echoed 
1. The Report was published as House of Commons Papers. 1920, No. 102, 
and c i r c u l a t e d t o the Cabinet under a memo, by Chamberlain, the 
Chancellor, as CP.1319. i n P.R.0. ,Cj^.2^10,6. 
2. P.R.O..Cab.23/21. Cabinet meeting 31(20), 2 June, 1920, and Cabinet 
meeting 3 2 ( 2 0 ) , 4 June, 1920. 
3. P.R.O..Cab.23/21. Cabinet meeting 32(20), A June, 1920. 
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a s i m i l a r one which Norman suggested p r i o r t o t h e . V i c t o r y issues i n 1919. 
by which the v o l u n t a r y l o a n would have been replaced by a.forced one t o 
which a l l income t a x payers would have been o b l i g e d t o c o n t r i b u t e . Norman 
set out h i s o b j e c t i v e s i n a memorandum t o the Chancellor on A p r i l 15th 
1919s 
" A l l f l o a t i n g debt was i n c u r r e d as War expenditure, and should be 
t r e a t e d as such w i t h o u t delay. - I t s existence paralyses the money-
p o l i c y of the Treasury. The o r d i n a r y method of a p u b l i c i n v i t a t i o n 
t o subscribe t o a l o a n w i t h or w i t h o u t the b i g drum w i l l n o t produce 
the desired r e s u l t . . . N o r can we contemplate l o a d i n g the Banks again. 
Therefore the Government must, as i t were, underwrite the issue. 
The scale i s , of course, too g r e a t t o admit of any v o l u n t a r y scheme. 
So the income-tax payers must stand by and take f i r m the. r e q u i s i t e - . -
t o t a l , pro r a t a t o t h e i r Income Tax r e t u r n s . They w i l l not l i k e i t , 
but they (and the Community) w i l l s u f f e r l e s s than by any other 
method of r a i s i n g (or f a i l i n g t o r a i s e ) such a loan a t t h i s stage." 
Chamberlain d i d not f e e l t h i s proposal t o be p o l i t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e art t h a t 
t i me, and i t d i d not reach the Cabinet. Norman's second attempt d i d , but 
was r e j e c t e d , on the grounds t h a t a dangerous' precedent would be created^ 
people might be w i l l i n g t o b e l i e v e t h a t a c a p i t a l l e v y was such a d r a s t i c 
remedy and so d i f f i c u l t t o achieve a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y t h a t i t was g e n e r a l l y 
a o n c e - f o r - a l l proposal, suggested only as a l a s t r e s o r t f o r d e a l i n g w i t h 
the e x t r a o r d i n a r y f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s thrown up by the war. But a 
f o r c e d l o a n through the income t a x system, w h i l e e q u a l l y d r a s t i c i n i t s 
impact, might be thought t o create a precedent f o r the f u t u r e since i t 
was comparatively easy t o a dminister. The summary of the Cabinet discus-
s i o n of the proposal .occupies o n l y a short paragraph i n the minutes, and 
2 
the d e c i s i o n seems t o have been unanimous. 
Thus a t the end of 1920 the Treasury was confronted w i t h the t w i n 
problems' of the existence o f a huge load of f l o a t i n g debt, mainly i n the 
form of Treasury B i l l s , which i t had experienced considerable d i f f i c u l t y 
1 0 Clay, Lord Norman. pp 0117-118. 
2. P.R.0.7~Cab.23/21. Cabinet meeting 3 2 ( 2 0 ) , A June, 1 9 2 0 . 
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i n renewing t h a t year, and of a l a r g e volume of s e c u r i t i e s w i t h m a t u r i t y 
.dates i n the near f u t u r e . That the Treasury was alarmed at the size of 
the f l o a t i n g debt even before the d i f f i c u l t p e r i o d of e a r l y 1920 i s 
obvious. B l a c k e t t ' s evidence t o the Select Committee on Increase i n 
Wealth (War) i s a case i n p o i n t . He was before them i n March 1920, when 
Bank Ways and Means were at t h e i r lowest f o r the year and the p o s i t i o n 
was not n e a r l y as d i f f i c u l t as i t was t o become a f t e r the peak p e r i o d f o r 
revenue c o l l e c t i o n was over. Nevertheless, when asked by the Chairman 
whether i t was the op i n i o n of the Treasury t h a t a r e d u c t i o n of debt was 
v i t a l a t the present moment, B l a c k e t t r e p l i e d : 
" I should say i t was very d e f i n i t e l y the o p i n i o n of the Treasury 
t h a t i t i s almost impossible, w i t h o u t some very s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n 
f o r a very l a r g e r e d u c t i o n i n the f l o a t i n g debt, t o get back t o 
a sound p o s i t i o n e i t h e r i n the general economic po s i t i o n , of the 
country or i n the p o s i t i o n as regards the Exchequer...At the 
present moment there are outstanding something over £1,000 m i l l i o n 
of Treasury B i l l s and about £200 m i l l i o n of Ways and Means 
advances i n a d d i t i o n . U n t i l those have been funded i n some way, 
or else paid o f f , i t i s impossible t o put a stop t o the present 
v i c i o u s c i r c l e which you have, f i r s t of a l l , a new c r e a t i o n of 
c r e d i t by the Government, f o l l o w e d then r i s e s of p r i c e s , then 
higher wages, f u r t h e r issues of currency, and then again new 
c r e d i t creations by the Government. 
Because of t h i s , B l a c k e t t was i n favour of a c a p i t a l l e v y by which 
the f l o a t i n g debt might be s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced. He r e a l i s e d , however, 
t h a t t o o b t a i n a r e a l l y l a r g e sum i n cash a t once, and t o use i t a l l t o 
redeem the f l o a t i n g debt, would have d i s a s t r o u s l y heavy d e f l a t i o n a r y 
e f f e c t s c He envisaged t h a t whatever sum might be r a i s e d by such a l e v y 
the amount by which i t would be safe t o reduce the f l o a t i n g debt i n a 
3 
s i n g l e year would be from £300 t o £500 m i l l i o n . He was asked why, apart 
from the sheer, volume of the sums i n v o l v e d , i t would not be possible t o 
e f f e c t a r e d u c t i o n of the f l o a t i n g debt out of t a x a t i o n i n s t e a d of by a 
1. See below, Appendix, Table 5». 
2. H. of C. Papers. 1920. No. 102, Q J 5 3 3 . 
3 . I b i d . . Q . 1 6 3 1 . 
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l e v y , t h a t i s by the normal process - of achieving a s u b s t a n t i a l surplus 
of revenue over expenditure. He answered: 
"The urgent necessity, as I put i t , i s t o get t a x a t i o n i n cash 
a v a i l a b l e t o reduce the f l o a t i n g debt. I do not suggest t h a t 
the whole of the f l o a t i n g debt could or should be reduced. .,* 
such a very sudden d e f l a t i o n would create more t r o u b l e t h a t i t 
would a l l a y . On the other hand, the importance of a l a r g e sum 
t o my mind r a t h e r l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t as you e f f e c t d e f l a t i o n 
you increase the burden i n terms of commodities of the debt t h a t 
you leave.' That i s a very strong reason f o r not d e f l a t i n g w i t h -
out any r e d u c t i o n of debt, i n which case you would haver the debt 
a t i t s present f i g u r e , . . . r e p r e s e n t i n g a considerably heavier 
burden i n terms of commodities a f t e r you had reduced p r i c e s . 
I f a t the same time as reducing p r i c e s by d e f l a t i o n you were 
reducing the debt by a very considerable sum, you would ease 
the p o s i t i o n of the f u t u r e taxpayer very mueh more- and make i t 
very much" "easier t o "deal w i t h " the debt t h a t remained than i f you 
t r i e d t o do i t g r a d u a l l y out of revenue a f t e r you had e f f e c t e d 
d e f l a t i o n . . . " 1 
This l a s t passage i s i n t e r e s t i n g i n view of the f a c t t h a t the p o l i c y 
which i t condemns i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t which was c a r r i e d out, a f t e r the 
Cabinet had r e j e c t e d the proposed l e v y , and the events o f 1920 had shown 
j u s t how accurate the f e a r s of the o f f i c i a l s about the f l o a t i n g debt were. 
But the f a c t remains t h a t B l a c k e t t was aware of the importance of repaying 
a l a r g e amount of .the debt before p r i c e s f e l l so f a r t h a t the burden of 
the debt was markedly increased. Another c r i t i c i s m , t h a t repayment of 
the debt would be of more b e n e f i t t o i t s holders' than t o the r e s t of the 
n a t i o n - t h a t the a c t i v e were being penalised t o a s s i s t the i n a c t i v e -
was d e a l t w i t h i n a s i m i l a r l y o p t i m i s t i c and humane manner. 
Qs " I f you reduce your debt very c o n s i d e r a b l y . . . i t w i l l not 
b e n e f i t the trader...and.-..the workman?" 
B l a c k e t t : "Surely the whole country w i l l be immensely b e n e f i t t e d i f we 
can get r i d of the v i c i o u s c i r c l e of i n c r e a s i n g p r i c e s t h a t 
causes so much unrest...The workman w i l l , i f he manages t o 
mai n t a i n the present scale of wages, have a much b e t t e r r e a l 
wage than he has a t present. That i s one of the great hopes. 
I f you could secure d e f l a t i o n and s t a b i l i s a t i o n of p r i c e s 
w i t h money wages, as they have been during the war, consid-
e r a b l y increased. o.the r e a l wage of the workman i s stereotyped 
at a b e t t e r f i g u r e . 
1. 
2. 
H. of C. Papers. 1920. No. 102, Q.1539. 
I b i d . . QQ.1585-1587. 
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y the ! g r e a t hope 1 was not r e a l i s e d , and by 1921' B l a s k e t t 
and Niemeyer were both supporting the p a r t i e s i n favour of a r e d u c t i o n 
i n money wages as a necessary forerunner of a f a l l i n p r i c e s . 
B l a c k e t t i n h i s evidence refused t o support the ide a of a f o r c e d 
loan as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o the l e v y ; he was of the o p i n i o n t h a t i t would 
be a very cumbersome way of funding and would severely a f f e c t s e c u r i t y 
p r i c e s . But he f e l t very s t r o n g l y , as we have seen, t h a t some measure 
by which the f l o a t i n g debt could be s w i f t l y reduced before a great f a l l 
i n p r i c e s took place was as e s s e n t i a l as was. t h a t f a l l i t s e l f . - This " 
comes out very c l e a r l y i n the w r i t t e n memorandum which B l a c k e t t submitted 
t o the Committee. 
" 0..steady d e f l a t i o n would n e c e s s a r i l y reduce imports and release 
f o r exports goods and services at present being consumed at home 
and would thus s i m p l i f y the problem of dea l i n g w i t h the e x t e r n a l 
debt. D e f l a t i o n should moreover improve our c r e d i t abroad, while 
i f i t i s accompanied by a. b i g r e d u c t i o n of gross debt i t s e f f e c t 
i n improving our c r e d i t would be very great indeed. I n view of 
the magnitude of our e x t e r n a l d e b t , . . . t h i s i s a very important 
p o i n t I n favour of s p e c i a l t a x a t i o n f o r r e d u c t i o n of debt. Since 
t h e r e f o r e d e f l a t i o n i s the only a l t e r n a t i v e t o a c o n t i n u a t i o n of 
high p r i c e s and of the heavy discount on s t e r l i n g i n terms of 
d o l l a r s , the choice i f there i s one must be between a) i n c r e a s i n g 
the burden of the present debt by d e f l a t i o n w i t h o u t any c u r r e n t 
r e d u c t i o n of debt by s p e c i a l t a x a t i o n and b) d e f l a t i o n by s p e c i a l 
t a x a t i o n which simultaneously pays o f f debt at a time when p r i c e s 
are high and when the burden of paying a given amount of t a x a t i o n 
is. t h e r e f o r e less heavy.''^ 
B l a c k e t t ' s views as expressed i n t h i s evidence have been d e a l t w i t h at 
l e n g t h because they not only i n d i c a t e the views of the Treasury a t the 
time he was speaking, but when compared w i t h the tone and words of the 
3 
memoranda on the subject w r i t t e n i n 1921 provide a u s e f u l i n d i c a t i o n of 
the extent t o which Treasury o p i n i o n had hardened on d e f l a t i o n and debt 
funding f o l l o w i n g the events of 1920. 
1. H. of C. Papers, 1920, No. 102, QQ.1668-1670. 
2. I b i d . , Appendix I I t o Report of Select Committee on Increase i n 
Wealth (War), para. 9. 
3. See above, pp. 280, 282. 
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New N a t i o n a l Debt issues. 1920-25 
During 1920 a new issue of Exchequer Bonds was made t o cover those 
f a l l i n g due i n the course of the year, and a new s e r i e s of Treasury Bonds 
was also issued i n May. The l a t t e r was a s i g n a l f a i l u r e j t ogether w i t h 
i. 
a second issue i n October the t o t a l received was o n l y £23 m i l l i o n . I n 
view of the l e v e l of i n t e r e s t r a t e s p r e v a i l i n g a t the time any l a r g e 
issue was i n any case out of the question. But the problem of war and 
Exchequer Bond issues coming t o m a t u r i t y was becoming pressing, p a r t i c -
u l a r l y i n view of the f a c t , noted _by B l a c k e t t - i n -February192T, " t h a t these-
Bonds tended t o come i n t o the hands of the money market anything up t o a 
2 
year before t h e i r m a t u r i t y dates. This meant t h a t o f f e r s of conversion 
t o longer dated stock were u n l i k e l y t o be successful i f made w i t h i n a 
year of m a t u r i t y . B l a c k e t t wrote a memorandum t o the Chancellor on the 
3 
sub j e c t , l i s t i n g a l l the debt i n terms of i t s m a t u r i t y date, and prop-
osing t h a t i n view of the noted tendency f o r the Bonds t o leave the hands 
of 'genuine' savers a year before t h e i r m a t u r i t y , strenuous e f f o r t s should 
be made a t once to- deal w i t h the la r g e volume of such Bonds maturing i n 
the next few years. This paper was the background t o the issue i n A p r i l 
1921 of the 3^> Conversion l o a n . The stock was issued t o holders of 
Na t i o n a l War Bonds maturing up t o 1st September 1925 a t var y i n g terms; 
those a p p l i c a b l e t o the Bonds maturing i n 1922 gave about 5.6$ i n i n t e r e s t 
alone, while y i e l d i n g a t r u e r a t e of 6,S% at the e a r l i e s t redemption date. 
Since the stock was f o r not l e s s than 4-0 years, and the i n t e r e s t was 
exempt from Corporation P r o f i t s Tax, t h i s conversion o p e r a t i o n was an 
expensive one and assumed a c o n t i n u a t i o n f o r a very long p e r i o d of hi g h 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 191/k"1925. p.117. 
2. P.R.Q., T.171/196, memo, by B l a c k e t t on fu n d i n g , 1Z. Feb„ ? 1921. 
3. See Appendix, Table 5„. 
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i n t e r e s t r a t e s . Yet despite the f a c t t h a t the terras were very favourable 
1 
o nly j u s t over a quarter of the e l i g i b l e bond's were converted. 
2 
This issue has been described as both unnecessary and expensive. 
The reasons why i t was made at t h i s time are set out i n B l a c k e t t ' s 
memorandum, which i n f a c t a n t i c i p a t e s t h i s c r i t i c i s m . To the charge t h a t 
i t was unnecessarily expensive B l a c k e t t s t a t e d t h a t he f e l t i t would be 
impossible f o r the Government t o borrow more cheaply u n t i l some of the 
nearer m a t u r i t i e s were out of the way, and t h a t although the cost of t h i s 
Conversion Loan was hig h , the improvement i n Government c r e d i t which would 
r e s u l t "would mean t h a t e v e n t u a l l y the Treasury would be able t o produce 
a more than compensating r e d u c t i o n i n the t o t a l of both the i n t e r e s t on 
the f l o a t i n g debt and the cost of funding i t . C e r t a i n l y B l a c k e t t f e l t 
t h a t a Conversion issue was an e s s e n t i a l p r e l i m i n a r y t o any attempt t o 
3 
fund the f l o a t i n g debt.' 
Further attempts t o fund the Exchequer Bonds were made during 1921", 
and a s e r i e s of Treasury Bond issues were made both f o r t h i s purpose and 
f o r cash. Market con d i t i o n s were beginning t o move i n favour of the 
Government, c o n t r a r y t o B l a c k e t t ' s expectations, and t o t a l cash subscrip-
t i o n s amounted t o about £300 m i l l i o n more than m a t u r i t i e s of Exchequer 
and N a t i o n a l War Bonds. This together w i t h t h a t p a r t of the budget 
surplus which was not needed f o r the various s t a t u t o r y s i n k i n g and deprec-
i a t i o n funds, and t o cover payments of Excess P r o f i t s Duty i n Government 
s e c u r i t i e s , was used t o reduce the f l o a t i n g debt, from over £1,350 m i l l i o n 
i n the summer of 1921 t o £1,038 m i l l i o n by March 1922.^ 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1914-1925, p.118. 
2. I b i d . , p.118 
3. P.R.O., T.171/196. memo, by B l a c k e t t on f u n d i n g , U Feb., 1921'. 
U. Morgan, o p . c i t . , p.119. 
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The continued, depression i n the economy helped t o keep the s i t u a t i o n 
easy f o r the Treasury, and conversions and f l o a t i n g debt redemption cont-
inued d u r i n g 1922, w i t h o f f e r s of conversion i n t o Conversion Loan 
being made t o holders of maturing Bonds, and considerable conversion of 
Na t i o n a l War Bonds i n t o 5% War Loan t a k i n g place ( t h i s o p t i o n was cont-
ained i n the o r i g i n a l c onditions of sale but only became a t t r a c t i v e t o 
holders at t h i s t i m e ) . Further sales of Treasury Bonds were made on 
improving terms, and the proceeds of t h i s and of the small a v a i l a b l e 
Budget surplus were again used t o redeem some f l o a t i n g debt. The t o t a l 
f e l l from £1,038 i n March 1922 t o £821 m i l l i o n a year l a t e r , and Treasury 
B i l l s f e l l from £908 m i l l i o n t o £64-3 m i l l i o n i n the same p e r i o d . ' By 
March 1922 Bank Ways and Means had been repa i d completely, and they 
resumed t h e i r pre-war f u n c t i o n of easing p u r e l y t e m p o r a r i l y d i s l o c a t i o n s 
i n Government payments and r e c e i p t s . For the r e s t of our p e r i o d the sums 
under t h i s heading never exceeded £16 m i l l i o n , and only t w i c e , i n June of 
1922 and 1924, d i d they exceed £10 m i l l i o n ; f o r a t h i r d of the remainder 
3 
of the p e r i o d they were zero, and f o r another t h i r d were under £2 m i l l i o n . 
Repayment of Treasury B i l l s continued during 1923 and 1924, though a t a 
much slower r a t e , the f i g u r e s f o r March i n 1923, 1924 and 1925 being £643, 
£594 and £571 m i l l i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . Sales of Treasury Bonds and conversions 
of maturing Exchequer Bonds i n t o 5% War Loan and. i n t o Treasury Bonds 
continued.^ 
Resulting Changes i n the St r u c t u r e of the N a t i o n a l Debt 
Thus a considerable change i n the s t r u c t u r e of the N a t i o n a l Debt 
took place. A considerable r e d u c t i o n was e f f e c t e d i n the l i q u i d i t y base 
of the market, and by v i r t u e of the continuing budget surpluses a 
1. Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h F i n a n c i a l P o l i c y 1914-1925, p.120. 
2. I b i d . , p.147. 3. I b i d . 
4. I b i d . , pp.120-121. 
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s i g n i f i c a n t t r a n s f e r o f purchasing power from t a x payers t o holders of 
Government stock was e f f e c t e d . At the time, t h i s t r a n s f e r was seen as a 
wholly admirable t h i n g , since the s t o c k of savings was thereby increased. 
Keynsian t h e o r y would i n any case contest t h i s d e s i r a b i l i t y of a s h i f t of 
t h i s k i n d d u r i n g a depression; but i n any case i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o under-
stand why Treasury o p i n i o n should have been so f i r m l y convinced t h a t debt 
repayment increased the funds a v a i l a b l e f o r i n d u s t r y . Government stock 
i s g e n e r a l l y regarded as the s a f e s t haven f o r money i n the market; i t i s 
not immediately obvious t h a t Hick's contention t h a t those whose stock.was _ 
being r e p a i d would have t o r e i n v e s t i n s i m i l a r s e c u r i t i e s , r a t h e r than i n 
2 
more r i s k y e n t e r p r i s e s , i s e i t h e r wrong or u n r e a l i s t i c . F u r t h e r , the 
very ease, and inc r e a s i n g ease, by which the Government was able t o e f f e c t 
the Conversion operations of 1921-25 i s an i n d i c a t i o n of the l a c k of demand 
i n the market f o r funds. I t i s one of the unfortunate i m p l i c a t i o n s o f 
c y c l i c a l p o l i c y t h a t the easiest times f o r a Government t o fund and repay 
debt are j u s t those when, from the p o i n t of view of countering c y c l i c a l 
i n f l u e n c e s , i t should not be doing so.. But the Treasury o f f i c i a l s cont-
inued t o be l i e v e t h a t the t r a n s f e r t o savers was a good t h i n g i n i t s e l f , 
r a t h e r than simply an i n c i d e n t a l p a r t of the debt management p o l i c y . 
There can be no doubt t h a t the l a r g e volume of f l o a t i n g debt which 
e x i s t e d i n the immediately post-war p e r i o d was a serious problem f o r the 
o f f i c i a l s ; i t i s e q u a l l y c l e a r t h a t although they were aware o f the 
problems created i n a s i t u a t i o n i n which d e f l a t i o n was t a k i n g place w h i l e 
the t o t a l size of the N a t i o n a l Debt was being m a r g i n a l l y increased, the 
ad m i n i s t r a t i v e d i f f i c u l t i e s of dea l i n g w i t h the short-term and f l o a t i n g 
debt obscured t h e i r perception of the importance of these problems. 
1. See, f o r example, P.R.Q., T.172/1208. memo, by Niemeyer on 
monetary p o l i c y , 5 Oct., 192T. 
2. Hicks, The Finance of B r i t i s h Government 1920-1938, p.34-1. 
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Their understanding of the deflationary mechanisms set o f f by t h e i r 
T 
policy seems to have been highly rudimentary; and both Blaekett and 
Niemeyer, but p a r t i c u l a r l y the l a t t e r , resisted strenuously any attempt 
to d i v e r t Treasury debt policy from the straight and narrow path of 
redemption and retrenchment. I t is.not, however, obvious that they 
would have been popular with the general public had they been less 
orthodox; the mood of the country was not such as to encourage 
experimentation. 
Interest Rate Policy^JigZQ-S _ _ _ 
Prior to the F i r s t World War, changes i n Bank Rate had been 
e n t i r e l y the province of the Bank of England, and there i s no evidence 
to suggest that the Treasury was consulted about changes. During and 
after the war, however, while there were large numbers of Treasury B i l l s 
on tap and the banks held considerable balances at the Bank,, Bank Rate 
was t o t a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e , and the r u l i n g rates, i n the market were largely 
determined by the Treasury B i l l rate. Thus u n t i l the tap issue was susp-
ended i n 1921, by which time the credit s i t u a t i o n had i n any case changed 
considerably, i t was necessary f o r there to be co-operation between the 
two authorities on the course of int e r e s t rates, and the Treasury i n effe c t 
had the casting vote. 
Early i n 1920 i t became apparent that the rises i n Bank and Treasury 
B i l l rates of the previous autumn had had l i t t l e e f f e c t on the market, 
and that i n f l a t i o n was s t i l l continuing apace. I t was becoming obvious 
that i f the Government's avowed policy of curbing i n f l a t i o n and inducing 
1. There was another deflationary aspect to the repayment of the 
f l o a t i n g debt; with the reduction i n Wiys and Means advances 
from the Bank i t became necessary f o r the Public Deposits item 
to be increased, and t h i s withdrawal of funds from the market 
implied a doubly deflationary e f f e c t . See Harris, Monetary 
Problems of the B r i t i s h Empire, pp.172-173. 
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d e f l a t i o n was t o be carried out, further action would have- to be taken,, 
But there was considerable opposition among the bankers to any increase 
of rates. So before the Chancellor made up his mind, he asked his chief 
advisers at the Treasury to submit memoranda on the d e s i r a b i l i t y or other-
wise of dearer money. He also requested one on the same subject from the 
Bank of England. A l l the memoranda were w r i t t e n w i t h i n a few days of 
each other i n the early part of February 1920. A conference with the 
bankers followed i n March, and eventually i n A p r i l the unanimous advice 
of the advisers at the Treasury and the Bank was taken, and Treasury B i l l 
and Bank Rates were raised on successive days, the former from to 
G^fo and the l a t t e r also by to 1%.2 
The memoranda wr i t t e n by the o f f i c i a l s to the Chancellor were 
collected i n t o a single f i l e during Keynes5 time at the Treasury i n the 
Second World War, and form a series of documents of absorbing i n t e r e s t 
f o r the study of the monetary policy of the period. There i s also an 
interesting covering Note w r i t t e n by Keynes i n 194-2. I n 1920 he had, i n 
common with the other o f f i c i a l s , advocated dearer money at once, although 
he favoured a swifter measure of d e f l a t i o n than had i n f a c t been applied. 
Despite the changes i n his ideas by the time he wrote the l a t e r note3: 
Keynes1 says that his advice would s t i l l be the same. 
"With a l l the methods of control, then so unorthodox, excluded, 
I f e e l myself that I should give today exactly the same advice 
that I gave then, namely, a swift and severe dose of dear money, 
s u f f i c i e n t to break the market, and quick enough to prevent at 
least some of the disastrous consequences which would otherwise 
ensue„"3 
1 . Economist. Vol. XC, 17 Apr., 1920. 
2 . According to Clay, the Chancellor was i n f a c t under pressure from 
Lloyd George to reduce rates, to cheapen Government borrowing, and 
by r a i s i n g security prices to enable the banks to l i q u i f y t h e i r 
holdings of long-term stock. Clay, Lord Norman, pp„124»5» For a 
summary of Bank Rate Changes 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 5 , See below, Appendix, 
Table £.„ 
3. P.R.O., T.I72/13BA. covering note by Keynes, 7 Jan. y 1942. 
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I n the event., he says, t h i s advice was taken, but too ti.mi.dlyj- however, 
he doubted whether much of the consequences could have been averted, even 
i f the de f l a t i o n had been faster. The moral of the ta l e p . and the lesson 
for the future ?- i s , he suggests, that controls should be continued f o r 
much longer than was p o l i t i c a l l y feasible i n the post-First World War 
period, p a r t i c u l a r l y as the controls then i n existence were more crude 
than those evolved during the course of the Second World War. The main 
lesson f o r the policy makers f o r the period following the current war i s , 
he says, that 
" a l l controls must be retained in" p r i n c i p l e f o r a~period of at 
least two years...If the vast bulk of purchasing power, which 
must necessarily exist at the end of the war, i s released i n 
the psychological conditions necessarily surrounding the end 
of the war, the re s u l t cannot be d i f f e r e n t from what i t was 
i n 1919 to 192T."1 
But i n 1920 the paraphernalia of control had been la r g e l y disbanded, mainly 
i n response to- the unanimous clamour of opinion of a l l shades f o r a return 
to the laissez-faire conditions of 1914-5 and a removal of the r e s t r i c t i o n s 
2 
imposed by Government control. I f i n f l a t i o n was to be controlled and 
def l a t i o n begun, there was l i t t l e choice of policy; and the unanimity 
of the Chancellor's advisers i s an indication of t h i s . 
The papers contain memoranda by two permanent o f f i c i a l s , Blackett 
and Niemeyer; one by Hawtrey, the Director of Financial Inq u i r i e s , one 
by Keynes, although he had by t h i s time resigned from the s t a f f of the 
Treasury to have a free hand i n w r i t i n g his book on the Peace Conference, 
and one by a member of the Bank of England s t a f f , sent by Cokayne with a 
covering l e t t e r . Niemeyer's paper i s short and to the point. He l a i d 
p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on the importance of raising our rates so that they 
should not be so f a r out of l i n e with those prevailing i n the United States. 
1. P.R.O., T. 172/1384-, covering note by Keynes, 7 Jan., 194-1. 
2. See above, pp. .133-144. 
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This i s f o r two reasons; the encouragement to our own investors to take 
t h e i r money abroad, where- i t can earn better i n t e r e s t , would be reduced, 
as would be the incentive f o r foreign borrowers to draw on London f o r 
loans rather than t r y i n the United States„ A fu r t h e r reason was that 
i f the holding of stocks became more expensive y traders would be forced 
to liquidate them, and t h i s would force prices doim and encourage exports, 
both of which would have an advantageous e f f e c t an the exchange. Niemeyer 
stressed that a reduction of rates, which apparently was being urged on 
Chamberlain by the Prime Minister, would lead to r u i n 0 
" - " . o.a~ reversion to cheap money would undo a l l the educative e f f e c t 
of even 6$„ People w i l l say: scarcity i s over; money i s cheap; 
there i s no need f o r economy: and rush down the steep place of 
i n f l a t i o n u n t i l the s h i l l i n g goes the way of the franc and the 
mark."'' 
Blackett's memorandum was longer, more detailed and more closely 
argued. The basic substance of his argument was that during the war, 
credit i n f l a t i o n , brought about by the Government borrowing more than 
the true savings of the people, had resulted i n a large increase i n purch-
asing powero At the same time, production of goods and services had not 
only not risen to meet t h i s increase., but had i n many cases f a l l e n , because 
of the necessity f o r div e r t i n g resources in t o the manufacture of instruments 
of war, and men to the waging of i t . As a r e s u l t , a considerable r i s e i n 
prices had occurred. Although a big price r i s e had also taken place i n 
the United States, the r i s e was not so great, and a depreciation of s t e r l -
ing i n terms of the d o l l a r had therefore taken place. The only remedy f o r 
t h i s was a reduction i n the B r i t i s h price l e v e l to p a r i t y with the American 
i n terms of gold prices. Before the war a r i s e i n Bank rate would normally 
have been s u f f i c i e n t to i n i t i a t e an adjustment i n price levels. But the 
si t u a t i o n i n 1920 was rather d i f f e r e n t . 
1. P.R.O., T.172/138A. memo, by Niemeyer, 3 Feb.,. 1920. 
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" o o othough people s t i l l think and t a l k about Bank Rate i t s action 
though important i s at present subsidiary to that of the Treasury 
B i l l rates." 1 
I n addition, the pre-war effec t of a r i s e i n Bank Rate on the flow of 
gold was not l i k e l y to be seen for a very long time, because the d i f f -
erence i n the price levels and therefore the depreciation of the exchange 
was so great. 
One of the objections to a policy of dear money was that the cur-
rent p r o f i t a b i l i t y of trading was so great that even a large r i s e i n 
i n t e r e s t rates would not be s u f f i c i e n t to l i q u i d a t e stocks or reduce 
trade borrowings. Blackett suggested that i n practice t h i s assessment 
was not accurate i n any but very short-term situations. 
" I t i s true that the riotous a c t i v i t y of trade and the phenomenal 
p r o f i t s which are the effects of continually r i s i n g prices make 
i t d i f f i c u l t to check borrowings. But t h i s i s largely because 
there i s an expectation that prices w i l l s t i l l continue to r i s e ; 
some borrowers and i n p a r t i c u l a r foreign borrowers are checked 
by every r i s e i n rates. And once i t i s clear that a d e f i n i t e 
policy of d e f l a t i o n i s i n process of being realised, the expect-
ation of further rises i n prices w i l l be dispelled and moderately 
high rates w i l l e f f e c t i v e l y r e s t r i c t borrowing."^ 
However, Blaekett emphasised that while a policy of dearer money such as 
to r e s t r i c t credit and reduce prices was advisable, and indeed a r e s t r -
i c t i o n of credit was an essential preliminary to d e f l a t i o n - currency 
r e s t r i c t i o n alone being i n s u f f i c i e n t , since increases i n the volume of 
currency were largely a reaction to high prices rather than the cause 
of them - i t would be necessary to guard against proceeding too precip-
i t a t e l y . 
"A dear money policy has f o r i t s object a r e s t r i c t i o n of c r e d i t . 
I t s power f o r good i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n i s l i m i t e d by the proviso 
that i t must not be carried to such lengths that i t w i l l cause 
a decrease i n production. Falling prices are d i s l i k e d by a l l 
traders, and however much the working man as consumer may d i s l i k e 
high prices, he d i s l i k e s s t i l l more reductions i n wages and lack 
of employment. Any policy therefore which aims at reduction of 
prices must move slowly, and i f the social benefits which the 
world hopes to win from the reconstruction period are to be attained, 
r e a l wages must be kept above pre-war levels and unemployment must 
be avoided to the utmost extent possible,"3 
1. P.R.O., T.172/138A. memo, by Blackett, 21 Feb., 1920. 
2. I b i d . 3. I b i d . . 
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Blackett emphasised the i n f l a t i o n a r y nature of Ways and Means advances, 
but he also stressed the similar e f f e c t of Treasury B i l l s ? p a r t i c u l a r l y 
as they approached maturity: 
11 o o«Treasury B i l l s with a very early maturity date are looked 
on by the banks and s t i l l more by many of t h e i r customers as 
the equivalent of purchasing power."'' 
I t was important, therefore, that the Treasury should be able to renew 
a l l B i l l s without too much d i f f i c u l t y , and t h i s implied higher rates. 
These rates would probably not have to be maintained f o r very long, as 
once the cycle of price and wage rises was broken, conditions would 
become easier again, and when rates could be brought down again i t would 
be possible f o r the Government to begin funding the debt, •••to make sure 
that the problem could not arise so acutely again. Blackett concluded: 
" I t i s certain that a further i n f l a t i o n of credit would i n e v i t a b l y 
lead to a further r i s e i n prices. I f a steady following of the 
policy of d e f l a t i o n can secure the country against a new ris e i n 
the cost of l i v i n g or keep w i t h i n small l i m i t s the fu r t h e r 
temporary r i s e which the general conditions i n the world today 
threaten to cause, and can then lead on to a r e a l f a l l i n that 
cost, not only w i l l the community reap an adequate reward f o r 
the expense incurred i n paying high rates f o r Treasury B i l l s y : 
but the Exchequer w i l l benefit by a gradual restoration of 
normal exchanges and the e a r l i e r a r r i v a l of the moment when 
the national debt can be funded on reasonable terms „,,<: 
The advice which the Chancellor received from the professional. 
3 
economists and from the Bank was on much the same l i n e s . Keynes was 
i n favour of more drastic action than Blackett was prepared to contem-
plate; he proposed a r i s e to 7% at once followed by a further r i s e to 
8%, and opined that 10$ bank rate might eventually be necessary. He f e l t 
that a quick clean cut would be better than a slow f a l l i n the price l e v e l y 
and that although a c r i s i s might res u l t i t would probably be a financial, 
one only, not a commercial one.^ The Bank of England was„ as one might 
1. P.RoO..T.172/1384. memo, by Blackett, 21 Feb., 1920. 
2. ' I b i d . 
3. I b i d . . memos by Hawtrey, 4 Feb.,1920, Keynes, 15 Feb. ,.1920, and one, 
unsigned, from the Bank of England, 10 Feb.,1920. 
4. I b i d . , memo, by Keynes. 
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have expected, even more concerned with the effects of i n f l a t i o n cn the 
exchanges than were the Treasury advisers„ 
"The f i r s t and most urgent task before- the Country i s to get 
back to the gold standard by getting r i d of t h i s specific 
depreciation of the currency. 
This end can only be achieved by a reversal of the 
process by which the specific depreciation was produced;, the 
a r t i f i c i a l creation of currency and c r e d i t , and f o r t h i s the 
appropriate instrument I s the rate of i n t e r e s t . 
The Bank]s memorandum was accompanied by a l e t t e r from Cokayne urging 
an increase i n rates, because of the amount of accommodation which the 
Bank was being asked f o r at the current Bank Rate of 6%.^ 
Following t h i s flood of o f f i c i a l advice ? Chamberlain also received 
the opinions of the bankers- upon the subject, at two meetings early i n 
3 
March. They were almost unanimous i n t h e i r opposition to a ri s e i n 
in t e r e s t rates, and suggested that i t would i n any case be i n e f f e c t i v e 
since the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of trade was so great at the present- time. I n 
any case the only way of r e s t r i c t i n g credit was f o r the bankers to r a t i o n 
advances to t h e i r customers, and they therefore suggested to the Chancellor 
that he should allow them to do t h i s v o l u n t a r i l y without a further r i s e i n 
in t e r e s t rates, and see what e f f e c t t h i s had. Chamberlain was most unwil-
l i n g to do t h i s , but he could not extract any more d e f i n i t e undertaking 
from the bankers, as to the extent to which they would be prepared t o 
reduce t h e i r advances.-
Chamberlain decided to give the bankers a l i t t l e time i n which to 
t r y to improve the si t u a t i o n by t h e i r own e f f o r t s . But the s i t u a t i o n was 
becoming steadily worse. Blackett, who i n early February was of the 
opinion that a 6% bank rate was high enough f o r the time being„ and was 
c h i e f l y concerned that rates should not be reduced, was by early March 
1 . P.R.O. ,T. 172/1384-, memo, from Bank of England, unsigned, but the 
author was almost cer t a i n l y Montagu Norman. 
2» Ibid»? Cokayne to Chancellor, 25 Feb. J. 1920. 
3. I b i d . , reports of meetings with the bankers on 9 and 11 Mar..1920. 
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convinced that Bank Rate should be raised to 7% as soon as possible. 
Early i n A p r i l the Treasury began to experience considerable d i f f i c u l t y 
i n renewing B i l l s , and Bank Ways and Means rose by £55 m i l l i o n i n the 
2 
f i r s t ten days of the month. This called f o r t h a strong protest from 
Norman, who had by t h i s time taken over from Gokayne at the Bank, He 
asked to see Chamberlain with a view to discussing an immediate r i s e i n 
rates, since he was unwilling any longer t o wait while Chamberlain asse-
3 
ssed the results of the bankers' voluntary e f f o r t s . The meeting took 
place the following day, the 13th,^" and Treasury B i l l and Bank Rates 
were oach raised by 1$ on 14-th and T5th"of A p r i l ' respectively„ 
The fears of the Treasury men were not f u l f i l l e d about the possib-
i l i t y of a need f o r 8% or even 10$ l a t e r on. But the d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
the spring of 1920 continued to af f e c t the atmosphere of decision-making 
f o r some time, as did the need to finance a large volume of Treasury B i l l 
borrowing, and Bank Rate stayed at 7% f o r a year, when i t was brought down 
by steps t o % i n November 1921 * Treasury B i l l s had by then ceased t o 
be available on tap i n the fashion of the war and post-war period;, so that 
there was no longer a r i v a l to Bank Rate i n the d i c t a t i o n of the l e v e l of 
money rates i n the market. As the country was by t h i s time i n the grips 
of a severe, trade depression, even 5$ seemed high, and the rate came down 
to 4§$ i n February 1922, l& i n A p r i l and 3% i n July, where i t stayed f o r 
5 
a year. 
From t h i s time on,Bank Rate policy seems to have been mainly i n 
keeping with Cunliffe's recommendation that rates should be kept above 
those i n countries w i t h whose currency s t e r l i n g was at a discount,. The 
Federal Reserve rate was raised from 4 to 4g$ i n February 1923, and t h i s 
1. P.R.O.„T.172/1384. note by Blaekett, 4 Mar., 1920. 
2. Economist. Vol.XC', 17 Apr., 1920. 
3. Clay, Lord Norman, pp.127-128, Norman t o Blackett, 12 Apr.,1920. 
4. I b i d . , p.128. 
5. Economist. - 306 -
and the Ruhr c r i s i s in. the summer resulted i n an outflow of short-term 
funds which increased the s t e r l i n g discount again. Bank Rate was raised 
to A% i n July 1923, and when the Federal Reserve rate f e l l to 3ji% and then 
3% i n the summer of 1924. Bank Rate was maintained at the l$> l e v e l and the 
Bank took advantage of the s i t u a t i o n to make i t s own rate e f f e c t i v e and 
to discourage foreign loans, to aid the appreciation of s t e r l i n g . The 
u n o f f i c i a l discouragement of foreign lending was i n t e n s i f i e d i n the 
autumn, and there was a sharp f a l l i n new issues. When the Federal 
Reserve rate was raised to 3^% i n February, Bank Rate was -immediately ~ 
raised to 5%, to maintain the d i f f e r e n t i a l which Norman f e l t to be 
necessary to encourage the appreciation of s t e r l i n g to par, before 
returning to the Gold Standard i n A p r i l . 
While there seems to have been more co-operation between the Treasury 
and the Bank i n t h i s l a t e r period than pre-war, once the compulsion on 
mutual agreement and understanding had been removed with restoration of 
the tender issue to i t s previous position, i t was not to be expected that 
Norman would welcome interference from the Treasury i n what he regarded 
as the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of the Bank, and the regulation of Bank Rate 
became again a matter f o r the Bank alone. I t i s recorded that Churchill 
did once attempt to influence Norman i n a Bank Rate decision., and was 
2 
met with a decisive rebuff. But although the Treasury o f f i c i a l s may 
not have been quite so single-minded i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e to the Gold Standard 
as Norman, on the whole they shared the orthodox attitude to i n t e r e s t rates, 
as i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e i r behaviour and advice i n the c r i s i s of 
spring 1920. 
1. Sir Albert Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling (2nd edn; Oxford: Clarendon 
1963), p.358. **ess 
2. P.J. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement (London: Jonathan Cape, 194-8), 
p.193. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE TREASURY AND THE 
GOLD STANDARD 
During the whole of the period from 1918 to 1925, the aim of restoring the 
Gold Standard i n B r i t a i n dominated the actions of the Treasury o f f i c i a l s i n the 
Finance Divisions, and the advice which they gave to the Chancellor, no less 
than i t did the policy of the Governor of the Bank of England. The need to keep 
Bank Rate high i n order to a t t r a c t funds to London and support s t e r l i n g , when 
the i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n would have suggested quite d i f f e r e n t moves, bedevilled 
a l l e f f o r t s towards trade recovery, and increased the already huge burden of 
servicing the National Debt. The b e l i e f that the restoration of the Gold 
Standard would help B r i t a i n to regain her previous trade posit i o n acted to the 
detriment of other suggestions f o r reviving the stagnating export trades. The 
importance of avoiding the currency disasters experienced by countries on the 
Continent, and i n p a r t i c u l a r by Germany, also pointed to the dangers of incon-
v e r t i b l e currencies and the advantages of the "automatic" d i s c i p l i n e of the 
Gold Standard. 
But over and above the l o g i c a l reasons f o r desiring a return to the Gold 
Standard, there was a longing f o r a return to the r e l a t i v e l y stable conditions 
of the pre-war world, when B r i t a i n held an undisputed position of supremacy i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l finance, and the dangers of Britain's trade position were not 
immediately obvious. I t i s t h i s element of b e l i e f i n the advantages of the Gold 
Standard as an a r t i c l e of f a i t h that makes the problem of prime importance i n 
Treasury thinking, and thus i n any study of the Treasury during the inter-war 
period. But the d i r e c t involvement of the Treasury i n t h i s area of f i n a n c i a l 
policy was a new development; u n t i l the e f f e c t i v e prevention of gold exports 
during the war, the operation of the Gold Standard had been the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
the Bank of England. Thus although the Gold Standard was a new problem f o r the 
Treasury, i t had a considerable history, and i t was also an area i n which the 
Bank was deeply concerned. 
309. 
The H i s t o r i c a l Background 
In order to understand the supreme importance of the Gold Standard, and the 
sacrosanct nature of the pre-war pound, i t i s necessary to examine b r i e f l y the 
history of the problem. The establishment of the mint price of gold at 
£3»17.10fd. a standard ounce had occurred i n 1717, following a period of 
devaluation of gold against s i l v e r . From that point on, changes i n the r e l a t i v e 
values of the two metals took place through a r i s e i n the gold price of s i l v e r , 
rather than a f a l l i n the price of gold i n terms of s i l v e r , and B r i t a i n was thus 
1 
established on a gold standard f o r domestic purposes. 
During the Napoleonic Wars, i n 1797, the. Bank, of -England was obliged to 
suspend payments, and f o r the rest of the wartime period trade was financed by 
means of an i n f l a t e d paper currency. Following the end of the war, considerable 
controversy arose over the currency problem. F i n a l l y i n 1319 Peel secured the 
2 
passing of an Act, which i s generally kno\m by his name, i n which a timetable 
was set out f o r a restoration of the pre-war currency standard. During the course 
of the eighteenth century the ancient prohibitions on the exporting and melting of 
gold and s i l v e r had become increasingly i n e f f e c t i v e . Peel extended the effects 
of the restoration to overseas trade by expressly permitting the export and 
melting of gold, and by repealing the relevant portions of the Statutes which 
prohibited these a c t i v i t i e s . Thus began the standardisation which lasted 
almost exactly a hundred years. 
The apparent p a r a l l e l between 1819 and 1919 i s s t r i k i n g . The country had 
been forced o f f a f i x e d standard by war, ?,r.d had ended the war with an i n f l a t e d 
paper currency. A committee was set up - chaired by Peel i n 1819, by Gunliffe 
i n 1919 - to discuss the problem, which concluded that B r i t a i n should restore 
a fix e d price f o r gold, equal to the pre-war p a r i t y , and c o n v e r t i b i l i t y , as 
1. Sir Albert Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling (2nd edn; Oxford: Clarendon 
H- o 
2. GUI, c . 4 9 , 2 July, 1 9 1 9 . 
Press, 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 1 5 4 
3 1 0 . 
soon as possible. The conclusions of the committee were also those of v i r t u a l l y -
a l l the witnesses i n both cases. The p r i n c i p a l difference was that Cunliffe's 
committee recommended that c o n v e r t i b i l i t y should be in t o b u l l i o n , aid t h a t the 
i n t e r n a l gold c i r c u l a t i o n should not be restored; t h i s course of action had i n 
fa c t been suggested to Peel's committee i n 1819 by Ricardo, i n order to mitigate 
the deflationary effects of the s t a b i l i s a t i o n policy, but the suggestion was 
rejected. F i n a l l y , the restoration period, and the years immediately afterwards, 
were characterised by f a l l i n g prices, trade depression and high unemployment. 
The War and Post-war Periods 
The p a r a l l e l between 1 8 1 9 and 1 9 1 9 did not f a i l to s t r i k e the o f f i c i a l s of 
the Treasury, and indeed the Chancellors, f o r one of the papers w r i t t e n f o r 
Churchill at his request by Hawtrey i n 1925 was on the subject of the restoration 
2 
of the Gold Standard af t e r the Napoleonic Wars. But the influence of the 
previous century of Gold Standard operation was s u f f i c i e n t to encourage the 
o f f i c i a l s to stress the speed and ease - from a f i n a n c i a l point of view - with 
which the Standard was restored, rather than the rigours of d e f l a t i o n to which 
the economy was subjected, and the distress which resulted. Furthermore, because 
the o f f i c i a l s were thinking at least p a r t l y i n terms of 1 8 1 9 as a h i s t o r i c a l 
precedent, they paid i n s u f f i c i e n t attention to the impact of fresh factors, such 
as the vast body of f l o a t i n g Debt which had been incurred daring the war and 
which dramatically affected the a b i l i t y of the Treasury and the Bank to control 
the supply of c r e d i t , the changes i n gold supply and i n the extent to which the 
available gold supply was- channelled through London,and so on. The Gold Standard 
was not i n fact o f f i c i a l l y abandoned u n t i l a f t e r the war; during the war* there 
1. Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling , p. 2 2 0 . 
2 . P.R.O., T O 1 7 2 / 1 4 9 9 B . memo, by Hawtrey, undated. 
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was v i r t u a l l y no export of gold, p a r t l y due i n the l a t e r stages to the submarine 
r i s k and insurance problems. But during most of the war, B r i t a i n was l i q u i d a t i n g 
existing securities and borrowing heavily i n New York to support the exchanges 
at the o f f i c i a l rate; the object being to avoid paying vastly i n f l a t e d prices 
fo r war supplies and food purchased i n America. This policy ran i n t o increasing 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n 1 9 1 6 and early 1 9 1 7 , and i n the view of Keynes, who was handling 
the problem i n his capacity as a temporary Treasury o f f i c i a l , only the entry of 
America int o the war i n ..April 1 9 1 7 saved s t e r l i n g and the currencies of the other 
belligerents from collapse. After the end of the war, the need f o r exchange 
support f o r t h i s purpose declined, and i n March 1 9 1 9 the export of gold was 
2 
prohibited by administrative regulation. This was l a t e r modified to permit 
export of new gold from South Afric a , - by arrangement with the Bank of England, 
and given statutory force by the Gold and Silver- (Export Control) Act of 1 9 2 0 . " 
This Act had an expiry date of December, 1 9 2 5 , and t h i s implied deadline was to 
have repercussions l a t e r . 
The classical exposition of the working of the Gold Standard i n the period 
before 1 9 1 4 - , set out by the Gunliffe Committee i n i t s F i r s t Interim Report 9 has 
already been discussed.^ There i s every reason to believe that t h i s was the view 
which the p r i n c i p a l Treasury o f f i c i a l s took of the s i t u a t i o n . Sir John Bradbury, 
then j o i n t Permanent Secretary, took a major part i n the discussions of the 
Committee, and signed i t s Interim Report. By the time the Committee came to 
consider I t s Final Report, Sir John had l e f t f o r the Reparations Commission, 
and his place was taken by Sir Basil Blackett, then Financial Controller at the 
Treasury, who also concurred i n the conclusions, and signed the Final Report. 
Because the Treasury had a member on the Committee, i t was f e l t that the Treasury 
1 . J.M. Keynes, A c t i v i t i e s 1 9 U - 1 9 1 9 : The Treasury and Versailles, Collected 
Writings of J.M. Keynes, ed. E. Johnson (London: Macmillan and Co., f o r 
the Royal Economic Society, 1 9 7 1 ) , p e 2 2 4 . 
2e Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, p. 3 5 1 • 
3 o 1 0 and 1 1 Geo. V . c.70.~~ 
Ao See above, 0h o I I I passim. 
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view was adequately represented, and no Treasury witnesses were called. But-
t-here i s l i t t l e evidence to suggest that other members of the Finance Divisions 
would have expressed contrary opinions; Sir Otto Niemeyer, who became Blaskett^s 
deputy i n 1921, tended to be r i g i d l y orthodox on the subject, and younger 
o f f i c i a l s who expressed opinions l a t e r were substantially i n agreement with 
1 
t h e i r superiors, Keynes, who was l a t e r such a convinced opponent of a return 
at the pre-war p a r i t y , was apparently not consulted, but there i s no evidence 
to suggest that at that stage he had evolved his ideas s u f f i c i e n t l y to have been 
a determined c r i t i c , had he been called as a witness before the Cunliffe Committ 
His involvement with post-war planning- while" at the Treasury seems to have been 
2 
confined to the problems of peace terms and reparations. 
As we. have seen, no record remains of the process by which the Cunliffe 
Committee's reports came to be accepted by the Government; the f a c t that no 
mention was made of any discussion i n any of the o f f i c i a l records of the period, 
nor i n the private papers of the Prime Minister or either of the Chancellors 
concerned, nor i n any of the f a i r l y large number of biographies and autobiog-
raphies of the period, suggests that there may well have been none, that the 
necessity f o r the measures recommended by the Committee was accepted as automata 
a l l y by the Government as by the Committee and most of i t s witnesses, and by the-
3 
Treasury o f f i c i a l s . Be that as i t may, the Reports of the Committee set the 
course f o r Bri t a i n ' s f i n a n c i a l policy f o r a decade, and provided an exposition 
i n uncompromising terms of both the logic and the f a i t h of the proponents of the 
Gold Standard. 
T b B ^ a i t ^ ^ e x i o d ^ J ^ ^ l ^ 
The examples of the Treasury's obsession with the Gold Standard during the 
'twenties are numerous. The f i r s t major occasion a f t e r the Committee reported 
1. See below, p. ..328. 
2. Keynes, The Treasury and Versailles, Part I I . 
3 . See above, Ch. I l l , especially pp. ^ q - f o q . 
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I s which the question of the Gold Standard was treated as a major element ire a 
discussion of another problem was i n the spring of 1920, when the o f f i c i a l s were 
urging a r i s e i n Bank and Treasury B i l l Rates. The chief reason f o r advocating 
t h i s policy was the need to control the i n t e r n a l i n f l a t i o n which was then at i t s 
height, during the post-war boom. But the exchanges were a major factor i n the 
argument too, even though at the time there was no prospect of an immediate 
return to the Gold Standard, since the pound was then more than a do l l a r under 
1 
the pre-war par rate. 
During the course of the discussions of the Bank Rate problem, Sir Ralph 
Hawtrey, Blackett and Niemeyer a l l wrote memoranda on the subject, as did 
Sir Brian Cokayne, then Governor of the Bank of England. A l l of them stressed 
the importance of higher money rates i n achieving the goal at which they were 
a l l aiming, the return to the Gold Standard. Hawtrey urged as one reason f o r a 
higher Bank Rate the f a c t that 
' " o . o t h e gap that has to be crossed before s t e r l i n g rises to i t s 
gold par i s already enormous..."^ 
Blackett also stressed the importance of the exchange rate factor as one of his 
reasons f o r recommending a ris e i n the Bank Rate: 
"In spite of a big r i s e i n prices i n the United States of America 
where the Gold Standard has remained e f f e c t i v e the l e v e l of s t e r l i n g 
prices has ris e n much higher than the l e v e l of d o l l a r prices. The 
natural r e s u l t i s a depreciation of s t e r l i n g i n terms of d o l l a r s . 
The only eff&ctive remedy i s to bring back s t e r l i n g prices to a l e v e l 
approximately equal to t h e i r proportionate l e v e l as compared with 
dollar prices before the war... ."3 
Blackett was i n no doubt that the restoration of the exchanges to par was the 
r i g h t objective i n i t s e l f : 
" I f a steady policy of d e f l a t i o n can. secure the country against a 
new ri s e i n the cost of living...and then go on to a re a l f a l l i n 
that cost,...the Exchequer w i l l benefit by a gradual restoration, 
of normal exchanges. .„ "4-
1. ¥„A. Brown, The International Gold Standard Re-interpreted (2nd. edn; 
New York; N.B.E.R., 194-0), p. 231, Table 18. 
2. P.R.O., T.172/1384. memo, by Hawtrey, 4 Apr., 1920. 
3° I b i d -
4. I b i d . 
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Niemeyer was of the same opinion, but expressed himself i n rather mere f o r t h r i g ' 
terms s 
" I t i s notorious that American rates are even now much higher than 
London rates: i f , as i s not improbable, there i s a f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s 
i n America, American rates w i l l go s t i l l higher c Our exchange w i l l 
depreciate s t i l l f urther and the gap between gold and s t e r l i n g , which 
we hope to bridge, w i l l become wider and wider...the logic of the 
position seems to be that we should substantially increase i t 
{ B r i t i s h Bank Rate]' "'1 
Gokayne put even greater stress on the needs of the exchange situations 
"The f i r s t and most urgent task before the country i s to get back 
to the gold standard by getting r i d of t h i s specific depreciation 
of the currency. 
The importance of promo-ting a re t u r n to the Gold Standard continued to be 
a major feature i n Treasury memoranda i n t h i s period,, Niemeyer, asked by the 
Chancellor i n November 1921 to prepare a statement on the principles governing 
B r i t i s h policy on i n f l a t i o n , credit and prices, said: 
"The main p r i n c i p l e of monetary policy followed since the Armistice 
flows from the Report of the Cuniiffe Committee-. „ „ To t h i s day there-
has been no substantial change i n the policy then adopted. I t has 
been steadily pursued."-^ 
I t i s interesting to note that Niemeyer was not thinking only of the benefits 
of stable exchanges and a return to the Gold Standard to the f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o i 
of the country. As i s frequently suggested, i n the Treasury- f i l e s , the Gold 
Standard was thought of as an unemployment policy as w e l l . 
"oo.the object of our monetary policy has been throughout to produce 
such economic conditions as would enable B r i t i s h trade to compete i n 
world markets and thus afford,, as I n the past, steady employment i n 
t h i s country. "4-
The lmportan.ee of a restoration of the Gold Standard i n the other major 
countries of the world was one of the major themes of the Genoa Conference, 
called by the B r i t i s h to discuss the problems of European economic reconstruct 
and held i n 1922. Indeed, as others have noted, the programme adopted by the 
1. P.R.O., T„ 172/1384-. memo, by Niemeyer, 3 Feb., 1920. 
2. Ibid.., memo, by Cokayne, 25 Feb., 1920. 
3. P.R.O.., T.176/5, memo, by Niemeyer, 5 Oct., 1921, para. 1. 
k* Ibid.., para. 7. 
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Conference i n the f i n a n c i a l sphere closely followed the Cunliffe Committee{s 
recommendations. Balanced budgets, an end to i n f l a t i o n and a return to the 
Gold Standard were prescribed as the remedies f o r Barope's ailments. But these 
t r a d i t i o n a l tenets were reinforced, by some novel ideas about Central Bank 
co-operation which were largely the work of Hawtrey. Unfortunately, the 
troubled conditions of the 'twenties rendered such desirable developments 
impossible, and the orthodox merits of the Gold Standard continued to be urged 
without there being any prospect of the in t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation which the 
changed conditions of the post-war years rendered essential. But there seems 
l i t t l e doubt that the Genoa Conference, at which B r i t a i n took a leading role 
i n urging other countries to put t h e i r f i n a n c i a l houses i n order, had the 
effec t of reinforcing the Treasury's determination to set an example to the 
world by returning to the Gold Standard ourselves. 
Soon after the Conference, at the beginning of 1923, the exchange s i t u a t i o n 
began to look more hopeful, and there was some p o s s i b i l i t y of returning to the 
Gold Standard at that stage„ In January 1923, Niemeyer was asked by the Chancellor 
to comment on a suggestion by McKenna, Chairman of the Midland Bank, that Treasury 
Bonds be withdrawn from the market i n favour of Treasury B i l l s , the e f f e c t being 
to encourage short-term lending at the expense of medium-term, and to induce a 
general f a l l i n money rates since Treasury B i l l rates were lower than Bond rates. 
Niemeyer rejected the suggestion f o r a number of reasons, among which not the least 
important was the e f f e c t on the exchanges of cheaper money and possible i n f l a t i o n . 
"American prices are r i s i n g steadily. „ .exchange i s working towards par-; 
with her enormous gold accretions America can hardly avoid further 
credit i n f l a t i o n and price increases. As soon as t h i s process has 
gone a l i t t l e f u rther and we arrive at par, we s h a l l get a l l the 
i n f l a t i o n we want here; possibly more than we want i f America begins 
to send back gold. I f i n advance of t h i s we s t a r t an i n f l a t i o n of 
our own, we shal l lose a l l the advantage we have laboriously gained 
ju s t when a l l the trumps are i n our hand."^ 
1, P.R.O., Cab. 3 l / l ; H. Roseveare, The Treasury (London: Allen Lane 
The Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 262-3. 
2. P.R.O., T.176/5, memo, by Niemeyer, 24 Jan., 1923. 
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I n the eventj, a return to the Gold Standard was not attempted at that stage, 
prima r i l y because of the dislocation of the International f i n a n c i a l system 
resulting from wartime debts and reparations. At that time, although the Anglo-
American debt problem was near solution (the terms f o r funding arranged by 
Baldwin were formally agreed i n February 1923) the European s i t u a t i o n was s t i l l 
very unstable: France had invaded the Ruhr i n January as a consequence of a 
technical German default on reparation payments. I n a note on a question to be 
asked i n the House of Lords on the problems of the currency s i t u a t i o n and the need 
for a new Committee to review i t , Niemeyer wrote: 
".oo.CThe Report of the Cunliffe Committee} speaks of 'a review,,.when 
the exchanges -are working normally'. Obviously we have not reached 
t h i s condition. Indeed, u n t i l there i s a settlement of Reparations 
we cannot even begin to see what the normal exchange position w i l l be."'' 
Despite these international d i f f i c u l t i e s , the Treasury advisers s t i l l kept 
the return as the central theme i n t h e i r policy recommendations. R.G. Hawtrey, 
w r i t i n g i n March 1923, suggested that there were two main objectives to be kept 
i n view: 
"(1) .We must avoid any further d e f l a t i o n , and with a view to the early 
absorption of our unemployed a moderate degree of i n f l a t i o n , such as 
has been experienced i n the past twelve months i n America, would be 
desirable; 
(2) We must restore s t e r l i n g to i t s gold par as soon as possible,."'4 
Hawtrey accepted that these two objectives might be largely incompatible, but 
th i s did not lead him to reject either a l t e r n a t i v e . His remedy was that we should 
export large sums of gold to America i n order to promote i n f l a t i o n there, rather 
than bring the exchanges to par by forcing further d e f l a t i o n i n t h i s country. This 
3 
advice was repeated i n another memorandum i n October, 1923. 
The f a c t that there might be a c o n f l i c t between d i f f e r e n t parts of t h e i r 
policies was not ? however, obvious to a l l the Treasury o f f i c i a l s , and there are 
some inte r e s t i n g examples of inherently contradictory statements on these problems 
1 . P.R.O., T.I76/5. note by Niemeyer, 24 Apr., 1923. 
2. I b i d . P memo, by Hawtrey, 5 Mar., 1923. 
3. I b i d . . memo, by Hawtrey, 31 Oct., 1923. 
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i n the Treasury memoranda. Niemeyer, w r i t i n g i n March 1924- on the e v i l s of 
i n f l a t i o n , said: 
"This country has to s e l l her goods, i f she i s to l i v e , abroad. The great 
d i f f i c u l t y of the l a s t two years...has been that many of the natural 
purchasers of B r i t i s h exports have not been able to afford B r i t i s h 
s t e r l i n g prices. Nothing ef f e c t i v e can be done f o r trade or 
unemployment by increasing these prices."^ 
This statement i s followed a few l i n e s l a t e r by the inevitable: 
"...the object to be kept steadily i n view i s to arrive at a p a r i t y 
between s t e r l i n g and gold."^ 
Yet unless Britain's customers were able to keep t h e i r exchange rates i n step, 
t h i s process must have resulted i n B r i t i s h goods becoming yet more expensive f o r 
them. But t h i s contradiction never became apparent to Niemeyer and his -colleagues, 
because they regarded the pre-war p a r i t y as a fixed and immutable law of the 
universe; i t was a l l the other factors which were out of step, not the gold p a r i t y . 
•Another example of t h i s attitude i s to be found i n a memorandum wr i t t e n on 
the best means of assisting i n the r e l i e f of unemployment and distress: 
"The root cause of unemployment at the present time...is that costs of 
production are so high that purchasers whether from abroad or i n t h i s 
country cannot afford to buy. The main item i n the cost of production 
i s the cost of vages. The only hope of ultimate f u l l employment i n 
t h i s country i s therefore a reduction i n prices and correspondingly i n 
wages. "2 
The writer apparently did not understand that the wage-earner i s a consumer as 
well as a producer, and with his reduced wages would be able to buy s t i l l less; 
nor that the poverty of other countries r e l a t i v e to B r i t a i n would hardly be 
eased by pushing s t e r l i n g up to p a r i t y with tne d o l l a r . 
The policy of subordinating a l l other considerations to a restoration of 
the Gold Standard was not e n t i r e l y without i t s c r i t i c s . Many i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , 
including some prominent i n the Federation of B r i t i s h Industries, were unhappy 
at the apparent stagnation i n production and employment; but none of any weight 
1. P.R.O., T sr76A, memo, by Niemeyer, 1 Mar., 1924. 
2. P.R.O., T.172/1 208. memo, undated and unsigned, but context indicates 
mid-1921, and style suggests that the author was Niemeyer. 
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was prepared to cease at least paying lip-service to the importance of returning 
to the Gold Standard. Indeed the views of the FBI upon the subject became so 
schizophrenic that several d i f f e r e n t versions of the FBI's representations to the 
Bradbury Committee i n 1924 have appeared, some i n d i r e c t contradiction to one 
1 
another. Other doubters appeared on the l e f t wing of the Labour Party, notably 
2 
G„D„H„ Cole, with his famous phrase, "the worship of par". ' About the middle of 
1923 Keynes began to protest about the way deflationary policies were working out, 
and started his long quest f o r a sound theor e t i c a l base f o r his unorthodox ideas 
about purchasing power and the prime importance of the s t a b i l i t y of the price 
l e v e l . ^ 
Nevertheless, the bulk of informed opinion was s t i l l strongly i n favour of 
restoring the Gold Standard. The f i r s t Labour Government, which came to power i n 
l a t e 1923, continued the policy of i t s predecessors. By t h i s time the American 
debt settlement negotiated by Baldwin had proved workable, and the s i t u a t i o n i n 
Europe was beginning to improve. During the course of 1924, the German mark was 
st a b i l i s e d , and an interim reparations settlement was reached, and i n October 1924 
the Dawes Loan was successfully f l o a t e d to aid German recovery. The pounds which 
had f a l l e n from i t s peak of $4.70 i n March 1923 to $4.29 i n January 1924, had by-
May recovered to # 4 . 3 9 . ^ ^he climate f o r a return was thus becoming more favourable 
as the need, f o r a decision was becoming more pressing, due to the expiry of the 
gold export p r o h i b i t i o n at the end of 192.5. At the suggestion of Montagu Norman, 
Governor of the Bank of England, a fresh committee on the currency issue was set 
up by Snowden, Chancellor i n the Labour Government. This committee's report was 
the i n i t i a l impetus f o r the discussions which took place w i t h i n the Treasury early 
i n I925 on the return to gold, and i t i s therefore appropriate that we should now 
turn to an examination of i t s proceedings and findings. 
1 . See below, pp. 321-322, 332-333. 
2» Mornjjig^ JPo s t , 13 June, 192-4, l e t t e r to the Editor from G.D.H. Cole. : 
3. See, f o r example, Times, 7 Aug., 1923, l e t t e r to the Editor from J.M„ Keynes. 
4. W.A. Brown Jnr., The International Gold' Standard Re-interpreted, p. -231, 
Table 18. 
5. P.R.O., T.160/197/7528, Niemeyer to Chancellor, 5 May, 1924. 
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The Bradbury Committee 
This committee was, i n effec t a reconvening of the active members of the 
Gunliffe Committee who were s t i l l a l i v e . The only members who had not also 
served under Cunliffe (who died i n 1920) were Sir Austen Chamber-lain^ who was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, and Sir Ottc Niemeyer, who became the 
Treasury representative. The other members were Sir John Bradbury,, Professor 
Pigou and Gaspard Farrer. Thus the Committee consisted of an ex-Chancellcr, 
an ex-Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, a serving Treasury o f f i c i a l , and two 
signatories to the Cunliffe Committee's Reports. I t i s therefore scarcely 
surprising that t h e i r report was i n favour ,of returning to-the-Gold Standard "in 
1925. However, the process by which the Committee arrived at i t s decision was 
not quite so simple as i t sounds, and the period of i t s discussions f a l l s i n t o 
two d i s t i n c t parts, separated by the General Election of November 1924. 
The Committee followed l a r g e l y the same course as i t s predecessor*, hearing 
witnesses, discussing the whole problem i n the l i g h t of t h e i r comments, and 
producing a d r a f t report. They heard fewer witnesses than the previous Committee 
however, perhaps la r g e l y because the Committee had been appointed without public 
announcement, and some need f o r d i s c r e t i o n , i f not f o r secrecy, was f e l t . 
The Committee's f i r s t witness was, appropriately enough, Montagu Norman, 
Governor of the Bank of England. He was f i r m l y i n favour of returning to the 
Gold Standard as soon as was reasonably possible. He f e l t that the mere announce-
ment of the i n t e n t i o n to return would be enough to bring the exchanges to par,, 
However, when asked whether he f e l t that the eighteen months which remained before 
the embargo expired was too short a time to achieve p a r i t y and return to the Gold 
Standard he replied that i n essence there was enough time, but: 
" I do not think i t i s a reasonable proposition to put before 
the man i n the street."^ 
1. P.R.Oc, T.I60/I.97/7528, Niemeyer to Chancellor, 19 May, 1924. 
2 . .P.R.O., T. 16W^7 /7528/02/1, evidence of Montagu Norman before the Bradbury 
Committee, 24 June, 1924. 
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This momentary concession to popular opinion did r o t outlast the summer, and 
there was no trace of hesitation i n his second appearance before the Committee„ 
The general f e e l i n g of the majority of the witnesses, including Sir Fel i x 
Schuster, Professor Paish, Walter Goodenough and even Reginald McKenna was that 
with patience, p a r i t y with the d o l l a r would be regained without d i r e c t action,, 
either through a r i s e i n American prices, or through the confidence engendered 
by an announcement of the i n t e n t i o n to l i f t the gold export embargo, Goodenough 
expressed the 'middle-of-the-road' a t t i t u d e w e l l : 
" I want to see a free gold market, but I do not want to force i t . 
I want i t to come as easily and naturally as possible,"'' 
Both McKenna and Keyn.es, however, put the argument f o r price s t a b i l i t y strongly, 
and i t i s apparent that they made a considerable impression at the time. I n a 
l e t t e r to Farrer w r i t t e n during the course of these sessions i n the summer of 
1924-, Bradbury wrote: 
" I am so f a r impressed by the views of McKenna and Keynes as to thin k 
that i t may be wise not to pursue a policy of restoring the d o l l a r 
exchange to p a r i t y at the cost of depressing home prices,""' 
However, he f e l t that t h i s should be no impediment to the restoration of the 
Gold Standard: 
"The odds are that w i t h i n the comparatively near future America w i l l 
allow gold to depreciate to the value of sterling,„,"^ 
Apart from Keynes and. McKenna, the only witnesses who were at a l l hesitant 
i n t h e i r advocacy of a return to the Gold Standard were the representatives of 
the Federation of B r i t i s h Industries. Their p r i n c i p a l f eeling was that while 
B r i t a i n should aim at a restoration of the Gold Standard, she should not 'go i t 
alone 1. However, when asked i f Germany, the Scandinavian and Commonwealth 
countries together represented a s u f f i c i e n t l y large body f o r B r i t a i n to have i n 
1 . P.R.O., T.160/197/7528/02/3, evidence of Mr. Goodenough before the Bradbury 
Co.mmItt.ee, 11 July, 1924. 
2 . P oR o0o, T.I60/197/7528/01/I. Bradbury to Farrer, 2A July, 1924-. 
3 . I b i d . 
3 2 1 . 
company when returning, the representatives agreed that t h i s would not be 
•going i t alone 5. I n addition, they made two comments which make i t clear how 
f a r from the t r u t h i s the •'bankers' ramp:' theory of the return to gold. At one 
point, they volunteered that: 
"Considerations of high finance might make i t Cthe return to gold} so 
important that we should have to take the r i s k " . 
thus showing t h e i r acceptance of the p o s s i b i l i t y that the decision might have 
to be taken on purely f i n a n c i a l grounds. Furthermore, they said, 
"oo.those who speak f o r the Federation are j u s t as well aware as 
anyone else that the ultimate banking i n t e r e s t i s j u s t the same 
as the ultimate trading interest."2 
Having,.heard, .their witnesses, the Committee set about preparing a report. . 
The f i r s t d r a f t was produced by N.E. Young, the Treasury o f f i c i a l acting as 
Secretary to the Committee, and then amended thoroughly by Professor Pigou. 
Pigou's d r a f t e f f e c t i v e l y advocated a 'wait-and-see' policy f o r the immediate 
future, but his covering l e t t e r made i t p l a i n that t h i s was not the whole t r u t h 
of his feelings on. the subject: 
"On the main issue, which i s one of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s and not of 
economics, whether the Government should take the plunge now or 
announce no renewal of the embargo, I am only j u s t on balance i n 
favour of a 'wait-and-see' policy. I t would be very inappropriate 
f o r me as an academic person to press f o r heroism; but i f the rest 
of the Committee had been i n favour of i t , I doubt i f I should have 
opposed."3 
Pigou-'s d r a f t did, however, make a number of categorical assertions: 
"During the l a s t few years, two po l i c i e s have been advocated as 
alternative to the restoration of the p a r i t y of the sovereign; one,, 
the policy of devaluation, that i s , of the re-establishment of a 
free gold market with a u n i t i d e n t i c a l I n name but of a lessor 
content than the pre-war standard u n i t : the second involving the 
abandonment of the gold standard. The former of these policies need 
only be mentioned to be dismissed; i t could not be seriously considered 
as a p o l i c y f o r the United Kingdom. The second alternative policy,, 
that of substituting the price l e v e l of commodities i n general f o r 
gold as the regulating p r i n c i p l e of the currency, has been f u l l y and. 
care f u l l y explained i n evidence before us.„„as a p r a c t i c a l present day 
1 . P.R.O., T.I 60/7528/02/3 , evidence of the representatives of the Federation 
of B r i t i s h Industries before the Bradbury Committee, 29 July, 192-4. 
2 . I b i d . . evidence of the F.B.I, representatives, 30 July, 1924. 
3. P.R.ol, T.-160/197/7528/01/2, Pigou-'s covering l e t t e r , quoted i n Young to 
Bradbury, 12 Sept., 1924-5 Pigou's underlining. 
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policy f o r t h i s country there i s , i n our opinion, no alternative 
comparable with return to the former gold p a r i t y of the sovereign. 
I n t h i s conclusion we are supported by the overwhelming majority 
of opinion, both f i n a n c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l , represented i n evidence 
before us.'"'' 
Pigou then turned to the urgency of the problem, and here he f e l t that the 
best thing to do was to await the course of events in.America, and to come to 
a decision i n a year's time. The other members of the Committee thought t h i s 
too cautious - Bradbury described i t as "flabby"^ - and Sir Austen Chamberlain 
summed up the positi o n i n a l e t t e r to Young: 
"Was ever such a happy family? I wished to say more, PIgou would have 
l i k e d to say more, Farrer regretted that more was not said - and 
Bradbury sat down and said (or rather wrote) i t l " ^ ' 
Chamberlain went on to suggest that the Secretary incorporate Bradbury's 
.suggestions i n Pigou's d r a f t - "B i n P" he called i t - and t h i s substantially 
represents the t h i r d d r a f t report, which combined Pigou's assertions of the need 
f o r a return to the Gold Standard at the pre-war p a r i t y with greater optimism 
about the timetable. 
Had the Labour Government not f a l l e n I n October 1924, t h i s d r a f t would 
probably have become the f i n a l report. But before the Committee could meet f o r 
f i n a l , discussions, the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n had changed. Soon aft e r the election,, 
Montagu Norman went to New York, apparently on his own I n i t i a t i v e , to discuss 
with Benjamin Strong, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the necessity f o r 
Anglo-American co-operation on the restoration of the Gold Standard i n England. 
•Soon aft e r his return, i n January 1925, the Committee was reconvened, t h i s time 
with Sir John Bradbury as Chairman, since Chamberlain had taken o f f i c e i n the 
Cabinet of the new Conservative Government. Norman was recalled to give evidence 
again, with a Director of the Bank of England, Sir Charles Addis. While they were 
both i n favour of returning to gold at the old p a r i t y , Norman alone was convinced 
1 P.R.O 
2. Ibid.., Bradbury to Young, 11 Sept., 1924. 
3. i b i d . , Chamberlain to Young, 13 Sept... 1924. 
, Pigou's draft, report, Aug., 1924° 
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of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of an immediate return,, I n the period since the f a l l of 
the Labour Government, s t e r l i n g had risen sharply against the d.o.llar, from 
$4.46 i n October 1924- to $4<>78 i n January 1925: and t h i s r i s e proved c r u c i a l 
i n a l l subsequent discussions. Referring to his at t i t u d e before t h i s r i s e , 
Norman commented to the Committee: 
.while I was then greatly i n favour of a return to gold at 
an early date, but a date which I could not be brave enough to 
define -'then, I am now greatly i n favour of a return during t h i s 
year."1 
Norman was asked about the intermediate period between the announcement that 
the export embargo would not be renewed, and the actual removal; he f e l t that 
at the same time as the announcement was made i t should be made clear that a 
. general licence to export would be issued at once to cover the interim period. 
This .seems to have been the.origin of the form the announcement took, that i s 
that the p r o h i b i t i o n on export of gold would be l i f t e d immediately without a 
t r a n s i t i o n period.. He was not asked, any questions about the r e l a t i v e price-
levels i n B r i t a i n and .America, but volunteered a comment on: 
"...the d i f f i c u l t y of the position of the two price levels i n the 
two countries j „ . ,that I think has so f a r adjusted i t s e l f and from 
what I understand i s so close that even I f i t presented a d i f f i c u l t y 
six or seven months ago I do not think i t presents a r e a l d i f f i c u l t y 
now. .,,.."2 
Thus Norman had no doubts,, Sir Charles Addis, however, was not quite so 
sure.-. He f e l t that p r i c e - l e v e l calculations were dangerous as a basis f o r 
judgement and suggested, another remedy. Price-level calculations were, he f e l t 
"...so diverse,..as f o r myself at least to f e e l less and less confidence 
i n relying upon them as a sign that the conditions necessary f o r a return 
to the gold standard have been reached... . i t i s desirable that they should 
be put to some t e s t before they are f i n a l l y accepted as having reached 
the point of equilibrium. I know of no other t e s t than an approximately 
steady rate of exchange round about p a r i t y f o r a continued period. , !-
1.. P.R.O., T. 160/197/7528/02/3. second evidence of Norman before the Bradbury 
Committee, 28 Jan., 1925. 
2. I b i d . 
3. I b i d . . evidence of Sir Charles Addis before the Bradbury Committee, 
28 Jan., 1925. 
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Unfortunately Sir Charles rather s p o i l t t h i s piece of advice by saying that the 
Government should announce i t s intentions, which as Pigou pointed out wou].d tend 
to invalidate the test by encouraging speculative demands f o r s t e r l i n g , and 
become a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy. 
The circumstances, discussion and evidence of the Chamberlain/Bradbury 
Committee have been examined i n some d e t a i l because they represent the major 
contribution to Treasury thinking from outside the charmed c i r c l e of the Treasury 
and the Bank of England. During the period up to the f a l l of the Labour Govern-
ment i n October 1924-, the recommendations of the Committee had been tempered with 
considerable caution,, i n view, .of the gap -that s t i l l "existed between s t e r l i n g and 
the d o l l a r . This view was largely i n agreement with the opinions of the majority 
of witnesses, including the F.B.I. After the sharp r i s e i n s t e r l i n g during the 
winter of 1924/5, the Committee became much bolder. I n i t s f i n a l Report i t 
recommended that the Government should announce i n the near future that the gold 
export embargo would not be renewed.,.. and that u n t i l the end of the year a general 
licence would be issued, allowing the free outflow of gold. The Committee minimised 
the effects of the adjustments needed, and did not even consider the p o s s i b i l i t y 
that the recent improvement I n the exchanges was due, not to a change i n the 
underlying competitive positions of America and B r i t a i n , but to speculation that 
i n the absence -of any announcement to the contrary, with a Conservative Government, 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y favourable to f i n a n c i a l and commercial i n t e r e s t s , i n o f f i c e , and 
with Montagu Norman i n constant consultation with Strong, there was a strong 
presumption that p r o h i b i t i o n would not be renewed. 
Be that as i t may, the Committee reported to the Chancellor on the 5th of 
February, and from that point on the discussion largely concerned the Treasury 
1. P.R.O., T.160/197/7528/01/3; published as Cmd. 2393 (London; H.M.S.O., 1925). 
One w r i t e r has suggested that had the Conservatives not won the election, the 
Gold Standard would not have been restored: see W. Reddaway, "Was $4.86 
inevitable i n 1925?", Lloyds Bank Review, 96(1970). Given Snowden's known 
views, i t seems unli k e l y that the re s u l t of the election had any long-term 
e f f e c t , although return might have been delayed u n t i l the end of the year. 
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a,nd the Bank of England alone. To t h i s f i n a l phase of the discussions we s h a l l 
now t u r n . 
The.. Period of Int e r n a l Discussion 
Following the f a l l of the Labour Government i n October 192/+, a General 
Election was held, at which the Conservative Party was triumphant. The Chancellor 
of the Exchequer i n the new administration was Winston Churchill who, although a 
p o l i t i c i a n of long experience, knew l i t t l e about f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s . Partly, i t 
seems, because of t h i s , he asked more questions than was normal i n a Chancellor s 
and the resulting memoranda present a f u l l and clear picture of the s i t u a t i o n i n 
the f i r s t quarter of 1925. 
According to Sir James Grigg, at that time the Chancellor's Private Secretary 
Churchill was 
"t o l d soon aft e r his a r r i v a l fat the Treasury i n November 1924] 
that the Act under which gold payments were suspended would expire 
with the year 1925? and that he would, therefore, have to face 
before long., the choice between going back to gold or l e g i s l a t i n g 
to stay o f f i t f o r another period of years."'' 
Although serious discussions did not begin u n t i l the end of January 1925* 
the problem was undoubtedly i n Churchill's mind from the time he took o f f i c e . 
I n December- 1924 he wrote to Baldwin, the Prime Minister; 
"The Governor of the Bank w i l l , I hope, have t o l d you t h i s weekend about 
the imminence of an attempt to re-establish the gold standard...It w i l l 
be easy to a t t a i n i t , and indeed almost impossible to avoid taking the 
decision...,. "^ 
and. i n January 1925 he asked Niemeyer to request Hawtrey to write a paper on the 
problem of gold and the United States, commenting: 
"The United. States has accumulated the greater part of the gold i n the 
world and i s suffering from a serious plethora. Are we sure that i n 
t r y i n g to establish the gold standard we shall not be favouring 
American i n t e r e s t s . . . s h a l l we not be re l i e v i n g them of the consequences 
of t h e i r s e l f i s h and extortionate policy?"3 
1. P.J. Grigg, Prejudice' and Judgement (London: Jonathan Cape, 1948), p.180-
2„ Ghartwell papers, Churchill to Baldwin, 12 Dec.., 1924? quoted i n 
D.J. Moggridge, The ..Return to Gold (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1969), p. 40. 
3. P.R.D., IJ.7IZ246, Churchill to Niemeyer, 2 Jan., 1925. 
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The r e a l debate on the problem began at the end of January, i n i t i a t e d by a 
minute w r i t t e n by Churchill on the 2 9 t h , and referred to i n the f i l e s as 
!Mr„ Churchill's exercise'. This questioned the whole basis of the Gold Standard, 
and argued i n favour of a managed currency, aimed at a stable price level,•and 
a continuation of the gold export embargo. The object of the exercise was to 
enable Churchill to marshall the arguments i n favour of returning to the Gold 
Standard: 
" o . o l do not wish i t to be inf e r r e d that I have arrived at any 
conclusions adverse to the re-establishment of the Gold Standard. 
On the contrary I am ready and anxious to be convinced..." 
Niemeyer submitted two separate replies to t h i s memorandum, one arguing the case 
Churchill had presented step by step, the other giving i n more general terms the 
fa m i l i a r summary of the arguments i n favour of returning to the Gold Standard. 
A copy of the Report of the Bradbury Committee was attached. The commentary on 
Churchill's minute has one p a r t i c u l a r l y revealing passage. On the subject of the 
advance i n s t e r l i n g , Niemeyer suggested that t h i s was 
" o o . p r i m a r i l y because everyone believes we are going to revert to 
gold. I t would soon cease to do so i f t h i s b e l i e f were damped down.-"^  
He thus recognised that the current improvement i n the exchange was pr i m a r i l y due 
to speculative movements, without examining the p o s s i b i l i t y that speculation might 
act i n a d i f f e r e n t sense once the Gold Standard had been restored.. The remainder 
of the paper i s concerned with combatting the points i n a standard fashion, 
Churchill's minute was also sent to Sir John Bradbury, Montagu Norman and 
Havtrey. Norman, had no doubts at a l l that 
" i n the opinion of educated and reasonable men....."^  
there was no alternative to restoring the Gold Standard, and the only question to 
be decided was the date. Bradbury and Hawtrey, the former- b r i e f l y ^ - and the l a t t e r 
at great length," concurred i n the general b e l i e f that an early r e t u r n to the 
1 . P.R.O.., TgJ^2/]^.22B, Churchill to Norman, Niemeyer, Bradbury and Hawtrey, 
29 Janl, 1925. 
2 . I b i d . , Niemeyer to Churchill, 2 Feb., 1925. 
3. ikicU? Norman to Chancellor, 2 Feb.., 192.5. 
A. I b i d . . 'The Gold Standard', memo, by Bradbury, 5 Feb., 1925. 
5. I h i d . j 'The Gold Standard', memo, by Hawtrey, 2 Feb., 1925. 
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Gold Standard was the only practicable policy f o r Great B r i t a i n to follow. 
Further l i g h t on Bradbury's opinion on the vexed question of p a r i t y i s 
shed by a comment by a mere junior member of the Treasury s t a f f , Frederick 
( l a t e r Sir Frederick) Leith-Ross: 
"Bradbury t o l d me that they Cthe Bradbury Committee} were going to 
recommend the return to gold at the old p a r i t y . This surprised me, 
as i t seemed to me to be putting a s t r a i n on the balance of payments 
at the then price l e v e l . But Bradbury said the evidence,' both from 
the City and from economists, was overwhelmingly i n favour of the 
pre-war p a r i t y , now that s t e r l i n g had ri s e n so near to that l e v e l 
(about 10 per cent below). I t must be remembered that i n those days 
devaluation was a novelty and there was something sacrosanct about 
the old parity......" 
This i n c i d e n t a l l y i s -the o n l y - c r i t i c a l comment by"a Treasury o f f i c i a l that has 
come to l i g h t , and the only comment of a more junior o f f i c i a l on the problem.. 
I n the Treasury f i l e s , apart from b r i e f notes on purely technical aspects of the 
problem, the minutes and papers are exclusively w r i t t e n by the senior o f f i c i a l , 
Niemeyer, Hawtrey i n his position as a theoretician, Bradbury, an ex-Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, and Norman, Governor of the Bank. But i f Grigg cs 
reactions are representative, the juniors were not i n any disagreement over poll. 
Of the f amous dinner party at which Bradbury and Niemeyer supported the Gold 
Standard, opposed by Keynes and McKenna, Grigg says, 
" I thought at the time that the ayes had i t . " ^ ' 
and l a t e r comments that he considered that, by returning to the Gold Standard,, 
3 
we i n B r i t a i n were "shackling ourselves to r e a l i t y . " 
The response of the o f f i c i a l s to Churchill's 'exercise 8 seemed to s a t i s f y 
him f o r the time being; he wrote to Niemeyer th a t : 
1 „ Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Money Talks (London: Hutchison and Co0.; 1968), 
PPO 91--92. I t i s perhaps worth observing that present-day attitudes i n 
p o l i t i c a l and o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s to the current d o l l a r / s t e r l i n g p a r i t y are 
hardly less d e f e r e n t i a l . 
2 . Grigg, Prejudice and' Judgement, p. 180. 
.3. I b i d . , p. 183. 
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"Year papers and the Report of the (Bradbury) Committee marshalled 
f o r the f i r s t time, so f a r as I am concerned, the arguments f o r 
the policy you advocate. The Report of the Committee c e r t a i n l y 
provides a broad foundation both of argument and authority 
j u s t i f y i n g the action proposed,"'' 
He requested some more fac t u a l information, including a note on the return to the 
Gold. Standard a f t e r the Napoleonic Wars, At the same time, he wrote to Sir 
Austen Chamberlain, who had resigned as Chairman of the Chamberlain/Bradbury 
Committee on taking o f f i c e i n the new Conservative Government, sending him a 
2 
copy of the Committee's f i n a l Report, and asking his opinion of i t . 
Chamberlain r e p l i e d : 
" I have read with profound in t e r e s t and complete agreement the report 
of the-Currency Committee,. , I - f e e l - sux-e-that,--if -you—make- your — 
announcement with decisive confidence on your own part, the operation 
w i l l now be found, a l l things considered, a very easy one...I strongly 
support what' I believe i s your own' view that you should make an early 
announcement of your power and determination not to renew the 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on the export of gold."^ 
The Treasury discussions continued during February, and at one point there 
seems to have been a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y that Churchill would r e j e c t the advice of 
the o f f i c i a l s , and postpone or r e j e c t outright a return to the Gold Standard. Tht 
cause was an a r t i c l e by Keynes i n the Nation, e n t i t l e d "The Return Towards Gold"/ 
Keynes stressed the dangers of l i n k i n g the price l e v e l i n B r i t a i n with that I n 
America, p a r t i c u l a r l y when the American price l e v e l was i n f l a t e d by a boom i n 
which B r i t a i n had not f u l l y shared, and advocated a managed currency. Churchill 
read the a r t i c l e and NiemeyerJs comments upon I t , and wrote to Niemeyer asking 
for further amplification and explanation i n trenchant and almost b i t t e r tones. 
"The Treasury have never, i t seems to me, faced the profound significance 
of what Mr. Keynes c a l l s 'the paradox of unemployment amidst dearth'. 
The Governor shows -himself perfec t l y happy i n the spectacle of B r i t a i n 
possessing the f i n e s t c r e d i t i n the world simultaneously with a m i l l i o n 
1 . P.R.O., T.I72/14-99B, Churchill to Niemeyer, 6 Feb.,, 1925. 
2 . P.R.O.^  T.171 /2A6."Churchill to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 Feb., 1925. 
3. I b i d . , Chamberlain to Churchill, 8 Feb., 1925; present author's underlining. 
\, J.M. Keynes, "The Return Towards Gold", Nation (London: 1925), Vol. XXXV, 
21 Feb., 1925. 
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and a quarter unemployed,„„.The Treasury and the Bank of England 
policy i s the only policy consistently pursued. I t i s a t e r r i b l e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r those who have shaped i t , unless they can be 
sure that there i s no connection between the unique B r i t i s h 
phenomenon of unemployment and the long, resolute consistency of 
a par t i c u l a r f i n a n c i a l policy...At any rate while that unemploy-
ment e x i s t s , no one i s e n t i t l e d to plume himself on the f i n a n c i a l 
or credit policy which we have pursued....You and the Governor have 
managed, t h i s a f f a i r . Taken together I expect you know more about 
i t than anyone else I n the world. At any rate alone i n the world 
you have had an opportunity over a d e f i n i t e period of years of 
seeing your policy carried out. That i t I s a great policy, greatly 
pursued, I have no doubt. But the f a c t that t h i s island with i t s 
enormous resources i s unable to maintain i t s population i s surely 
a cause f o r the deepest heart-searching. 
Niemeyer's reply to t h i s l e t t e r was i n two parts. One part took the form of a 
detailed series of comments annotating Churchill's own l e t t e r , while the other 
consisted of a short paper restating the Treasury case. This episode provides 
an example of the problems caused by the vagaries of the Treasury f i l i n g system. 
For the Treasury's 'Gold Standard f i l e ' , TjjV72^ 1_429_B, contains i n t h i s instance 
only a carbon copy of Churchill's l e t t e r to Niemeyer, and thus on the basis of 
that f i l e , upon which so much previous comment has been based, i t would appear 
that Niemeyer's only reply was the short memorandum. The top copy of Churchill's 
l e t t e r , with Niemeyer's hand-written comments, i s i n one of the f i l e s of papers 
on the 1925 Budget, 1^ 1.21/24.6., and has thus escaped general notice. 
I n his main reply to Churchill's l e t t e r , Niemeyer suggested that the 
Chancellor was overestimating the Importance of credit policy. 
"Does 'the paradox of unemployment amidst dearth' arise wholly or 
mainly from c r e d i t policy? Clearly not wholly....! doubt whether . 
credit policy i s even a, chief cause, and I at any rate would not 
advocate, s t i l l less be 'happy' with a credit policy which I 
thought would produce unemployment....You can by i n f l a t i o n (a most 
vicious form of subsidy) enable, temporarily, spending power to 
cope with large quantities of products. But unless you Increase 
the dose continually, there comes a time when having destroyed the 
credit of the country you can i n f l a t e no more, money having ceased 
to be acceptable as value.. . . . I assume i t to be admitted that with 
Russia and Germany before us we do not think plenty can be found on 
• t h i s path. • 
1. P.R.O., TJ22Zl^22§> Churchill to Niemeyer, 22 Feb., 1925. Elsewhere i n the 
l e t t e r , Churchill refers to his thoughts as "these Sunday morning r e f l e c t i o n s " 
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I f that be admitted, economic employment can only be given 
to the extent to which commodities can be produced at a price 
which existing uninflated wealth can pay f o r them. As the r e s u l t 
of war there has been a great decrease i n wealth, and there i s 
consequently less effective demand,, The only permanent remedy i s 
to recreate the losses of war - r e a l l y , not merely by manufacturing 
paper - and what we have to do f o r t h i s purpose i s (1) to s t a b i l i s e 
our currency i n r e l a t i o n to the main trading currencies of the world, 
(2) to reconstruct the broken parts of Europe and (3) to encourage 
t h r i f t and the accumulation of c a p i t a l f o r industry„ These methods 
and not doles and p a l l i a t i v e s are going to remedy unemployment (at 
least to the extent to which i t was remedied i n pre war days). 
We are now t r y i n g to put the f i n i s h i n g touches to ( 1 ) . We have done 
what we can f o r (2) League Loans, Dawes, etc. We do a l l we can f o r 
(3) especially by repaying debt and by encouraging a b e l i e f that 
currency w i l l not lose i t s value. Other methods may give f o r a year 
or so a hectic prosperity,..but they won't give a permanent cure. 
The above i s necessarily-put i n a doctrinaire way. I n practice 
we have to go now slow, now f a s t . But the root idea I am convinced 
i s r i g h t , and the only way to enable t h i s small island bound to buy 
and s e l l l a r g e l y abroad....ultimately to support i t s population."' 
There i s unfortunately l i t t l e evidence to show what Churchill's reaction was to 
t h i s classic exposition of the t r a d i t i o n a l Treasury view. But^his a t t i t u d e to 
the Governor, whom, i n the l e t t e r j u s t quoted, he blamed equally with Niemeyer 
fo r the problems of the economy, there seems at t h i s time to have been a strong 
element of ambivalence. I n the passage j u s t quoted, Churchill's animosity towards 
the Governor i s evident; yet we have Randolph Churchill's evidence that Norman 
v i s i t e d his father once or twice a week during t h i s period, and the younger 
Churchill remembers Norman t e l l i n g Winston " I w i l l make you the golden Chancellor,," 
The two men had a serious brush over the r i s e i n Bank Rate from U to 5 percent 
i n March 1925. At t h i s time Niemeyer was away i n Geneva on reparations business,, 
and we have the s t o r y from Leith-Ross. Norman called at the Treasury to t e l l the 
Chancellor of his i n t e n t i o n , and f i n d i n g him away, asked Leith-Ross to inform 
Churchill. 
"When Winston heard i t he was indignant and complained b i t t e r l y 
that he ought to have been consulted."3 
1 . P.R.O*, T . 172 /U99B, Niemeyer to Churchill, 2U Feb., 1925o 
2 . A. Boyle, Montagu .Npjrman (London: Cassell and Co., 1967) , p. 189. 
3 . Leith-Ross, Money Talks, p. 95 . 
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Apparently Leith-Ross suffered somewhat i n the backwash of t h i s indignation;, 
and t o l d Niemeyer of i t i n his next l e t t e r . Niemeyer re p l i e d , 
"Winston w i l l never realise that he i s not Governor of the Bank..." 
Despite t h i s a l t e r c a t i o n , relations between the Governor and the Chancellor 
continued to be mainly f r i e n d l y ; there i s f o r instance a note i n Norman-5 s diary 
2 
of lunching with Churchill i n Downing Street i n mid-March. 
I n addition to the i n t e r n a l discussions, the Treasury had plenty of advice 
from outside.. The f i l e s contain numerous press-cuttings, l e t t e r s from interested 
parties, and. so on. The bulk of the material i s i n support of the decision to 
return to the Gold Standard. Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t i s an a r t i c l e by Snowden, 
the former Labour Chancellor, published i n the Observer i n February 1925, on 
the advantages of the policy. 
"To restore s t a b i l i t y we must bind the currency to gold. A l l the 
dangers and uncertainties of an unstable currency w i l l remain i f 
the pound reaches par unless i t i s st a b i l i s e d by being placed or. 
a gold basis.-"3 
Snowden did, however, stress the need f o r co-operation with other countries, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y America, and t h i s was a point echoed by the Federation of B r i t i s h 
Industries, who wrote to Churchill i n the middle of Marsh. The Federation was 
of the opinion that a return to the Gold Standard should be delayed u n t i l American 
prices had risen s u f f i c i e n t l y to enable B r i t i s h prices to remain stable, but i t 
appreciated that 
"...while a waiting policy might be to the more immediate interests 
of those engaged i n industry, i t may be urged that other considerations 
make i t inexpedient that we should wait i n d e f i n i t e l y f o r the necessary 
upward movement i n American, prices."^ 
Furthermore, the Federation 
1 . Leith-Ross, Money Talks, p. 95» 
2 . Boyle, Montagu Norman, p. 189. 
3« Obserjrer, a r t i c l e by Snowden, 8 Feb., 1925. 
4o P.R.D., T.172/1.49.9B, F.B.I, to Churchill, 17 Mar., 1925. 
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"o»o.desired to state c l e a r l y that i n t h e i r opinion.;, since Great B r i t a i n 
i s the p r i n c i p a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l clearing house both f o r money and f o r 
goods, any step which would lead to a general return to a gold standard 
by the p r i n c i p a l i n d u s t r i a l countries i n the world would be greatly to 
the benefit of B r i t i s h industry. ..„'" ' 
This point about a general return was, as we saw, raised before the Ctinliff e 
Committee? and the Federation's representatives then agreed that the Scandinavian 
countries, the major Commonwealth countries, and Germany together constituted a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y large block of countries to accompany the B r i t i s h return. The 
Federation's l e t t e r of March 1925 was less e x p l i c i t on the subject, which i s 
unfortunate, since i t was p r i n c i p a l l y on the a t t i t u d e of the Federation that 
one commentator has based his assertion that Churchill was 'railroaded' i n t o 
2 
returning to the Gold Standard by bad Treasury advice. 
The_Rejburn to Gold' 
The Treasury thus approached the point of decision through a period of 
exhaustive discussion. This discussion, and the c o l l e c t i o n of papers which have 
survived, are unique i n Treasury documentation, although the process was i n 
general t y p i c a l of that normally followed. But when a l l the arguments had been 
put and discussed, a f i r m decision had to be taken. Unfortunately, there i s very 
l i t t l e information about the f i n a l discussion at which the decision was formally 
taken 0 This took place at a meeting on March 2 0 t h , 1925, between the Prime 
• • 3 
Minister, the Chancellor, the Foreign Secretary, Norman, Bradbury and Niemeyer. 
There i s no record of the discussion at t h i s meeting, nor of the Cabinet discussion 
of the proposal, since the decision formed part of the 1925 Budget, and, i n 
accordance with convention, no minutes were kept of the meeting at which the 
Budget proposals were discussed. There i s no record of the Cabinet having 
discussed the problem at any other time. The restoration of the Gold Standard 
1 . P.R.D., W32hM££k, F.B.I, to Churchill, 17 Mar., 1925. 
2 0 See below, p«335. 
3o P.R.O., T J 7 2 / 1 ^ 2 B , note by Niemeyer, 20 Mar., 1925. 
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was announced i n the House of Commons during the Budget speech, on A p r i l 28th, 
19-25. 1 
TheJj^ g.sj.g.U^ Y-- a n d the Return to Gold 
The decision to return to the Go .Id Standard was, as we have seen, subject 
to doubt and c r i t i c i s m i n some quarters at the time, and to increasing c r i t i c i s e 
since„ The main burden of t h i s c r i t i c i s m has been that Churchill was persuaded, 
against bis better judgement and by the bad advice of his Treasury o f f i c i a l s , 
to take the wrong decision, and that other courses of action were open to him. 
There seems l i t t l e doubt that i n l a t e r years Chur-ihi-11 himself came to" believe 
2 
that the 'doctrine -of bad -advice1 was relevant i n t h i s case. ' But at the time, 
there i s much evidence to suggest that the Chancellor was at least a w i l l i n g 
victim,, I t i s true that he went en questioning the policy r i g h t up to the last-
moment: for instance, as l a t e as A p r i l 2 3 r d , only f i v e days before the Budget, 
he wrote to Niemeyer asking him f o r an argued ease i n favour of returning tv the 
Gold Standard immediately, rather than waiting f o r the gold export embargo to 
expire at the end of the year. But the tone of his request makes his a t t i t u d e 
obvious j 
" I am, as you know, i n favour of t h i s course on general grounds, but I 
should l i k e to see the case f o r i t set out quite clearly.. "3 
The suggestion that Churchill was urged i n t o the decision by bad advice has 
been given added force i n recent years by the publication of Churchill's minute 
of February 2 2 n d , i n which he raises the problem of 'the paradox of unemployment 
amidst dearth'„^ Skidelsky has asserted solely on the basis of t h i s memorandum 
that Churchill was v i r t u a l l y forced in t o the decision by the Treasury, and suggested 
that only the memory of his father's fate prevented, him from resigning rather than 
1 - Ho of C Debates, 1 9 2 5 . CLXXXIII, cols. 5 2 - 5 7 . 
2 „ See. f o r example, Grigg, PrejudjLce__and Judgement, p. 1 8 5 . 
.3. PoRl fL , 1,171^246, Churchill to Niemeyer, 23 Apr., 1 9 2 5 . 
4 . P.R.D., T..172/U99B. Churchill to Niemeyer, 22 Feb., 1 9 2 5 . 
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carry out the policy of returning to the Gold Standard. Another writer., 
Rhodes James, has commented, 
"The 'doctrine of bad advice 1 may be invoked on t h i s occasion,, but i t -
should be emphasised that the urgings of the Federation of B r i t i s h 
Industries were i n a contrary d i r e c t i o n . By acting against t h i s 
advice, and taking that of the bankers, Churchill had made a decision 
which was f u l l y i n l i n e with his atti t u d e on economic matters.1''^ 
I n other words, Churchill took the decision w i l l i n g l y , but i n doing so ignored 
the advice, of the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and took that of the bankers. This point 
about the a t t i t u d e of the Federation of B r i t i s h Industries i s something of a 
vexed question. Baldwin's biographers, f o r instance, state that the Federatien 
3 
was i n favour- of returning to the Gold Standard i n the. spring of 1925.' I t i s 
clear both from t h e i r evidence to the Bradbury Committee, and from the l e t t e r 
w r i t t e n i n March 1925, that they c e r t a i n l y were not opposed to a return, but that 
they were anxious l e s t the return be forced, and c r e d i t r e s t r i c t i o n , f a l l i n g prices 
and depression r e s u l t . Their advice was quite c l e a r l y not s u f f i c i e n t l y categ-
o r i c a l to stand against so many opponents i n f i n a n c i a l c i r c l e s , and i n commercial 
f i e l d s too - the London Chamber of Commerce, f o r instance, was strongly i n favour 
of a return to the Gold Standard.^ F i n a l l y , the Federation themselves admitted 
that there might be circumstances I n which from a f i n a n c i a l point of view i t might 
be 5inexpedient 8 to wait, and that i n the long run the interests of the i n d u s t r i a l 
and banking communities were the same. 
On the personal l e v e l , there seems l i t t l e doubt that the Treasury found 
Churchill somewhat t r y i n g at times. Thomas Jones noted: 
"Grigg has net found Winston so malleable as Home or Snowden. "-' 
1« ^jg-Times, a r t i c l e by R. Skidelsky. 17 Mar., 1969. 
2 . R. Rhodes' James, Churchill; a Study i n Failure. 1900-1939 (London; Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 1970), p." 1 6 1 . 
3 . K. Middlemass and J. Barnes, Baldwin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969)> 
p. 304. 
4. P.R.O., T.J22£U29_B, London Chamber of Commerce to Chancellor, 16 Mar., 192?. 
5. Thomas Jones, Whitehall. Diary, Volume I„ 1916-1925 ed. K. Middlemass (London: 
O.U.P., 1969) , "p. 315, entry f o r 17 May, 1925. 
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Leith-Ross, who was away during February 1925? wrote afterwards: 
"The s i t u a t i o n was s t i l l f l u i d during February and Niemeyer wrote me 
C s i c ] : 'Gold i s excessively active and very troublesome„ None of 
the witch-doctors see eye-to-eye and Winston cannot make up his mind 
whether he i s a gold bug or a pure i n f l a t i o n i s t , , 1 The Chancellor 
f i n a l l y deeided i n favour of the return to gold - p a r t l y , as he 
himself said, because he knew that i f he adopted t h i s course Niemeyer 
ttould give him i r r e f u t a b l e arguments to support i t , whereas i f he 
refused to adopt i t he would be faced w i t h c r i t i c i s m s from the 
Treasury to which he would have no ef f e c t i v e answer. 
However, i t was not u n t i l some time a f t e r the decision that Churchill began 
to have serious misgivings* At the time, the single highly c r i t i c a l minute stands 
out as being atypical of his personal opinions; his speeches afterwards, and his 
2 
l e t t e r s to Baldwin, showed him to be happy with-the—results-. ~ ~ - • • 
As to the wisdom of the decision i t s e l f , opinion since has been almost 
unanimous i n declaring that Keynes was r i g h t and that the pound was overvalued 
by approximately 10$. Since t h i s work i s prima r i l y concerned with the way i n 
which the decision was taken, i t i s not appropriate here to examine t h i s question 
i n any detail., p a r t i c u l a r l y as many of the participants f e l t the calculations of 
r e l a t i v e price-levels to be so crude at that time as not to be very h e l p f u l . 
I t i s ce r t a i n l y arguable that the Treasury's s t a t i s t i c a l expertise was sadly 
lacking, and that had they been better equipped they might have realised that 
the r i s e i n s t e r l i n g i n the winter of 1924-/5 was a purely speculative one« The 
purchasing power question, and the economic implications of the decision, have been 
3 
ably dealt with by Moggridge, and I see no cause to dispute his analysis.' However, 
to maintain that the decision was wrong from the point of view of hindsight without 
taking the matter any fur t h e r , begs the question of what would have been the 
correct decision, and whether t h i s was a p r a c t i c a l and a p o l i t i c a l p o ssibility,, 
I t i s arguable that i n f a c t , given the administrative, f i n a n c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 
1 . Leith-Ross, Money Talks, p. 92* 
2 . Middlemass and Barnes, Baldwin. p 0 303 0 
3 . Moggridge, The Return to' Gold, p a r t i c u l a r l y pp. 71 -90 . 
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structure of the day, there was no feasible alternative but to take what proved 
to be the 'wrong* decision. 
I t i s easy, so many years afterwards, to forget how 'way-out1 Keynes' 
ideas were at the time, p a r t i c u l a r l y since he then had no theoretical backing 
f o r them. The financiers, many of the commercial and i n d u s t r i a l i n t e r e s t s , the 
f i n a n c i a l press, the majority of p o l i t i c i a n s i n the major parties, were a l l i n 
favour of the r e t u r n . Even the Federation of B r i t i s h Industries only d i f f e r e d 
to an extent which must have made i t seem to the convinced that they were 
'd i t h e r i n g 1 . Keynes' prime supporter i n the banking sphere, McKenna, said i n 
January 1925, i n a private conversation at the Treasury: 
"Even i f the gold standard were not preferable f o r other reasons, 
i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y would be decisive i n i t s f avour. „ ...So long as 
nine people out of every ten i n every country think the gold 
standard is' the best, i t i s the best."'' 
Further, when asked f o r his opinion by Churchill at the famous dinner party 
reported by Grigg, McKenna again deserted his f r i e n d and agreed that we would 
have to go back to the Gold Standard. Beaverbrook's championship seems l i k e l y 
to have cost the opposition more enemies than i t won friends i n i n f l u e n t i a l 
c i r c l e s . I n these circumstances, i t i s hardly surprising that the o f f i c i a l s 
were misled by the r i s e i n s t e r l i n g , which they had been long expecting, int© 
believing that the underlying movement i n American prices was i n the desired 
d i r e c t i o n , and that the exchanges were a more accurate indicator of .relative price 
levels than the price indices. 
Given that the great mass of informed opinion was i n favour of a return to 
the Gold Standard, the Treasury would have had to be a singularly independent-minded, 
imaginative and authoritative body to combat ....it. But. ..the-whole'organisation ,of 
the Treasury, including i t s method of doing business and the way i n which i t s 
s t a f f were trained, m i l i t a t e d against i t s being i n any sense a place f o r o r i g i n a l 
1 . P.R.O., T.,171/24.6, McKenna's conversation with the Chancellor, 17 Jan., 1925. 
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ideas and fresh policy i n i t i a t i v e s . The whole ethos of the Treasury was based 
on following h i s t o r i c a l precedent, on doing things the way they had always been 
done, and from t h i s arose the desire to get back to the conditions of pre-war 
days, the 'back to normalcy' desire that was echoed i n the, population as a whole. 
This i s what makes the Gold Standard so important f o r the purpose of t h i s work. 
I t occupied a pre-eminent place of importance among the problems of the period. 
But i t also, and i n large part because of t h i s , t y p i f i e d the whole o f f i c i a l , 
dilemma. The structure of the Treasury, and i t s pattern of policy-making, meant 
that the strongest possible emphasis was placed on following previous decisions 
and practice, where t h i s had. proved successful. This meant"that where conditions 
had changed, the Treasury was l i k e l y to take- i n s u f f i c i e n t account of the changes: 
t h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y true of the Gold Standard question.- Thus the Treasury 
became, i n a sense, the prisoner of past success; i t advised the Chancellor to 
take what proved to be the wrong decision, because the deeisio.n--making processes 
allowed i n s u f f i c i e n t weight to be given to changed conditions. 
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CONCLUSION: 
THE ROLE OF THE TREASURY IN THE 
FORMATION OF BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY. 1918-1925 
The aim of t h i s study has been to i d e n t i f y the ro l e of the Treasury i n the 
formation of B r i t i s h economic policy i n the years from 1918 to 1925. During t h i s 
period, r a d i c a l changes were taking place, both w i t h i n the t r a d i t i o n a l spheres of 
res p o n s i b i l i t y of the Treasury, and i n the scope of i t s commitments and involvemen-
outside those areas. For a number of reasons, the years of the F i r s t World War 
and the period immediately afterwards saw changes of considerable magnitude i n the 
work of the B r i t i s h Treasury. Partly i t was due to the great upheaval i n a l l 
areas of economic l i f e caused by the war, and p a r t l y to long-term trends which had 
begun before 1914-. As a re s u l t of alterations i n external conditions, i n both the 
domestic and the in t e r n a t i o n a l economy, the Treasury's t r a d i t i o n a l areas of 
re s p o n s i b i l i t y - budgetary control and debt management - changed both i n substance 
and i n magnitude. At the same time, the Treasury's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s extended in t o 
new areas which either did not exist before the war, or else were not regarded as 
being, the concern of the central government. Many of the great problems of the 
'twenties, such as reparations, i n t e r - a l l i e d debt, and high long-term unemployment 
had no pre-war p a r a l l e l . There was thus no previous experience to act as guide. 
Moreover, another important area of d i f f i c u l t y i n the 'twenties, that of i n t e r n -
ational monetary policy and the Gold Standard, had been prima r i l y the responsib-
i l i t y of the Bank of England before the war. 
The role of the Treasury i n policy-making can be divided, i n t o three main 
elements. The f i r s t concerns the way i n which opinion was formed w i t h i n the 
Treasury, and the factors influencing the advice which the o f f i c i a l s tendered to 
t h e i r Ministers. Secondly, there i s the nature of the advice which they gave, i t s 
appropriateness and effectiveness i n the problem concerned, and the competence of 
the•Department i n implementing decisions on policy matters. Thirdly, we should 
consider the ef f e c t of t h i s advice and the manner i n which i t was given upon the 
decision-making process, and the extent of o f f i c i a l influence on M i n i s t e r i a l 
opinions and decisions. 
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Treasury Structure and the Formation of Opinion 
The Treasury.which had to deal with these problems of change was, at the 
same time, going through a period of i n t e r n a l upheaval.. The structure which had 
been appropriate to a small, homogeneous Department became inappropriate to one 
more than twice i t s pre-war size, and with greatly enlarged and highly disparate 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The Department was accordingly reorganized, but i t was s t i l l 
a, r e l a t i v e l y small body at the administrative l e v e l , and retained much of i t s 
friendliness, and i t s t r a d i t i o n a l methods of working and approach- to i t s duties. 
This was p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n those sections of the Treasury most closely 
concerned with policy-making. This was l a r g e l y a function of the way_in.jwhiah- the 
Treasury s t a f f was organised. The parts of the work of the Treasury most closely 
concerned with policy-making were heavily concentrated i n the Finance Divisions 
of the Treasury, 1D and 2D, which after the reorganisation of 1919 were grouped, 
together, with Financial Enquiries, to form the Finance Department, under the 
Controller of Finance. The remainder of the Administrative Class s t a f f I n the 
Treasury worked i n the Supply and Establishments Divisions, where the responsib-
i l i t i e s were of a more routine kind, and which, since these Divisions tended to 
work through and with other Government Departments, r a r e l y took policy i n i t i a t i v e s 
of t h e i r own. Within the Finance Department, the numbers of s t a f f , although 
double the pre-war f i g u r e , were s t i l l very small. I n 1920, there were seven 
Principals and four Assistant Principals, divided between the Finance Divisions, 
with a Principal, Assistant Secretary i n charge of 1D and of 2D, and a Controller 
of Finance with overall r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the Chancellor, and the rank of a 
Permanent Secretary. So that i n the Department most closely concerned with 
policy-making, there was during the inter-war period a s t a f f of t h i r t e e n c i v i l 
servants of the administrative class. I t i s perhaps not surprising, then, that 
at least t h i s part of the Treasury retained much of I t s pre-war atmosphere, and 
tended to remain a closely-integrated Department. 
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The small size of the Department mainly concerned with decision-making would 
probably have tended to encourage homogeneity and continuity i n opinions and 
actions,, But other factors contributed to enhance t h i s tendency. Each Principal 
had an Assistant Principal responsible to him; since Assistant Principal was a 
t r a i n i n g grade, and a man i n t h i s position was not able to commit the Treasury to 
a course of action on his own authority, the two tended to work closely together. 
One contemporary, i t w i l l be remembered, was, as an Assistant Pr i n c i p a l , responsible 
to two Principals; he was given a room between the two occupied by his seniors,, 
with interconnecting doors to both rooms, and there was considerable and close 
contact between the Junior-and his- seniors. I t is", however, in t e r e s t i n g that 
as f a r as one can t e l l , t h i s close contact was confined to the professional 
(•Afif-jS WAS 
s i t u a t i o n . Certain clubs had several Treasury members, but^no strong tendency 
fo r nearly a l l , or large sections, to belong to one p a r t i c u l a r club, nor f o r them 
to belong to the same clubs as t h e i r Ministers. Nor i s there any suggestion from 
contemporaries that there was much social contact between o f f i c i a l s ; t h e i r homes 
tended to be i n many d i f f e r e n t areas, and what contact there was, was with the 
few o f f i c i a l s who l i v e d r e l a t i v e l y close. Organised Service a c t i v i t i e s only 
r e a l l y tended to get under way i n the l a t e r part of the inter-war period, although 
there was by the l a t e 'twenties a rambling club i n existence, which used occas-
i o n a l l y to meet Baldwin and Norman af t e r t h e i r tramp and go to Baldwin's home to 
sing madrigals. But apparently no 'shop! was talked even on those occasions. 
Within the Department, as we have seen, action tended to be taken at the 
lowest l e v e l consistent with the importance of the problem. Each Principal had 
his own area of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ; i t was the job of his Assistant to draft- w r i t t e n 
material on matters w i t h i n t h i s area, and f o r the Principal wherever possible to 
take the necessary steps himself i n the l i g h t of the evidence presented to him. 
This would of course include precedents f o r the question. Where a problem was a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t one, i t would be taken up with the appropriate Under 
Secretary, or i f r e a l l y serious i t might eventually reach the Controller, whose 
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i t was to see that matters of M i n i s t e r i a l concern did i n fa c t reach 
the Minister. Matters f o r decision might also be raised independently at any 
l e v e l ; problems were also presented to the o f f i c i a l s from Ministers f o r advice 
and information. Where matters of major policy importance were concerned, only 
the most senior o f f i c i a l s tended to be involved; t h i s seems to have been p a r t l y 
because the Treasury was very 'security-conscious' even at t h i s period. The one 
exception to t h i s seems to have been where the s t a f f of the Chancellor's Private 
Office were concerned; the Minister's Private Secretaries played a p i v o t a l role 
I n the network of o f f i c i a l relationships. 
The conservative bias i n the o f f i c i a l environment tended _to be-reinforced 
during the period from 1918 to 1925 by continuity of tenure of o f f i c e among the 
small number of o f f i c i a l s concerned with advising Ministers on matters of policy. 
A l l three men who held the post of Controller of Finance had been Treasury c i v i l 
servants f o r most of t h e i r working l i v e s , and one man., Sir Otto Niemeyer,- was 
successively Deputy Controller and Controller f o r s i x of the seven years of our 
study. For the same six years, another man, Sir Warren Fisher, held the post of 
Permanent Secretary, with ultimate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the work of the Treasury as 
a whole. I n addition, a single Private Secretary, Sir James C-ri.gg, served f i v e 
of the seven Chancellors of our period, that i s a l l except Bonar Law and Sir 
Austen Chamberlain.-
Treasury Opinion and Competence 
As might be expected from what has been said about the tr a i n i n g and experience 
of Treasury o f f i c i a l s , the main strand of thought i d e n t i f i a b l e i n our period i s 
t h e i r great concern with orthodox values, and the importance of h i s t o r i c a l 
precedent. This t r a d i t i o n also found some support i n the population as a whole, 
which was anxious to return to the apparent s t a b i l i t y and certainty of the pre-
1914- period, a desire echoed i n the popular American cry, 'baek to normalcy'. 
m i on 
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Nowhere i s the desire to return to pre-war s t a b i l i t y more evident than i n the 
Reports of the Gunliffe Committee. Sir John Bradbury, then j o i n t Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, made a major contribution to the form and content of 
the Reports. At the heart of the Committee's recommendations was the b e l i e f 
that the pre-war Gold Standard represented the only tenable way of regulating 
Britain's f i n a n c i a l relations with other countries. The analysis presented by 
the Committee of the way i n which the Gold Standard worked before the war f a i l e d 
to recognise the f a c t that an essential part of i t s smooth working was the position 
of London as the f i n a n c i a l centre of the world. The extent to which the European 
A l l i e s were indebted to -the United -States contributed to the r i s e i n importance 
of New York, as did the effects of the sale of B r i t i s h overseas assets during the 
war. Because they did not realise that the pre-war Gold Standard was essentially 
a. s t e r l i n g standard, they did not make s u f f i c i e n t allowance f o r the increasing 
importance of New York as a f i n a n c i a l centre, nor did they f u l l y appreciate the 
way i n which the changes brought about by the war would affect the working of the 
Gold Standard. 
I n the country as a whole, the desire to return to pre-war conditions found 
expression p r i m a r i l y i n the demand f o r a 'bonfire of controls'. I n i t i a l l y , there 
had been much anxiety about the p o s s i b i l i t y of high unemployment. when the Forces 
were demobilised, but as these fears were apparently seen to be groundless, the 
s i t u a t i o n changed, and more and more people became anxious- to be rid. as soon as 
possible of irksome Government interference I n t h e i r everyday l i v e s . The structure 
of control had grown up i n such a way that the l i n e of least resistance at the end 
of the war was simply to l e t them lapse, and t h i s was a major factor i.r: the speed 
with which the Government jettisoned i t s hold over the economy. This was a serious 
setback f o r those who, l i k e Addison, saw the period of reconstruction as an 
opportunity f o r using some of the control which the Government had amassed during 
the war period as a means of improving the l o t of the people i n peace-time. 
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The death-blow to these schemes was, however, dealt by the 'Economy' campaign 
of 1919, with whose aims the Treasury, anxious to re-establish i t s control over 
Government expenditure, completely concurred. I n the early part of 1919, the 
Treasury had found i t s e l f opposed by many men i n public l i f e , who f e l t that 
large sums of money were necessary to rebuild the economy, and to provide jobs 
and homes ' f i t f o r heroes'. As time went on, however, public opinion became 
increasingly anxious' about the levels of Government expenditure, led by an a n t i -
waste campaign directed by the popular newspapers. I n the spring of 19"! 9 , Lloyd 
George had advocated reconstruction with as much vigour as Addison; by the l a t e 
summer of that year, when the unemployment bogey had f o r the time being receded, 
he was being assisted by the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury i n carrying out 
a stringent economy campaign, i n which many treasured schemes of reconstruction, 
such as the creation of a Ministry of Supply, wex-e qu i e t l y shelved. Despite t h i s 
setback, Government involvement i n the economy continued to be at a higher l e v e l 
than before the war, and Government expenditure took about double the proportion 
of GNP which i t had expended before the war. I n the Treasury's anxiety to reduce, 
public expenditure, and i n pa r t i c u l a r i t s antipathy to the big new Departments set 
up during the war which were f e l t to be p a r t i c u l a r l y spendthrift, i t may be that 
another a t t i t u d e was involved besides that of the desire to re-establish Treasury 
control. I t may be that t h e i r resistance to movements i n the d i r e c t i o n of a mixed 
economy was p a r t l y due to a reluctance to allow t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l role I n the 
economy to change. This would go some way to explaining the lack of any sense of 
dir e c t i o n i n Treasury a c t i v i t i e s i n our period, or of any recognition of the 
impact upon the economy of Treasury actions. 
The speed and readiness with which controls were removed served to increase 
the problems which the Treasury experienced i n the f i e l d of debt redemption and 
monetary policy. I n t h i s f i e l d , the Treasury's task was made immeasurably more 
d i f f i c u l t by the improvident way i n which the war had. been financed, whereby 
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taxation had been expected to provide only s u f f i c i e n t revenue to cover normal 
peace-time expenditure, leaving the whole cost of the war to be financed from 
loans. This area i s another i n which the Treasury's predilection f o r 
following pre-war precedent i s evident, even when t h i s Involved pursuing confl-
i c t i n g strategies. The two main aims of Treasury policy here, pursued both f o r 
t h e i r own sake, and because i f carried out successfully would assist the return 
to the Gold Standard, were the funding and. repayment of the vast volume of 
Government debt as quickly as possible, and the maintenance of i n t e r e s t rates 
which would be competitive with those i n other centres, especially New York, 
This l a t t e r aim often led during the 'twenties to a-hlgher"level of" i n t e r e s t 
rates than would have seemed wise i f judged purely i n the l i g h t of the needs of 
the domestic economy. A further aim, which was l a r g e l y i n c o n f l i c t with the other-
two, was to keep the cost of Government borrowing as low as possible; throughout 
the early 'twenties, the volume of Treasury B i l l s which had regularly to be renewed 
was such that t h i s consideration had to take second place to the others'. Thus 
during t h i s period, once the p o t e n t i a l f o r Imposed controls over the money market 
had been gladly relinquished by the Treasury i n 1919, the authorities were to a 
large extent at the mercy of the market. But the payment and funding of the short-
term debt was an essential .prerequisite f o r regaining o f f i c i a l , control over money-
rates, a desirable thing i n any case, and essential before a return to the Gold 
Standard was attempted. 
Throughout the post-war period, the importance of a return to the Gold 
Standard bulked large i n the minds of the Treasury o f f i c i a l s . There was something 
almost moral about the fervour with which they pursued t h e i r goal; there was 
ce r t a i n l y an element of 'setting an example' to the rest of the world i n much 
of t h e i r w r i t i n g on the subject, as i f B r i t a i n had only to behave as though the 
world had remained unchanged since 1914 f o r t h i s to be sc. The question, of the 
Gold Standard was one with which the Treasury had not previously had to deal, 
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but i t was a, s i t u a t i o n i n which the desire to get back to pre-war s t a b i l i t y 
was s i g n i f i c a n t . This desire, coupled with and enhanced by the Treasury's 
preoccupation with h i s t o r i c a l precedent, tended to blin d the o f f i c i a l s to the 
changes which had taken place during the war. The lack of fac t u a l knowledge 
about the nature of these changes enabled the o f f i c i a l s to take less cognizance 
of the new s i t u a t i o n than was appropriate. They were in c l i n e d to- pursue t h e i r 
aim single-mindedly, even when the requirements of t h i s policy conflicted with 
the immediate needs of the domestic economy, This i s another example of the 
unwillingness of the Treasury to think i n terms of the impact of i t s actions upon 
the economy as a whole. But i t may also have some significance i n terms of the 
desire of the Treasury to return to i t s pre-war r o l e , as well as to previous policies 
For the Gold Standard was t r a d i t i o n a l l y the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Bank of England, 
One might have expected that, having gained control over so important an instrument 
i n the regulation of economic l i f e as the exchange rate, the Treasury would have 
made some e f f o r t to r e t a i n i t ; but there i s no evidence of tension of t h i s kind 
between the Treasury.and the Bank. This may at f i r s t seem surprising, but there 
appears to have been a well-understood separation of roles and i d e n t i t i e s between 
the two i n s t i t u t i o n s . Treasury o f f i c i a l s with pre-war experience seemed to regard 
the pre-war functions of the Bank which had been abrogated to the Treasury during 
the war as very temporary r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , to be restored to the Bank as soon as • 
was feasible, so that the Treasury could return to i t s normal peace-time r o l e . 
Among the aspects of Treasury policy which we have examined, the only point 
at which a Treasury o f f i c i a l suggested a major change i n policy, i n c o n f l i c t with 
many other i n f l u e n t i a l people, was the Blackett i n i t i a t i v e over i n t e r - A l l i e d 
debts. This i s a good example of an occasion when a Treasury o f f i c i a l , unencum-
bered by the weight of h i s t o r i c a l precedent or the overwhelming weight of informed 
opinion, put forward a policy which could have formed a basis f o r a viable solution 
fo r one of the most serious and intractable problems of the inter-war* period. I t 
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was. however, as f a r as can be seen, unique. Whether t h i s was because t h i s 
combination of circumstances, involving a lack of close h i s t o r i c a l precedents,, 
combined with a dearth of strongly-held i n f l u e n t i a l opinion, occurred only i n t h i s 
f i e l d , i s d i f f i c u l t to say. But i t may well be thought s i g n i f i c a n t that the only 
discoverable major contribution to a new policy i n i t i a t i v e by a member of the 
Treasury was i n an area where he had, so to speak, a clear f i e l d , , I t i s i n t e r -
esting to note, too, that the area concerned was that of i n t e r n a t i o n a l policy. 
For i f there was evidence of the Treasury breaking new ground i n the inter-war 
period, i t i s i n t h e i r increasing involvement, p a r t i c u l a r l y at the personal l e v e l , 
i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s : the careers of many of those mentioned i n t h i s study 
bear witness to t h i s . 
Thus a most s t r i k i n g aspect of Treasury policy i n our period i s the extent 
to which i t was dominated throughout by the overwhelming desire and need to return 
to the Gold Standard as soon as possible, at the pre-war rate of exchange. 
Wherever any major policy matter was discussed, the probable effe c t cn G-old 
Standard policy was a major f a c t o r . The conclusions of the Cunliffe Committee 
l a i d down i n uncompromising terms what every Treasury o f f i c i a l of note f e l t to- be 
the principles on which post-war monetary policy should be based, Every attempt 
during the early 'twenties to expand the economy and improve the employment 
s i t u a t i o n by a measure of what would nowadays be called r e f l a t i o n , was met with 
the sane objection, that i t might damage our prospects of returning to the Gold 
0 
Standard. 
But although t h i s aspect of policy i s v i t a l l y important, i t was i n f a c t 
part of an all-pervading a t t i t u d e i n the Treasury, that a f t e r the war i t would be 
possible and desirable to continue to behave, i n the economic sphere, i n the same 
way as before the war, despite the extent to which conditions had changed. This 
can be seen i n many of the policies advocated by the Treasury. The approach which 
i t took during the economy campaign i s one example. The opportunity to take 
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advantage of some of the beneficial aspects of war-time control was l o s t i n the 
hectic rush to r i d the economy of a l l controls as soon as the war was over. But 
t h i s attitude was simply a continuation of the previous peace-time la i s s e z - f a i r e 
approach to economic problems, and an i n t r i n s i c part of the e f f o r t s to reintroduce 
Treasury control. Similarly, the approach to the problem of the National Debt, 
was a continuation of the pre-war a t t i t u d e that funding and repayment were the 
only correct methods of dealing with the problem, despite the f a c t that the 
National. Debt had reached such proportions by the end of the war that to- fund and 
repay at the rate that most Treasury o f f i c i a l s would have l i k e d would have resulted 
i n severe d e f l a t i o n . Awareness -of- t h i s "problem was demonstrated by Blackett, but 
the evidence i s that he was alone among senior Treasury o f f i c i a l s i n having some-
awareness of the macro-economic implications of Treasury a c t i v i t y i n t h i s f i e l d . 
The Treasury O f f i c i a l s and t h e i r Ministers 
The t r a d i t i o n a l view of the decision-making process i n Government lays down 
that i t i s the c i v i l servant's duty to advise his Minister on matters which are 
the l a t t e r ! s concern, o.n which the Minister makes up his own mind,, and then goes 
to the Cabinet f o r discussion, and acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of his decision. What 
we have to consider i s the extent to which t h i s view represents the r e a l i t i e s , , 
rather than the form of the formulation of policy during our period. To some 
extent t h i s must be a function of the personalities involved, both, at the o f f i c i a l 
and M i n i s t e r i a l levels; but i t i s also related to the general character of the 
Treasury as a Department, and to outside influences, both general and personal, 
such as the weight carried by the Chancellor i n the Cabinet, the influence of 
public opinion, and so on. 
The importance of the influence of personality upon the relationship between 
Ministers and t h e i r o f f i c i a l s , , and the extent to which particular- Ministers' tended 
to go against o f f i c i a l advice or accept i t without demur, i s somewhat d i f f i c u l t 
i r n i 
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to establish. Several contemporaries have emphasised the importance of the 
personality of the Chancellor i n establishing the qu a l i t y of the relationship 
between himself and the officials„ Where a Chancellor was a man of strong 
personality, senior i n his party and experienced i n holding p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e , 
there seems l i t t l e doubt that he was able without great d i f f i c u l t y to establish 
his own ideas, and be i n that sense 'master i n his own house '•, and a l l the 
contemporaries consulted agree that t h i s i s the s i t u a t i o n which o f f i c i a l s prefer. 
However, i n the period from 1918 to 1 9 2 5 , a rather special set of circumstances 
presented themselves. There was considerable continuity among the o f f i c i a l s ; 
against t h i s , there was great-discontinuity among the Chancellors„ During the 
period there were seven Chancellors, many of them with l i t t l e or no experience of 
senior Cabinet r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The f i r s t two, Bonar Law and Austen Chamberlain, 
were considerably more senior and more experienced than t h e i r successors, but both 
had other r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r a great part of t h e i r period of office,- which tended 
to take them away from t h e i r Treasury duties a good deal. 
Thus during the years immediately after the war, policy-making w i t h i n the 
Treasury tended s t i l l to be concentrated i n the hands of a few senior o f f i c i a l s , 
whose t r a i n i n g and' method of working tended to reinforce the conservative t r a d -
i t i o n s inherent i n the atmosphere of the Treasury, The Ministers whom they advised 
tended to be i n o f f i c e f o r a short time, and to be inexperienced i n Cabinet o f f i c e 
and i n f i n a n c i a l a f f a i r s . Thus, while i t seems clear from the evidence of 
contemporaries that both the normal s i t u a t i o n , and that preferred by the o f f i c i a l s , 
was f o r the Chancellor to be 'the boss', i n our period the Chancellors were i n 
the main either distracted by outside duties or lacking i n experience, and the 
advice of Treasury o f f i c i a l s tended to be accepted without much opposition from 
Ministers, nor did those Ministers show much i n i t i a t i v e i n policy-making themselves„ 
However, i t would be wrong to suggest that i n t h e i r advocacy of t r a d i t i o n a l 
p o licies the Treasury o f f i c i a l s were encouraging t h e i r Ministers to take a 
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contentious view. On the whole, the attitudes of the Treasury reflected the 
orthodoxies of the period, and were i n agreement wi t h the opinions of most of 
the leading figures i n i n d u s t r i a l l i f e , i n the City of London, i n the 5serious 1 
press, and among academic economists. There was some, public opposition to d e f l a t -
ionary policies during the 'twenties, but i t did not become more than a 1respectable 
heresy 1, and none of those involved, except Keynes, was prepared to push t h e i r 
view to i t s l o g i c a l conclusion and c r i t i c i s e the p o l i c y of returning to the Gold 
Standard, which was a main reason f o r continuing deflationary p o l i c i e s long a f t e r 
the needs of the domestic economy were f o r quite d i f f e r e n t measures. 
The f i n a l l i n k i n the o f f i c i a l decisionmaking- process? that-between 
M i n i s t e r i a l recommendations and the adoption of such proposals as Government policy 
by the Cabinet, i s not easy to establish. One might have expected that an inexper-
ienced Chancellor might have undergone pressure both from his o f f i c i a l s to adhere 
to t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s , and from his Cabinet Colleagues, perhaps of a d i f f e r e n t 
nature. But one of the remarkable things about the period under review i s the 
extent to which v i t a l f i n a n c i a l decisions were taken, without the Cabinet being 
consulted at a l l . For instance, the decision to accept the Reports of the 
Cunliffe Committee was taken without consulting the Cabinet„ and there i s no 
evidence of the Chancellor having any informal consultations about the decision 
outside his own Department. Similarly, the decision to return to the Gold Standard 
was taken at a meeting at which the only p o l i t i c i a n s present were the Chancellor 
and the Prime Minister; the Cabinet was only t o l d formally as pari; of the discussion 
of the Budget proposals, on the day on which the Budget was to be presented in. 
the House. 
However, there i s l i t t l e evidence to suggest t h a t , had the Cabinet been 
consulted more frequently, the policy-making machinery would have been more 
capable of adapting to the changes which had taken place. The i n t e r - A l l i e d debt-
problem provides us with an interesting example of the i n a b i l i t y of the Cabinet 
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to react appropriately to changed conditions, even when the o f f i c i a l s and the 
Minister concerned were attempting to do so. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , unshackled by 
the chains of conventional ideas and h i s t o r i c a l precedent, the Controller of 
Finance was able to produce an o r i g i n a l and helpful solution to the problem,, 
only to be thwarted by the less imaginative and more vote-conscious members of 
the Cabinet. This policy may not have been the r i g h t one f o r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
problem, but i t at least had the appeal of an attempt to 'cut the gordian knot!„ 
I t s r e j e c t i o n , and the manner i n which i t was rejected, provide fur t h e r evidence 
of the extent to which the vast majority of people i n public l i f e , not j u s t 
Treasury o f f i c i a l s , were unable.to..widen-their-thinking-sufficiently to make any 
r e a l contribution to solving the economic problems of the period, and continued 
to be bound by t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s . 
The Role of the Tre asury 
I t seems clear that w i t h i n the Treasury during the post—war period, there was 
a strong tendency to accept and put forward solutions which had been successful 
i n the past i n the same or similar situations i n the past. This tendency was 
reinforced by the f a c t that these solutions were consistent with the t r a d i t i o n s 
of the Department, and that the t r a i n i n g and environment of the o f f i c i a l s 
encouraged them to seek such consistency. I n addition, the correctness of these 
orthodox solutions was apparently further endorsed by the way i n which they 
conformed to the views of outside opinion close to the Treasury, and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
to the recommendations of the Cunliffe Committee. The f a c t that t h i s Committee 
had examined, the problems of post-war f i n a n c i a l p o licy i n d e t a i l , and had, a f t e r 
considering and rej e c t i n g other possible courses of action, put forward j u s t those 
solutions which the Treasury believed from past experience would be the most 
successful, was a powerful reinforcement f o r t r a d i t i o n a l attitudes. On the whole, 
i t i s not unfair to say that, a f t e r the Cunliffe Reports had been accepted, B r i t i s h 
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f i n a n c i a l policy did not have any i d e n t i f i a b l e source; i t simply consisted of a 
series of reactions' to particular events and problems„ Conscious decisions were 
taken about particular.' actions, but general discussion about central ideas i n 
policy-making simply did not take place, except on rare occasions, such as 
Churchill's 'exercise' i n the spring of 1 9 2 5 . Unfortunately; while the problems 
to which the Treasury o f f i c i a l s were attempting to apply pre-war solutions 
appeared similar to situations which they had encountered before, conditions 
had i n fact changed to a remarkable degree. Not only did the Treasury's 
predilection f o r previously successful remedies blind i t to the changes wi t h i n 
i t s t r a d i t i o n a l areas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . "In "addition, the t r a i n i n g and experience 
of the o f f i c i a l s concerned helped to hide from them the extent to which the role 
of the State as a whole had changed, and encouraged them to continue to view 
particular problems and t h e i r solution i n i s o l a t i o n from the rest of the economy. 
In the f i e l d of inte r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a s d i s t i n c t from the specific position of 
B r i t a i n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economy, the Treasury recognised that conditions had 
changed to such an extent that greater international, co-operation was essential. 
But i t persisted i n believing that i t was possible f o r B r i t a i n to continue to behave 
as though her position i n the world, and the position of the State i n the B r i t i s h 
economy, were unaltered. 
Thus the advice which o f f i c i a l s gave to the Chancellor often tended to 
emphasise the appropriateness of one solution to a problem to the exclusion, or 
at least the denigration, of other possible courses. However, as we have seen, 
most of the Chancellors of the period were Inexperienced i n public finance and i n 
o f f i c e f o r a very short time. They do not seem to have resented, or even noticed, 
the lack of room f o r manoeuvre given to them by the way i n which Treasury advice-
was presented during t h i s period. Even Churchill did not persist with his 
criti c i s m s once the Treasury view on the Gold Standard had been explained to him 
i n d e t a i l , although he gradually grew bolder as his term of o f f i c e progressed. 
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For as f a r as we can determine, the Chancellors were largely i n agreement with 
t h e i r o f f i c i a l s over the fundamental principles of economic policy, as were the 
majority of t h e i r contemporaries i n p o l i t i c s , i n industry and i n the City, 
There are therefore three major cri t i c i s m s which can be made of Treasury 
attitudes during our period.,, F i r s t l y there was a lack of consideration of the 
extent to which conditions had changed w i t h i n the areas of f i n a n c i a l and economic 
policy with which they had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been concerned. Secondly, there was 
l i t t l e recognition either of the changes i n the role of the State i.n general, 
and the Treasury i n pa r t i c u l a r , or of the effec t of Treasury actions on the 
economy as a whole. Thirdly, and relat.ecL t o . t h i s l a s t point, there was l i t t l e " i n 
the way of long-term planning as a preliminary to action; apart from an almost 
blind f a i t h i n the Gold Standard, the restoration of which became an end i n i t s e l f , 
there was very l i t t l e sense of d i r e c t i o n i n the Treasury's actions during the post-
war years. 
Thus the role of the Treasury o f f i c i a l s i n the formation of economic policy 
during the period from 1918 to 1925 was to promulgate t h e i r considered views to 
the Chancellors whom they served. The measure of success which they achieved i n 
putting forward t h e i r ideas, of which the central theme was the restoration of the 
Gold Standard,, was due ultimately to the conjunction of events and the general 
climate of opinion. Despite the f a c t that pre-war experience was proving to be 
increasingly i r r e l e v a n t , the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c i e s were- endorsed because no-one 
i n a position of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y had any idea what else to do. 'Back to normalcy 5 
was not an a t t i t u d e confined to Treasury c i v i l servants; nor were they alone i n 
viewing the world of the 'twenties through the blinkers of the past. They were 
simply t y p i c a l of the public men of t h e i r time. However, f o r the Treasury, the 
urge to return to the s t a b i l i t y of the pre-war world had a special significance: 
i t was due not only to a desire to continue to carry out t r a d i t i o n a l policies,, but 
also to an anxiety to resume an e a r l i e r role i n the economy. 
354-. 
BIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX 
ON 
TREASURY OFFICIALS 
These biographical notes are intended to supplement the ir_formatior:. given 
about Treasury o f f i c i a l s mentioned i n the t e x t . The information i s r e a d i l y 
available i n the standard works of reference. 
Blackett, Sir Basil P h i l l o t t : 
Born i n 1 8 8 2 , the son of missionaries; his father was a clergyman. He 
went to Marlborough as- a Foundation Scholar, a f t e r his father died. He 
gained a F i r s t i n Classics at University College, Oxford i n 1904? and entered 
the Treasury af t e r coming top of the l i s t i n the C i v i l Service examinations. 
He was Secretary to the Royal Commission on Indian Currency during 191.3-14-j 
J.M. Keynes was a member "of t h i s "Commission. He went tb the United States"' 
twice on Treasury missions early i n the war, and was Treasury Representative 
i n Washington from 1917 to 1 9 1 9 . On his return to London, he was appointed 
Controller of Finance i n the Treasury. I n 1 9 2 2 , he went to India as Finance 
Member of the Viceroy's Council, and during his time i n India he made major 
reforms and .gained great personal prestige. On his r e t u r n i n 1928„ he l e f t 
the Treasury f o r international work on the Reparations Committee which drew 
up the Young plan i n 1 9 2 9 , and f o r work i n the City. He became a Director of 
the Bank of England i n 1 9 2 9 . The events of 1931 converted him -bo Keynsian 
ideas, and he wrote a book on planned money. He stood as an u n o f f i c i a l 
Conservative candidate f o r Parliament i n 1 9 3 2 , but f a i l e d to become elected. 
He died i n a car accident i n Germany i n 1937. 
Clubs: Oxford and Cambridge. 
Bradbury, John Swanwick, F i r s t Baron Bradbury: 
Born i n 1 8 7 2 , he was the only son of an o i l merchant. He was educated at 
Manchester Grammar School and Brasenose College, Oxford, where he gained a 
double F i r s t i n Classics and Modern History. He entered the Colonial Office 
i n 1896 , from where he was transferred to the Treasury. He was Asquith's 
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Private Secretary i n 1905 ; and became head of ID i n 1 9 0 8 . He was a member 
of the National Insurance Commission i n 1911? and on returning to the Treasury 
was made j o i n t Permanent Secretary i n 1 9 1 3 . One of his major achievements i n 
the early part of the war was the evolving of a system f o r issuing notes 
of small denominations, which became known as 'Bradburys 1, thus making his 
name a household word. I n 1919 he l e f t the Treasury to become B r i t i s h 
Delegate to the Reparations Commission, where he remained u n t i l he r e t i r e d i n 
1 9 2 5 . He undertook a number of Directorships i n the c i t y , and served on the 
MacMillan Committee on Finance and Industry from 1929 to 1 9 3 1 ; unable to 
- agree with his colleagues on the Committee, he -wrote a Minority Report, 
dissenting from t h e i r views.-
Club: United University. 
Chalmers, Robert, F i r s t Baron Chalmers of Northiam: 
Born i n Scotland i n 1 8 5 8 , he was educated at the City of London School. 
He gained degrees i n Classics and i n Biology while at Oriel College, Oxford, 
and entered the Treasury i n 1 8 8 2 . During his early years i n the Treasury 
he l i v e d I n the East End of London, working at St. Ju.de's, Whitechapel, and 
giving up a l l his spare time to social work. He was promoted to Assistant 
Secretary i n 1903 , and i n 1907 moved to the Inland Revenue, where he was 
Chairman u n t i l 1 9 1 1 . He then returned to the Treasury to be Permanent 
Secretary u n t i l 1 9 1 3 . when he went to Ceylon, to be the Governor there. 
He was not happy i n his new post, and returned to the Treasury i n 1 9 1 6 5 to 
be j o i n t Permanent Secretary with Bradbury and Sir Thomas Heath u n t i l the end 
of the war. After his retirement he returned to academic l i f e , and became 
Master of Peterhouse i n 1924-, where he remained u n t i l his death i n 19.31 0 
Club: United University. 
3 5 7 . 
Fisher, Sir Norman Fenwick Warren: 
Born i n 1 8 7 9 , the son of a gentleman of independent means, he was educated 
at Winchester and Hertford College, Oxford, where he gained a Second i n 
Classics. He entered the Inland Revenue i n 1 9 0 3 , and was Private Secretary 
to Chalmers, the Chairman, from 1907-1909= I n 1912 he was seconded to the 
National Insurance Commission, where he remained f o r two years. He returned 
to the Inland Revenue, and became Deputy Chairman i n 1914- and Chairman i n 
1 9 1 8 . I n the autumn of the following year, he moved to the Treasury to 
become Permanent Secretary, a post which he retained u n t i l his retirement 
I n 1939 . His Treasury-interests were confined i n the-main to Establishment 
problems. After leaving the Treasury, he spent the war as a C i v i l Defence 
Commissioner. 
Clubs: Athenaeum-, Brooke' s. 
Grigg, Rt. Hon. Sir Percy James: 
Born i n 1890 , he was the son of a boat-builder, who set up i n business on 
his own so that his eldest son could have the education his talents merited. 
He was educated at Bournemouth School and St. John's College, Cambridge, 
where he gained a F i r s t i n Mathematics i n 1 9 1 3 . He entered the Treasury, tet 
I n 1915 , he joined the armed forces and served throughout the war. He 
returned to the Treasury i n 1918 , and i n 1921 became Private Secretary to 
Sir Robert Home on his becoming Chancellor. For the next nine years he was 
Private Secretary to f i v e successive Chancellors. I n 1930 he l e f t the Treasury 
to become Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise, from which post he moved 
after a few months to be Chairman of the Inland Revenue. I n 1934- he went to 
India as Finance Member of the Indian Government, returning i n 1939 to become 
Under Secretary of State f o r War; i n 1 9 4 2 , he was made Secretary of State f o r 
War. After the war he l e f t p o l i t i c s f o r business. 
Club; Athenaeum. 
3 5 8 . 
Hawtrey, Sir Ralph: 
Born i n '1879, he was educated at Eton and T r i n i t y College , Cambridge „ He 
entered the Admiralty i n 1903? and transferred to the Treasury the following 
year„ I n 1919 he became Director of the Financial Enquiries Division, which 
was part of the Finance Department. He retained t h i s post u n t i l his r e t i r e -
ment i n 194-5. His many publications, the f i r s t of which appeared i n 1913 
and the l a t e s t i n 1 9 6 7 , included Currency and Credit ( 1 9 1 9 ) , Trade and Credit 
( 1 9 2 9 ) , A Century of Bank Rate ( 1 9 3 8 ) , and many others. 
Club: United University. 
Leith-Ross, Sir Frederick: 
Born i n 1 8 8 7 , he was educated at the Merchant Taylors' School and B a l l i o l 
College, Oxford, where he gained a F i r s t i n Classics i n 1 9 0 9 s and entered 
the Treasury i n the same year. He was Private Secretary to Asquith from 
1911 to 1913 , and returned to normal Treasury duties i n the Finance Division 
u n t i l 1920 . He was B r i t i s h Representative on the Finance Beard of the 
Reparations Commission from 1920 u n t i l 1925? when he returned to England, 
to become Deputy Controller of Finance. I n 1932 he became Chief Economic 
Adviser to His Majesty's Government, where he remained u n t i l his retirement 
i n 194-6. During t h i s time he represented Great B r i t a i n at numerous in t e r n a t -
ional conferences and similar gatherings. 
Club: Athenaeum. 
Ma-Fad ye an, Sir Andrews 
Born i n 1 8 8 7 , he went to University College School and then to University 
College, Oxford. He gained, a F i r s t i n Classics i n 1 9 0 9 s and joined the 
Treasury the following year. He was Private Secretary to several Chancellors 
and Financial Secretaries, including Baldwin. I n 1919 he went to Paris as 
Treasury Representative, and. thereafter his Treasury career was spent almost 
359 e 
e n t i r e l y overseas. From 1920 u n t i l 1922 he was Secretary to the B r i t i s h 
Delegation to the Reparations Commission.;, where he came in t o constant 
contact with Bradbury. He then became General Secretary to the Reparations 
Commission, on secondment, u n t i l 1924-, and was Commissioner f o r Controlled 
Revenues i n Berli n from 1924- u n t i l 1 9 3 0 . On his return to England I n 1 9 3 0 , 
he decided against returning to the Treasury, and devoted his time to 
business and p o l i t i c s , where he was f o r many years the mainstay of Liberal 
Party organisation. 
Club s Travellers'. 
Niemeyer, Sir Otto Ernst: 
Born i n 1 8 8 3 , he was educated at St. Paul's School and B a l l i o l College 
Oxford. He entered the Treasury i n 1 9 0 6 , and was made Controller of Finance 
i n 1 9 2 2 , having been Blackett's Deputy Controller since the reorganisation 
of 1 9 1 9 . He remained i n his new post u n t i l 1 9 2 7 , when he l e f t the Treasury 
fo r work i n int e r n a t i o n a l finance. He was a member of the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations from 1922 to 1 9 3 7 . After he l e f t the 
Treasury, he undertook a series of f i n a n c i a l missions: to Australia and 
New Zealand i n 1 9 3 0 , to B r a z i l i n 193T, to Argentine i n 1933 , to India i n 
1935 , and to China i n 194-1. He was a Director of the Bank of England from 
1938 u n t i l 1 9 5 2 , and of the Bank f o r International Settlements from 1931 
to 1965 . 
Club: Reform. 
P h i l l i p s , Sir Frederick: 
Born i n 1884-, he was educated at Haberdasher's Aske's and Emmanuel College 3 
Cambridge. He gained a double F i r s t i n Mathematics and Natural Sciences, 
and entered the Treasury i n 1 9 0 8 . He spent a l l his working l i f e i n the 
Whitehall Treasury, being promoted to Assistant Secretary i n 1919 and to 
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Principal Assistant Secretary i n 1 9 2 7 . I n 1940 he was Chairman of the 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations. 
Clubs: United University, Reform. 
Rowe-Dutton, Sir Ernests 
Born i n 1 8 9 1 , he entered the Treasury i n 1919 , a f t e r transferring from 
the Inland Revenue, where he spent the war year's. He accompanied Baldwin 
and Norman on the Funding Mission to Washington i n 1923 , and spent much of 
his career abroad; from 1928 to 1932 he was Treasury representative i n 
Ber l i n , and from 1934 to 1939 he was Financial Adviser to the B r i t i s h 
Embassy i n Paris. ~ - - - -
Clubs Union. 
I t i s in t e r e s t i n g to note, f o r purposes of comparison, that of the seven 
Chancellors of the period 1918 to 1925 , only one, Snowden, did not attend a 
Public School, and four went to Harrow or Rugby. As to Clubs, of those mentioned 
f o r the Treasury C i v i l Servants, the Athenaeum.- also counted among i t s members" 
Baldwin, Churchill and Neville Chamberlain; Austen Chamberlain and Baldwin 
belonged to the United University, and Baldwin also to the Travellers'„ 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
TABLE 1 
Total government income and expenditure 
Figures i n £ m i l l i o n 
Total Gross- Total Gross 
Income Expenditure 
1921 1,426.0 1,188.1 
1922 1,124.9 1,070.1 
1923 914.0 812.5 
1924 837.2 - - ' • - 748.8 
1925 799.4 750.8 
1926 812.1 776.1 
1927 805.7 782.4 
1928 8 4 2 . 4 773.6 
1929 836.4 760,5 
1930 815.0 781.7 
1931 857.8 814.2 
1932 851.5 818.6 
1933 827.0 833.0 
193-4 809.4 770.5 
1935 804.6 784.7 
1936 844.8 829.4 
1937 896.6 889.1 
1938 948.7 909.3 
Source: Mi t c h e l l & Deane, Abstract .ofLJjrjLtish H i s t o r i c a l 
S t a t i s t i c s , pp. 395 , 39.8 , 4 0 0 . 
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TABLE 2-
Bank Rate. 1919-25 
Month and Year of Change New Rate 
November 1919 6% (from % ) 
A p r i l 1920 1% 
A p r i l 1921 6 ^ 
June 1921 6% ' 
July 1921. 5 ^ 
November 1921 5% 
February 1922 J^> 
A p r i l 1922 1$ 
July 1 9 2 2 3% 
July 1 9 2 3 A% 
February 1 9 2 5 5% 
Source: The Economist (London? 1919-1925) 
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TABLE .3 
Floating Debt of the U.K. Government 
1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 5 
(Monthly Averages of Weekly Figures) 
(£ m.) 
Bank Depart- Bank Depart-
Ways mental Treasury Total Ways mental Treasury Total and Ways B i l l s and Ways B i l l s 
Means and 
Means 
Means and 
Means 
1 9 1 9 1 9 2 2 
Jan. 1 0 9 5 . 8 1 5 0 8 Mar. — 1 3 0 . 3 9 0 7 . 5 1 0 3 8 
Feb. 1 0 0 6 . 2 1 3 8 8 Apr. 7 . 9 1 8 0 . 1 7 8 7 . 8 9 7 6 
Mar. 9 5 8 . 9 1 4 0 6 . May - 6 . 5 - 1 6 9 - . 1 - 7 7 2 . 1 " 9 4 8 
Apr.- - 2 3 1 „ 9 2 3 8 . 7 " 9 8 2 . 7 1 4 5 3 June 1 5 . 0 1 6 8 . 0 7 9 2 . 6 9 7 6 
May 2 2 6 . 3 2 3 8 . 5 1 0 1 8 . 6 1 4 8 3 July 1 . 2 1 6 6 . 2 7 6 8 . 4 9 3 4 
June 4 3 3 . 6 2 4 4 . 6 8 7 4 . 9 1 5 3 1 Aug. - 1 5 9 . 0 7 2 6 . 1 8 8 5 
July 5 1 3 . 8 2 2 3 . 3 6 7 0 . 9 1 4 0 8 Sept. 2 . 3 1 5 3 . 9 7 1 6 . 2 8 7 2 
Aug. 1 9 1 . 2 2 0 9 . 2 7 8 7 . 3 1 1 8 7 Oct. 6 . 7 1 8 0 . 6 7 3 4 . 9 9 2 2 
Sept. 1 7 4 . 4 1 8 9 . 8 8 6 3 . 9 1 2 2 8 .'Nov. — 1 7 7 . 8 7 3 8 . 3 9 1 6 
Oct. 1 2 1 . 3 1 8 9 . 6 9 8 3 . 8 1 2 9 5 ;Dec„ 8 . 8 2 0 6 . 3 7 3 1 . 2 9 4 6 
Nov. 3 2 . 0 1 8 3 . 0 1 0 8 5 . 1 1 3 0 0 1 9 2 3 
Dec. 4 5 . 8 1 9 0 . 2 1 1 0 9 . 8 1 3 4 5 Jan. 9 . 6 2 0 6 . 9 7 1 3 . 5 9 3 0 
1 9 2 0 |Feb. — 1 7 3 . 9 7 0 9 . 2 8 8 3 
Jan. 2 8 . 8 1 8 0 . 5 1 2 0 1 . 5 1 4 1 1 Mar. 0 . 3 1 7 8 . 3 6 4 2 . 9 8 2 1 
Feb. 2 8 . 3 1 6 8 . 8 1 0 9 5 . 1 1 2 9 2 Apr. — 1 9 9 . 9 6 0 2 . 4 8 0 2 
Mar. 8 . 9 1 7 5 . 5 1 0 6 8 . 0 1 2 5 2 May - 1 9 4 . 3 5 8 8 . 7 7 8 3 
Apr. 4 5 * 0 2 0 6 . 7 1 0 4 9 . 4 1 3 0 1 : June 3 . 5 2 0 2 . 4 6 0 8 . 8 8 1 5 
May 2 7 . 2 1 9 9 . 7 1 0 6 0 . 1 1 2 8 7 July 0 . 8 2 0 7 . 9 6 0 0 . 1 8 0 9 
June 5 4 . 3 1 7 4 . 6 1 0 6 9 . 1 1 2 9 8 Aug. 1 . 3 1 9 6 . 8 5 9 8 . 6 7 9 7 
July 4 1 . 1 1 6 7 . 5 1 0 6 7 . 4 1 2 7 0 Sept. 1 . 8 1 8 4 . 6 6 2 0 . 6 8 1 7 
Aug. 4 1 . 2 1 5 8 . 4 1 0 5 5 . 7 1 1 5 5 Oct. 1 . 6 1 7 9 . 2 6 3 3 . 6 8 1 4 
Sept. 3 0 . 1 . 1 4 8 . 2 1 0 8 9 . 2 1 2 6 7 Nov. 0 . 6 1 6 8 . 6 6 4 0 . 7 8 1 0 
Oct. 5 9 . 8 1 7 5 . 9 1 0 7 8 . 0 1 3 1 4 Dec. 6 . 8 1 9 7 . 0 6 4 8 . 4 8 4 7 
Nov. 4 9 . 4 1 8 9 . 3 1 0 9 1 . 2 1 3 3 0 1 9 2 4 -
Dec. 6 3 . 1 2 1 1 . 3 1 1 2 4 . 5 1 3 9 9 Jan. 2 . 0 1 9 0 . 7 6 4 9 . 2 8 4 2 
1 9 2 1 Feb. 1 . 2 1 7 6 . 9 6 4 1 . 3 8 1 9 
Jan. 3 3 . 8 2 0 6 . 9 1 1 5 2 . 0 1 3 9 3 Mar. — 1 8 6 . 4 5 9 4 . 3 7 8 1 
Feb. 2 0 . 7 1 9 9 . 7 1 1 2 1 . 5 1 3 4 2 Apr. — 2 0 8 . 8 5 5 4 . 2 7 6 3 
Mar. 4 . 8 1 6 9 . 5 1 0 9 8 . 3 1 2 7 3 May 1 . 0 1 9 1 . 0 5 5 6 . 9 7 4 9 
Apr. 1 1 . 9 1 7 5 . 4 1 1 0 2 . 6 1 2 9 0 June 1 1 . 8 1 9 5 . 6 5 8 4 . 3 7 9 2 
May 1 5 . 5 1 6 4 . 3 1 1 2 8 . 9 1 3 0 9 July 1 . 3 1 9 4 . 2 5 9 4 . 7 7 9 0 
June 3 8 . 5 1 3 2 . 0 1 1 9 8 . 9 1 3 6 9 Aug. — 1 8 1 . 8 5 9 4 . 7 7 7 7 
July 2 8 . 7 1 2 2 . 6 1 2 0 8 . 5 1 3 6 0 Sept. 0 . 9 1 7 4 . 1 6 0 1 . 1 7 7 5 
Aug. 2 7 . 6 1 4 1 . 4 1 1 8 3 . 9 1 3 5 3 Oct. 3 . 4 1 7 6 . 1 6 1 2 . 3 7 9 2 
Sept. 3 5 . 3 1 5 2 . 5 1 1 5 6 . 4 1 3 4 4 Nov. 0 . 4 1 7 2 . 1 6 1 8 . 8 7 9 1 
Oct. 5 2 . 2 1 5 9 . 0 1 1 3 8 . 7 1 3 5 0 Dec. 9 . 8 1 8 9 . 6 6 3 5 . 0 8 3 4 
Nov. 1 0 . 8 1 8 6 . 7 1 1 1 6 . 7 1 3 1 4 1 9 2 5 
Dec. 1 6 . 1 1 8 9 . 6 1 0 8 4 . 8 1 2 9 1 Jan. 3 . 2 1 6 8 . 8 6 4 2 . 1 8 1 3 
1 9 2 2 Feb. — 1 6 7 . 0 6 0 9 . 7 7 7 7 
Jan. 6 . 5 1 4 6 . 1 1 0 5 7 . 9 1 2 1 1 Mar. — 1 7 7 . 7 5 7 1 . 5 7 4 9 
Feb. 6 . 4 1 2 6 . 1 9 8 3 . 7 1 1 1 6 
Source: Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 2 5 . p . 1 4 7 . 
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TABLE 4 
Composition of the National Debt, 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 1 
Type of Security- Outstanding 
on 3 1 . 3 . 1 4 
Outstanding 
on 3 1 . 3 . 1 9 
Net addnSo 
during 
f i n a n c i a l 
y r . 1 9 1 9 / 2 0 
Funded debt 5 8 6 0 7 3 1 7 . 6 - 2 . 7 
Cap„ v a l . of terminable 
annuities 2 9 o 6 2 0 . 6 - 1 . 3 
3 § # War Loan 1 9 2 5 - 8 - 6 2 . 7 -
Ai% War Loan 1 9 2 5 - 4 - 5 - 1 4 - . 3 - 1 . 5 
% War Loan 1 9 2 9 - 4 - 7 - 2 0 1 1 . 5 - 3 4 . 7 
U% War Loan 1 9 2 9 - 4 - 2 - 5 6 . 3 - 7 . 8 
IS Funding Loan 1 9 6 0 - 9 0 - - 4 0 8 . 9 
3 g / £ Conversion Loan - - -
l&0> Conversion Loan 1 9 4 0 - 4 - - -
U% Victory Bonds - 3 5 9 . 5 
Exchequer Bonds 2 0 . 5 3 8 3 . 7 - 6 5 . 1 
National War Bonds - 1 6 3 6 . 2 - 1 6 0 . 4 
Treasury Bonds - - -
War Savings Certificates - 2 2 7 . 0 4 6 . 6 
Treasury B i l l s 1 3 o 0 : 9 5 7 . 2 1 5 0 . 1 
Ways and Means Advances - 4 5 5 . 0 - 2 5 0 . 1 
Total Internal Debt " : 6 4 9 0 8 : 6 1 4 - 2 . 1 4 5 7 . 1 
Source: E . V o Morgan, Studies i n B r i t i s h Financial Policy 1 9 1 4 - - 1 9 2 
(London: Macmillan & Co O J 1 9 5 2 ) p . 1 0 7 . 
- 3 U -
. TABLE 5 
Summary of Total Sums of In t e r n a l Debt Maturing 
1 9 2 1 - 2 to 1 9 2 9 - 3 0 
Financial Year Total i n £ m i l l i o n 
1 9 2 1 - 2 1 0 4 J 
1 9 2 2 - 3 2 3 3 o 7 
1 9 2 3 - 4 - 3 7 9 o 0 
1 9 2 4 - - 5 1 6 0 . 9 
1 9 2 5 - 6 " ~ 2 9 o 9 
1 9 2 6 - 7 
1 9 2 7 - 8 2 9 8 . 7 
1 9 2 8 - 9 5 5 4 . 5 
1 9 2 9 - 3 0 1 5 o 6 
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